Friday 8 April 2016

Whether prosecution can be quashed against accused due to long pendency of said prosecution?

 Nothing material has been brought in the notice of this Court
that delay in framing charge is caused by the petitioner. Thus, keeping
the case pending for indefinite period amounts to violation of
constitutional rights of the petitioner recognized under Article 21 of
the Constitution of India. Moreover, a case could not have been
registered against the petitioner only on the basis of disclosure
statement of co-accused without any supporting material.
Thus, keeping in view the dictum of the Supreme Court in the
case of Vakil Prasad (Supra) and of this Court in Kamal Kapoor
(Supra), case FIR no. 719/96 registered at PS-Mangol Puri, New
Delhi, for the offences punishable under Sections 468/471/120B/34
IPC and the consequential proceedings thereto pending before the
Trial Court are hereby quashed qua the petitioner.
 IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Judgment delivered on: 29th March, 2016
 CRL.M.C. 770/2016
JOGINDER SINGH 
Versus
THE STATE (NCT OF DELHI) ..

CORAM:
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SURESH KAIT
Dated;MARCH 29, 2016



1. By way of the present petition filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C.,
petitioner seeks directions thereby quashing of FIR no. 719/96
registered at PS-Mangol Puri, Delhi for the offences punishable under
Sections 468/471/120B/34 IPC and the consequential proceedings
thereto pending before the Trial Court.
2. The brief facts of the case are that on 02.07.1996, complainant
ASI Ramesh Kumar posted in Special Staff, North West District,
Delhi was performing his duty at the barricade at outer ring road
Police Post near Kali Mandir, Delhi. At that time, he received a secret
information about plying of a stolen car. On receiving the
information, he stopped Maruti Esteemed Car bearing no. HR-14-
1477A, which was being driven by one Daljit Singh and asked him to
produce documents of the Car. Accordingly, the documents wereCrl.M.C.No.770/2016 
produced, but on suspicion the said vehicle was seized under Section
102 Cr.P.C. vide D.D. No.7. However, on verification of the
documents, it was found that the documents were forged and
consequently FIR No. 719/96 was registered on 02.07.1996 against
Daljit Singh for the offences punishable under Sections
468/471/120B/34 IPC.
3. On completion of investigation, police filed the chargesheet
before the Trial Court on 12.06.1998 against Joginder Singh
(petitioner herein), Daljit Singh, Kuldeep Singh and Mohd. Akram,
however, till date, the charges have not been framed.
4. Ld. Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner submits that
in the aforesaid case, police has roped four accused persons and the
petitioner was arrested on the disclosure of Daljeet Singh that he took
the financed Maruti Car No. DL-4C-CJ-9621 for a sum of
Rs.1,10,000/- from the petitioner and he had to sell the same in
Shillong by preparing a forged temporary no. HR-14-1503A from
Jhajjar Authority.
5. Ld. Counsel further submits that accused Daljeet Singh, who
made a disclosure statement against the petitioner had already expired
and other two accused persons have been declared as proclaimed
offenders. Thus, none has been attending the proceedings before the
Trial Court except the petitioner. Seventeen years have already been
passed. However, till date, even the charges have not been framed.
Moreover, no recovery was effected from the petitioner. Crl.M.C.No.770/2016
6. To strengthen his arguments, ld. Counsel for the petitioner has
relied upon a case of Vakil Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar AIR 2009
SC 1822, wherein the Supreme Court observed as under:
“16. Tested on the touchstone of the broad principles
enumerated above, we are convinced that in the present
case appellant's constitutional right recognised under
Article 21 of the Constitution stands violated. It is
manifest from the facts narrated above that in the first
instance investigations were conducted by an officer, who
had no jurisdiction to do so and the appellant cannot be
accused of delaying the trial merely because he
successfully exercised his right to challenge an illegal
investigation. Be that as it may, admittedly the High Court
vide its order dated 7th September, 1990 had directed the
prosecution to complete the investigation within a period
of three months from the date of the said order but nothing
happened till 27th February, 2007 when, after receipt of
notice in the second petition preferred by the appellant
complaining about delay in investigation, the
Superintendent of Police, Muzaffarpur directed the
Deputy Superintendent of Police to complete the
investigation. It was only thereafter that a fresh
chargesheet is stated to have been filed on 1st May, 2007.
It is also pertinent to note that even till date, learned
Counsel for the State is not sure whether a sanction for
prosecuting the appellant is required and if so, whether it
has been granted or not. We have no hesitation in holding
that at least for the period from 7th December, 1990 till
28th February, 2007 there is no explanation whatsoever
for the delay in investigation. Even the direction issued by
the High Court seems to have had no effect on the
prosecution and they slept over the matter for almost
seventeen years. Nothing could be pointed out by the
State, far from being established to show that the delay in
investigation or trial was in any way attributable to the
appellant. The prosecution has failed to show any
exceptional circumstance which could possibly be taken
into consideration for condoning a callous and inordinate
delay of more than two decades in investigations and the
trial. The said delay cannot, in any way, be said to be Crl.M.C.No.770/2016 
arising from any default on the part of the appellant.
Thus, on facts in hand, in our opinion, the stated delay
clearly violates the constitutional guarantee of a speedy
investigation and trial under Article 21 of the
Constitution. We feel that under these circumstances,
further continuance of criminal proceedings, pending
against the appellant in the court of Special Judge,
Muzaffarpur, is unwarranted and despite the fact that
allegations against him are quite serious, they deserve to
be quashed.”
7. Ld. Counsel for the petitioner further submits that the case
against the petitioner ought not to have been registered simply on the
disclosure statement of Daljeet Singh, until and unless recovery is
effected from the petitioner. In similar circumstances, this Court had
quashed the proceedings in the case of Kamal Kapoor v. State
Through Delhi Administration 1997 Cri LJ 2106.
8. In the present case, person who made the disclosure statement
and pursuant to which case was registered against the petitioner had
already been expired and the other two accused had been declared
proclaimed offenders. Moreover, name of the petitioner was disclosed
pursuant to FIR no. 253/1996 registered at PS-Nabi Karim for the
offences punishable under Section 379/411/34 IPC, wherein the
petitioner has already been acquitted vide order dated 04.08.2001. In
such eventuality, the case against the petitioner may be quashed.
9. On the other hand, ld. APP appearing on behalf of the State
submits that chargesheet was filed on 12.06.1998 and thereafter the
matter was adjourned as some of the accused either not appeared or
declared proclaimed offenders and thus till date, the charges have not
been framed. Crl.M.C.No.770/2016
10. Ld. APP further submits that it is a fact that the petitioner was
arrested on the disclosure statement of co-accused Daljeet Singh, who
expired and proceedings qua him were abetted on 01.08.2003.
However, during investigation, the said Daljeet Singh disclosed that he
had purchased Maruti Car No. DL 4 C CJ 9621 from the petitioner and
upon verification, it was revealed that the said car was stolen from the
area of PS-Nabi Karim and in this regard case FIR no. 253/1996 under
Section 379 IPC was registered against the petitioner.
11. Ld. APP further submits that charges could not be framed due to
the various reasons, viz., for non-appearance of accused persons,
non-appearance of Investigating Officer, non-availability of ld. APP
concerned, non-availability of ld. Counsel for the accused, ld.
Presiding Officer being on leave, heavy rush of work with the ld.
Presiding Officer etc. The framing of charges also got delayed due to
the reasons that accused Mohd. Akram and Kuldeep Singh were
declared as proclaimed offenders and the case had to be abated against
accused Daljeet Singh due to his death.
12. The fact remains that petitioner was roped in the present case on
the disclosure statement of Daljeet Singh, who had already expired
and no recovery was effected from the petitioner in the present case.
Moreover, petitioner has already been acquitted in the case FIR no.
253/96 registered at PS-Nabi Karim for offence punishable under
Section 379/411/34 IPC. The petitioner is facing the trial since 1998
although there is no delay on his part. More than 17 years have
already been passed. 
13. Nothing material has been brought in the notice of this Court
that delay in framing charge is caused by the petitioner. Thus, keeping
the case pending for indefinite period amounts to violation of
constitutional rights of the petitioner recognized under Article 21 of
the Constitution of India. Moreover, a case could not have been
registered against the petitioner only on the basis of disclosure
statement of co-accused without any supporting material.
14. Thus, keeping in view the dictum of the Supreme Court in the
case of Vakil Prasad (Supra) and of this Court in Kamal Kapoor
(Supra), case FIR no. 719/96 registered at PS-Mangol Puri, New
Delhi, for the offences punishable under Sections 468/471/120B/34
IPC and the consequential proceedings thereto pending before the
Trial Court are hereby quashed qua the petitioner.
15. Accordingly, the petition is allowed.
16. Dasti.
 SURESH KAIT
 (JUDGE)
MARCH 29, 2016

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