How is the doctrine of merger and precedent attracted in the case of Judgment passed by the Supreme court?

 (b) We reiterate the conclusions relevant for these cases as under:

"(iv) An order refusing special leave to appeal may be a non-speaking order or a speaking one. In either case it does not attract the doctrine of merger. An order refusing special leave to appeal does not stand substituted in place of the order under challenge. All that it means is that the Court was not inclined to exercise its discretion so as to allow the appeal being filed.

(v) If the order refusing leave to appeal is a speaking order, i.e., gives reasons for refusing the grant of leave, then the order has two implications. Firstly, the statement of law contained in the order is a declaration of law by the Supreme Court within the meaning of Article 141 of the Constitution. Secondly, other than the declaration of law, whatever is stated in the order are the findings recorded by the Supreme Court which would bind the parties thereto and also the court, tribunal or authority in any proceedings subsequent thereto by way of judicial discipline, the Supreme Court being the Apex Court of the country. But, this does not amount to saying that the order of the court, tribunal or authority below has stood merged in the order of the Supreme Court rejecting the special leave petition or that the order of the Supreme Court is the only order binding as res judicata in subsequent proceedings between the parties.

(vi) Once leave to appeal has been granted and appellate jurisdiction of Supreme Court has been invoked the order passed in appeal would attract the doctrine of merger; the order may be of reversal, modification or merely affirmation.

(vii) On an appeal having been preferred or a petition seeking leave to appeal having been converted into an appeal before the Supreme Court the jurisdiction of High  Court to entertain a review petition is lost thereafter as provided by sub-rule (1) of Rule 1 of Order 47 CPC.”

Supreme Court of India

Khoday Distilleries Ltd. (Now ... vs Sri Mahadeshwara Sahakara ... on 1 March, 2019

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Whether single judge of high court can grant certificate of fitness to appeal to Supreme Court?

 Before we consider the merits of the case, it is apposite to deal with one question which though arises, was not argued by pointing out the relevant provisions governing the question.

17. As mentioned above, this appeal is filed on a certificate granted by the High Court (Single Judge) on the oral application made by the Appellant immediately after the pronouncement of the impugned judgment as provided Under Article 134-A of the Constitution. The order granting certificate is a part of the impugned judgment in its concluding Para which reads thus:

Learned Counsel for the Respondent seeks leave of this Court to prefer an appeal against this judgment.

Accordingly, leave is granted."

18. What is the true interpretation of Articles 133 and 134-A of the Constitution and who can grant the certificate of fitness to appeal to the Supreme Court remains no more res integra. It is settled by the decision of this Court in State Bank of India and Anr. v. S.B.I. Employees' Union and Anr. MANU/SC/0146/1987 : 1987 (4) SCC 370.

19. The facts of this case and the one involved in the SBI case (supra) are somewhat similar wherein Their Lordships examined the issue as to whether the certificate granted by the High Court (Single Judge) satisfied the requirements contained in Articles 133 and 134-A. Justice Venkataramiah (as His Lordship then was and later became CJI) speaking for the Bench held thus:

2. The certificate contemplated Under Article 134-A of the Constitution can only be a certificate which is referred to in Clause (1) of Article 132 or in Clause (1) of Article 133 or in Sub-clause (c) of Clause (1) of Article 134 of the Constitution. This is quite obvious from the language of Article 134-A of the Constitution. This case does not fall either Under Article 132(1) or under Sub-clause (c) of Article 134(1) as it neither involves a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution nor it is a criminal proceeding. It can only fall, if at all, Under Article 133(1) of the Constitution. Article 133 of the Constitution reads thus:

133. (1) An appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court from any judgment, decree or final order in a civil proceeding of a High Court in the territory of India if the High Court certifies Under Article 134-A--

(a) that the case involves a substantial question of law of general importance; and

(b) that in the opinion of the High Court the said question needs to be decided by the Supreme Court.

(2) Notwithstanding anything in Article 132, any party appealing to the Supreme Court under Clause (1) may urge as one of the grounds in such appeal that a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of this Constitution has been wrongly decided.

(3) Notwithstanding anything in this article, no appeal shall, unless Parliament by law otherwise provides, lie to the Supreme Court from the judgment, decree or final order of one judge of a High Court.

3. Clause (3) of Article 133 says that notwithstanding anything in that Article no appeal shall, unless Parliament by law otherwise provides, lie to the Supreme Court from the judgment, decree or final order of one judge of the High Court. Before the introduction of Article 134-A of the Constitution by the Forty-fourth Amendment of the Constitution there was no express provision in Articles 132, 133 and 134 of the Constitution regarding the time and manner in which an application for a certificate under any of those articles could be made before the High Court. There was also a doubt as to the power of the High Court to issue a certificate suo motu under any of those articles. Article 134-A was enacted to make good the said deficiencies. Article 134-A does not constitute an independent provision under which a certificate can be issued. It is ancillary to Article 132(1), Article 133(1) and Article 134(1)(c) of the Constitution. That is the reason for the use of words "if the High Court certifies Under Article 134-A" in Article 132(1) and Article 133(1) and for the use of the words certifies Under Article 134-A in Article 134(1)(c). The High Court can issue a certificate only when it is satisfied that the conditions in Article 132 or Article 133 or Article 134 of the Constitution as the case may be are satisfied. In the instant case such a certificate could not have been issued by reason of Clause (3) of Article 133 of the Constitution by the learned Single Judge.

4. The fact that in a similar case a certificate had been issued by a Division Bench of the High Court consisting of two judges in a case decided by the Division Bench did not empower the Single Judge to issue the certificate Under Article 133(1) of the Constitution in a case decided by him. The restriction placed by Clause (3) of Article 133 of the Constitution could not be got over by relying upon the order of the Division Bench.

5. We, therefore, revoke the certificate. This petition of appeal may, however, be treated as a special leave petition Under Article 136 of the Constitution and posted for preliminary hearing.
20. In our considered opinion, the law laid down in S.B.I. case (supra) would squarely apply to the case at hand because in the instant case also, the impugned judgment and the certificate of fitness to file an appeal was passed by the Single Judge of the High Court.

21. As held in S.B.I. case, such certificate/leave could not have been issued/granted by the Single Judge by reason of Clause (3) of Article 133 of the Constitution. In other words, the Single Judge of the High Court had no jurisdiction to grant certificate in the light of restrictions contained in Clause (3) of Article 133 of the Constitution.

22. We, therefore, revoke the certificate granted by the Single Judge of the High Court. However, this appeal is treated as a special leave petition Under Article 136 of the Constitution as was done by this Court in S.B.I. case (supra). Leave is accordingly granted.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 5817 of 2012

Decided On: 13.04.2017

 Agnigundala Venkata Ranga Rao Vs.  Indukuru Ramachandra Reddy (dead) by L.Rs. and Ors.

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How to ascertain locus standi of third party to file appeal under Article 136 of constitution?

Further, it is
pertinent here to observe that it may not be possible
to strictly enumerate as to who all will have locus
to maintain an appeal before this Court invoking
Article 136 of the Constitution of India, it depends
upon the factual matrix of each case, as each case
has its unique set of facts. It is clear from the
aforementioned case law that the Court should be
liberal in allowing any third party, having bonafide
connection with the matter, to maintain the appeal
with a view to advance substantial justice. However,
this power of allowing a third party to maintain an
appeal should be exercised with due care and caution.
Persons, unconnected with the matter under
consideration or having personal grievance against
the accused should be checked. A strict vigilance is
required to be maintained in this regard.
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 299 OF 2016

AMANULLAH AND ANR  Vs. STATE OF BIHAR AND ORS. 

V.GOPALA GOWDA, J.
Citation:2016 ALLSCR (CRI)763:(2016) 6 SCC 699

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When special leave petition is not maintainable?

 It has to be understood that the Court has evolved and formulated a principle that if the basic judgment is not assailed and the challenge is only to the order passed in review, this Court is obliged not to entertain such special leave petition. The said principle has gained the authoritative status and has been treated as a precedential principle for more than two decades and we are disposed to think that there is hardly any necessity not to be guided by the said precedent. 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 2687 of 2006

Decided On: 22.01.2016

Appellants: Bussa Overseas and Properties (P) Ltd. and Ors.
Vs.
Respondent: Union of India (UOI) and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:Dipak Misra and Shiva Kirti Singh, JJ.

Citation:(2016) 4 SCC 696

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Whether private party in criminal case can file appeal before supreme court as per Article 136 of constitution?

 Further, this Court in the case of Ramakant
Rai’s case (supra) has held thus:
“12. A doubt has been raised about the
competence of a private party as
distinguished from the State, to invoke the
jurisdiction of this Court under Article 136
of the Constitution of India, 1950 (in short
“the Constitution”) against a judgment of
acquittal by the High Court. We do not see
any substance in the doubt. The appellate
power vested in this Court under Article 136
of the Constitution is not to be confused
with the ordinary appellate power exercised
by appellate courts and Appellate Tribunals
under specific statutes. It is a plenary
power, “exercisable outside the purview of
ordinary law” to meet the pressing demands of
justice (see Durga Shankar Mehta v. Raghuraj
Singh). Article 136 of the Constitution
neither confers on anyone the right to invoke
the jurisdiction of this Court nor inhibits
anyone from invoking the Court’s
jurisdiction. The power is vested in this
Court but the right to invoke the Court’s
jurisdiction is vested in no one. The
exercise of the power of this Court is not
circumscribed by any limitation as to who may
invoke it. Where a judgment of acquittal by
the High Court has led to a serious
miscarriage of justice, this Court cannot
refrain from doing its duty and abstain from
interfering on the ground that a private
party and not the State has invoked the
Court’s jurisdiction. We do not have
slightest doubt that we can entertain appeals
against judgments of acquittal by the High
Court at the instance of interested private
parties also. The circumstance that the
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (in short “the
Code”) does not provide for an appeal to the
High Court against an order of acquittal by a
subordinate court, at the instance of a
private party, has no relevance to the
question of the power of this Court under
Article 136. We may mention that in Mohan Lal
v. Ajit Singh this Court interfered with a
judgment of acquittal by the High Court at
the instance of a private party. An
apprehension was expressed that if appeals
against judgments of acquittal at the
instance of private parties are permitted
there may be a flood of appeals. We do not
share the apprehension. Appeals under Article
136 of the Constitution are entertained by
special leave granted by this Court, whether
it is the State or a private party that
invokes the jurisdiction of this Court, and
special leave is not granted as a matter of
course but only for good and sufficient
reasons, on well-established practice of this
Court.”
In Esher Singh’s case (supra), it has been held by
this Court that Article 136 of the Constitution of
India neither confers on anyone the right to invoke
the jurisdiction of this Court nor inhibits anyone
from invoking it. The relevant para 29 of the case
reads thus:
“29. A doubt has been raised in many cases
about the competence of a private party as
distinguished from the State, to invoke the
jurisdiction of this Court under Article 136 of
the Constitution against a judgment of
acquittal by the High Court. We do not see any
substance in the doubt. The appellate power
vested in this Court under Article 136 of the
Constitution is not to be confused with
ordinary appellate power exercised by appellate
courts and appellate tribunals under specific
statutes. It is a plenary power “exercisable
outside the purview of ordinary law” to meet
the pressing demands of justice. (See Durga
Shankar Mehta v. Raghuraj Singh.) Article 136
of the Constitution neither confers on anyone
the right to invoke the jurisdiction of this
Court nor inhibits anyone from invoking the
Court’s jurisdiction. The power is vested in
this Court but the right to invoke the Court’s
jurisdiction is vested in no one. The exercise
of the power of this Court is not circumscribed
by any limitation as to who may invoke it.
Where a judgment of acquittal by the High Court
has led to a serious miscarriage of justice,
this Court cannot refrain from doing its duty
and abstain from interfering on the ground that
a private party and not the State has invoked
the Court’s jurisdiction. We do not have the
slightest doubt that we can entertain appeals
against judgments of acquittal by the High
Court at the instance of interested private parties also. The circumstance that the Code
does not provide for an appeal to the High
Court against an order of acquittal by a
subordinate court, at the instance of a private
party, has no relevance to the question of the
power of this Court under Article 136. We may
mention that in Mohan Lal v. Ajit Singh this
Court interfered with a judgment of acquittal
by the High Court at the instance of a private
party. An apprehension was expressed that if
appeals against judgments of acquittal at the
instance of private parties are permitted,
there may be a flood of appeals. We do not
share the apprehension. Appeals under Article
136 of the Constitution are entertained by
special leave granted by this Court, whether it
is the State or a private party that invokes
the jurisdiction of this Court, and special
leave is not granted as a matter of course but
only for good and sufficient reasons, well
established by the practice of this Court.”
 (emphasis supplied by this Court)
Further, in Rama Kant Verma’s case (supra) this Court
has reiterated the aforesaid view that the appellate
power of this Court under Article 136 of the
Constitution of India is not just an ordinary
appellate power exercised by appellate courts and
appellate tribunals under specific statutes. It is a
plenary power which can be exercised outside the
purview of ordinary law to meet the ends of justice.

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 299 OF 2016
(Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.2866 of 2011)
AMANULLAH
Vs.
STATE OF BIHAR 

V.GOPALA GOWDA, J.
Dated;12th April, 2016
Citation:2016 ALL SCR (CRI)763

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When supreme court would grant special leave to appeal?

Article"136. (1) Notwithstanding anything in this Chapter, the Supreme Court may, in its discretion,grant special leave to appeal from any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order in any cause or matter passed or made by any court or tribunal in the territory of India, (2)....................

The points to be noted in regard to this article are firstly, that it is very general and is not confined merely to criminal cases, as is evident from the words "appeal from any judgment, decree, sentence or order" which occur therein and which obviously cover a wide range of matters; secondly, that the words used in this article are "in any cause or matter," while those used in articles 132 to 134 are "civil, criminal or other proceeding," and thirdly, that while in articles 132 to 134 reference is made to appeals from the High Courts, under this article, an appeal will lie from any court or tribunal in the territory of India. On a careful examination of article 136 along with the preceding article, it seems clear that the wide discretion- ary power with which this Court is invested under it is to be exercised sparingly and in exceptional cases on13,, and as far as possible a more or less uniform standard should be adopted in granting special leave in the wide range of matters which can come up before it under this article. By virtue of this article, we can grant special leave in civil cases, in criminal cases, in income-tax cases, in cases which come up before different kinds of tribunals and in a variety of other cases. The only uniform standard which in our opinion can be laid down in the circumstances is that Court should grant special leave to appeal only in those cases where special circumstances are shown to exist. The Privy Council have tried to lay down from time to time certain principles for granting special leave in criminal cases, which were reviewed by the Federal Court in Kapildeo v. The King. It is sufficient for our purpose to say that though we are not bound to follow them too rigidly since the reasons, constitutional and administrative, which sometimes weighed with the Privy Council, need not weigh with us, yet some of those principles are useful as furnishing in many cases a sound basis for invoking the discretion of this Court in granting special leave. Generally speaking, this Court will not grant special leave, unless it is shown that exceptional and special circumstances exist, that substantial and grave injustice has been done.

Supreme Court of India

Pritam Singh vs The State on 5 May, 1950

Equivalent citations: 1950 AIR 169, 1950 SCR 453

Bench: Fazal Ali, Saiyid, Sastri, M. Patanjali, Mahajan, Mehr Chand, Mukherjea, B.K., Das, Sudhi Ranjan

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Special leave petition would be granted where approach of court whose judgment is under appeal is wrong in law

Petition for leave would be granted where approach of the court whose judgment is under appeal is wrong in law;
 To be fair to Mr. Choudhary, learned Counsel for the respondent, we must notice that his claim that all these are findings of fact not normally open in our jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution must meet with disapproval from us because the whole approach of the High Court and the Subordinate Judge in fixing liability of the appellant was erroneous in law and facts had to be viewed in the right perspective. Even if the facts be taken to have been settled, they at best lead to an inference that the conduct of the appellant was not of a submissive tenant. We reject this contention.

Supreme Court of India

Munisami Naidu vs C. Ranganathan on 30 October, 1990

Equivalent citations: AIR 1991 SC 492, (1991) 1 MLJ 42 SC, (1991) 2 SCC 139

Bench: M Punchhi, S Agrawal

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