Delhi HC: The object of Section 24 of HMA is to avoid vagrancy but it is not meant to equalize the income of the wife with that of the husband

 It is settled that object of Section 24 of HMA is to avoid vagrancy but it is not meant to equalize the income of the wife with that of the husband. A co-ordinate Bench of this Court has observed in K.N. v. {Para 16}

“12. The provisions of this section are not meant to equalize the income of the wife with that of the husband but are only to see that when divorce or other matrimonial proceedings are filed, either of the party should not suffer because of paucity of source of income and the maintenance is then granted to tie over the litigation expenses and to provide a comfortable life to the spouse. Where, however, both the spouses are earning and have a good salary, merely because there is some salary difference cannot be a reason for seeking maintenance.”

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI 

  MAT.APP.(F.C.) 109/2022

 MEENAKSHI BATRA  Vs  VIJAY KUMAR BATRA 

CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE VIVEK CHAUDHARY HON’BLE MS. JUSTICE RENU BHATNAGAR

Dated: 08.10.2026.

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Delhi HC: Whether wife is entitled to get maintenance if her expenses are more than her recurring income?

The appellant has relied upon her monthly expenditure, which according to her affidavit is approximately Rs. 1,16,150/-, apart from litigation expenses. The mere assertion of an expenditure figure, however, cannot be treated as conclusive. Section 24 requires the Court to determine the reasonable needs of the applicant. The assessment necessarily has to take into account the age of the parties, their present circumstances, their established standard of living, their medical requirements, residential expenses and other genuine necessities. {Para 21}

22. The fact that a particular expenditure has been disclosed in an affidavit does not make the expenditure, by itself, an expenditure which the other spouse is statutorily liable to fund. The Court has to distinguish between expenses which are necessary for reasonable support and expenses which represent discretionary expenditure or a manner of deployment of one's resources which cannot automatically be fastened upon the other spouse.

 The fact that the appellant’s disclosed expenditure exceeds her recurring income cannot, by itself, lead to the conclusion that she is entitled to maintenance under Section 24. The expenditure claimed must first be assessed for reasonableness.Section 24 is intended to secure reasonable support and the necessary expenses of litigation; it does not contemplate reimbursement of every item of expenditure disclosed by the claimant irrespective of its nature or necessity.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI 

  MAT.APP.(F.C.) 109/2022

 MEENAKSHI BATRA  Vs  VIJAY KUMAR BATRA 

CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE VIVEK CHAUDHARY HON’BLE MS. JUSTICE RENU BHATNAGAR

Dated: 08.10.2026.

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Retirement corpus can't be treated as monthly income for maintenance, Delhi High Court clarifies in matrimonial dispute

 In considering these assets, a distinction has to be made between the retirement corpus and the income generated from that corpus. The retirement corpus is accumulated capital. It cannot, merely because it is substantial, be treated as if it were a monthly income. A retired person cannot be expected to consume his or her retirement savings merely for the reason that such savings exist. At the same time, where the retirement savings are invested and generate interest or other returns, such recurring returns are income and have to be considered. The question before the Court is, therefore, not whether the appellant has a substantial retirement corpus, but whether she has sufficient recurring income and financial resources to meet her reasonable needs. {Para 18}

19. The Family Court, while considering the appellant’s financial position, placed considerable reliance upon her retiral benefits and investments. To that extent, the approach requires some clarification. The entire retiral corpus cannot be treated as recurring monthly income. What can be taken into account as income is the interest or other return actually generated from those investments.

20. However, the existence of a retirement corpus is not completely irrelevant. It forms part of the overall financial circumstances of the appellant. The Court is entitled to consider the financial resources available to her while deciding whether she is in a position to support herself. What the Court cannot do is to treat the corpus itself as though it were a recurring salary.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI 

  MAT.APP.(F.C.) 109/2022

 MEENAKSHI BATRA  Vs  VIJAY KUMAR BATRA 

CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE VIVEK CHAUDHARY HON’BLE MS. JUSTICE RENU BHATNAGAR

Dated: 08.10.2026

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Supreme Court: Whether appellate court must hear accused on the point of sentence while convicting him after setting aside order of his acquittal?

It can be seen from Section 386(a), Code of Criminal Procedure, that where in an appeal from an order of acquittal, the court hearing the appeal finds the Accused guilty it is required to pass a sentence on him according to law. {Para 13}

14. In Kumar Exports v. Sharma Carpets   MANU/SC/8414/2008 : 2008:INSC:1437, this Court interpreting Section 386(a), Code of Criminal Procedure, while holding that appellate court ought not, after recording conviction, remit the matter to the trial court and that the appellate court is obligated to impose an appropriate sentence, held as under:

26. This Court has also noticed a strange and very disturbing feature of the case. The High Court, after convicting the Appellant Under Section 138 of the Act, remitted the matter to the learned Magistrate for passing appropriate order of sentence. This course, adopted by the learned Single Judge, is unknown to law. The learned Single Judge was hearing an appeal from an order of acquittal. The powers of the appellate court, in an appeal from an order of acquittal, are enumerated in Section 386(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Those powers do not contemplate that an appellate court, after recording conviction, can remit the matter to the trial court for passing appropriate order of sentence. The judicial function of imposing appropriate sentence can be performed only by the appellate court when it reverses the order of acquittal and not by any other court. Having regard to the scheme of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 this Court is of the view that after finding the Appellant guilty Under Section 138 of the Act, the judicial discretion of imposing appropriate sentence could not have been abdicated by the learned Single Judge in favour of the learned Magistrate. Having found the Appellant guilty Under Section 138 of the Act it was the bounden duty of the High Court to impose appropriate sentence commensurate with the facts of the case. Therefore, we do not approve or accept the procedure adopted by the High Court. Be that as it may, in this case, we have found that reversal of acquittal itself was not justified.

[Emphasis supplied]

15. Not only should the appellate court not remand the matter to the trial court only for the purpose of imposing a sentence, after it finds Accused guilty, it has a bounden duty to hear and impose an appropriate sentence.

16. The appellate court which will include the High Court, in a given scenario, while recording a conviction after reversing the acquittal, should adjourn the matter to a suitable date, hear the convicts, and impose an appropriate sentence itself.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 1432 of 2019

Decided On: 08.10.2026

Ramkrushna Prahllad Dongardive Vs. The State of Maharashtra

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Ujjal Bhuyan and A.S. Chandurkar, JJ.

Author: A.S. Chandurkar, J.

Citation: MANU/SC/1143/2026,2026 INSC 1099.

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