Supreme Court: Court's Permission Needed To Arrest Accused For Offence Added After Grant Of Bail

 34. In such circumstances referred to above, we arrive at

following conclusions in respect of a circumstance whereafter

the grant of bail to an accused, further cognizable and nonbailable

offences are added:-

(i) The accused can surrender and apply for bail for newly

added cognizable and non-bailable offences. In the event of

refusal of bail, the accused can certainly be arrested.

(ii) The investigating agency can seek order from the court

under Sections 437(5) or 439(2) of Cr.P.C. respectively for

arrest of the accused and his custody.

(iii) The Court, in exercise of its power under Sections

437(5) or 439(2) of Cr.P.C. respectively, can direct for

taking into custody the accused who has already been granted

bail after cancellation of his bail. The Court in exercise of

its power under Section 437(5) as well as Section 439(2)

respectively can direct the person who has already been

granted bail to be arrested and commit him to custody on

addition of graver and non-cognizable offences which may not

be necessary always with order of cancelling of earlier bail.

(iv) In a case where an accused has already been granted bail,

the investigating authority on addition of an offence or

offences may not proceed to arrest the accused, but for

arresting the accused on such addition of offence or offences

it needs to obtain an order to arrest the accused from the

Court which had granted the bail.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2026

(Arising out of SLP(Crl.)No.1536/2026)

SUMIT  Vs STATE OF U P & ANR. 

Coram: J.B.PARDIWALA & K.V.VISWANATHAN, J.J.

Citation: 2026 INSC 145.

Dated: 09TH FEBRUARY 2026

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Supreme Court: Absconding Accused Not Entitled To Anticipatory Bail On Sole Ground Of Co-Accused' Acquittal

Although the aforesaid case dealt with quashing of the

proceedings entirely, the rationale applied therein can be

instrumental in the present case, for the reason that the High

Court, by way of the Impugned Order, granted anticipatory bail

to the Accused solely based on the fact that the prosecution failed

to produce any cogent evidence proving the involvement of the

accused persons named in the Subject FIR, in the alleged offence.

The High Court also took note of certain findings recorded in

favour of the Accused by the trial Court in its judgment dated

24.06.2023 acquitting the co-accused. However, the said

consideration is completely erroneous and perverse in an

anticipatory bail application, especially when the Accused had

been absconding for about 6 years and made a mockery of the

judicial process. In view of such circumstances, the Accused

cannot be permitted to encash on the acquittal of the co-accused

persons. Further, the High Court failed to consider that any

finding recorded by the trial Court either against or in favour of

the absconding Accused is wholly irrelevant for the purpose of

deciding the bail application as the prosecution was not required

to produce any evidence against the absconding Accused during

the trial of the co-accused persons, in view of the judgment in

Moosa (supra). {Para 49}

50. It is apposite to mention that granting the relief of anticipatory bail to an absconding accused person sets a bad precedent and sends a message that the law-abiding co-accused persons who stood trial, were wrong to diligently attend the process of trial and further, incentivises people to evade the process of law with impunity.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO…………………………OF 2026

(ARISING OUT OF SLP (CRIMINAL) NO. 15349 OF 2024)

BALMUKUND SINGH GAUTAM Vs STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND ANR.

Author: VIJAY BISHNOI, J.

Citation: 2026 INSC 157

DATED: 13th FEBRUARY, 2026.

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Supreme Court: The 6-month statutory "cooling-off" period for mutual consent divorce can be waived if there is zero possibility of reconciliation.

As rightly submitted by

the learned counsel appearing for the parties, the

decision in Amardeep Singh (supra) has been taken

note of, and explained by this Court in Amit Kumar

v. Suman Beniwal – (2023) 17 SCC 648. Paras 18 to 21

of the same states as follows:

“18. Where there is a chance of

reconciliation, however slight, the cooling

period of six months from the date of

filing of the divorce petition should be

enforced. However, if there is no

possibility of reconciliation, it would be

meaningless to prolong the agony of the

parties to the marriage. Thus, if the

marriage has broken down irretrievably, the

spouses have been living apart for a long

time, but not been able to reconcile their

differences and have mutually decided to

part, it is better to end the marriage, to

enable both the spouses to move on with

life.

21. The Family Court, as well as the High

Court, have misconstrued the judgment of

this Court in Amardeep Singh v. Harveen

Kaur (supra) and proceeded on the basis

that this Court has held that the

conditions specified in para 19 of the said

judgment, quoted hereinabove, are mandatory

and that the statutory waiting period of

six months under Section 13-B(2) can only

be waived if all the aforesaid conditions

are fulfilled, including, in particular,

the condition of separation of at least

one-and-half year’s before making the

motion for decree of divorce.”

When the parties have taken a conscious decision

to seek a decree of divorce by mutual consent under

Section 13B of the Act, there is no point in keeping

the marriage continuing. 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO . 80 1 /202 6

[@ SLP [C] NO.3775/2026]

MISHA SOMANI  Vs RITURAJ SOMANI 

Dated: FEBRUARY 02, 2026.

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Supreme Court: The Magistrate recording S 164 CRPC statement is usually summoned only if the defence challenges the manner of recording/voluntariness, or to clarify disputed aspects of compliance

PW-3 and PW-4 have deposed that they were under threat

from the concerned Investigating Officer who was present along

with them before the Magistrate. The concerned Investigating

Officer has been examined as PW-8 in the present case and

during his examination, there is not even a suggestion from the

appellants to the effect that he was present along with PW-3 and

PW-4 at the time of recording their statement under Section 164

or to the effect that he had threatened them to give incriminating

statements against the appellants. Furthermore, the concerned

Magistrate could have been examined as a witness in the present

matter to clear the controversy on this aspect and for unexplained reasons, he was never called for examination especially when a completely hostile version was being provided by the witnesses qua the proceedings which were conducted before him. The appellants failed to place any material on record to justify the allegation of threat and as discussed above, the statements of PW-3 and PW-4 recorded under Section 164 CrPC reflected the correct version of the events that transpired on the fateful day. {para 30}

Ratio: The Magistrate is usually summoned only if the defence challenges the manner of recording/voluntariness, or to clarify disputed aspects of compliance (warning, voluntariness, memorandum, etc.). 

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 122 OF 2013

VIJAYA SINGH & ANR. Vs STATE OF UTTARAKHAND 

Author: SATISH CHANDRA SHARMA, J.

Citation: 2024 INSC 905

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