Saturday, 21 March 2026

MCOCA Charges Added After Bail? A Practical Roadmap for Sessions Judges

 When MCOCA is invoked mid‑stream in a case where the accused is already on bail, three issues arise together: jurisdiction, the fate of existing bail, and the correct form of the Sessions Court’s order. This article consolidates the law from Supreme Court and High Court decisions into a single, practitioner‑oriented guide.

Jurisdiction: Sessions Court Is Immediately Divested

Section 6 of the Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime Act, 1999 provides that “every offence punishable under this Act shall be triable only by the Special Court within whose local jurisdiction it was committed…” This “only by the Special Court” language, read with Section 5, creates exclusive jurisdiction in the notified MCOCA Special Court; no other criminal court can assume such jurisdiction.

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Supreme Court Clarifies: Default Bail Pleas Can Be Decided Independently of Ritu Chhabaria case

The Supreme Court on Friday clarified that its interim order which directed that any application filed before any court seeking default bail on the basis of Ritu Chhabaria v. Union of India And Ors. should be deferred, shall not preclude any trial courts or High Courts from considering applications for grant of default bail independent of and without relying on the judgement in Ritu Chhabaria. IRitu Chhabaria, a two-judge bench of the Supreme Court had held that a chargesheet filed on the basis of an incomplete investigation, though filed within time, will not defeat the right of an accused to seek default bail. 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal Crl. No. 5724/2023, 

Date of Order: 12.05.2023

Directorate of Enforcement Vs. Manpreet Singh Talwar

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, C.J.I., Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and J.B. Pardiwala, JJ.

Citation: MANU/SCOR/68550/2023.

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Supreme Court: Under which circumstances, Creditor making phone call to the debtor for return of his money will not amount to abetment to Suicide?

The only basis on which the charge-sheet has been

laid against the accused is the suicide note

coupled with the call detail records which indicate

that 40 phone calls were made by the appellant to

the deceased in last six months. As far as the

suicide note is concerned, we find that it lacks

material particulars regarding the nature of those

threats and the time and place when those threats

were extended. Moreover, the suicide note indicts

as many as 9 accused without specifying the role of

any one of them. It is not the case of the

prosecution that all accused belong to one family

or were harassing the deceased as a group. Further,

the deceased has painted all creditors with one

brush. Therefore, a trial based on such a suicide

note would be a futile exercise. Besides, if a

creditor makes a phone call to the debtor for

return of his money that being a lawful act, it

cannot on its own constitute a ground to prosecute

the creditor. Moreover, the deceased may have

committed suicide on account of depression for not

being able to clear of the debt.

14. In such circumstances, particularly when

there is no material to indicate that the deceased

was beaten or physically assaulted to return the

dues, we are of the view that there is hardly any

material on basis whereof it could be inferred that

the appellant by demanding his dues abetted

commission of suicide by the deceased. In our view,

therefore, the continuance of the proceedings

against the appellant would be a futile exercise

and would amount to abuse of the process of the

Court. Hence, to secure the ends of justice, it is

necessary that the same be quashed.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Criminal Appeal No(s). /2026

SLP (Crl.) No(s). 4644/2025

DHIRUBHAI NANJIBHAI PATEL LOTWALA  Vs STATE OF GUJARAT & ANR. 

Dated: March 10, 2026

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Supreme Court: Under which circumstances, the high court or Session court should not release the accused on bail only on the ground that offence is triable by JMFC?

 At this stage, we may note that one of the grounds that weighed with the High Court was that the offences against Respondent No. 1 were triable by a Magistrate. However, the High Court overlooked the fact that the offences now alleged against Respondent No. 1 include offences Under Section 409 Indian Penal Code and Section 467 Indian Penal Code also. Significantly, the punishment for offences under these provisions can extend to imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term up to ten years. Similarly, some of the other offences for which Respondent No. 1 has been hauled up for entail a possible sentence of imprisonment over three years. {Para 12}


13. Under Section 29 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 19732, a Magistrate of First Class can pass a sentence of imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years, while a Chief Judicial Magistrate may pass a sentence of imprisonment, excepting imprisonment for a term exceeding seven years or a sentence of death or imprisonment for life. A Metropolitan Magistrate has the same powers as a Magistrate of First Class while a Chief Metropolitan Magistrate is equivalent to a Chief Judicial Magistrate.


14. In that view of the matter, it would always be open to a Magistrate, if he is of the opinion that any of the offences in the case are exclusively triable by a Court of Sessions, to commit the case to a Court of Sessions Under Section 209 Code of Criminal Procedure or Section 323 Code of Criminal Procedure. It may be noted that Under Section 323 Code of Criminal Procedure, such power can be exercised by the Magistrate even during the course of the trial. Therefore, the assumption of the High Court that the case on hand is triable by a Magistrate is premature.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 957 of 2026 

Decided On: 17.02.2026

Rakesh Mittal Vs. Ajay Pal Gupta and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

P.V. Sanjay Kumar and K. Vinod Chandran, JJ.

Author: P.V. Sanjay Kumar, J.

Citation: 2026 INSC 161, MANU/SC/0164/2026.

Read full judgment here: Click here.

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