Supreme Court: Surviving Partner In Mutual Suicide Pact Liable For Abetment

 SURVIVING PARTNER IN A MUTUAL SUICIDE PACT IS LEGALLY CULPABLE

117. Notwithstanding the culpability of the act of purchasing pesticide, the Accused’s participation in a suicide pact renders him culpable under Section 107 IPC. A suicide pact involves mutual encouragement and reciprocal commitment to die together. The survivor’s presence and participation acts as a direct catalyst for the deceased’s actions. It is pertinent to mention that abetting as defined under Section 107 IPC is not limited to physical act of supplying means to commit suicide. Accordingly, any psychological assurance or instigation, as long as the same is intentional and directly related to the commission of offence, also constitutes abetment.

118. This Court is of the view that it is the reciprocal commitment of each party to commit suicide which provides necessary impetus/support to the other to go through with the act. In a suicide pact, it is implicit that each participant knows the intent of the other to commit the act knowing that their withdrawal from the pact will likely deter the other. Each party’s resolve to commit the act is, therefore, reinforced and strengthened due to the participation of the other party. Suicide in a suicide pact is conditional upon mutual participation of the other. In other words, if not for the active participation of both the parties, the act would not occur. The law treats such conduct as abetment because the State has a fundamental interest in preserving life. Any assistance in ending life is treated as a crime against the State.

119. Consequently, this Court holds that the accused’s conduct in entering into and acting upon the suicide pact falls squarely within all the three situations envisaged in Section 107 of the IPC. His participation directly facilitated the deceased’s suicide. Notably, it is not his defence that the deceased was the dominant personality who pressured him into the pact. His culpability therefore stands established.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 457 OF 2012

GUDIPALLI SIDDHARTHA REDDY Vs  STATE C.B.I.

Author: MANMOHAN, J.

Citation: 2026 INSC 160.

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Supreme Court: Disclosure Statements Made U/S 27 Evidence Act outside Police Custody Not Admissible

 Now we come to the recovery allegedly made Under Section 27, which is also fraught with inconsistencies as we would presently indicate. The memorandum Under Section 27 of the Evidence Act produced as Ex. P4 indicates the same having been drawn up on 13.10.2018 at 10.30 A.M. The only admissible portion in the said memorandum is: 'I will show you the place... where her bones and ashes are and the place where her skull and bones were..'(sic). The police were led by the Accused first to a field from where bones with ashes were recovered at 10.55 A.M evidenced by Property Seizure Memo Ex.P5. The canal was searched by three fishermen PW 3 to PW 5 who recovered the skull with 8 numbers of tooth of the upper jaw and a piece of bone wrapped in a green color saree, all of which showed evidence of burning as indicated in Ex.P3 Property Seizure Memo at 13.00 on 13.10.2018. Though the recoveries as per Exts. P3 & P5 Memos were made, in accordance with the confession statement of the Accused, Ext. P4 at 10.30 on 13.10.2018, the Arrest/Court Surrender Memo produced at Ex.P27, indicates the arrest of the Accused having been made on 13.10.2018 at 22.00 hrs. Section 27 of the Evidence Act clearly speaks of information received from a person Accused of any offence while in the custody of the police leading to a discovery of a fact being enabled of proof in the trial. The Accused at the time of the statement was not in the custody of the police and hence it is removed from the ambit of Section 27. {Para 10}

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 689 of 2026 

Decided On: 17.02.2026

Rohit Jangde Vs. The State of Chhattisgarh

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

P.V. Sanjay Kumar and K. Vinod Chandran, JJ.

Author: K. Vinod Chandran, J.

Citation:  MANU/SC/0159/2026.

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Bombay HC: Under which circumstances it is mandatory for police to produce accused before nearest Magistrate within 24 hours of arrest?

 We are unable to agree with the submissions of the learned APP that the Petitioner was arrested on 17/06/2025 at 06:45 p.m. The Affidavit of the Investigating Agency itself shows that he was taken in custody at 10:00 p.m. on 16/06/2025. From that point onwards, he was always in the custody of the Police Officers and therefore, it cannot be said that he was not arrested at 10:00 p.m. on 16/06/2025 but was arrested only at 06:45 p.m. on 17/06/2025. Therefore, Shri. Rokade, learned Counsel is right in his submissions that the Police Officers were duty bound to produce the Petitioner before the nearest Magistrate at Indore before 10:00 p.m. on 17/06/2025. Shri. Rokade submitted that the first production before the Magistrate had to be before the nearest Magistrate and not before the jurisdictional Magistrate. {Para 11}

14. Both these Judgments have explained the term 'nearest Magistrate'. Therefore, based on these observations, it is clear that as per the requirement of law, the Police Officers had a duty to produce the Petitioner before the nearest Magistrate at Indore after his arrest at 10:00 p.m. on 16/06/2025. They have failed to do so and thus, there is violation of Article22(2) of the Constitution of India and Section 58 of the BNSS. Therefore, we are constrained to observe that this procedure was illegal and therefore, his first remand on 18/06/2025 was illegal. {Para 14}

16. Considering the gravity of the offence and the nature of evidence, we are inclined to follow the same course and though we are inclined to hold that the Petitioner was not produced within 24 hours of his arrest before the nearest Magistrate and therefore, direct his release on certain conditions, we are granting liberty to the Investigating Agency to re-arrest the Petitioner after following due process of law. It is necessary to consider that the deceased victim also had a fundamental right to life guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. It is grossly violated by the Petitioner by taking away his life in the most brutal and cruel manner. Therefore, the Investigating Agency can be given liberty to re-arrest the Petitioner. 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Criminal Writ Petition No. 4084 of 2025

Decided On: 03.10.2025

Suraj Ganesh Suryawanshi Vs. The State of Maharashtra and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Sarang V. Kotwal and Shyam C. Chandak, JJ.

Author: Sarang V. Kotwal, J.

Citation: MANU/MH/6371/2025,2025:BHC-AS:43096-DB.

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Allahabad HC: Direction For Re-Recording Of Victim's Statement U/S 183 BNSS Can Be Given Only In 'Exceptional Circumstances

Ordinarily no routine direction for second statement under Section 183 B.N.S.S. can be given but under exceptional circumstances. High Court in exercise of it’s extraordinary jurisdiction, if justified to rectify injustice, may issue directions for recording second statement under Section 183 B.N.S.S. but it cannot be exercised as a general rule where victim alleges that her statement recorded under Section 183 B.N.S.S. was not read over to her or that she was not given an opportunity to confirm its correctness. The High Court can in appropriate cases exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction to direct a fresh recording of statement before the Magistrate and the power is not a routine or an automatic power but is exercised by High Court or Supreme Court to prevent abuse of process, to secure ends of justice or rectify grave procedural irregularities that could lead to miscarriage of justice.{Para 16}

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD

CRIMINAL MISC. WRIT PETITION No. - 3822 of 2026

Kirti Verma Vs  State of U.P.

HON'BLE RAJIV GUPTA, J.

HON'BLE ACHAL SACHDEV, J.

Per: Hon’ble Achal Sachdev, J.

Judgement Delivered on 26.02.2026

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