What is ouster of co-sharer? which law is related to it?

A three judge bench of this Court in P. Lakshmi Reddy v. R. Lakshmi Reddy AIR 1957 SC 1789, while examining the necessary conditions for applicability of doctrine of ouster to the shares of co-owners, held as follows: {Para 22}

4. Now, the ordinary classical requirement of adverse possession is that it should be nec vi nec clam nec precario. (See Secretary of State for India v. Debendra Lal Khan [MANU/PR/0072/1933 : (1933) LR 61 IA 78, 82]). The possession required must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and in extent to show that it is possession adverse to the competitor. (See Radhamoni Debi v. Collector of Khulna [(1900) LR 27 IA 136, 140]). But it is well-settled that in order to establish adverse possession of one co-heir as against another it is not enough to show that one out of them is in sole possession and enjoyment of the profits of the properties. Ouster of the non-possessing co-heir by the co-heir in possession who claims his possession to be adverse, should be made out. The possession of one co-heir is considered, in law, as possession of all the co-heirs. When one co-heir is found to be in possession of the properties it is presumed to be on the basis of joint title. The co-heir in possession cannot render his possession adverse to the other co-heir not in possession merely by any secret hostile animus on his own part in derogation of the other co-heir's title. (See Cores v. Appuhamy [(1912) AC 230)]. It is a settled rule of law that as between co-heirs there must be evidence of open assertion of hostile title, coupled with exclusive possession and enjoyment by one of them to the knowledge of the other so as to constitute ouster. This does not necessarily mean that there must be an express demand by one and denial by the other.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal Nos. 1858-1859 of 2016 

Decided On: 26.02.2016

 Nagabhushanammal  Vs. C. Chandikeswaralingam

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Kurian Joseph and Rohinton Fali Nariman, JJ.

Author: Kurian Joseph, J.

Citation: MANU/SC/0231/2016.

Read full judgment here: Click here

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Supreme Court: Disclosure by One Accused U/S 27 of Evidence Act Can extend to the discovery of identity and involvement of Co- accused and recovery from that co-accused,

Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act carves out a well-known exception to the general rule that confessions made to police are inadmissible. The Supreme Court in Mehboob Ali v. State of Rajasthan, 2015 SCC OnLine SC 1043, explained that when information supplied by an accused leads to the discovery of a new fact previously unknown to the police, that part of the statement becomes admissible in evidence. Significantly, the Court held that such discovery may also include the involvement and arrest of a co-accused.

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What are recent developments in DNA test from perspective of Criminal trial?

 Recent judicial developments show that courts now accept DNA evidence as highly probative, but they insist much more strongly on chain of custody, proper sampling, laboratory integrity, and corroboration before acting on it. From a judge’s point of view, the shift is from treating DNA as merely “scientific and powerful” to asking whether the collection, preservation, documentation, and interpretation are legally reliable and fair.

Main developments

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Supreme Court: Whether an appellate court can dismiss an appeal solely on the basis of an unrebutted affidavit of the respondent without considering the entire material on record, including the trial court record?

Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and having

perused the documentary material on record, we are of the view

that the writ petition did not warrant dismissal solely on the

ground that the original plaintiffs failed to file any rejoinder to the defendants’ affidavit in reply dated 12th April 2023. In our view, all relevant material that was brought on record by both the parties ought to have been examined while deciding the writ petition. The affidavit in reply dated 12th April 2023 could have been considered as additional material in opposing the claim for eviction on theground of bonafide need. Dismissal of the writ petition solely on the ground of non-traverse has, in our view, vitiated the impugned judgment. {Para 6}.

18. In the case of Gaya Prasad v. Pradeep Srivastava [(2001)

2 SCC 604], this Court held that the landlord should not be

penalised for the slowness of the legal system and the crucial

date for deciding the facts of the requirement of the landlord is

the date of his application for eviction. It is also observed that

the process of litigation cannot be made the basis for denying

the landlord relief unless the litigation at least reaches the final

stages. However, it is further added that subsequent events

may, in some situations, be considered to have overshadowed

the genuineness of the landlords’ needs but only if they are of

such nature and dimension as to completely eclipse such need

and make it lose the significance altogether.”

In the light of above discussion, the High Court failed to consider whether the subsequent event as urged by the defendants had material bearing on the right claimed by the plaintiffs. It has to be borne in mind that the Trial Court had passed a decree for eviction on the basis of the evidence on record which was reversed by the Appellate Court. It was, therefore, necessary for the High Court to have taken into consideration the entire material available on record including the affidavit dated 12th April 2023. Thus, by failing to do so, the High Court failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in it while deciding the challenge to the reversal of the decree for eviction. We, therefore, find that the order passed by the High Court deserves interference.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2026

MARIA MARTINS  Vs NOEL ZUZARTE AND OTHERS 

Author: ATUL S. CHANDURKAR, J.

Citation: 2026 INSC 376

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