Supreme Court : Jurisdiction to try case U/S 138 of NI Act is to the court within whose jurisdiction payee's home branch, was situated irrespective of cheque was deposited in any other branch of same bank

What is discernible from the aforesaid exposition is that this Court considered the requirement of "maintaining of the account" implicit in "for collection through an account". In other words, once it is identified that the cheque in question is an account payee cheque, the delivery must be to such branch in which the payee maintains the account as it is this branch of the bank that will receive the funds in the account maintained by the payee, from the drawee bank which will debit the drawer's account to send such amount. However, the necessity of delivery of an account payee cheque to the home branch is only legal and not commercial. It is to address commercial exigencies that the legislature enacted the Explanation to Section 142(2)(a). The deeming fiction in the Explanation ensures that even if a cheque is delivered to a branch other than the home branch for commercial convenience, it shall be considered to have been delivered to the home branch for the legal purpose of determining jurisdiction. {Para 72}

76. It was as clear as a noon day that the jurisdiction to try a complaint filed under Section 138 in respect of a cheque delivered for collection through an account, i.e., an account payee cheque, was vested in the court within whose local jurisdiction the branch of the bank in which the payee maintains the account, i.e., the payee's home branch, was situated. Therefore, there was no force in the petitioner's argument that as per the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the jurisdiction to try the complaint under Section 138 was vested in the court within whose local bounds the drawee bank was situated where the cheque was dishonoured. This court say so because the enactment of the Amendment Act, 2015 and the introduction of Section 142(2) thereby, being a special legislation, occupies the field over a general procedural legislation viz. Code of Criminal Procedure. Thus, the MM, Kolkata did not have jurisdiction to try the case.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Transfer Petition (Crl.) No. 1099 of 2025 

Decided On: 28.11.2025

Jai Balaji Industries Ltd. and Ors. Vs. HEG Ltd.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan, JJ.

Author: J.B. Pardiwala, J.

Citation: MANU/SC/1600/2025.

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Pending Appeal, New Schedule: Calcutta HC Applies Enhanced Section 163-A Compensation to a 2004 Accident in Urmila Halder

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Section 163-A — Second Schedule — Notification dated 22.05.2018 substituting the Second Schedule — Whether the substituted (enhanced) Schedule can be applied to compute compensation where the accident occurred prior to the date of the notification but the claim/appeal was still pending on that date — Held, yes.

The claimant's daughter, aged 22 years, died in a motor accident on 11.12.2004. A claim under Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 was filed before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Sealdah, which computed compensation under the structured formula then prevailing in the Second Schedule and awarded ₹1,14,500 by judgment dated 17.12.2008. The claimant preferred a first appeal seeking enhancement. During the pendency of the appeal, the Central Government, by notification dated 22.05.2018, substituted the Second Schedule to Section 163-A, replacing the age-and-income-linked formula with fixed lump-sum compensation, prescribing ₹5,00,000 for death.

Held: The right to claim compensation under Section 163-A accrues on the date of the accident and is not disturbed by a subsequent amendment to the Second Schedule. However, the Second Schedule prescribes only the mode and modality of computing the quantum of an already-existing statutory liability; it does not itself create or extinguish liability. Since the appeal remained pending and undecided as on the date the substituted Schedule came into force, the enhanced/substituted Schedule — and not the Schedule as it stood on the date of the accident — governs computation of compensation. The claimant was accordingly held entitled to the fixed sum of ₹5,00,000 prescribed under the substituted Schedule, notwithstanding that the accident had occurred nearly fourteen years earlier, and the insurer was directed to pay the balance amount (₹5,00,000 minus the sum already awarded) within two months.

Ratio: A beneficial amendment to the Second Schedule under Section 163-A, altering only the computational formula for an existing no-fault liability, applies to all claims/appeals pending adjudication on the date the amendment comes into force, irrespective of the date of the accident, since the amendment does not create a new cause of action but merely revises the yardstick for quantifying a liability that already exists.

Subsequent history: The insurer's appeal against this judgment was dismissed by the Supreme Court in The New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Urmila Halder (Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 6260 of 2019, decided on 8.02.2024), which affirmed the above reasoning and upheld the award of ₹5,00,000.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA

F.M.A. No. 446 of 2010 and F.M.A.T. No. 278 of 2009

Decided On: 09.08.2018

Urmila Halder Vs. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Dipankar Datta and Shampa Sarkar, JJ.

Author: Dipankar Datta, J.

Citation: MANU/WB/1123/2018.

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No Prescription, No Problem? What MAC Tribunals Really Do With Unsupported Medical Bills in Motor Accident Claims

 The short answer

The weight of judicial authority favours claimants: medical bills need not be tied to an individually traceable prescription slip to be accepted in a Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (MACT). What matters is whether the bills are referable to the period and nature of treatment, and whether they are corroborated by the claimant's oral testimony or the hospital record. The absence of a prescription is a factor the Tribunal may weigh — particularly where the insurer specifically challenges the bills or the medicines appear unconnected to the injury — but it is not, by itself, a ground for wholesale rejection.

The governing principle: linkage over paperwork

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P & H High court: The presence of doctors or the chemists for proving medicine bills must be confined only to extraordinary situations where the documents themselves are seriously in doubt.

 The practice of merely marking them but not exhibiting them in evidence and looking for proof by examination of a chemist is quite a needless exercise. The Tribunals must be more pragmatic in their approach while dealing with the cases for motor accident victims and invoke the power which is vested in them under Sections 168 and 169 in such a fashion that they do not shackle themselves by unrealistic procedures to meet the ends of justice/Unless the bills seem fabricated or there is something very peculiar elicited at the trial to doubt genuineness of the bills, the Tribunal dealing with the motor accident cases ought not to be looking for evidence through a chemist who had issued the bills. The production of the bills relating to the purchase of medicines during the period of hospitalization and oral evidence given by the party about purchasing of medicines ought to be taken as sufficient proof of authentication and admissibility of these documents. {Para 2}

3. Similarly, the practice of summoning doctors even for merely marking the MLR reports must be stopped. It must be remembered that the procedure under the M.V. Act is summary in character and documents which are maintained in the Government hospitals in the regular course of business require no more proof and a mere copy produced at the trial shall be received as public documents satisfying the requirements under Section 76 of the Indian Evidence Act. The summoning of the documents from lawful custody or copy of the document duly authenticated by the seal of the hospital which has issued the MLR must themselves be taken as sufficient proof for the same and the procedures that go to prolong the proceedings or delay them must be immediately curtailed by the Tribunals.

4. Even as regards the examination of doctors, it should be confined only to securing appropriate proof of disability and in special circumstances where there is a prolonged treatment or a requirement for a continuous treatment even beyond the period of trial, the attempt of the Tribunal must be to elicit from the doctors the prognosis for cure and the likely expenses that may have to be incurred in future. With a view to devise a procedure adopted in the manner of assigning dates for doctors and the need to save time for professionals like doctors, they must stay confined to what are most essential features to assist the Court to understand the nature of injuries and assess disability, if any to the claimant. They shall not be merely called to Courts for exhibiting some documents like MLR, period of treatment, etc. A hospital document produced by a party which is duly authenticated must be taken as sufficient as proof of the documents themselves and the requirement to produce the doctor for mere production of hospital documents must be immediately given up.

5. Some directions as regards the procedure become necessary only because it is a recurrent theme in our Tribunals that they reject the medical bills or keep out of reckoning the hospital records only because either the chemist is not examined or the doctor is not before the Court to speak about the hospital records. The presence of doctors or the chemists must be confined only to extraordinary situations where the documents themselves are seriously in doubt.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA

F.A.O. No. 12 of 1994 (O&M)

Decided On: 09.02.2012

Parsanni Vs. Sube Singh and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

K. Kannan, J.

Citation: 2011 SCC ONLINE P&H 2510,MANU/PH/4065/2012

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