Whether it is necessary to provide digital copy of CCTV Footage to accused as per S 207 of CRPC?

 In other words, any electronic record, which is printed, stored, recorded or copies made on to an optical or magnetic media and produced by a computer will be deemed to be a document only if the conditions set out in Section 65B(1) of the Evidence Act are satisfied and it was held so in Anwar P.V. v P.K. Basheer MANU/SC/0834/2014 : (2014)10 SCC 473. However, in Shafhi Mohammed v. State of H.P. MANU/SC/0331/2018 : (2018) 5 SCC 311 the Apex Court revisited the principles laid down in Anwar P.V. (supra) and it was held that the applicability of procedural requirement under Section 65B(4) of the Evidence Act for furnishing certificate is not always mandatory. Later, in the case of Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal (Civil Appeal No(s). 2407 of 2018 and connected cases) by interim order dated 26.7.2019, their Lordships of the Apex Court had ordered that in view of Anwar P.V. (supra), the pronouncement of this Court in Shafhi Mohammad (supra) needs reconsideration and the matter was referred to be considered by a larger Bench. However, in the instant case, the said question is merely academic as Sri. Suman Chakravarthy, the learned Senior Public Prosecutor, submitted that the requisite certification under Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act has been obtained for the electronic evidence. In that view of the matter, there is no embargo in providing to the accused a copy of the CCTV Footage, which is relied on by the prosecution in the subject case.

38. In the case on hand, I have no doubt in my mind that the investigating agency has committed a grave error by producing the CCTV footage as a material object and also in refusing to give a copy of the same to the accused. The accused is entitled to a digital copy of the CCTV footage, which is relied on by the prosecution to prove the charge. That being the case, the order passed by the learned Magistrate will stand set aside.

39. This petition will stand allowed. The digital copies of the electronic record relied on by the prosecution and sought for by the petitioner shall be issued to him by imposing appropriate safeguards that the jurisdictional court may deem fit and proper.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

Crl. M.C. No. 4148 of 2019(G)

Decided On: 30.09.2019

 Jisal Rasak Vs.  The State of Kerala

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Raja Vijayaraghavan V., J.

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Whether offence of defamation is made out even if there is true narration of incident in newspaper?

As can be seen from the First exception, whether or not the statement or imputation is for the public good is a question of fact. Both these exceptions save the imputations which are made in public good. It being a pure question of fact, as has been observed in the case of Dilip Babasaheb Londhe (supra), it would be appropriate to leave it for the decision at the trial to ascertain if the news item was published in good faith, by extending suitable opportunity to both the sides to lead evidence.

13. As has been held in the case of Sewakram v. R.K Karanjia; (1981) 3 SCC 208, journalist do not enjoy some kind of special privilege or have a greater freedom than others to make imputations or allegations, sufficient to ruin the reputation of a citizen. They are in no better position than any other person. Truth of an allegation does not permit a justification under First exception unless it is proved to be in public good. The question whether or not it was for public good is a question of fact which needs to be proved like any other relevant fact. Bearing in mind these principles, without intending to traverse the jurisdiction of the Magistrate to inquire into and decide the issue, publishing names of the respondent no. 2 and his associates in a news item which could have been published by deleting the names is indeed a material circumstance which will have to be borne in mind by the Magistrate during the trial. At this juncture, in my considered view, publication of such item which has the potential of putting the respondent no. 2 to disrepute and to lower him in the esteems of the others is prima facie sufficient to constitute defamation as defined under Section 499 of the Indian Penal Code and the doors cannot be shut at the threshold.

In the High Court of Bombay

(Before Mangesh S. Patil, J.)

Vijay Jawaharlalji Darda  v. State of Maharashtra 

Criminal Application No. 2032 of 2009

Decided on October 4, 2019, [Reserved On: 04.09.2019]

Citation: 2019 SCC OnLine Bom 2634

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Whether clauses of partnership deed will be automatically binding on legal heirs of deceased partners?

 At this stage, it is to be noticed that once the

partnership comes to an end, by virtue of death of

one of the partners, there will not be any

partnership existing in which legal representatives

of late Smt. Hashmatunnisa Begum could be taken in.

The judgment and decree obtained by late Sri Jai

Narayan Misra against late Smt. Hashmatunnisa Begum,

in pursuance of partnership deed dated 14.04.1982,

cannot bind the legal representatives of late Smt.

Hashmatunnisa Begum, as such, decree is not

executable against them. The legal representatives

of late Smt. Hashmatunnisa Begum are not the

partners of the original partnership deed dated

14.04.1982. When such legal representative are not

parties to the contract, such contract cannot confer

rights or impose obligations arising under it on any

third party, except parties to it. No one but the

parties to the contract can be entitled under it or

born by it. Such principle is known as ‘Privity of

Contract’. When the partnership stands dissolved by

operation of law under Section 42(c) of the Indian

Partnership Act, 1932, the question of execution in

pursuance of the decree does not arise. There cannot

be any contract unilaterally without acceptance and

agreement by the legal heirs of the deceased

partner. If there are any clauses in the agreement,

entered into between the original partners, against

the third parties, such clauses will not bind them,

such of the clauses in the partnership deed, which

run contrary to provisions of Indian Partnership

Act, 1932, are void and unenforceable. Such clauses

are also opposed to public policy.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.3311 OF 2015

S.P. Misra Vs  Mohd. Laiquddin Khan 

Coram:

R.Subhash Reddy,J.

Dated: October 18,2019

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Whether court should dismiss complaint for dishonour of cheque if cheque amount is more than amount due?

 However, the learned Trial Court found contradiction in the

number of cartons in the complaint as well as in the statement of

the appellant. It was found that the cheque amount is more than

the amount allegedly due on the date when cheque was

presented, therefore, the complaint was dismissed. It held that

there are three different versions as to the number of apple

cartons, therefore, the alleged amount would have been less than

the amount claimed by the complainant.

Once the agent of the respondent has admitted the settlement of

due amount and in absence of any other evidence the Trial Court

or the High Court could not dismiss the complaint only on account

of discrepancies in the determination of the amount due or oral

evidence in the amount due when the written document

crystalizes the amount due for which the cheque was issued.

28. The accused has failed to lead any evidence to rebut the statutory

presumption, a finding returned by both the Trial Court and the

High Court. Both Courts not only erred in law but also committed

perversity when the due amount is said to be disputed only on

account of discrepancy in the cartons, packing material or the rate

to determine the total liability as if the appellant was proving his

debt before the Civil Court. Therefore, it is presumed that the

cheques in question were drawn for consideration and the holder

of the cheques i.e., the appellant received the same in discharge

of an existing debt. The onus, thereafter, shifts on the accusedappellant

to establish a probable defence so as to rebut such a

presumption, which onus has not been discharged by the

respondent.

29. Learned counsel for the respondent has referred to the judgment

reported in M. S. Narayana Menon v. State of Kerala 9 (2006) 6 SCC 39 that evidence adduced by the complainant can be relied upon to rebut

the presumption of consideration. However, said judgment has no

applicability to the facts of the present case as the Trial Court has

found that the presumption is not rebutted but still the Trial Court

dismissed the complaint for the reason that the appellant has

failed to prove the amount mentioned in the cheque as due

amount. Once the cheque is proved to be issued it carries

statutory presumption of consideration. Then the onus is on the

respondent to disprove the presumption at which the respondent

has miserably failed.

30. In Kumar Exports evidence to rebut the presumption was led and

accepted by the Court. In these circumstances, it was held that

the burden shifts back to the complainant and the presumption

under the Act will not again come to his rescue. However, in the

present case, the presumption of consideration has not been

rebutted by the respondent even on the basis of the evidence laid

by the appellant. The difference in the number of cartons supplied

or the rate charged is not relevant when the accounts were settled

in writing to rebut the presumption of consideration of issuance of

a cheque.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1545 OF 2019

UTTAM RAM  Vs DEVINDER SINGH HUDAN 

HEMANT GUPTA, J.

Dated:OCTOBER 17, 2019.

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