Monday, 31 March 2025
Important LLM Notes on Research Methodology (Part 2)
1) LLM Notes: What is meaning and importance of induction and deduction in legal research?
2) LLM Notes: What is basic concept of case study method in research?
3) LLM Notes: Seminar Method of Research: Its merits and demerits
Important LLM Notes on Research Methodology (Part 1)
1) LLM Notes: Merits and demerits of interview method of Data Collection {Part 1}
2) LLM Notes: Navigating the Legal Landscape: A Detailed Look at Doctrinal and Non-Doctrinal Research Methodologies (Part 1)
3) LLM Notes: Doctrinal & non-doctrinal legal research (Part 2)
Sunday, 30 March 2025
Bombay HC: Whether detailed ingredients mentioned in clause 8 of S. 2 of Bankers' Books Evidence Act, 1891 for qualifying to be certified copy are mandatory?
Admittedly, the bank statements are not accompanied by certificate under the Bankers Book Evidence Act, however, bears the seal of Bank of Baroda and signature of the official. In Radheshyam G. Garg vs. Safiyabai Ibrahim Lighwalla (MANU/MH/0368/1988), this Court held the certificate under Bankers Book Evidence Act to be directory as under:
"The lower appellate Court by placing reliance on section 2(8) of the Bankers' Books Evidence Act, 1891 has held that 'certified copy' means a copy of any entry in the books of a Bank, together with a certificate written at the foot of such copy that it is a true copy of such entry, that such entry is contained in one of the ordinary books of the bank and was made in the usual and ordinary course of business, and that such book is still in the custody of the bank, such certificate being dated and subscribed by the principal accountant or manager of the Bank with his name and official title. According to the learned Judge since the said extracts of statement of account had not been signed by the principal accountant or manager as required and since the same did not bear any date or official seal, the same could not be treated as certified copy and consequently the same could not be read in evidence.
In my judgment the aforesaid view of the learned Judge of the lower appellate Court was hypertechnical. The said extract of account was duly signed by the Agent of the bank. Implicit in it was a certificate that it was a true copy of an entry contained in one of the ordinary books of the bank and was made in the usual and ordinary course of business and that such book was in the custody of the bank. The detailed ingredients mentioned in the defining clause 8 of section 2 of Bankers' Books Evidence Act, 1891 for qualifying to be 'certified copy' are not mandatory but merely directory." {Para 29}
30. In the present case, the original bank statements were not per se inadmissible in evidence. What was objected was to the mode and manner of proof. As held by this Court in the decision cited above, the detailed ingredients of Section 2(8) of Bankers Book Evidence Act are merely directory. The bank statements are the original bank statements bearing the seal and signature of the bank. PW-1 has deposed about the cheque payments made through Bank of Baroda and corroborated the same by producing original bank statement. The bank statements could be received as prima facie evidence of existence of such entries. Further, the Plaintiff was cross examined by the Defendant. Once the document is used in cross examination, then the document gets proved and can be read in evidence as held by the Apex Court in case of Ram Janki Devi vs. Juggilal Kamlapat [MANU/SC/0533/1971 : 1971:INSC:35 : 1971 (1) SCC 477]. The Apex Court in that case had held that it is not possible to accept complaint of lack of proof when the documents are shown in cross examination to the witness.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
First Appeal No. 1841 of 2024
Decided On: 21.02.2025
Yasin Khan and Ors. Vs. Ajit Developers Pvt. Ltd. and Ors.
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Sharmila U. Deshmukh, J.
Citation: MANU/MH/1001/2025,2025:BHC-AS:8423.
Read full Judgment here: Click here.
Bombay HC: Whether the court can decree suit for Specific performance of contract even if there are procedural irregularities regarding admissibility of documents
The Bombay High Court upheld a decree for specific performance despite procedural irregularities in evidence admission at the trial court level. The court concluded that even if certain documents were excluded, sufficient evidence supported granting specific performance based on the agreement's existence and fulfillment of obligations by the plaintiff.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
First Appeal No. 1841 of 2024
Decided On: 21.02.2025
Yasin Khan and Ors. Vs. Ajit Developers Pvt. Ltd. and Ors.
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Sharmila U. Deshmukh, J.
Citation: MANU/MH/1001/2025,2025:BHC-AS:8423
Supreme Court: Whether a party can say that a document is not proved if he has shown that document in cross- examination of other side witness?
His evidence was that the books were, systematically kept on 'mahajani' system in connection with the business. The witness proved the Khata, the raznamcha and the nakalbahi entries. In cross-examination of Gopi Kishan Saraugi it was suggested that the entry under the date 30 September, 1942 in the roznamcha was not written at the same time. The suggestion was that there was interpolation of the words "deposit karaya" in the roznamcha entry. In cross-examination of Padampat Singhania questions were asked about the rokar, khata, nakalbahi and roznamcha entries. Padampat Singhania said that the entry of Rs. 4,00,000 was not recorded in the daily cash book but was recorded in the roznamcha. He said that credit and debit entries were made in the roznamcha. Padampat Singhania said that the entries were made by Gopi Kishan Jaipuria who was in a dying condition at the time the witness gave evidence.
16. It was suggested to Padampat Singhania that the words "deposit karaya" in the roznamcha entry were not written at the same sitting. Padampat Singhania denied that, Counsel for the appellant contended that in the absence of Gopi Kishan Jaipuria the account books were not proved. This is unacceptable for two reasons. First, the account books were shown in cross-examination of Padampat Singhania and question were asked on the same. It is not open to the appellant to complain of lack of proof of account books when the documents are shown to the witness in cross-examination.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Civil Appeal No. 2151 of 1966
Decided On: 21.01.1971
Ram Janki Devi and Ors. Vs. Juggilal Kamlapat
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
A.N. Ray and G.K. Mitter, JJ.
Author: A.N. Ray, J.
Citation: 1971:INSC:35 : 1971 (1) SCC 477, MANU/MH/1001/2025.
Supreme court: Under which circumstances the party must pay stamp duty on agreement of sale treating it as Conveyance?
In the instant case, the agreement to sell executed between the Appellant and mother of the Respondent No. 1, specifically states that "this property is in your occupation on rental basis and it will not be part of the sale transaction. After completion of sale transaction, the possession of the said property will be given to you on the ownership basis. This makes it very clear that the suit property was occupied by the Appellant on a rental basis and it would not be a part of the sale transaction. Further, there was a clause, by which, timeline was given for execution of sale deed. Since the possession was admittedly given to the Appellant even before the date of agreement, implying acquisition of possessory rights protected Under Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, the same requires payment of proper stamp duty. As indicated above, the agreement to sell includes a Clause stating that physical possession had already been handed over to the Appellant, regardless of the basis of such possession. This satisfies the requirement to treat the instrument as a 'conveyance' within the meaning of Explanation I to Article 25 of Schedule I of Bombay Stamp Act, with only the formality of executing the sale deed remaining. Pertinently, it is to be pointed out that the Appellant filed a suit for specific performance of the agreement to sell against the Respondents; Respondent No. 1 filed a suit seeking eviction of the Appellant from the subject property; and both the suits are pending, which clearly establish the possession of the property by the Appellant. Therefore, the said document is liable for payment of stamp duty at the hands of the Appellant. {Para 11}
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Civil Appeal No. 2549 of 2025.
Decided On: 14.02.2025
Ramesh Mishrimal Jain Vs. Avinash Vishwanath Patne and Ors.
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan, JJ.
Author: R. Mahadevan, J.
Citation: 2025 INSC 213, MANU/SC/0218/2025.
Supreme Court: What is the duty of executing court while executing decree for specific performance of contract?
The executing court was not clear, both as regards the facts and as to law. On facts, it did not take into account, the real purport of the decree. The relevant portion has already been extracted. The stipulation of two months was for the first Respondent to execute the decree. That stipulation, no doubt, is coupled with the right to receive the balance of consideration. There was nothing on record to indicate that he ever made any effort to collect or demand the balance of consideration from the Petitioner, within that time. The plea of the Petitioner that when he offered the amount, the Respondents refused to receive; remained unrebutted. The first Respondent did not file any rejoinder to the counter-affidavit. As observed in the preceding paragraphs, the executing court did not record any evidence of the parties. Therefore, the finding recorded by the trial court, in this behalf, cannot be sustained. When valuable rights accrued to a party, on account of the suit for specific performance being decreed, they cannot be taken away, on the basis of such an untenable finding.
{Para 17}
18. On the aspect of law, the executing court proceeded as though Section 28 of the Act gets attracted, though it did not mention in so many words. Firstly, the first Respondent himself did not invoke that provision. Secondly, the provision gets attracted only where, (a) the court, which passed the decree, directs the decree-holder to pay the purchaser money (balance of consideration) within a period, stipulated by it, and (b) the decree-holder failed to comply with the direction. It is then, and only then, that the court can consider the feasibility of directing rescission of contract. In the instant case, the time stipulated by the trial court in its decree was for the first Respondent to execute the decree, and not directly for the Petitioner to deposit the amount.
19. There is nothing on record to disclose that the first Respondent has ever made any effort to receive the amount, stipulated in the decree. On the other hand, the plea of the Petitioner that, when he offered to pay the amount, the first Respondent did not receive the same; remained unrebutted. The court must ensure strict compliance with the conditions stipulated in a provision, which has the effect of nullifying a decree. Even where two views are possible on the facts of the case, the one, which would sustain the decree, must be adopted.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Civil Appeal Nos. 563-566 of 2025.
Decided On: 17.01.2025
Balbir Singh and Ors. Vs. Baldev Singh (D) through His Lrs and Ors.
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan, JJ.
Author: J.B. Pardiwala, J.
Citation: MANU/SC/0079/2025.
Judgment analysis of Balbir Singh & Anr. v. Baldev Singh (D) Through His LRs & Ors., in IRAC Format
Case Title: Balbir Singh & Anr. v. Baldev Singh (D) Through His LRs & Ors., Civil Appeal Nos. 563-566 of 2025
Court: Supreme Court of India
Date of Judgment: January 17, 2025
Issue
1. Whether the High Court erred in
rejecting the defendants' application under Section 28 of the Specific Relief
Act, 1963, for rescission of the contract due to the plaintiffs' failure to
deposit the balance sale consideration within the stipulated time.
2. Whether the doctrine of merger applies when an appellate court modifies or restores a trial court's decree and its implications on execution timelines.
Supreme Court: Relinquishment Of Claims Under S.12(3) For Part Performance Can Be Made At Any Stage Of Litigation, including the appellate stage
Ratio: The Supreme Court clarified that relinquishment under Section 12(3) can be made at any stage of litigation, including the appellate stage. This provision applies when a party cannot perform the entirety of their contractual obligations due to statutory limitations or other causes. The court emphasized that granting partial relief under Section 12(3) is discretionary and depends on the facts and circumstances of each case.
11. The words 'unable to perform' suggest that the Sub-section is applicable only when the party cannot for any reason perform the whole of what he has promised. The inability may arise by any cause whatsoever including any statutory limitations. The inability to perform may arise by-
(i) deficiency in quantity of the subject-matter, or
(ii) variance in quality, or
(iii) defect in title; or
(iv) some legal prohibition; or
(v) other causes.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Special Leave to Appeal (C) No. 25246/2023
Decided On: 08.01.2025
Vijay Prabhu Vs. S.T. Lajapathie and Ors.
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan, JJ.
Citation: 2025 INSC 52,MANU/SC/0063/2025.
Tripura HC: Multiplier of 5 should be applied while granting compensation under Motor accident if deceased was aged more than 70 years
According to the Pension Payment Order book, on the date of the accident, the age of the deceased was 78 years. So, in terms of the multiplier as made applicable under the table decided at Column No. (4) in Sarla Verma (supra), multiplier 5 is to be applied for the age group of 65 years and above, the same is taken on record. Accordingly, the first point of argument of Mr. Deb, learned counsel appearing for the appellant-Insurance Company is answered in favour of the claimants. Here the argument of Mr. Deb, learned counsel that in Sarla Verma (supra) multiplier 5(five) is allowed up to the age schedule 66 years to 70 years does not stand because the same was said the by Hon'ble Apex Court in the said Judgment in the context of other cases. Therefore, the age of the deceased 78 years is considered as per table 65 years and above and considered the case of the claimants accordingly as there is no restriction up to 70 years. The lifespan as per table can be beyond 70 years. Thus, the argument of the Insurance-counsel is rejected. {Para 19}
In the High Court of Tripura at Agartala
(Before T. Amarnath Goud, J.)
MAC App No. 07 of 2023
National Insurance Company Ltd. Vs Sadhana Debnath and Others
Decided on October 5, 2023,
Citation: 2023 SCC OnLine Tri 846.
Madras HC: Multiplier of 3 should be applied while granting compensation under Motor accident if deceased was aged more than 70 years
In this case, the deceased admittedly crossed 70 years. He was 71 years old at the time of his death. Therefore, the correct multiplier is only ‘3’ and not ‘5’. Likewise, the claimants are undoubtedly legal heirs of the deceased, but they are not dependants of the deceased financially. As submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant, 71 years old male member will have his own expenses peculiarly related to his age. Therefore, his financial need will certainly be between 1/3rd and 50%. So, 1/3rd has to be deducted towards his personal expenses from the notional income inclusive of future prospect. {Para 8}
In the High Court of Madras
(Before G. Jayachandran, J.)
United India Insurance Company Ltd. Vs Mary Victoria and Others
Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 1320 of 2016 and C.M.P. No. 10195 of 2016
Decided on August 27, 2020.
Citation: 2020 SCC OnLine Mad 16456.
P& H HC: Multiplier of 4 should be applied while granting compensation under Motor accident if deceased was aged more than 70 years
Keeping in view the fact that nothing has been held in Sarla Verma's case (supra) declining the compensation in a case where deceased had been more than 70 years of age I adopt the multiplier of 4 to assess compensation in this case.
IN THE COURT OF PUNJAB ABD HARYANA
(Before Vijender Singh Malik, J.)
Kulwant Kaur v. Harpreet Singh and ors.
FAO No. 3997 of 2011 (O&M)
Decided on September 12, 2013.
Citation: 2013 SCC OnLine P&H 18959. |
Bombay HC: Multiplier of 5 should be applied while granting compensation under Motor accident if deceased was aged 71 years
The claimants no. 2 to 4 are major sons and daughter, therefore looking to the number of the claimants 1/4th is required to be deducted to self expenses hence loss of dependency comes to Rs.2250/-(Rupees two thousand two hundred fifty only) per month multiplied by 12 months comes to Rs.27000/-(Rupees twenty seven thousand only) per annum. Admittedly deceased was about 71 years old at the time of death, therefore, appropriate multiplier would be 5, hence compensation towards loss of dependency comes to Rs.135,000/-(Rupees one lakhs thirty five thousand only).
IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY AT GOA
First Appeal No. 2 of 2012
Decided On: 30.01.2015
Sumitra Dwarkanath Sirsat and Ors. Vs. Shivanand Hanumantappa Bisirotti and Ors.
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
K.L. Wadane, J.
Citation: MANU/MH/0118/2015.
Bombay HC: Medical insurance payouts not deductible from Motor Vehicles Act compensation
ANSWER TO THE QUESTION REFERRED
18. In the light of the foregoing discussion, we are of the considered opinion that the question as framed ought to be answered in the negative. Thus, any amount received by a claimant under a mediclaim policy or under a medical insurance policy is not liable to be deducted from the amount of compensation payable to a claimant under the head “medical expenses” in proceedings under Section 166 of the M.V. Act.
Any Amount Received By Accident Victim from Mediclaim Cannot Be Deducted from Compensation to be paid to the Claimants as same is independent contract. Insurer are liable to pay even if Claimants receive amount from Mediclaim.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
FIRST APPEAL NO.1344 OF 2014
The New India Assurance Co. Ltd. Vs Mrs. Dolly Satish Gandhi
CORAM : A.S. CHANDURKAR, MILIND N. JADHAV & GAURI GODSE, JJ
Dated: 28TH MARCH 2025.
JUDGMENT : [ Per A.S. Chandurkar, J. ]
Citation: 2025:BHC-AS:14458-FB
Tuesday, 25 March 2025
From Judicial Interpretation to Statutory Law: Section 156 CrPC and S 175 of BNSS, 2023
Introduction
The Supreme Court of India, in Om Prakash Ambadkar v. The State of
Maharashtra and Ors. (Criminal Appeal No. 352/2020), has analyzed the
procedural changes introduced by the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023
(BNSS) in relation to Section 156 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC).
This judgment highlights the legislative codification of judicial safeguards
aimed at preventing misuse of the powers vested in Magistrates for ordering
investigations.
Key Changes in Section 175 of BNSS
Section 175 of BNSS corresponds to Section 156 CrPC but introduces significant procedural modifications:
Section 156(3) of CR.P.C vs. Section 175(3) of B.N.S.S : A Comparative Analysis of Procedural Changes
The new interpretation of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), specifically Section 175(3), which replaces Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), introduces significant procedural changes that will affect its practical application. These changes aim to enhance judicial scrutiny, reduce misuse, and increase accountability in the process of ordering investigations. Below is an explanation of how these changes will impact the working of Section 156 in practice:
Key Changes and Their Practical Implications
Supreme Court: How BNSS Modernizes Section 156(3) CrPC: Key Changes and Implications
However, before we part with the matter, we deem it necessary to discuss the changes brought to the scheme of Section 156 of the Code of Criminal Procedure by the enactment of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (for short, "the BNSS"). {Para 28}
29. Section 175 of the BNSS corresponds to Section 156 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Sub-section (1) of Section 175 of the BNSS is in pari materia with Sub-section 156(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure except for the proviso which empowers the Superintendent of Police to direct the Deputy Superintendent of Police to investigate a case if the nature or gravity of the case so requires. Sub-section (2) of Section 175 the BNSS is identical to Section 156(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 175(3) of the BNSS empowers any Magistrate who is empowered to take cognizance Under Section 210 to order investigation in accordance with Section 175(1) and to this extent is in pari materia with Section 156(3) of Code of Criminal Procedure. However, unlike Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, any Magistrate, before ordering investigation Under Section 175(3) of the BNSS, is required to:
a. Consider the application, supported by an affidavit, made by the complainant to the Superintendent of Police Under Section 173(4) of the BNSS;
b. Conduct such inquiry as he thinks necessary; and
c. Consider the submissions made by the police officer.
30. Sub-section (4) of Section 175 of the BNSS is a new addition to the scheme of investigation of cognizable cases when compared with the scheme previously existing in Section 156 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It provides an additional safeguard to a public servant against whom an accusation of committing a cognizable offence arising in the course of discharge of his official duty is made. The provision stipulates that any Magistrate who is empowered to take cognizance Under Section 210 of the BNSS may order investigation against a public servant upon receiving a complaint arising in course of the discharge of his official duty, only after complying with the following procedure:
a. Receiving a report containing facts and circumstances of the incident from the officer superior to the Accused public servant; and
b. Considering the assertions made by the Accused public servant as regards the situation that led to the occurrence of the alleged incident.
31. A comparison of Section 175(3) of the BNSS with Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure indicates three prominent changes that have been introduced by the enactment of BNSS as follows:
a. First, the requirement of making an application to the Superintendent of Police upon refusal by the officer in charge of a police station to lodge the FIR has been made mandatory, and the applicant making an application Under Section 175(3) is required to furnish a copy of the application made to the Superintendent of Police Under Section 173(4), supported by an affidavit, while making the application to the Magistrate Under Section 175(3).
b. Secondly, the Magistrate has been empowered to conduct such enquiry as he deems necessary before making an order directing registration of FIR.
c. Thirdly, the Magistrate is required to consider the submissions of the officer in charge of the police station as regards the refusal to register an FIR before issuing any directions Under Section 175(3).
32. The introduction of these changes by the legislature can be attributed to the judicial evolution of Section 156 of the Code of Criminal Procedure undertaken by a number of decisions of this Court. In the case of Priyanka Srivastava v. State of U.P. reported in MANU/SC/0344/2015 : 2015:INSC:239 : (2015) 6 SCC 287, this Court held that prior to making an application to the Magistrate Under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the applicant must necessarily make applications Under Sections 154(1) and 154(3). It was further observed by the Court that applications made Under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure must necessarily be supported by an affidavit sworn by the applicant. The reason given by the Court for introducing such a requirement was that applications Under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure were being made in a routine manner and in a number of cases only with a view to cause harassment to the Accused by registration of FIR. It was further observed that the requirement of supporting the complaint with an affidavit would ensure that the person making the application is conscious and also to see that no false affidavit is made. Once an affidavit is found to be false, the applicant would be liable for prosecution in accordance with law. This would deter him from casually invoking the authority of the Magistrate Under Section 156(3).
28. Issuing a direction stating "as per the application" to lodge an FIR creates a very unhealthy situation in society and also reflects the erroneous approach of the learned Magistrate. It also encourages unscrupulous and unprincipled litigants, like Respondent 3, namely, Prakash Kumar Bajaj, to take adventurous steps with courts to bring the financial institutions on their knees.
29. At this stage it is seemly to state that power Under Section 156(3) warrants application of judicial mind. A court of law is involved. It is not the police taking steps at the stage of Section 154 of the Code. A litigant at his own whim cannot invoke the authority of the Magistrate. A principled and really grieved citizen with clean hands must have free access to invoke the said power. It protects the citizens but when pervert litigations takes this route to harass their fellow citizens, efforts are to be made to scuttle and curb the same.
30. In our considered opinion, a stage has come in this country where Section 156(3) Code of Criminal Procedure applications are to be supported by an affidavit duly sworn by the applicant who seeks the invocation of the jurisdiction of the Magistrate. That apart, in an appropriate case, the learned Magistrate would be well advised to verify the truth and also can verify the veracity of the allegations. This affidavit can make the applicant more responsible. We are compelled to say so as such kind of applications are being filed in a routine manner without taking any responsibility whatsoever only to harass certain persons. That apart, it becomes more disturbing and alarming when one tries to pick up people who are passing orders under a statutory provision which can be challenged under the framework of the said Act or Under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. But it cannot be done to take undue advantage in a criminal court as if somebody is determined to settle the scores.
31. We have already indicated that there has to be prior applications Under Sections 154(1) and 154(3) while filing a petition Under Section 156(3). Both the aspects should be clearly spelt out in the application and necessary documents to that effect shall be filed. The warrant for giving a direction that an application Under Section 156(3) be supported by an affidavit is so that the person making the application should be conscious and also endeavour to see that no false affidavit is made. It is because once an affidavit is found to be false, he will be liable for prosecution in accordance with law. This will deter him to casually invoke the authority of the Magistrate Under Section 156(3). That apart, we have already stated that the veracity of the same can also be verified by the learned Magistrate, regard being had to the nature of allegations of the case. We are compelled to say so as a number of cases pertaining to fiscal sphere, matrimonial dispute/family disputes, commercial offences, medical negligence cases, corruption cases and the cases where there is abnormal delay/laches in initiating criminal prosecution, as are illustrated in Lalita Kumari [ MANU/SC/1166/2013 : 2013:INSC:748 : (2014) 2 SCC 1: (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 524] are being filed. That apart, the learned Magistrate would also be aware of the delay in lodging of the FIR.
(Emphasis supplied)
33. In a recent pronouncement of this Court in the case of Babu Venkatesh v. The State of Karnataka reported in MANU/SC/0214/2022 : 2022:INSC:209 : (2022) 5 SCC 639, the observations made in Priyanka Srivastava (supra) were referred to and it was held as follows:
24. This Court has clearly held that, a stage has come where applications Under Section 156(3) Code of Criminal Procedure are to be supported by an affidavit duly sworn by the complainant who seeks the invocation of the jurisdiction of the Magistrate.
25. This Court further held that, in an appropriate case, the learned Magistrate would be well advised to verify the truth and also verify the veracity of the allegations. The Court has noted that, applications Under Section 156(3) Code of Criminal Procedure are filed in a routine manner without taking any responsibility only to harass certain persons.
26. This Court has further held that, prior to the filing of a petition Under Section 156(3) Code of Criminal Procedure, there have to be applications Under Sections 154(1) and 154(3) Code of Criminal Procedure. This Court emphasises the necessity to file an affidavit so that the persons making the application should be conscious and not make false affidavit. With such a requirement, the persons would be deterred from causally invoking authority of the Magistrate, Under Section 156(3) Code of Criminal Procedure. Inasmuch as if the affidavit is found to be false, the person would be liable for prosecution in accordance with law.
(Emphasis supplied)
34. In light of the judicial interpretation and evolution of Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure by various decisions of this Court as discussed above, it becomes clear that the changes introduced by Section 175(3) of the BNSS to the existing scheme of Section 156(3) merely codify the procedural practices and safeguards which have been introduced by judicial decisions aimed at curbing the misuse of invocation of powers of a Magistrate by unscrupulous litigants for achieving ulterior motives.
35. Further, by requiring the Magistrate to consider the submissions made by the concerned police officer before proceeding to issue directions Under Section 175(3), BNSS has affixed greater accountability on the police officer responsible for registering FIRs Under Section 173. Mandating the Magistrate to consider the submissions of the concerned police officer also ensures that the Magistrate applies his mind judicially while considering both the complaint and the submissions of the police officer thereby ensuring that the requirement of passing reasoned orders is complied with in a more effective and comprehensive manner.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Criminal Appeal No. 352/2020
Decided On: 16.01.2025
Om Prakash Ambadkar Vs. The State of Maharashtra and Ors.
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan, JJ.
Citation: MANU/SC/0134/2025, 2025 INSC 139.
Read full Judgment here: Click here.
Supreme Court: What are essential ingredients of offence punishable U/S 504 and 506 of IPC?
Section 504 of the Indian Penal Code contemplates intentionally insulting a person and thereby provoking such person insulted to breach the peace or intentionally insulting a person knowing it to be likely that the person insulted may be provoked so as to cause a breach of the public peace or to commit any other offence. Mere abuse may not come within the purview of the section. But, the words of abuse in a particular case might amount to an intentional insult provoking the person insulted to commit a breach of the public peace or to commit any other offence. If abusive language is used intentionally and is of such a nature as would in the ordinary course of events lead the person insulted to break the peace or to commit an offence under the law, the case is not taken away from the purview of the Section merely because the insulted person did not actually break the peace or commit any offence having exercised self control or having been subjected to abject terror by the offender. In judging whether particular abusive language is attracted by Section 504, Indian Penal Code, the court has to find out what, in the ordinary circumstances, would be the effect of the abusive language used and not what the complainant actually did as a result of his peculiar idiosyncrasy or cool temperament or sense of discipline. It is the ordinary general nature of the abusive language that is the test for considering whether the abusive language is an intentional insult likely to provoke the person insulted to commit a breach of the peace and not the particular conduct or temperament of the complainant. {Para 25}
26. Mere abuse, discourtesy, rudeness or insolence, may not amount to an intentional insult within the meaning of Section 504, Indian Penal Code if it does not have the necessary element of being likely to incite the person insulted to commit a breach of the peace of an offence and the other element of the Accused intending to provoke the person insulted to commit a breach of the peace or knowing that the person insulted is likely to commit a breach of the peace. Each case of abusive language shall have to be decided in the light of the facts and circumstances of that case and there cannot be a general proposition that no one commits an offence Under Section 504, Indian Penal Code if he merely uses abusive language against the complainant. In King Emperor v. Chunnibhai Dayabhai, (1902) 4 Bom LR 78, a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court pointed out that:
To constitute an offence Under Section 504, Indian Penal Code it is sufficient if the insult is of a kind calculated to cause the other party to lose his temper and say or do something violent. Public peace can be broken by angry words as well as deeds.
27. A bare perusal of Section 506 of the Indian Penal Code makes it clear that a part of it relates to criminal intimidation. Before an offence of criminal intimidation is made out, it must be established that the Accused had an intention to cause alarm to the complainant.
28. In the facts and circumstances of the case and more particularly, considering the nature of the allegations levelled in the FIR, a prima facie case to constitute the offence punishable Under Section 506 of the Indian Penal Code may probably could be said to have been disclosed but not Under Section 504 of the Indian Penal Code. The allegations with respect to the offence punishable Under Section 504 of the Indian Penal Code can also be looked at from a different perspective. In the FIR, all that the first informant has stated is that abusive language was used by the Accused persons. What exactly was uttered in the form of abuses is not stated in the FIR. One of the essential elements, as discussed above, constituting an offence Under Section 504 of the Indian Penal Code is that there should have been an act or conduct amounting to intentional insult. Where that act is the use of the abusive words, it is necessary to know what those words were in order to decide whether the use of those words amounted to intentional insult. In the absence of these words, it is not possible to decide whether the ingredient of intentional insult is present.
19. Applying the principles as explained aforesaid, we are of the view that none of the ingredients to constitute the offence punishable Under Sections 504 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code respectively are borne out.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Criminal Appeal No. 352/2020
Decided On: 16.01.2025
Om Prakash Ambadkar Vs. The State of Maharashtra and Ors.
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan, JJ.
Citation: MANU/SC/0134/2025, 2025 INSC 139.
Read full Judgment here: Click here.
Supreme Court: What are essential ingredients of offence punishable U/S 294 of IPC?
However, what is important to observe is that whenever any application is filed by the complainant before the Court of Judicial Magistrate seeking police investigation Under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it is the duty of the concerned Magistrate to apply his mind for the purpose of ascertaining whether the allegations levelled in the complaint constitute any cognizable offence or not. In other words, the Magistrate may not undertake the exercise to ascertain whether the complaint is false or otherwise, however, the Magistrate is obliged before he proceeds to pass an order for police investigation to closely consider whether the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence are borne out on plain reading of the complaint. {Para 11}
12. In the case on hand, it appears that the Magistrate passed an order directing police investigation mechanically and without ascertaining whether the allegations levelled disclose commission of any offence or not.
13. It is the case of the complainant that the Appellant herein committed offence punishable Under Section 294 of the Indian Penal Code. The Magistrate very promptly accepted this contention without ascertaining if the necessary ingredients required to constitute the offence were disclosed in the complaint or not. In our view, even if all the allegations as levelled in the complaint are believed to be true, none of the ingredients to constitute the offence punishable Under Section 294 of the Indian Penal Code could be said to be borne out.
14. In so far as Section 294 of the Indian Penal Code is concerned, this Court in N.S. Madhanagopal and Anr. v. K. Lalitha reported in MANU/SC/1805/2022 : (2022) 17 SCC 818 has explained the true purport and scope of Section 294. We quote the relevant observations as under:
6. Section 294(b) Indian Penal Code talks about the obscene acts and songs. Section 294 Indian Penal Code as a whole reads thus:
294. Obscene acts and songs.-Whoever, to the annoyance of others-
(a) does any obscene act in any public place, or
(b) sings, recites or utters any obscene songs, ballad or words, in or near any public place, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three months, or with fine, or with both.
7. It is to be noted that the test of obscenity Under Section 294(b) Indian Penal Code is whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscenity is to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences. The following passage from the judgment authored by K.K. Mathew, J. (as his Lordship then was) reported in P.T. Chacko v. Nainan Chacko [P.T. Chacko v. Nainan Chacko, MANU/KE/0284/1967 : 1967 KLT 799] explains as follows: (SCC OnLine Ker paras 5-6)
5. The only point argued was that the 1st Accused has not committed an offence punishable Under Section 294(b) Indian Penal Code, by uttering the words above-mentioned. The courts below have held that the words uttered were obscene and the utterance caused annoyance to the public. I am not inclined to take this view. In R. v. Hicklin [R. v. Hicklin, (1868) LR 3 QB 360], QB at p. 371 Cockburn, C.J. Laid down the test of "obscenity" in these words: (QB p. 371) '... the test of obscenity is this, whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscenity is to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences....'
6. This test has been uniformly followed in India. The Supreme Court has accepted the correctness of the test in Ranjit D. Udeshi v. State of Maharashtra [Ranjit D. Udeshi v. State of Maharashtra, MANU/SC/0080/1964 : 1964:INSC:171 : AIR 1965 SC 881]. In Roth v. United States [Roth v. United States, 1957 SCC OnLine US SC 106: MANU/USSC/0157/1957 : 1 L Ed 2d 1498 : 354 US 476 (1957)], Chief Justice Warren said that the test of "obscenity" is the 'substantial tendency to corrupt by arousing lustful desires'. Mr. Justice Harlan observed that in order to be "obscene" the matter must "tend to sexually impure thoughts". I do not think that the words uttered in this case have such a tendency. It may be that the words are defamatory of the complainant, but I do not think that the words are "obscene" and the utterance would constitute an offence punishable Under Section 294(b) Indian Penal Code.
8. It has to be noted that in the instance case, the absence of words which will involve some lascivious elements arousing sexual thoughts or feelings or words cannot attract the offence Under Section 294(b). None of the records disclose the alleged words used by the Accused. It may not be the requirement of law to reproduce in all cases the entire obscene words if it is lengthy, but in the instant case, there is hardly anything on record. Mere abusive, humiliating or defamatory words by itself cannot attract an offence Under Section 294(b) Indian Penal Code.
9. To prove the offence Under Section 294 Indian Penal Code mere utterance of obscene words are not sufficient but there must be a further proof to establish that it was to the annoyance of others, which is lacking in the case. No one has spoken about the obscene words, they felt annoyed and in the absence of legal evidence to show that the words uttered by the Appellant- Accused annoyed others, it cannot be said that the ingredients of the offence Under Section 294(b) Indian Penal Code is made out.
15. We fail to understand how the act of a police officer assaulting the complainant within public view or public as alleged would amount to an obscene act. Obscene act for the purpose of Section 294 has a particular meaning. Mere abusive, humiliating or defamatory words by themselves are not sufficient to attract the offence Under Section 294 of the Indian Penal Code.
16. Thus, in so far as Section 294 of the Indian Penal Code is concerned, we are of the view that no case is made out to put the Appellant/Accused to trial.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Criminal Appeal No. 352/2020
Decided On: 16.01.2025
Om Prakash Ambadkar Vs. The State of Maharashtra and Ors.
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan, JJ.
Citation: MANU/SC/0134/2025, 2025 INSC 139.
Read full Judgment here: Click here.
Supreme Court: What precautions the Magistrate should take before ordering investigation U/S 156(3) of CRPC{S 175 of BNSS}?
Thus, there are prerequisites to be followed by the complainant before approaching the Magistrate Under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure {S 175 of BNSS} which is a discretionary remedy as the provision proceeds with the word 'may'. The Magistrate is required to exercise his mind while doing so. He should pass orders only if he is satisfied that the information reveals commission of cognizable offences and also about the necessity of police investigation for digging out of evidence neither in possession of the complainant nor can be procured without the assistance of the police. It is, thus, not necessary that in every case where a complaint has been filed Under Section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure the Magistrate should direct the Police to investigate the crime merely because an application has also been filed Under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure even though the evidence to be led by the complainant is in his possession or can be produced by summoning witnesses, with the assistance of the court or otherwise. The issue of jurisdiction also becomes important at that stage and cannot be ignored. {Para 24}
25. In fact, the Magistrate ought to direct investigation by the police only where the assistance of the Investigating Agency is necessary and the Court feels that the cause of justice is likely to suffer in the absence of investigation by the police. The Magistrate is not expected to mechanically direct investigation by the police without first examining whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, investigation by the State machinery is actually required or not. If the allegations made in the complaint are simple, where the Court can straightaway proceed to conduct the trial, the Magistrate is expected to record evidence and proceed further in the matter, instead of passing the buck to the Police Under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure{S 175 of BNSS}. Ofcourse, if the allegations made in the complaint require complex and complicated investigation which cannot be undertaken without active assistance and expertise of the State machinery, it would only be appropriate for the Magistrate to direct investigation by the police authorities. The Magistrate is, therefore, not supposed to act merely as a Post Office and needs to adopt a judicial approach while considering an application seeking investigation by the Police.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Criminal Appeal No. 352/2020
Decided On: 16.01.2025
Om Prakash Ambadkar Vs. The State of Maharashtra and Ors.
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan, JJ.
Citation: MANU/SC/0134/2025, 2025 INSC 139.
Supreme Court: Under which circumstances Wife, Separated From 1st Husband, Can Claim Maintenance U/S 125 of CRPC From 2nd Husband Though 1st Marriage is Not Legally Dissolved?
The present case does not concern a live-in relationship. The Family Court made a factual finding that Appellant No. 1 married the Respondent and that finding is not disputed by the Respondent. Instead, the Respondent seeks to defeat the right to maintenance by claiming that his marriage to Appellant No. 1 is void ab initio as her first marriage is still subsisting. Two other pertinent facts must be considered: firstly, it is not the case of the Respondent that the truth was concealed from him. In fact, the Family Court makes a specific finding that Respondent was fully aware of the first marriage of the Appellant No. 1. Therefore, Respondent knowingly entered into a marriage with Appellant No. 1 not once, but twice. Secondly, Appellant No. 1 places before this Court an MoU of separation with her first husband. While this is not a legal decree of divorce, it also emerges from this document and other evidence that the parties have dissolved their ties, they have been living separately and Appellant No. 1 is not deriving maintenance from her first husband. Therefore, barring the absence of a legal decree, Appellant No. 1 is de facto separated from her first husband and is not deriving any rights and entitlements as a consequence of that marriage. {Para 17}
18. In the opinion of this Court, when the social justice objective of maintenance Under Section 125 Code of Criminal Procedure is considered against the particular facts and circumstances of this case, we cannot, in good conscience, deny maintenance to Appellant No. 1. It is settled law that social welfare provisions must be subjected to an expansive and beneficial construction and this understanding has been extended to maintenance since Ramesh Chander (supra). An alternate interpretation would not only explicitly defeat the purpose of the provision by permitting vagrancy and destitution, but would also give legal sanction to the actions of the Respondent in knowingly entering into a marriage with Appellant No.1, availing its privileges but escaping its consequent duties and obligations. The only conceivable mischief that could arise in permitting a beneficial interpretation is that the Appellant No.1 could claim dual maintenance--however, that is not the case under the present facts. We are aware that this Court has previously denied maintenance in cases of subsisting marriages (See Yamunabai (supra) and Bakulabai (supra)). However, a plea of separation from the first marriage was not made in those cases and hence, they are factually distinguishable.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Criminal Appeal No. 515 of 2025.
Decided On: 30.01.2025
N. Usha Rani and Ors. Vs. Moodudula Srinivas
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
B.V. Nagarathna and S.C. Sharma, JJ.
Author: S.C. Sharma, J.
Citation: MANU/SC/0142/2025.
Supreme Court: Whether repealing Act require Presidential Assent if Original Act Got President's Assent?
The contention advanced by the Respondent Corporation (KSRTC) that repealing the KCCA Act is unconstitutional because it effectively overrules the decisions of the Supreme Court in Ranganatha Reddy (Supra) and Vijayakumar Sharma (Supra) fails to recognize the dynamic nature of legislative policy. Those Supreme Court decisions merely affirmed the constitutional validity of the KCCA Act at the time of its enactment; they do not bind the Legislature from modifying or repealing a statute when subsequent developments warrant a change in policy. Moreover, the argument that the repeal should have required fresh presidential assent is misplaced. A repeal statute does not recreate the legal framework anew but rather extinguishes the earlier Act's operative provisions; it is not subject to the same procedural requirements as an original enactment when it comes to the need for fresh assent, provided that the repeal falls within the legislative competence of the State. {Para 13}
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Civil Appeal Nos. ... of 2025.
Decided On: 06.02.2025
S.R.S. Travels by its Proprietor K.T. Rajashekar Vs. The Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation Workers and Ors.
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Vikram Nath and P.B. Varale, JJ.
Author: Vikram Nath, J.
Citation: MANU/SC/0147/2025.
Supreme Court: Under which circumstances burden of proof would be on investigating officer that he has supplied grounds of arrest to accused?
The learned Single Judge, unfortunately, has equated information given regarding the Appellant's arrest with the grounds of arrest. The observation that the allegation of non- supply of the grounds of arrest made by the Appellant is a bald allegation is completely uncalled for. All courts, including the High Court, have a duty to uphold fundamental rights. Once a violation of a fundamental right Under Article 22(1) was alleged, it was the duty of the High Court to go into the said contention and decide in one way or the other. When a violation of Article 22(1) is alleged with respect to grounds of arrest, there can be possible two contentions raised: (a) that the arrested person was not informed of the grounds of arrest, or (b) purported information of grounds of arrest does not contain any ground of arrest. As far as the first contention is concerned, the person who is arrested can discharge his burden by simply alleging that grounds of arrest were not informed to him. If such an allegation is made in the pleadings, the entire burden is on the arresting agency or the State to satisfy the court that effective compliance was made with the requirement of Article 22(1). Therefore, the view taken by the High Court is completely erroneous. {Para 31}
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Criminal Appeal No. 621 of 2025.
Decided On: 07.02.2025
Vihaan Kumar Vs. State of Haryana and Ors.
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Abhay Shreeniwas Oka and N. Kotiswar Singh, JJ.
Authored By : Abhay Shreeniwas Oka, N. Kotiswar Singh
Abhay Shreeniwas Oka, J.
Citation: Citation: 2025 INSC 162, MANU/SC/0161/2025.
Read full Judgment here: Click here.
Supreme court: Accused should not be handcuffed and be tied to hospital bed if he is admitted in Hospital
Before we part with this judgment, we must refer to the shocking treatment given to the Appellant by the police. He was taken to a hospital while he was handcuffed and he was chained to the hospital bed. This itself is a violation of the fundamental right of the Appellant Under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The right to live with dignity is a part of the rights guaranteed Under Article 21. We, therefore, propose to direct the State Government to issue necessary directions to ensure that such illegalities are never committed. {Para 29}
e) The State of Haryana shall issue guidelines/departmental instructions to the police (i) to ensure that the act of handcuffing an Accused while he is on a hospital bed and tying him to the hospital bed is not committed again. (ii) to ensure that the constitutional safeguards Under Article 22 are strictly followed. If necessary, the State Government shall amend the existing Rules/guidelines; and
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Criminal Appeal No. 621 of 2025.
Decided On: 07.02.2025
Vihaan Kumar Vs. State of Haryana and Ors.
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Abhay Shreeniwas Oka and N. Kotiswar Singh, JJ.
Authored By : Abhay Shreeniwas Oka, N. Kotiswar Singh
Abhay Shreeniwas Oka, J.
Citation: Citation: 2025 INSC 162, MANU/SC/0161/2025.
Supreme Court: 'Legal Representative' in Motor accident claim petition Is One Who Suffers Loss; Need Not Be Spouse, Child Or Parent Of Deceased
This Court has clarified in the case of Meena Devi v. Nunu Chand Mahto[(2023) 1 SCC 204], that the objective of granting compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, is to ensure that just and fair compensation is paid to the aggrieved party. Another question which arose for our consideration, as for the purpose of loss of dependency, the deduction of annual income should be 1/3rdor 1/4th, as there are five claimants. The Tribunal did not consider appellant Nos.4 and 5, namely, the father and the younger sister, respectively, of the deceased as dependents, stating therein that the father was not dependent on the income of the deceased and since the father is alive, the younger sister is also not dependent on the income of the deceased. This Court inGujarat SRTC v. Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai[(1987) 3 SCC 234],observed that a legal representative is one, who suffers on account of death of a person due to a motor vehicle accident and need not necessarily be a wife, husband, parent or child. {Para 13}
14. Recently in N. Jayasree v. Cholamandalam MS General Insurance Company Ltd. [(2022) 14 SCC 712], this Court observed that :
"16. In our view, the term "legal representative" should be given a wider interpretation for the purpose of Chapter XII of the MV Act and it should not be confined only to mean the spouse, parents and children of the deceased. As noticed above, the MV Act is a benevolent legislation enacted for the object of providing monetary relief to the victims or their families. Therefore, the MV Act calls for a liberal and wider interpretation to serve the real purpose underlying the enactment and fulfil its legislative intent. We are also of the view that in order to maintain a claim petition, it is sufficient for the claimant to establish his loss of dependency. Section 166 of the MV Act makes it clear that every legal representative who suffers on account of the death of a person in a motor vehicle accident should have a remedy for realisation of compensation."
15. In our view, in furtherance of the above exposition of law, the appellant Nos.4 and 5 being the father and younger sister of the deceased, both not financially independent, would fall under the definition of legal representatives for the purpose of claiming the compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, and they were considered as dependents upon the income of the deceased, as he was doing wholesale business of selling fruits to meet the day-to-day expenses of the family. Therefore, the deduction made towards the personal expenses of the deceased should be 1/4thas the number of dependent family members is five.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Civil Appeal No. 3763 of 2025.
Date of Order: 24.01.2025
Sadhana Tomar and Ors. Vs. Ashok Kushwaha and Ors.
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Sanjay Karol and Prashant Kumar Mishra, JJ.
Citation: MANU/SCOR/28227/2025.