If the date is specified for receipt of application for consideration, the Court will not sit in appeal over such an issue and decide to enlarge the time. If the last date was 14.01.2008 for receipt of application, willy-nilly the petitioner has to ensure that the communication reaches before that date. The exclusion, which Section 10 of the General Clauses Act contemplates is an exclusion for computation of period of limitation. It has nothing to do with exclusion of the date for receipt of applications. Section 10 does not apply for a case where a cut-off date is specified for submission of applications. The burden is again on the petitioner to show that a postal delivery was not possible on that date. Again, the mode of dispatch itself is irrelevant, for it is nowhere mentioned that the application should be sent only through Registered Post or through Post. If a hand delivery was also possible and if the petitioner did not avail herself for such a mode, the petitioner cannot make her own lapse as a point in her favour.
1. The writ petition seeks for the consideration of the petitioner's candidature for LPG Agency. An advertisement had been issued stating the last date as 31.12.2007 for receipt of intending parties. It was subsequently extended upto 14.01.2008. The contention of the petitioner was that she had dispatched her application on 13.01.2008 by Speed Post and it was not delivered the following day on 14.01.2008, in view of the fact that it was local holiday. The application was rejected by the 2nd respondent C.W.P. No.2869 of 2009 -2- and communicated to the petitioner on 22.01.2008 that the application had reached beyond the prescribed period and therefore, was not entitled to consideration. The petitioner appears to have made a representation against the communication dated 22.01.2008, which was rejected on 09.05.2008. The petitioner appears to have made several representations as well. The writ petition came to be filed on 25.02.2009 only when an interview was sought to be held for one of the locations, which had been advertised. The petitioner would contend that as per Section 10 of the General Clauses Act, in the matter of computation of period a declared holiday shall be excluded.
2. The contention in defence to the claim of the petitioner is that the petitioner had dispatched her application through Speed Post knowing fully well that the application should be received on or before 14.01.2008 and it was her responsibility to ensure that the application reached before the prescribed date. The petitioner herself could have chosen to deliver it in person and she had adopted for a dispatch through post and if it was not delivered by the Postman, the petitioner cannot take advantage of the same. According to the learned counsel for the respondents, the office was actually working even on 14.01.2008 and even delivery of letters sent through Speed Post would be undertaken on a holiday. If the Postman did not deliver the letter, the petitioner cannot seek for exclusion of that day. The respondent would also urge that the petitioner is guilty of laches, for, a communication regarding rejection of her application was made as early as on 22.01.2008, C.W.P. No.2869 of 2009 -3- while the writ petition was filed only on the eve of the interview just two days before that date on 25.02.2009.
3. If the date is specified for receipt of application for consideration, the Court will not sit in appeal over such an issue and decide to enlarge the time. If the last date was 14.01.2008 for receipt of application, willy-nilly the petitioner has to ensure that the communication reaches before that date. The exclusion, which Section 10 of the General Clauses Act contemplates is an exclusion for computation of period of limitation. It has nothing to do with exclusion of the date for receipt of applications. Section 10 does not apply for a case where a cut-off date is specified for submission of applications. The burden is again on the petitioner to show that a postal delivery was not possible on that date. Again, the mode of dispatch itself is irrelevant, for it is nowhere mentioned that the application should be sent only through Registered Post or through Post. If a hand delivery was also possible and if the petitioner did not avail herself for such a mode, the petitioner cannot make her own lapse as a point in her favour.
4. I also uphold the contention that the petitioner has been guilty of laches. Though the petitioner would try to explain the delay by saying that the petitioner had been engaging the respondent in several representations and that she had also filed an application before the Information Commission for securing some details for presentation of the writ petition, I am unable to accept such a contention in a case where the petitioner was definitely confronted with an unequivocal decision by the respondent that her C.W.P. No.2869 of 2009 -4- application was not being considered since it was belated. The petitioner cannot wait for a year and engage her in communications which were of no avail. In this case even filing of writ petition would have obtained no meaning if what was required to be considered was whether the application was in time and whether the fact that it was declared to be a local holiday made any difference. I have already held that the declaration of a local holiday cannot itself explain the non-submission of the application within the time which the respondents had set out.
5. The petitioner cannot have any remedy and the writ petition is dismissed. No costs.
(K. KANNAN)
JUDGE
March 03, 2010
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