Sunday, 5 July 2015

Conditions which can be imposed while releasing seized vehicle on supratnama?


Therefore, this application can be allowed by modifying the condition Nos. (i), (ii) and (iii) in the impugned order dated 17/6/2014. Insofar as the contention regarding imposing of additional condition is concerned, I do not think that same is necessary as the applicant is a well established finance company which is furnishing an undertaking as well as an indemnity bond, which, therefore, are to be seen to be as good as a Bank guarantee. In the result, the application is allowed and the condition Nos. (i), (ii) and (iii) of the order dated 17/6/2014 are hereby deleted and substituted by the following conditions.:
I. The photographs of the seized vehicles taken by the Investigating Officer shall be used as secondary evidence during the trial and, therefore, physical production of the vehicles is dispensed with.
II. The applicant is permitted to sell the vehicles by auction. Before auctioning off the vehicles the applicant shall get the vehicles valued by recognized Government Valuer and the Valuation Report shall be submitted to the trial Court. The details of the auction and auction proceedings shall be submitted to the trial Court.
III. The applicant shall submit an indemnity bond, stating therein, that the applicant shall remit the proceeds from the sale of the vehicles conducted through auction by the applicant to such party as may be directed by the Court. The applicant shall also submit an undertaking within two weeks from the date of the order to the effect that in the event the ownership of vehicles is found to be vested with the accused persons, the sale proceeds of the vehicles shall be deposited by it in the trial Court or shall be paid by it in terms of the order to be passed in that regard by the trial Court.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (NAGPUR BENCH)
Criminal Application (Apl.) No. 431 of 2014
Decided On: 06.01.2015
Appellants: Shriram Transport Finance Co. Ltd.
Vs.
Respondent: The State of Maharashtra and Ors.
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:S.B. Shukre, J.
 Citation: 2015ALLMR(Cri)2257
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Whether wife can be denied maintenance on the ground of customary divorce?


It   is   to   be   noted   in   the   present   case   that   the 
parties   are   governed   by   the   Hindu   Law.     Both   the   Courts 
below have recorded specific and clear­cut finding that the 
petitioner/husband could not establish the custom prevailing 
in their caste, by which customary divorce can be given.   In 
absence of any custom, any document purported to be the 
divorce deed, has no value in the eye of law.  In that view of 
the   matter,   the   submission   of   the   learned   counsel   for   the 
petitioner   that   in   view   of   the   divorce   deed   [Exh.29],   the 
application   itself   is   not   maintainable   can   not   be   accepted. 
Further,   the   learned   revisional   Court   has   rightly   observed 

that   the   proceedings   u/s   125   of   the   Code   of   Criminal 
Procedure   were   filed   on   22/09/1999,   whereas   the   divorce 
deed is executed on 26/09/1999.   The learned trial Court, in 
the light of the admission given by the husband that he got 
the   divorce   deed   executed   because   he   wanted   to   perform 
second   marriage,   rightly   recorded   finding   that   the   divorce 
deed got executed by the husband from the wife, can not be 

relied upon.     Further, once the husband failed to point out 
the  custom, the  husband is  dis­entitled to  take  any benefit 
from such customary divorce deed.                                                                        
      
CRIMINAL WRIT PETITION NO. 528 OF 2002
          IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY   
                                BENCH AT AURANGABAD
Gangadhar S/o Manika Huge


V E R S U S

Rekhabai W/o Gangadhar Huge

           
    
        
CORAM : V.M.DESHPANDE, J.
                                
        
  
DATE OF JUDGMENT : 9th FEBRUARY, 2015   
Citation;2015 ALLMR(CRI)2243
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Whether in cheque dishonour case it is necessary to issue individual notices to directors of company?


Criminal - Acquittal - Dishonour of cheque - Validity of notice - Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 - Application filed by Appellant in High Court seeking leave to prefer appeal against judgment acquitting 1st and 2nd Respondents-Directors was rejected - Hence, present appeal - Whether notice under Section 138 of was mandatorily required to be sent to directors of Company before complaint could be filed against such directors along with Company - Held, there is nothing in Section 138 of Act which might even remotely suggest issuance of notice to anyone other than drawer - If it was Directors' case that offence was committed without their knowledge or that they had exercised due diligence to prevent such commission, it would be matter of defence to be considered at appropriate stage in trial and certainly not at stage of notice under Section 138 of Act - Section 138 of Act does not admit of any necessity or scope for reading into it requirement that Directors of Company in question must also be issued individual notices under Section 138 of Act - Since matter was at stage of considering application for leave to appeal and merits of matter were not considered by High Court, matter was remitted to High Court for fresh consideration - Impugned order set aside 
Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1220 of 2009
KIRSHNA TEXPORT &
CAPITAL MARKETS LTD.

Versus
ILA A. AGRAWAL & ORS.
Citation;2015 ALLMR(CRI)2414 SC,2015(3)BomCR544, 2015(2)BomCR(Cri)593,
Uday Umesh Lalit, J.

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Accused can raise plea of juvenility at any time and before any court ?

The Third and last ground pleaded before us was the plea of juvenility of the accused appellant. The accused appellant has submitted before us, true copy of the certificate issued by the Basiapara Nodal U.P. School which shows that the accused appellant was less than 18 years on the date of the occurrence. As per the School Certificate, the date of birth of the appellant is 08.07.1976. The age of the appellant on the date of occurrence i.e. 28.8.1993, was 17 years, 1 month & 20 days. The learned counsel for the appellant raises the plea of juvenility underSection 7(A) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection) Act, 2000. The plea can be raised before any Court and at any point of time. We feel that the stand taken by the counsel is correct and we will look into the present lis keeping in mind the juvenility of the accused appellant at the time of commission of the crime. As stated earlier, the age of the accused appellant was less than 18 years at the time of the incident. It has been brought to our notice that the appellant has undergone about 8 years in jail. The appellant falls within the definition of “juvenile” underSection 2(k) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of children) Act, 2000. He can raise the plea of juvenility at any time and before any court as per the mandate of Section 7(a) and has rightly done so. It has been proved before us, as per the procedure given in the Rule 12 of the Juvenile Justice Model Rules, 2007, and the age of the accused appellant has been determined following the correct procedure and there is no doubt regarding it.

Supreme Court of India
Upendra Pradhan vs State Of Orissa on 28 April, 2015

Bench: Pinaki Chandra Ghose, R.K. Agrawal

Citation;2015 ALLMR(CRI)2444 SC
                             
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