After reproducing the said paragraph, the Court proceeded to state
thus:
"Though there is no such statutory bar, the premise on which the High Court
quashed the proceedings was that the investigation by the same officer who
"lodged" the FIR would prejudice the accused inasmuch as the investigating
officer cannot be expected to act fairly and objectively. We find no
principle or binding authority to hold that the moment the competent police
officer, on the basis of information received, makes out an FIR
incorporating his name as the informant, he forfeits his right to
investigate. If at all, such investigation could only be assailed on the
ground of bias or real likelihood of bias on the part of the investigating
officer. The question of bias would depend on the facts and circumstances
of each case and it is not proper to lay down a broad and unqualified
proposition, in the manner in which it has been done by the High Court,
that whenever a police officer proceeds to investigate after registering
the FIR on his own, the investigation would necessarily be unfair or
biased. In the present case, the police officer received certain discreet
information, which, according to his assessment, warranted a probe and
therefore made up his mind to investigate. The formality of preparing the
FIR in which he records the factum of having received the information about
the suspected commission of the offence and then taking up the
investigation after registering the crime, does not, by any semblance of
reasoning, vitiate the investigation on the ground of bias or the like
factor. If the reason which weighed with the High Court could be a ground
to quash the prosecution, the powers of investigation conferred on the
police officers would be unduly hampered for no good reason. What is
expected to be done by the police officers in the normal course of
discharge of their official duties will then be vulnerable to attack."
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 554 OF 2012
Vinod Kumar V State of Punjab
Citation;2015ALLSCR900,AIR2015SC1206,2015CriLJ1442,(2015)3SCC220
If one is asked a question, what afflicts the legally requisite
criminal trial in its conceptual eventuality in this country the two
reasons that may earn the status of phenomenal signification are, first,
procrastination of trial due to non-availability of witnesses when the
trial is in progress and second, unwarranted adjournments sought by the
counsel conducting the trial and the unfathomable reasons for acceptation
of such prayers for adjournments by the trial courts, despite a statutory
command under Section 309 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC)
and series of pronouncements by this Court. What was a malady at one time,
with the efflux of time, has metamorphosed into malignancy. What was a mere
disturbance once has become a disorder, a diseased one, at present.
2. The instant case frescoes and depicts a scenario that exemplifies how
due to passivity of the learned trial Judge, a witness, despite having
stood embedded absolutely firmly in his examination-in-chief, has
audaciously and, in a way, obnoxiously, thrown all the values to the wind,
and paved the path of tergiversation. It would not be a hyperbole to say
that it is a maladroit and ingeniously designed attempt to strangulate and
crucify the fundamental purpose of trial, that is, to arrive at the truth
on the basis of evidence on record. The redeeming feature is, despite the
malevolent and injurious assault, the cause of justice has survived, for
there is, in the ultimate eventuate, a conviction which is under assail in
this appeal, by special leave.
3. The narration of the sad chronology shocks the judicial conscience
and gravitates the mind to pose a question, is it justified for any
conscientious trial Judge to ignore the statutory command, not recognize
"the felt necessities of time" and remain impervious to the cry of the
collective asking for justice or give an indecent and uncalled for burial
to the conception of trial, totally ostracizing the concept that a
civilized and orderly society thrives on rule of law which includes "fair
trial" for the accused as well as the prosecution.
4. In the aforesaid context, we may recapitulate a passage from Gurnaib
Singh V. State of Punjab.[1]
"...... We are compelled to proceed to reiterate the law and express our
anguish pertaining to the manner in which the trial was conducted as it
depicts a very disturbing scenario. As is demonstrable from the record, the
trial was conducted in an extremely haphazard and piecemeal manner.
Adjournments were granted on a mere asking. The cross-examination of the
witnesses was deferred without recording any special reason and dates were
given after a long gap. The mandate of the law and the views expressed by
this Court from time to time appears to have been totally kept at bay. The
learned trial Judge, as is perceptible, seems to have ostracised from his
memory that a criminal trial has its own gravity and sanctity. In this
regard, we may refer with profit to the pronouncement in Talab Haji Hussain
v. Madhukar Purshottam Mondkar[2] wherein it has been stated that an
accused person by his conduct cannot put a fair trial into jeopardy, for it
is the primary and paramount duty of the criminal courts to ensure that the
risk to fair trial is removed and trials are allowed to proceed smoothly
without any interruption or obstruction."
5. Be it noted, in the said case, the following passage from Swaran
Singh V. State of Punjab[3], was reproduced.
"It has become more or less a fashion to have a criminal case adjourned
again and again till the witness tires and gives up. It is the game of
unscrupulous lawyers to get adjournments for one excuse or the [pic]other
till a witness is won over or is tired. Not only is a witness threatened,
he is abducted, he is maimed, he is done away with, or even bribed. There
is no protection for him. In adjourning the matter without any valid cause
a court unwittingly becomes party to miscarriage of justice."
6. In this regard, it is also fruitful to refer to the authority in
State of U.P. V. Shambu Nath Singh[4], wherein this Court deprecating the
practice of a Sessions Court adjourning a case in spite of the presence of
the witnesses willing to be examined fully, opined thus:
"9. We make it abundantly clear that if a witness is present in court he
must be examined on that day. The court must know that most of the
witnesses could attend the court only at heavy cost to them, after keeping
aside their own avocation. Certainly they incur suffering and loss of
income. The meagre amount of bhatta (allowance) which a witness may be paid
by the court is generally a poor solace for the financial loss incurred by
him. It is a sad plight in the trial courts that witnesses who are called
through summons or other processes stand at the doorstep from morning till
evening only to be told at the end of the day that the case is adjourned to
another day. This primitive practice must be reformed by the presiding
officers of the trial courts and it can be reformed by everyone provided
the presiding officer concerned has a commitment towards duty."
7. With the aforesaid concern and agony, we shall presently proceed to
adumbrate the necessitous facts. We have already stated that despite the
impasse, there is a conviction by the trial Judge and an affirmation
thereof by the High Court. Elucidating the factual score, be it noted, the
instant appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 13.10.2011
passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in Criminal
Appeal No. 1280-SB of 2001 (O&M) wherein the learned Single Judge has
given the stamp of approval to the judgment and order dated 24.10.2001
passed by the learned Special Judge, Patiala whereby he had convicted the
appellant under Section 7 and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act,
1988 (for brevity, 'the Act') and sentenced him to undergo rigorous
imprisonment for a period of two years and to pay a fine of Rs.2,000/- with
a default clause.
8. The prosecution case, as has been unfurled, is that Baj Singh, PW-5,
used to bring earth in tractor trolley within the municipal area of
Rajpura. The appellant, at the relevant time, was posted as Octroi
Inspector and he demanded Rs.20/- per trolley for permitting him to enter
into the municipal area. Eventually, a deal was struck that the accused-
appellant would be paid Rs.500/- per month for the smooth operation. As
the prosecution story further unfolds, on 25.1.1995, Baj Singh met Jagdish
Verma, PW-7, and disclosed before him the fact about the demand of the
accused for permitting the entry of the tractor trolley inside the
municipal area and thereafter, as he was not desirous of obliging the
accused, he narrated the entire story to DSP Vigilance, who in his turn,
with the intention to lay the trap, explained it to Baj Singh, PW-5, and
Jagdish Verma, PW-7 about the procedure of the trap. As alleged, Baj Singh
gave five notes of Rs.100/- to the DSP Vigilance who noted the numbers of
the notes and completed other formalities like applying phenolphthalein
powder on the currency notes. Thereafter, they proceeded to the place of
the accused and a trap was laid. Eventually, currency notes amounting to
Rs.500/- were recovered from the trouser of the appellant and were taken
into possession. The statements of the witnesses were recorded and after
completing the investigation chargesheet was placed for the offences
punishable under Sections 7 and 13(2) of the Act.
9. To bring home the charges against the accused-appellant, the
prosecution examined eight witnesses. PW-1 to PW-4 are formal witnesses.
PW-5, the complainant resiled from his previous statement and was cross-
examined by the prosecution. Sher Singh, PW-6, a clerk in the office of
Tehsildar, Rajpura had joined the police party as an independent witness.
He supported the case of the prosecution in detail. Jagdish Verma, PW-7,
in his examination-in-chief, supported the prosecution case in all aspects,
but in cross-examination, resiled from his examination-in-chief. The
witness, PW-7, was declared hostile on a prayer being made by the Public
Prosecutor and was re-examined. Narinder Pal Kaushal, PW-8, DSP of
Vigilance Bureau who had led the raiding party on 25.1.1995, in his
deposition, deposed in detail about the conducting of the raid and recovery
of the amount.
10. The accused, in his statement under Section 313 CrPC, denied the
allegations and took the plea of false implication due to party faction and
animosity. It was his further stand that he was brought from his office
and was taken to the office of the Tehsildar and thereafter to the
Vigilance office.
11. The learned trial Judge, on the basis of the evidence brought on
record, came to hold that though the complainant had not supported the case
of the prosecution yet prosecution had been able to prove the demand and
acceptance of the bribe and the recovery of the tainted money from the
accused and, therefore, the presumption as envisaged under Section 20 of
the Act would get attracted and accordingly convicted the accused and
sentenced him, as has been stated hereinbefore.
12. In appeal, it was contended before the High Court that when the
testimony of Baj Singh, PW-5, and Jagdish Verma, PW-7, the shadow witness,
was absolutely incredible, the same could not have been pervertedly
filtered by the learned trial Judge to convict the accused-appellant for
the crime in question. It was also urged that mere recovery of the
currency notes would not constitute the offence under Section 7 of the Act.
It was also propounded that the offence under Section 13(2) of the Act
would not get attracted unless the demand and acceptance were proven. Non-
involvement of any independent witness in the raid was also seriously
criticised. The High Court posed the question whether the prosecution had
been able to prove the factum of demand of bribe, its acceptance and the
recovery of the money from the possession of the accused. With regard to
demand of bribe, the High Court placed reliance on the testimony of the
independent witness Sher Singh, PW-6, and the examination-in-chief of
Jagdish Verma, PW-7, and came to hold that the demand of bribe had been
proven. It appreciated the deposition of PW-7 and the documents,
especially, the Chemical Examiner's report of the hand wash liquid and came
to hold there had been acceptance of bribe. Relating to the recovery of
the tainted money, the High Court took note of the fact that the ocular
testimony had been duly corroborated by the documentary evidence and hence,
the recovery had been proved.
13. Be it noted, the High Court placed reliance upon Raghubir Singh V.
State of Haryana[5] and Madhukar Bhaskarrao Joshi V. State of
Maharashtra[6] and eventually came to hold that the prosecution had proven
its case to the hilt and resultantly affirmed the conviction and order of
sentence passed by the trial Court, but reduced the sentence of 2 years'
rigorous imprisonment to one year.
14. Criticizing the conviction as recorded by the learned trial Judge and
affirmed by the High Court, it is submitted by Mr. Jain, learned senior
counsel for the appellant that when the informant had not supported the
case of the prosecution, it was not justifiable on the part of the learned
trial Judge to record a conviction against the accused. It is his
submission that on the basis of the testimony of PW-6 to PW-8, the
conviction could not have been recorded, for Sher Singh, PW-6, is not a
witness either to the demand or acceptance of the bribe by the appellant
and further the version PW-7 requires careful scrutiny, regard being had to
the fact that he is a hostile witness. It is also urged that the evidence
of PW-8 deserves to be discarded as he is an interested witness. To
bolster the aforesaid submissions, learned senior counsel has drawn
inspiration from B. Jayaraj V. State of Andhra Pradesh[7] and M.R.
Purushotham Vs. State of Karnataka[8].
15. Apart from above, it is further put forth by him that as PW-7 has not
supported the prosecution story and stated to have been tutored to give
statement, his whole testimony should have been thrown out of consideration
and no reliance should have been placed on it. It is contended by him
that the High Court has failed to appreciate the importance of cross-
examination of PW-7 and hence, the judgment affirming the conviction is
absolutely flawed. To buttress the said submission, reliance has been
placed on Sat Paul V. Delhi Administration[9]. It is the further stand of
Mr. Jain, learned senior counsel that the evidence of the trap witnesses,
PW-6 and PW-8 should have been wholly ignored as they are partisan
witnesses and their statements could not have been given any credence to
inasmuch as there has been no corroboration. In this context, he has
commended us to the authorities in State of Bihar V. Basawan Singh
(CB)[10], Major E.G. Barsey V. State of Bombay[11], Bhanupratap Hariprasad
Dave V. State of Gujarat[12] and MO Shamshuddin V. State of Kerala[13].
16. Learned senior counsel would contend, solely on the basis of evidence
of recovery, a conviction is not sustainable and in the obtaining factual
matrix, the presumption under Section 20 of the Act would not be attracted.
To substantiate the said proposition, strength has been drawn from C.M.
Girish Babu V. C.B.I., Cochin[14] and Benarsi Das V. State of Haryana[15].
17. The last plank of submission of Mr. Jain, is that in the instant
case, the prosecution was launched by Narinder Pal Kaushal, PW-8, who has
investigated into the case and, therefore, the concept of fair
investigation, has been totally marred as a consequence of which, the trial
is vitiated. Learned senior counsel would contend that a person who is a
part of the trap party is an interested witness and he would be
enthusiastic to see that the trap is sustained in every manner and in such
a situation, it is per se an unfair and biased investigation that
frustrates the essential principle inhered under Article 21 of the
Constitution and eventually the trial.
18. Mr. Madhukar, learned senior counsel appearing for the State of
Punjab, per contra, would contend that the view expressed by the learned
trial Judge and the High Court cannot be found fault with, for a conviction
under the Act can be based on the evidence of trap witnesses, if they are
trustworthy and the ingredients of the offence are satisfied and in the
case at hand, the High Court on x-ray of the evidence has so recorded. It
is urged by him that neither the learned trial Judge nor the High Court has
fallen into error by applying the principle of presumption as engrafted
under Section 20 of the Act. It is canvassed by Mr. Madhukar that the
evidence of the hostile witness can be placed reliance upon by the
prosecution and in the obtaining factual matrix, the testimony of PW-7, one
of the shadow witnesses, renders immense assistance for establishing the
case of the prosecution. He has with great pains, taken us through the
evidence to substantiate the stand that the conviction recorded against the
appellant is totally defensible.
19. Keeping in abeyance what we intend to say on the facet of anguish
expressed by us in the beginning, we shall proceed to deal with the
proponement of Mr. Jain that when the investigation conducted by Mr.
Narinder Pal Kaushal, PW-8, is vitiated on the foundation that he has
lodged the FIR, the trial is also vitiated. Though the said submission has
been raised and taken note of by us as the last plank, yet we think it
seemly to deal with it first as it goes to the root of the matter. On a
perusal of the material on record, it is manifest that PW-8 is a part of
the raiding party, a shadow witness, and admittedly had also sent the
complaint through a Constable to the concerned police station for lodging
of FIR. This being the factual score, we are required to take note of
certain authorities in this regard. In Basawan Singh (supra), the
Constitution Bench, after referring to the decision in Shiv Bahadur Singh
V. State of Vindhya Pradesh[16], opined that the said decision does not lay
down an invariable rule that the evidence of the witness of the raiding
party must be discarded in the absence of any independent corroboration.
The larger Bench proceeded to state thus:
"......The correct rule is this: if any of the witnesses are accomplices
who are particeps criminis in respect of the actual crime charged, their
evidence must be treated as the evidence of accomplices is treated; if they
are not accomplices but are partisan or interested witnesses, who are
concerned in the success of the trap, their evidence must be tested in the
same way as other interested evidence is tested by the application of
diverse consideration which must vary from case to case, and in a proper
case, the Court may even look for independent corroboration before
convicting the accused person. If a Magistrate puts himself in the
position of a partisan or interested witness, he cannot claim any higher
status and must be treated as any other interested witness."
20. In Major E.G. Barsey (supra), while dealing with the evidence of a
trap witness, the court opined that though a trap witness is not an
approver, he is certainly an interested witness in the sense that he is
interested to see that the trap laid by him succeeds. The Court further
laid down that he can at least be equated with a partisan witness and it
would not be admissible to rely upon his evidence without corroboration,
but his evidence is not a tainted one.
21. In Bhanupratap Hariprasad Dave (supra), the Court observed that the
police witnesses can be said to be partisan witnesses as they are
interested in the success of the trap laid by them, but it cannot be said
that they are accomplices. Thereafter, the Court proceeded to state that
their evidence must be tested in the same way as any other interested
witness is tested and in an appropriate case, the Court may look for
independent corroboration before convicting the accused person. The three-
Judge Bench reiterated the principle thus:
"....It is now well settled by a series of decisions of this Court that
while in the case of evidence of an accomplice, no conviction can be based
on his evidence unless it is corroborated in material particulars but as
regards the evidence of a partisan witness it is open to a court to convict
an accused person solely on the basis of that evidence, if it is satisfied
that that evidence is reliable. But it may in appropriate case look for
corroboration".
22. In MO Shamshuddin (supra), the Court, after referring to the
decisions in DPP V. Hester[17] and DPP V. Kilbourne[18], made a distinction
between accomplice and an interested witness. The Court, referred to the
authority in Basawan Singh (supra) at length and eventually adverted to the
concept of corroborating evidence. In that context it has been ruled thus:
".......Now coming to the nature of corroborating evidence that is
required, it is well-settled that the corroborating evidence can be even by
way of circumstantial evidence. No general rule can be laid down with
respect to [pic]quantum of evidence corroborating the testimony of a trap
witness which again would depend upon its own facts and circumstances like
the nature of the crime, the character of trap witness etc. and other
general requirements necessary to sustain the conviction in that case. The
court should weigh the evidence and then see whether corroboration is
necessary. Therefore as a rule of law it cannot be laid down that the
evidence of every complainant in a bribery case should be corroborated in
all material particulars and otherwise it cannot be acted upon. Whether
corroboration is necessary and if so to what extent and what should be its
nature depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. In a case of
bribe, the person who pays the bribe and those who act as intermediaries
are the only persons who can ordinarily be expected to give evidence about
the bribe and it is not possible to get absolutely independent evidence
about the payment of bribe."
From the aforesaid authorities it is clear that a trap witness is an
interested witness and his testimony, to be accepted and relied upon
requires corroboration and the corroboration would depend upon the facts
and circumstances, nature of the crime and the character of the trap
witness.
23. There is no doubt that the status of PW8 is that of an interested
witness. There is no cavil over the fact that he had sent the FIR and
conducted the investigation, but the question posed is whether the
investigation by him is vitiated. In this context we may, with profit,
refer to the decision in Bhagwan Singh V. State of Rajasthan[19], where
one Ram Singh, who was a Head Constable, was the person to whom the offer
of bribe was alleged to have been made by the appellant therein and he was
the informant who had lodged the First Information Report for taking action
against the appellant. He himself had undertaken the investigation. In
that factual backdrop the Court ruled thus:
"Now, ordinarily this Court does not interfere with concurrent findings of
fact reached by the trial court and the High Court on an appreciation of
the evidence. But this is one of those rare and exceptional cases where we
find that several important circumstances have not been taken into account
by the trial court and the High Court and that has resulted in serious
miscarriage of justice calling for interference from this Court. We may
first refer to a rather disturbing feature of this case. It is indeed such
an unusual feature that it is quite surprising that it should have escaped
the notice of the trial court and the High Court. Head Constable Ram Singh
was the person to whom the offer of bribe was alleged to have been made by
the appellant and he was the informant or complainant who lodged the first
information report for taking action against the appellant. It is difficult
to understand how in these circumstances Head Constable Ram Singh could
undertake investigation of the case. How could the complainant himself be
the investigator? In fact, Head Constable Ram Singh, being an officer below
the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police, was not authorised to
investigate the case but we do not attach any importance to that fact, as
that may not affect the validity of the conviction. The infirmity which we
are pointing out is not an infirmity arising from investigation by an
officer not authorised to do so, but an infirmity arising from
investigation by a Head Constable who was himself the person to whom the
bribe was alleged to have been offered and who lodged the first information
report as informant or complainant. This is an infirmity which is bound to
reflect on the credibility of the prosecution case".
24. In Megha Singh V. State of Haryana[20], the Court noticed the
discrepancy in the depositions of PW-2 and PW-3 and absence of independent
corroboration. Be it noted, the Court was dealing with an offence under
Section 6(1) of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act,
1985. In that context the Court observed that the testimony of the said
witnesses did not inspire confidence about the reliability of the
prosecution's case. Proceeding further, the Court held:
".... We have also noted another disturbing feature in this case. PW 3,
Siri Chand, Head Constable arrested the accused and on search being
conducted by him a pistol and the cartridges were recovered from the
accused. It was on his complaint a formal first information report was
lodged and the case was initiated. He being complainant should not have
proceeded with the investigation of the case. But it appears to us that he
was not only the complainant in the case but he carried on with the
investigation and examined witnesses under Section 161 CrPC. Such
practice, to say the least, should not be resorted to so that there may not
be any occasion to suspect fair and impartial investigation".
25. In this regard, it is useful to refer to the pronouncement in State
vs. V. Jayapaul[21] wherein the Court posed the question whether the High
Court was justified in quashing the criminal proceedings on the ground that
the police officer, who had lodged/recorded the FIR regarding the suspected
commission of certain cognizable offence by the respondent should not have
investigated the case. The case against the accused was that he was
indulging in corrupt practices by extracting money from the drivers and
owners of the motor-vehicles while conducting check of the vehicles and
making use of certain bogus notice forms in the process. The charge-sheet
was filed under Sections 420 and 201 I.P.C. and Section 13(2) read with
Section 13(1)(d) of the Act. The Court referred to the decision in the
State of U.P. V. Bhagwant Kishore Joshi[22], wherein it has been ruled
thus:
"Section 154 of the Code prescribes the mode of recording the information
received orally or in writing by an officer in charge of a police station
in respect of the commission of a cognisable offence. Section 156 thereof
authorises such an officer to investigate any cognisable offence prescribed
therein. Though ordinarily investigation is [pic]undertaken on information
received by a police officer, the receipt of information is not a condition
precedent for investigation. Section 157 prescribes the procedure in the
matter of such an investigation which can be initiated either on
information or otherwise. It is clear from the said provisions that an
officer in charge of a police station can start investigation either on
information or otherwise."
26. After reproducing the said paragraph, the Court proceeded to state
thus:
"Though there is no such statutory bar, the premise on which the High Court
quashed the proceedings was that the investigation by the same officer who
"lodged" the FIR would prejudice the accused inasmuch as the investigating
officer cannot be expected to act fairly and objectively. We find no
principle or binding authority to hold that the moment the competent police
officer, on the basis of information received, makes out an FIR
incorporating his name as the informant, he forfeits his right to
investigate. If at all, such investigation could only be assailed on the
ground of bias or real likelihood of bias on the part of the investigating
officer. The question of bias would depend on the facts and circumstances
of each case and it is not proper to lay down a broad and unqualified
proposition, in the manner in which it has been done by the High Court,
that whenever a police officer proceeds to investigate after registering
the FIR on his own, the investigation would necessarily be unfair or
biased. In the present case, the police officer received certain discreet
information, which, according to his assessment, warranted a probe and
therefore made up his mind to investigate. The formality of preparing the
FIR in which he records the factum of having received the information about
the suspected commission of the offence and then taking up the
investigation after registering the crime, does not, by any semblance of
reasoning, vitiate the investigation on the ground of bias or the like
factor. If the reason which weighed with the High Court could be a ground
to quash the prosecution, the powers of investigation conferred on the
police officers would be unduly hampered for no good reason. What is
expected to be done by the police officers in the normal course of
discharge of their official duties will then be vulnerable to attack."
Be it noted, the Court distinguished the decisions in Bhagwant
Kishore Joshi (supra) and Megha Singh (supra).
27. At this juncture, it would be fruitful to refer to S.Jeevanatham V.
State (through Inspector of Police, T.N.)[23]. In the said case, the
appellant was found guilty under Section 8(c) read with Section 20(b)(ii)
of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985. One of the
contentions that was canvassed was that PW-8, who lodged the FIR had
himself conducted the investigation and hence, the entire investigation was
vitiated. The Court referred to the decision in Jayapaul (supra) and
opined thus:
"In the instant case, PW 8 conducted the search and recovered the
contraband article and registered the case and the article seized from the
appellants was narcotic drug and the counsel for the appellants could not
point out any circumstances by which the investigation caused prejudice or
was biased against the appellants. PW 8 in his official capacity gave the
information, registered the case and as part of his official duty later
[pic]investigated the case and filed a charge-sheet. He was not in any way
personally interested in the case. We are unable to find any sort of bias
in the process of investigation."
28. In the instant case, PW-8, who was a member of the raiding party had
sent the report to the police station and thereafter carried the formal
investigation. In fact, nothing has been put to him to elicit that he was
anyway personally interested to get the appellant convicted. In our
considered view, the decision in S. Jeevanatham (supra) would be squarely
applicable to the present case and, accordingly, without any reservation we
repel the submission so assiduously urged by Mr. Jain, learned senior
counsel for the appellant.
29. The next aspect which requires to be adverted to is whether testimony
of a hostile evidence that has come on record should be relied upon or not.
Mr. Jain, learned senior counsel for the appellant would contend that as
PW-7 has totally resiled in his cross-examination, his evidence is to be
discarded in toto. On a perusal of the testimony of the said witness, it
is evincible that in examination-in-chief, he has supported the prosecution
story in entirety and in the cross-examination he has taken the path of
prevarication. In Bhagwan Singh V. State of Haryana[24], it has been laid
down that even if a witness is characterised has a hostile witness, his
evidence is not completely effaced. The said evidence remains admissible
in the trial and there is no legal bar to base a conviction upon his
testimony, if corroborated by other reliable evidence. In Khuji @ Surendra
Tiwari V. State of Madhya Pradesh[25], the Court after referring to the
authorities in Bhagwan Singh (supra), Rabindra Kumar Dey V. State of
Orissa[26] and Syad Akbar V. State of Karnataka[27], opined that the
evidence of such a witness cannot be effaced or washed off the record
altogether, but the same can be accepted to the extent it is found to be
dependable on a careful scrutiny thereof.
30. In this context, we think it apt to reproduce some passages from
Rammi @ Rameshwar V. State of Madhya Pradesh[28], where the Court was
dealing with the purpose of re-examination. After referring to Section 138
of the Evidence Act, the Court held thus:
"There is an erroneous impression that re-examination should be confined to
clarification of ambiguities which have been brought down in cross-
examination. No doubt, ambiguities can be resolved through re-examination.
But that is not the only function of the re-examiner. If the party who
called the witness feels that explanation is required for any matter
referred to in cross-examination he has the liberty to put any question in
re-examination to get the explanation. The Public Prosecutor should
formulate his questions for that purpose. Explanation may be required
either when the ambiguity remains regarding any answer elicited during
cross-examination or even otherwise. If the Public Prosecutor feels that
certain answers require more elucidation from the witness he has the
freedom and the right to put such questions as he deems necessary for that
purpose, subject of course to the control of the court in accordance with
the other provisions. But the court cannot direct him to confine his
questions to ambiguities alone which arose in cross-examination.
Even if the Public Prosecutor feels that new matters should be elicited
from the witness he can do so, in which case the only requirement is that
he must secure permission of the court. If the court thinks that such new
matters are necessary for proving any material fact, courts must be liberal
in granting permission to put necessary questions".
31. We have reproduced the aforesaid paragraphs to highlight that when
the prosecution has such a right in the process of re-examination, as a
natural corollary, the testimony of a hostile witness cannot be brushed
aside. On the contrary, both the prosecution and the defence can rely for
their stand and stance. Emphasis on re-examination by the prosecution is
not limited to any answer given in the cross-examination, but the Public
Prosecutor has the freedom and right to put such questions as it deems
necessary to elucidate certain answers from the witness. It is not
confined to clarification of ambiguities, which have been brought down in
the cross-examination.
32. Mr. Jain, learned senior counsel has propounded that testimony of PW7
deserves to be discredited, and the learned trial Judge as well as the High
Court having not ignored have committed a grave error. We will be dealing
with the aspect whether the evidence of PW-7 should be totally ignored or
not while we will be dwelling upon the credibility and acceptability of his
testimony.
33. As a contention has been raised that once the informant has resiled
totally from his earlier statement no conviction can be recorded on the
basis of evidence of the trap witnesses, it required to be carefully
dwelled upon. In this regard, reference to the authority in Hazari Lal v.
State (Delhi Administration)[29] would be apt. In the said case a police
Constable was convicted under Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption
Act, 1947 on the allegation that he had demanded and received Rs.60/- from
the informant who was examined as PW-3 and had resiled from his previous
statement and was declared hostile by the prosecution. Official witnesses
had supported the prosecution version. Keeping in mind the evidence of the
official witnesses the trial Court had convicted the appellant therein
which was affirmed by the High Court. A contention was raised that in the
absence of any direct evidence to show that the police constable demanded
or accepted bribery no presumption under Section 4 of the Act, 1947 could
be drawn merely on the strength of recovery of the marked currency notes
from the said police constable. Chinnappa Reddy, J. speaking for the two-
Judge Bench observed as follows:-
"...It is not necessary that the passing of money should be proved by
direct evidence. It may also be proved by circumstantial evidence. The
events which followed in quick succession in the present case lead to the
only inference that the money was obtained by the accused from PW 3. Under
Section 114 of the Evidence Act the court may presume the existence of any
fact which it thinks likely to have happened, regard being had to the
common course of natural events, human conduct and public and private
business, in their relation to facts of the particular case. One of the
illustrations to Section 114 of the Evidence Act is that the court may
presume that a person who is in possession of the stolen goods soon after
the theft, is either the thief or has received the goods knowing them to be
stolen, unless he can account for his possession. So too, in the facts and
circumstances of the present case the court may presume that the accused
who took out the currency notes from his pocket and flung them across the
wall had obtained them from PW 3, who a few minutes earlier was shown to
have been in possession of the notes. Once we arrive at the finding that
the accused had obtained the money from PW 3, the presumption under Section
4(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act is immediately attracted."
34. It is pertinent to note here that in the aforesaid case the decision
rendered in Sita Ram v. State of Rajasthan[30] was pressed into service.
In the case of Sita Ram (supra) the complainant had turned hostile in the
court of Special Judge. However, the trial Judge convicted the accused who
was tried along with another accused, namely, Vikram Singh. The High court
on appreciation of the evidence acquitted Vikram Singh but maintained the
conviction against Sita Ram. This Court opined that the presumption under
Section 4(1) of the 1947 Act could not be drawn in the facts of the case.
The question, whether the rest of the evidence was sufficient to establish
that the accused had obtained the money from the complaint was not
considered. The Court in Hazari Lal (supra) distinguished the
pronouncement in Sita Ram (supra) by stating thus:-
"...The question whether the rest of the evidence was sufficient to
establish that the accused had obtained the money from the complainant was
not considered. All that was taken as established was the recovery of
certain money from the person of the accused and it was held that mere
recovery of money was not enough to entitle the drawing of the presumption
under Section 4(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The Court did not
consider the further question whether recovery of the money along with
other circumstances could establish that the accused had obtained
gratification from any person. In the present case we have found that the
circumstances established by the prosecution entitled the court to hold
that the accused received the gratification from PW 3. In Suraj Mal v.
State (Delhi Admn.)[31], also it was said mere recovery of money divorced
from the circumstances under which it was paid was not sufficient when the
substantive evidence in the case was not reliable to prove payment of bribe
or to show that the accused voluntarily accepted the money. There can be no
quarrel with that proposition [pic]but where the recovery of the money
coupled with other circumstances leads to the conclusion that the accused
received gratification from some person the court would certainly be
entitled to draw the presumption under Section 4(1) of the Prevention of
Corruption Act. In our view both the decisions are of no avail to the
appellant and as already observed by us conclusions of fact must be drawn
on the facts of each case and not on the facts of other cases."
35. In this context it would be germane to understand what has been
stated in M. Narsinga Rao v. State of A.P[32]. In the said case,
allegations against the accused- appellant were that one Satya Prasad, PW1
therein was to get some amount from Andhra Pradesh Dairy Development
Cooperative Federation for transporting milk to or from the milk chilling
centre at Luxettipet (Adilabad District). He had approached the appellant
for taking steps to enable him to get money disbursed. The appellant
demanded Rs.5000/- for sending the recommendation in favour of payment of
the amount due to PW1. As the appellant persisted with his demand PW1
yielded to the same. But before handing over the money to him he lodged a
complaint with DSP of Anti-Corruption Bureau. On the basis of the said
complaint all arrangements were made for a trap to catch the corrupt public
servant red-handed. Thereafter the Court adverted how the trap had taken
place. The court took note of the fact that PW1 and PW2 made a volteface
in the trial court and denied having paid any bribery to the appellant and
also denied that the appellant demanded the bribe amount. The stand of the
accused before the trial court under Section 313 of CrPC was that one Dr.
Krishna Rao bore grudge and had orchestrated a false trap against him by
employing PW1 and PW2. Be it stated, in his deposition PW1 had stated that
he had acted on the behest of one Dr. Krishna Rao. It was further the
stand of the accused-appellant that the tainted currency notes were
forcibly stuffed into his pocket. The trial court and the High Court had
disbelieved the defence evidence and found that PW1 and PW2 were won over
by the appellant and that is why they turned hostile against their own
version recorded by the investigating officer and subsequently by a
Magistrate under Section 164 of CrPC. The Special Judge ordered the
witnesses to be prosecuted for perjury and the said course suggested by the
trial Judge found approval of the High Court also. While dealing with the
controversy this court took note of the fact that the High Court had
observed that though there was no direct evidence to show that the accused
had demanded and accepted the money, yet the rest of the evidence and the
circumstances were sufficient to establish that the accused had accepted
the amount and that gave rise to a presumption under Section 20 of the
Prevention of Corruption Act that he accepted the same as illegal
gratification, particularly so, when the defence theory put forth was not
accepted. It was contended before this court that presumption under
Section 20 of the Act can be drawn only when the prosecution succeeded in
establishing with direct evidence that the delinquent public servant had
accepted or obtained gratification. It was further urged that it was not
enough that some currency notes were handed over to the pubic servant to
make it acceptance of gratification and it was incumbent on the part of the
prosecution to further prove that what was paid amounted to gratification.
In support of the said contention reliance was placed on Sita Ram (supra)
and Suraj Mal v. State (Delhi Admn.)[33]. The three-Judge Bench referred
to Section 20(1) of the Act, the pronouncements in Hawkins v. Powells
Tillery Steam Coal Co. Ltd[34] and Suresh Budharmal Kalani v. State of
Maharashtra[35] and adverted to the facts and came to hold as follows:-
"From those proved facts the court can legitimately draw a presumption that
the appellant received or accepted the said currency notes on his own
volition. Of course, the said presumption is not an inviolable one, as the
appellant could rebut it either through cross-examination of the witnesses
cited against him or by adducing reliable evidence. But if the appellant
fails to disprove the presumption the same would stick and then it [pic]can
be held by the court that the prosecution has proved that the appellant
received the said amount."
36. It is apt to note here the three-Judge Bench referred to the
observations in Hazari Lal (supra) and opined thus:-
"The aforesaid observation is in consonance with the line of approach which
we have adopted now. We may say with great respect to the learned Judges
of the two-Judge Bench that the legal principle on this aspect has been
correctly propounded therein."
37. In this regard Mr. Jain has placed reliance on the authority B.
Jayaraj (supra). In the said case the complainant did not support the
prosecution version and had stated in his deposition that the amount that
was paid by him to the accused was with a request that it may be deposited
in the bank as fee for renewal of his licence for the fair price shop. The
court referred to Section 7 of the Act and observed as follows:-
"Insofar as the offence under Section 7 is concerned, it is a settled
position in law that demand of illegal gratification is sine qua non to
constitute the said offence and mere recovery of currency notes cannot
constitute the offence under Section 7 unless it is proved beyond all
reasonable doubt that the accused voluntarily accepted the money knowing it
to be a bribe. The above position has been succinctly laid down in several
judgment of this Court. By way of illustration reference may be made to
the decision in C.M. Sharma v. State of A.P.[36] and C.M. Girish Babu v.
C.B.I.[37]"
After so observing, the court proceeded to state thus:-
"In the present case, the complainant did not support the prosecution case
insofar as demand by the accused is concerned. The prosecution has not
examined any other witness, present at the time when the money was
allegedly handed over to the accused by the complainant, to prove that the
same was pursuant to any demand made by the accused. When the complainant
himself has disowned what he had stated in the initial complaint (exbt. P-
11) before LW-9, and there is no other evidence to prove that the accused
had made any demand, the evidence of PW-1 and contents of Exbt. P-11 cannot
be relied upon to come to the conclusion that the above material furnishes
proof of the demand allegedly made by the accused. We are, therefore,
inclined to hold that the Ld. Trial court as well as the High Court was not
correct in holding the demand alleged to be made by the accused as proved.
The only other material available is the recovery of the tainted currency
notes from the possession of the accused. In fact, such possession is
admitted by the accused himself. Mere possession and recovery of the
currency notes from the accused without proof of demand will not bring home
the offence under Section 7. The above also will be conclusive insofar as
the offence under Section 13(1)(d)(i)(ii) is concerned as in the absence of
any proof of demand for illegal gratification, the use of corrupt or
illegal means or abuse of position as a public servant to obtain any
valuable thing of pecuniary advantage cannot be held to be established."
38. The said principle has been followed in M.R. Purushotham v. State of
Karnataka[38]. On an attentive and cautious reading of the aforesaid
decisions it is noticeable that the court disbelieved the story of the
prosecution as no other evidence was brought on record. In N. Narsinga Rao
case the accused was charged for the offences punishable under Sections 7
read with Section 13(1)(d) & (2) of the Act. The court, as we have stated
earlier, had referred to section 20(1) of the Act and opined that from the
proven facts the court can legitimately draw a presumption that the
delinquent officer had received and accepted money. As we notice, the
authorities in B. Jayaraj (supra) and M.R. Purushotam (supra) do not lay
down as a proposition of law that when the complainant turns hostile and
does not support the case of the prosecution, the prosecution cannot prove
its case otherwise and the court cannot legitimately draw the presumption
under Section 20 of the Act. Therefore the proposition, though
industriously, presented by Mr. Jain that when Baj Singh, PW5, the
complainant, had turned hostile the whole case of the prosecution would
collapse is not acceptable and accordingly hereby rejected.
39. Presently, we shall refer to the evidence of PW6, a clerk in the
office of Tehsildar, Rajpura. He has deposed that on 25.1.1995, on the day
of the raid, he joined the police party headed by Narinder Pal Kaushal,
DSP, on the instruction of Tehsildar. He was introduced to Baj Singh, the
complainant and Jagdish Verma, a shadow witness. Thereafter, the
complainant and the shadow witness, Jagdish Verma, were sent to the octroi
post and he stopped at some distance along with Narinder Pal Kaushal who
was waiting for signal and on receiving signal they went inside the octroi
post. As per his testimony Narinder Pal Kaushal introduced himself as DSP
and thereafter a glass of water was procured and sodium was added to it.
Both the hands of the accused were dipped in the glass of water and the
water turned pink. On search of the accused Rs.500/- in the denomination of
Rs.100/- were recovered. The numbers tallied with the numbers mentioned in
the memo, Ex. PE. The notes were taken into possession vide Ex. PH. As is
manifest that the said witness has supported the story of the prosecution
in toto. The submission of Mr. Jain is that he is merely a witness to
recovery and solely on the basis of recovery no conviction can be recorded.
There can be no quarrel over the proposition that on the basis of mere
recovery an accused cannot be found guilty. It is the settled principle
of law that mere recovery of the tainted money is not sufficient to record
a conviction unless there is evidence that bribe had been demanded or money
was paid voluntarily as bribe. In the absence of any evidence of demand
and acceptance of the amount as illegal gratification, recovery would not
alone be a ground to convict the accused. This has been so held in T.
Subramanian v. The State of Tamil Nadu[39], Madhukar Bhaskarrao Joshi v.
State of Maharashtra[40], Raj Rajendra Singh Seth v. State of Jharkhand and
Anr.[41], State of Maharashtra v. Dnyaneshwar Laxman Rao Wankhede[42], C.M.
Girish Babu v. C.B.I., Cochin[43], K. S. Panduranga v. State of
Karnataka[44] and Satvir Singh v. State of Delhi[45]. The fact remains
that PW6 has supported the recovery in entirety. He has stood firm and
remained unshaken in the cross-examination and nothing has been elicited to
dislodge his testimony. His evidence has to be appreciated regard being had
to what has been deposed by Jagdish Verma, PW7. In examination-in-chief he
has deposed that he had met the DSP, Narinder Pal Kaushal who had
introduced him to Sher Singh, PW6. He has further stated that he and PW5,
Baj Singh, went inside the octroi post where Vinod Kumar demanded bribe
from Baj Singh whereupon Baj Singh gave Rs.500/- to him, and at that
juncture, he gave the signal to the vigilance party to come inside where
after and they came and apprehended the accused. Apart from stating about
the demand and acceptance he had also stated that the hands of the accused
were dipped in that water and the colour of the water had turned light
pink. It was transferred into a quarter bottle and was sealed and was
taken into possession vide recovery memo Ex.PG which was attested by him
and Baj Singh. The amount of Rs.500/- was recovered from right side pant
pocket of the accused. After making the arrangement for the pant of the
accused, the right side pocket of the pant of the accused was dipped in the
mixture of water and sodium and its colour turned light pink. It was also
transferred into a quarter bottle which was duly sealed and was taken into
possession vide recovery memo Ex.PJ. The pant was also taken into
possession vide recovery memo Ex.PJ. The notes recovered from the accused
were compared with the numbers mentioned in the memo and those tallied.
The notes were taken into possession vide recovery memo Ex.PF. A sum of
Rs.310/- was recovered from the further search of the accused which was
taken into possession vide recovery memo Ex.PK. Thus, from the aforesaid
testimony it is absolutely clear that he has supported in entirety about
the demand, acceptance and recovery of money. It is necessary, though
painful, to note that PW7 was examined-in-chief on 30.9.1999 and was cross-
examined on 25.5.2001, almost after 1 year and 8 months. The delay in said
cross-examination, as we have stated earlier had given enough time for
prevarication due to many a reason. A fair trial is to be fair both to
the defence and the prosecution as well as to the victim. An offence
registered under the Prevention of Corruption Act is to be tried with all
seriousness. We fail to appreciate how the learned trial Judge could
exhibit such laxity in granting so much time for cross-examination in a
case of this nature. It would have been absolutely appropriate on the part
of the learned trial Judge to finish the cross-examination on the day the
said witness was examined. As is evident, for no reason whatsoever it was
deferred and the cross-examination took place after 20 months. The witness
had all the time in the world to be gained over. We have already opined
that he was declared hostile and re-examined. It is settled in law that
the testimony of a hostile witness can be relied upon by the prosecution as
well as the defence. In re-examination by the public prosecutor this
witness has accepted about the correctness of his statement in the court on
13.9.1999. He has also accepted that he had not made any complaint to the
Presiding Officer of the Court in writing or verbally that the Inspector
was threatening him to make a false statement in the Court. It has also
been accepted by him that he had given the statement in the Court on
account of fear of false implication by the Inspector. He has agreed to
have signed his statement dated 13.9.99 after going through and admitting
it to be correct. It has come in the re-examination that he had not stated
in his statement dated 13.9.99 in the Court that recovery of tainted money
was not effected in his presence from the accused or that he had been told
by the Inspector that amount has been recovered from the accused. He had
also not stated in his said statement that the accused and witnesses were
taken to the Tehsil and it was there that he had signed all the memos.
40. Reading the evidence in entirety, his evidence cannot be brushed
aside. The delay in cross-examination has resulted in his pre-varication
from the examination-in-chief. But, a significant one, his examination-in-
chief and the re-examination impels us to accept the testimony that he had
gone into the octroi post and had witnessed about the demand and acceptance
of money by the accused. In his cross-examination he has stated that he
had not gone with Baj Singh to the vigilance department at any time and no
recovery was made in his presence. The said part of the testimony, in our
considered view, does not commend acceptance in the backdrop of entire
evidence in examination-in-chief and the re-examination. The evidence of
PW6 and PW7 have got corroboration from PW8. He in all material
particulars has stated about the recovery and proven the necessary
documents pertaining to the test carried with phenolphthalein powder. The
fact remains that the appellant's pocket contained phenolphthalein smeared
currency notes when he was searched. It is apt to take note of the fact
that the currency notes that have been recovered from the right side of the
pant pocket were actually prepared by PW8 by smearing them with
phenolphthalein powder. The appellant was caught red-handed with those
currency notes. In is statement recorded under Section 313 of CrPC he has
taken the plea that he is innocent and has been falsely implicated due to
animosity. No explanation has been given as regards the recovery.
Therefore, from the above facts, legitimately a presumption can be drawn
that the accused-appellant had received or accepted the said currency notes
on his own volition. The factum of presumption and the testimony of PW6
and 7 go a long way to show that the prosecution has been able to prove
demand, acceptance and recovery of the amount. Hence, we are inclined to
hold that the learned trial Judge and the High Court have appositely
concluded that the charges leveled against the accused have duly been
proven by the prosecution. It is not a case that there is no other
evidence barring the evidence of the complainant. On the contrary there are
adequate circumstances which establish the ingredients of the offences in
respect of which he was charged.
41. Before parting with the case we are constrained to reiterate what we
have said in the beginning. We have expressed our agony and anguish the
manner in which trials in respect of serious offences relating to
corruption are being conducted by the trial courts. Adjournments are
sought on the drop of a hat by the counsel, even though the witness is
present in court, contrary to all principles of holding a trial. That
apart, after the examination-in-chief of a witness is over, adjournment is
sought for cross-examination and the disquieting feature is that the trial
courts grant time. The law requires special reasons to be recorded for
grant of time but the same is not taken note of. As has been noticed
earlier, in the instant case the cross-examination has taken place after a
year and 8 months allowing ample time to pressurize the witness and to gain
over him by adopting all kinds of tactics. There is no cavil over the
proposition that there has to be a fair and proper trial but the duty of
the court while conducting the trial to be guided by the mandate of the
law, the conceptual fairness and above all bearing in mind its sacrosanct
duty to arrive at the truth on the basis of the material brought on record.
If an accused for his benefit takes the trial on the path of total
mockery, it cannot be countenanced. The Court has a sacred duty to see
that the trial is conducted as per law. If adjournments are granted in
this manner it would tantamount to violation of rule of law and eventually
turn such trials to a farce. It is legally impermissible and
jurisprudentially abominable. The trial courts are expected in law to
follow the command of the procedure relating to trial and not yield to the
request of the counsel to grant adjournment for non-acceptable reasons. In
fact, it is not all appreciable to call a witness for cross-examination
after such a long span of time. It is imperative if the examination-in-
chief is over, the cross-examination should be completed on the same day.
If the examination of a witness continues till late hours the trial can be
adjourned to the next day for cross-examination. It is inconceivable in
law that the cross-examination should be deferred for such a long time.
It is anathema to the concept of proper and fair trial. The duty of the
court is to see that not only the interest of the accused as per law is
protected but also the societal and collective interest is safe-guarded.
It is distressing to note that despite series of judgments of this Court,
the habit of granting adjournment, really an ailment, continues. How long
shall we say, "Awake! Arise!". There is a constant discomfort. Therefore,
we think it appropriate that the copies of the judgment be sent to the
learned Chief Justices of all the High Courts for circulating the same
among the learned trial Judges with a command to follow the principles
relating to trial in a requisite manner and not to defer the cross-
examination of a witness at their pleasure or at the leisure of the defence
counsel, for it eventually makes the trial an apology for trial and compels
the whole society to suffer chicanery. Let it be remembered that law
cannot allowed to be lonely; a destitute.
42. In the ultimate analysis, we perceive no merit in the appeal and
consequently the same stands dismissed. As the appellant is on bail, his
bail bonds are cancelled. He be taken into custody forthwith to suffer the
sentence.
........................................J.
[DIPAK MISRA]
........................................J.
[ROHINTON FALI NARIMAN]
NEW DELHI
JANUARY 21, 2015.
-----------------------
[1] (2013) 7 SCC 108
[2] AIR 1958 SC 376
[3] (2000) 5 SCC 668
[4] (2001) 5 SCC 667
[5] (1974) 4 SCC 560
[6] (2000) 8 SCC 571
[7] (2014) 4 SCALE 81
[8] (2014) 11 SCALE 467
[9] (1976) 1 SCC 727
[10] (1959) SCR 195
[11] (1962) 2 SCR 195
[12] (1969) 1 SCR 22
[13] (1995) 3 SCC 351
[14] (2009) 3 SCC 779
[15] (2010) 4 SCC 450
[16] AIR 1954 SC 322
[17] (1972) 3 All ER 1056
[18] (1973) 1 All ER 440
[19] (1976) 1 SCC 15
[20] (1996) 11 SCC 709
[21] (2004) 5 SCC 223
[22] AIR 1964 SC 221
[23] (2004) 5 SCC 230
[24] (1976) 1 SCC 389
[25] (1991) 3 SCC 627
[26] (1976) 4 SCC 233
[27] (1980) 1 SCC 30
[28] (1999) 8 SCC 649
[29] (1980) 2 SCC 390
[30] (1975) 2 SCC 227
[31] (1979) 4 SCC 725
[32] (2001) 1 SCC 691
[33] (1979) 4 SCC 725
[34] (1911) 1 KB 988 : 1911 WN 53
[35] (1998) 7 SCC 337
[36] (2010) 15 SCC 1
[37] (2009) 3 SCC 779
[38] 2014 (11) SCALE 467
[39] AIR 2006 SC 836
[40] (2000) 8 SCC 571
[41] AIR 2008 SC 3217
[42] (2009) 15 SCC 200
[43] AIR 2009 SC 2011
[44] (2012) 3 SCC 721
[45] (2014) 13 SCC 143
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thus:
"Though there is no such statutory bar, the premise on which the High Court
quashed the proceedings was that the investigation by the same officer who
"lodged" the FIR would prejudice the accused inasmuch as the investigating
officer cannot be expected to act fairly and objectively. We find no
principle or binding authority to hold that the moment the competent police
officer, on the basis of information received, makes out an FIR
incorporating his name as the informant, he forfeits his right to
investigate. If at all, such investigation could only be assailed on the
ground of bias or real likelihood of bias on the part of the investigating
officer. The question of bias would depend on the facts and circumstances
of each case and it is not proper to lay down a broad and unqualified
proposition, in the manner in which it has been done by the High Court,
that whenever a police officer proceeds to investigate after registering
the FIR on his own, the investigation would necessarily be unfair or
biased. In the present case, the police officer received certain discreet
information, which, according to his assessment, warranted a probe and
therefore made up his mind to investigate. The formality of preparing the
FIR in which he records the factum of having received the information about
the suspected commission of the offence and then taking up the
investigation after registering the crime, does not, by any semblance of
reasoning, vitiate the investigation on the ground of bias or the like
factor. If the reason which weighed with the High Court could be a ground
to quash the prosecution, the powers of investigation conferred on the
police officers would be unduly hampered for no good reason. What is
expected to be done by the police officers in the normal course of
discharge of their official duties will then be vulnerable to attack."
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 554 OF 2012
Vinod Kumar V State of Punjab
Citation;2015ALLSCR900,AIR2015SC1206,2015CriLJ1442,(2015)3SCC220
If one is asked a question, what afflicts the legally requisite
criminal trial in its conceptual eventuality in this country the two
reasons that may earn the status of phenomenal signification are, first,
procrastination of trial due to non-availability of witnesses when the
trial is in progress and second, unwarranted adjournments sought by the
counsel conducting the trial and the unfathomable reasons for acceptation
of such prayers for adjournments by the trial courts, despite a statutory
command under Section 309 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC)
and series of pronouncements by this Court. What was a malady at one time,
with the efflux of time, has metamorphosed into malignancy. What was a mere
disturbance once has become a disorder, a diseased one, at present.
2. The instant case frescoes and depicts a scenario that exemplifies how
due to passivity of the learned trial Judge, a witness, despite having
stood embedded absolutely firmly in his examination-in-chief, has
audaciously and, in a way, obnoxiously, thrown all the values to the wind,
and paved the path of tergiversation. It would not be a hyperbole to say
that it is a maladroit and ingeniously designed attempt to strangulate and
crucify the fundamental purpose of trial, that is, to arrive at the truth
on the basis of evidence on record. The redeeming feature is, despite the
malevolent and injurious assault, the cause of justice has survived, for
there is, in the ultimate eventuate, a conviction which is under assail in
this appeal, by special leave.
3. The narration of the sad chronology shocks the judicial conscience
and gravitates the mind to pose a question, is it justified for any
conscientious trial Judge to ignore the statutory command, not recognize
"the felt necessities of time" and remain impervious to the cry of the
collective asking for justice or give an indecent and uncalled for burial
to the conception of trial, totally ostracizing the concept that a
civilized and orderly society thrives on rule of law which includes "fair
trial" for the accused as well as the prosecution.
4. In the aforesaid context, we may recapitulate a passage from Gurnaib
Singh V. State of Punjab.[1]
"...... We are compelled to proceed to reiterate the law and express our
anguish pertaining to the manner in which the trial was conducted as it
depicts a very disturbing scenario. As is demonstrable from the record, the
trial was conducted in an extremely haphazard and piecemeal manner.
Adjournments were granted on a mere asking. The cross-examination of the
witnesses was deferred without recording any special reason and dates were
given after a long gap. The mandate of the law and the views expressed by
this Court from time to time appears to have been totally kept at bay. The
learned trial Judge, as is perceptible, seems to have ostracised from his
memory that a criminal trial has its own gravity and sanctity. In this
regard, we may refer with profit to the pronouncement in Talab Haji Hussain
v. Madhukar Purshottam Mondkar[2] wherein it has been stated that an
accused person by his conduct cannot put a fair trial into jeopardy, for it
is the primary and paramount duty of the criminal courts to ensure that the
risk to fair trial is removed and trials are allowed to proceed smoothly
without any interruption or obstruction."
5. Be it noted, in the said case, the following passage from Swaran
Singh V. State of Punjab[3], was reproduced.
"It has become more or less a fashion to have a criminal case adjourned
again and again till the witness tires and gives up. It is the game of
unscrupulous lawyers to get adjournments for one excuse or the [pic]other
till a witness is won over or is tired. Not only is a witness threatened,
he is abducted, he is maimed, he is done away with, or even bribed. There
is no protection for him. In adjourning the matter without any valid cause
a court unwittingly becomes party to miscarriage of justice."
6. In this regard, it is also fruitful to refer to the authority in
State of U.P. V. Shambu Nath Singh[4], wherein this Court deprecating the
practice of a Sessions Court adjourning a case in spite of the presence of
the witnesses willing to be examined fully, opined thus:
"9. We make it abundantly clear that if a witness is present in court he
must be examined on that day. The court must know that most of the
witnesses could attend the court only at heavy cost to them, after keeping
aside their own avocation. Certainly they incur suffering and loss of
income. The meagre amount of bhatta (allowance) which a witness may be paid
by the court is generally a poor solace for the financial loss incurred by
him. It is a sad plight in the trial courts that witnesses who are called
through summons or other processes stand at the doorstep from morning till
evening only to be told at the end of the day that the case is adjourned to
another day. This primitive practice must be reformed by the presiding
officers of the trial courts and it can be reformed by everyone provided
the presiding officer concerned has a commitment towards duty."
7. With the aforesaid concern and agony, we shall presently proceed to
adumbrate the necessitous facts. We have already stated that despite the
impasse, there is a conviction by the trial Judge and an affirmation
thereof by the High Court. Elucidating the factual score, be it noted, the
instant appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 13.10.2011
passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in Criminal
Appeal No. 1280-SB of 2001 (O&M) wherein the learned Single Judge has
given the stamp of approval to the judgment and order dated 24.10.2001
passed by the learned Special Judge, Patiala whereby he had convicted the
appellant under Section 7 and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act,
1988 (for brevity, 'the Act') and sentenced him to undergo rigorous
imprisonment for a period of two years and to pay a fine of Rs.2,000/- with
a default clause.
8. The prosecution case, as has been unfurled, is that Baj Singh, PW-5,
used to bring earth in tractor trolley within the municipal area of
Rajpura. The appellant, at the relevant time, was posted as Octroi
Inspector and he demanded Rs.20/- per trolley for permitting him to enter
into the municipal area. Eventually, a deal was struck that the accused-
appellant would be paid Rs.500/- per month for the smooth operation. As
the prosecution story further unfolds, on 25.1.1995, Baj Singh met Jagdish
Verma, PW-7, and disclosed before him the fact about the demand of the
accused for permitting the entry of the tractor trolley inside the
municipal area and thereafter, as he was not desirous of obliging the
accused, he narrated the entire story to DSP Vigilance, who in his turn,
with the intention to lay the trap, explained it to Baj Singh, PW-5, and
Jagdish Verma, PW-7 about the procedure of the trap. As alleged, Baj Singh
gave five notes of Rs.100/- to the DSP Vigilance who noted the numbers of
the notes and completed other formalities like applying phenolphthalein
powder on the currency notes. Thereafter, they proceeded to the place of
the accused and a trap was laid. Eventually, currency notes amounting to
Rs.500/- were recovered from the trouser of the appellant and were taken
into possession. The statements of the witnesses were recorded and after
completing the investigation chargesheet was placed for the offences
punishable under Sections 7 and 13(2) of the Act.
9. To bring home the charges against the accused-appellant, the
prosecution examined eight witnesses. PW-1 to PW-4 are formal witnesses.
PW-5, the complainant resiled from his previous statement and was cross-
examined by the prosecution. Sher Singh, PW-6, a clerk in the office of
Tehsildar, Rajpura had joined the police party as an independent witness.
He supported the case of the prosecution in detail. Jagdish Verma, PW-7,
in his examination-in-chief, supported the prosecution case in all aspects,
but in cross-examination, resiled from his examination-in-chief. The
witness, PW-7, was declared hostile on a prayer being made by the Public
Prosecutor and was re-examined. Narinder Pal Kaushal, PW-8, DSP of
Vigilance Bureau who had led the raiding party on 25.1.1995, in his
deposition, deposed in detail about the conducting of the raid and recovery
of the amount.
10. The accused, in his statement under Section 313 CrPC, denied the
allegations and took the plea of false implication due to party faction and
animosity. It was his further stand that he was brought from his office
and was taken to the office of the Tehsildar and thereafter to the
Vigilance office.
11. The learned trial Judge, on the basis of the evidence brought on
record, came to hold that though the complainant had not supported the case
of the prosecution yet prosecution had been able to prove the demand and
acceptance of the bribe and the recovery of the tainted money from the
accused and, therefore, the presumption as envisaged under Section 20 of
the Act would get attracted and accordingly convicted the accused and
sentenced him, as has been stated hereinbefore.
12. In appeal, it was contended before the High Court that when the
testimony of Baj Singh, PW-5, and Jagdish Verma, PW-7, the shadow witness,
was absolutely incredible, the same could not have been pervertedly
filtered by the learned trial Judge to convict the accused-appellant for
the crime in question. It was also urged that mere recovery of the
currency notes would not constitute the offence under Section 7 of the Act.
It was also propounded that the offence under Section 13(2) of the Act
would not get attracted unless the demand and acceptance were proven. Non-
involvement of any independent witness in the raid was also seriously
criticised. The High Court posed the question whether the prosecution had
been able to prove the factum of demand of bribe, its acceptance and the
recovery of the money from the possession of the accused. With regard to
demand of bribe, the High Court placed reliance on the testimony of the
independent witness Sher Singh, PW-6, and the examination-in-chief of
Jagdish Verma, PW-7, and came to hold that the demand of bribe had been
proven. It appreciated the deposition of PW-7 and the documents,
especially, the Chemical Examiner's report of the hand wash liquid and came
to hold there had been acceptance of bribe. Relating to the recovery of
the tainted money, the High Court took note of the fact that the ocular
testimony had been duly corroborated by the documentary evidence and hence,
the recovery had been proved.
13. Be it noted, the High Court placed reliance upon Raghubir Singh V.
State of Haryana[5] and Madhukar Bhaskarrao Joshi V. State of
Maharashtra[6] and eventually came to hold that the prosecution had proven
its case to the hilt and resultantly affirmed the conviction and order of
sentence passed by the trial Court, but reduced the sentence of 2 years'
rigorous imprisonment to one year.
14. Criticizing the conviction as recorded by the learned trial Judge and
affirmed by the High Court, it is submitted by Mr. Jain, learned senior
counsel for the appellant that when the informant had not supported the
case of the prosecution, it was not justifiable on the part of the learned
trial Judge to record a conviction against the accused. It is his
submission that on the basis of the testimony of PW-6 to PW-8, the
conviction could not have been recorded, for Sher Singh, PW-6, is not a
witness either to the demand or acceptance of the bribe by the appellant
and further the version PW-7 requires careful scrutiny, regard being had to
the fact that he is a hostile witness. It is also urged that the evidence
of PW-8 deserves to be discarded as he is an interested witness. To
bolster the aforesaid submissions, learned senior counsel has drawn
inspiration from B. Jayaraj V. State of Andhra Pradesh[7] and M.R.
Purushotham Vs. State of Karnataka[8].
15. Apart from above, it is further put forth by him that as PW-7 has not
supported the prosecution story and stated to have been tutored to give
statement, his whole testimony should have been thrown out of consideration
and no reliance should have been placed on it. It is contended by him
that the High Court has failed to appreciate the importance of cross-
examination of PW-7 and hence, the judgment affirming the conviction is
absolutely flawed. To buttress the said submission, reliance has been
placed on Sat Paul V. Delhi Administration[9]. It is the further stand of
Mr. Jain, learned senior counsel that the evidence of the trap witnesses,
PW-6 and PW-8 should have been wholly ignored as they are partisan
witnesses and their statements could not have been given any credence to
inasmuch as there has been no corroboration. In this context, he has
commended us to the authorities in State of Bihar V. Basawan Singh
(CB)[10], Major E.G. Barsey V. State of Bombay[11], Bhanupratap Hariprasad
Dave V. State of Gujarat[12] and MO Shamshuddin V. State of Kerala[13].
16. Learned senior counsel would contend, solely on the basis of evidence
of recovery, a conviction is not sustainable and in the obtaining factual
matrix, the presumption under Section 20 of the Act would not be attracted.
To substantiate the said proposition, strength has been drawn from C.M.
Girish Babu V. C.B.I., Cochin[14] and Benarsi Das V. State of Haryana[15].
17. The last plank of submission of Mr. Jain, is that in the instant
case, the prosecution was launched by Narinder Pal Kaushal, PW-8, who has
investigated into the case and, therefore, the concept of fair
investigation, has been totally marred as a consequence of which, the trial
is vitiated. Learned senior counsel would contend that a person who is a
part of the trap party is an interested witness and he would be
enthusiastic to see that the trap is sustained in every manner and in such
a situation, it is per se an unfair and biased investigation that
frustrates the essential principle inhered under Article 21 of the
Constitution and eventually the trial.
18. Mr. Madhukar, learned senior counsel appearing for the State of
Punjab, per contra, would contend that the view expressed by the learned
trial Judge and the High Court cannot be found fault with, for a conviction
under the Act can be based on the evidence of trap witnesses, if they are
trustworthy and the ingredients of the offence are satisfied and in the
case at hand, the High Court on x-ray of the evidence has so recorded. It
is urged by him that neither the learned trial Judge nor the High Court has
fallen into error by applying the principle of presumption as engrafted
under Section 20 of the Act. It is canvassed by Mr. Madhukar that the
evidence of the hostile witness can be placed reliance upon by the
prosecution and in the obtaining factual matrix, the testimony of PW-7, one
of the shadow witnesses, renders immense assistance for establishing the
case of the prosecution. He has with great pains, taken us through the
evidence to substantiate the stand that the conviction recorded against the
appellant is totally defensible.
19. Keeping in abeyance what we intend to say on the facet of anguish
expressed by us in the beginning, we shall proceed to deal with the
proponement of Mr. Jain that when the investigation conducted by Mr.
Narinder Pal Kaushal, PW-8, is vitiated on the foundation that he has
lodged the FIR, the trial is also vitiated. Though the said submission has
been raised and taken note of by us as the last plank, yet we think it
seemly to deal with it first as it goes to the root of the matter. On a
perusal of the material on record, it is manifest that PW-8 is a part of
the raiding party, a shadow witness, and admittedly had also sent the
complaint through a Constable to the concerned police station for lodging
of FIR. This being the factual score, we are required to take note of
certain authorities in this regard. In Basawan Singh (supra), the
Constitution Bench, after referring to the decision in Shiv Bahadur Singh
V. State of Vindhya Pradesh[16], opined that the said decision does not lay
down an invariable rule that the evidence of the witness of the raiding
party must be discarded in the absence of any independent corroboration.
The larger Bench proceeded to state thus:
"......The correct rule is this: if any of the witnesses are accomplices
who are particeps criminis in respect of the actual crime charged, their
evidence must be treated as the evidence of accomplices is treated; if they
are not accomplices but are partisan or interested witnesses, who are
concerned in the success of the trap, their evidence must be tested in the
same way as other interested evidence is tested by the application of
diverse consideration which must vary from case to case, and in a proper
case, the Court may even look for independent corroboration before
convicting the accused person. If a Magistrate puts himself in the
position of a partisan or interested witness, he cannot claim any higher
status and must be treated as any other interested witness."
20. In Major E.G. Barsey (supra), while dealing with the evidence of a
trap witness, the court opined that though a trap witness is not an
approver, he is certainly an interested witness in the sense that he is
interested to see that the trap laid by him succeeds. The Court further
laid down that he can at least be equated with a partisan witness and it
would not be admissible to rely upon his evidence without corroboration,
but his evidence is not a tainted one.
21. In Bhanupratap Hariprasad Dave (supra), the Court observed that the
police witnesses can be said to be partisan witnesses as they are
interested in the success of the trap laid by them, but it cannot be said
that they are accomplices. Thereafter, the Court proceeded to state that
their evidence must be tested in the same way as any other interested
witness is tested and in an appropriate case, the Court may look for
independent corroboration before convicting the accused person. The three-
Judge Bench reiterated the principle thus:
"....It is now well settled by a series of decisions of this Court that
while in the case of evidence of an accomplice, no conviction can be based
on his evidence unless it is corroborated in material particulars but as
regards the evidence of a partisan witness it is open to a court to convict
an accused person solely on the basis of that evidence, if it is satisfied
that that evidence is reliable. But it may in appropriate case look for
corroboration".
22. In MO Shamshuddin (supra), the Court, after referring to the
decisions in DPP V. Hester[17] and DPP V. Kilbourne[18], made a distinction
between accomplice and an interested witness. The Court, referred to the
authority in Basawan Singh (supra) at length and eventually adverted to the
concept of corroborating evidence. In that context it has been ruled thus:
".......Now coming to the nature of corroborating evidence that is
required, it is well-settled that the corroborating evidence can be even by
way of circumstantial evidence. No general rule can be laid down with
respect to [pic]quantum of evidence corroborating the testimony of a trap
witness which again would depend upon its own facts and circumstances like
the nature of the crime, the character of trap witness etc. and other
general requirements necessary to sustain the conviction in that case. The
court should weigh the evidence and then see whether corroboration is
necessary. Therefore as a rule of law it cannot be laid down that the
evidence of every complainant in a bribery case should be corroborated in
all material particulars and otherwise it cannot be acted upon. Whether
corroboration is necessary and if so to what extent and what should be its
nature depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. In a case of
bribe, the person who pays the bribe and those who act as intermediaries
are the only persons who can ordinarily be expected to give evidence about
the bribe and it is not possible to get absolutely independent evidence
about the payment of bribe."
From the aforesaid authorities it is clear that a trap witness is an
interested witness and his testimony, to be accepted and relied upon
requires corroboration and the corroboration would depend upon the facts
and circumstances, nature of the crime and the character of the trap
witness.
23. There is no doubt that the status of PW8 is that of an interested
witness. There is no cavil over the fact that he had sent the FIR and
conducted the investigation, but the question posed is whether the
investigation by him is vitiated. In this context we may, with profit,
refer to the decision in Bhagwan Singh V. State of Rajasthan[19], where
one Ram Singh, who was a Head Constable, was the person to whom the offer
of bribe was alleged to have been made by the appellant therein and he was
the informant who had lodged the First Information Report for taking action
against the appellant. He himself had undertaken the investigation. In
that factual backdrop the Court ruled thus:
"Now, ordinarily this Court does not interfere with concurrent findings of
fact reached by the trial court and the High Court on an appreciation of
the evidence. But this is one of those rare and exceptional cases where we
find that several important circumstances have not been taken into account
by the trial court and the High Court and that has resulted in serious
miscarriage of justice calling for interference from this Court. We may
first refer to a rather disturbing feature of this case. It is indeed such
an unusual feature that it is quite surprising that it should have escaped
the notice of the trial court and the High Court. Head Constable Ram Singh
was the person to whom the offer of bribe was alleged to have been made by
the appellant and he was the informant or complainant who lodged the first
information report for taking action against the appellant. It is difficult
to understand how in these circumstances Head Constable Ram Singh could
undertake investigation of the case. How could the complainant himself be
the investigator? In fact, Head Constable Ram Singh, being an officer below
the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police, was not authorised to
investigate the case but we do not attach any importance to that fact, as
that may not affect the validity of the conviction. The infirmity which we
are pointing out is not an infirmity arising from investigation by an
officer not authorised to do so, but an infirmity arising from
investigation by a Head Constable who was himself the person to whom the
bribe was alleged to have been offered and who lodged the first information
report as informant or complainant. This is an infirmity which is bound to
reflect on the credibility of the prosecution case".
24. In Megha Singh V. State of Haryana[20], the Court noticed the
discrepancy in the depositions of PW-2 and PW-3 and absence of independent
corroboration. Be it noted, the Court was dealing with an offence under
Section 6(1) of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act,
1985. In that context the Court observed that the testimony of the said
witnesses did not inspire confidence about the reliability of the
prosecution's case. Proceeding further, the Court held:
".... We have also noted another disturbing feature in this case. PW 3,
Siri Chand, Head Constable arrested the accused and on search being
conducted by him a pistol and the cartridges were recovered from the
accused. It was on his complaint a formal first information report was
lodged and the case was initiated. He being complainant should not have
proceeded with the investigation of the case. But it appears to us that he
was not only the complainant in the case but he carried on with the
investigation and examined witnesses under Section 161 CrPC. Such
practice, to say the least, should not be resorted to so that there may not
be any occasion to suspect fair and impartial investigation".
25. In this regard, it is useful to refer to the pronouncement in State
vs. V. Jayapaul[21] wherein the Court posed the question whether the High
Court was justified in quashing the criminal proceedings on the ground that
the police officer, who had lodged/recorded the FIR regarding the suspected
commission of certain cognizable offence by the respondent should not have
investigated the case. The case against the accused was that he was
indulging in corrupt practices by extracting money from the drivers and
owners of the motor-vehicles while conducting check of the vehicles and
making use of certain bogus notice forms in the process. The charge-sheet
was filed under Sections 420 and 201 I.P.C. and Section 13(2) read with
Section 13(1)(d) of the Act. The Court referred to the decision in the
State of U.P. V. Bhagwant Kishore Joshi[22], wherein it has been ruled
thus:
"Section 154 of the Code prescribes the mode of recording the information
received orally or in writing by an officer in charge of a police station
in respect of the commission of a cognisable offence. Section 156 thereof
authorises such an officer to investigate any cognisable offence prescribed
therein. Though ordinarily investigation is [pic]undertaken on information
received by a police officer, the receipt of information is not a condition
precedent for investigation. Section 157 prescribes the procedure in the
matter of such an investigation which can be initiated either on
information or otherwise. It is clear from the said provisions that an
officer in charge of a police station can start investigation either on
information or otherwise."
26. After reproducing the said paragraph, the Court proceeded to state
thus:
"Though there is no such statutory bar, the premise on which the High Court
quashed the proceedings was that the investigation by the same officer who
"lodged" the FIR would prejudice the accused inasmuch as the investigating
officer cannot be expected to act fairly and objectively. We find no
principle or binding authority to hold that the moment the competent police
officer, on the basis of information received, makes out an FIR
incorporating his name as the informant, he forfeits his right to
investigate. If at all, such investigation could only be assailed on the
ground of bias or real likelihood of bias on the part of the investigating
officer. The question of bias would depend on the facts and circumstances
of each case and it is not proper to lay down a broad and unqualified
proposition, in the manner in which it has been done by the High Court,
that whenever a police officer proceeds to investigate after registering
the FIR on his own, the investigation would necessarily be unfair or
biased. In the present case, the police officer received certain discreet
information, which, according to his assessment, warranted a probe and
therefore made up his mind to investigate. The formality of preparing the
FIR in which he records the factum of having received the information about
the suspected commission of the offence and then taking up the
investigation after registering the crime, does not, by any semblance of
reasoning, vitiate the investigation on the ground of bias or the like
factor. If the reason which weighed with the High Court could be a ground
to quash the prosecution, the powers of investigation conferred on the
police officers would be unduly hampered for no good reason. What is
expected to be done by the police officers in the normal course of
discharge of their official duties will then be vulnerable to attack."
Be it noted, the Court distinguished the decisions in Bhagwant
Kishore Joshi (supra) and Megha Singh (supra).
27. At this juncture, it would be fruitful to refer to S.Jeevanatham V.
State (through Inspector of Police, T.N.)[23]. In the said case, the
appellant was found guilty under Section 8(c) read with Section 20(b)(ii)
of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985. One of the
contentions that was canvassed was that PW-8, who lodged the FIR had
himself conducted the investigation and hence, the entire investigation was
vitiated. The Court referred to the decision in Jayapaul (supra) and
opined thus:
"In the instant case, PW 8 conducted the search and recovered the
contraband article and registered the case and the article seized from the
appellants was narcotic drug and the counsel for the appellants could not
point out any circumstances by which the investigation caused prejudice or
was biased against the appellants. PW 8 in his official capacity gave the
information, registered the case and as part of his official duty later
[pic]investigated the case and filed a charge-sheet. He was not in any way
personally interested in the case. We are unable to find any sort of bias
in the process of investigation."
28. In the instant case, PW-8, who was a member of the raiding party had
sent the report to the police station and thereafter carried the formal
investigation. In fact, nothing has been put to him to elicit that he was
anyway personally interested to get the appellant convicted. In our
considered view, the decision in S. Jeevanatham (supra) would be squarely
applicable to the present case and, accordingly, without any reservation we
repel the submission so assiduously urged by Mr. Jain, learned senior
counsel for the appellant.
29. The next aspect which requires to be adverted to is whether testimony
of a hostile evidence that has come on record should be relied upon or not.
Mr. Jain, learned senior counsel for the appellant would contend that as
PW-7 has totally resiled in his cross-examination, his evidence is to be
discarded in toto. On a perusal of the testimony of the said witness, it
is evincible that in examination-in-chief, he has supported the prosecution
story in entirety and in the cross-examination he has taken the path of
prevarication. In Bhagwan Singh V. State of Haryana[24], it has been laid
down that even if a witness is characterised has a hostile witness, his
evidence is not completely effaced. The said evidence remains admissible
in the trial and there is no legal bar to base a conviction upon his
testimony, if corroborated by other reliable evidence. In Khuji @ Surendra
Tiwari V. State of Madhya Pradesh[25], the Court after referring to the
authorities in Bhagwan Singh (supra), Rabindra Kumar Dey V. State of
Orissa[26] and Syad Akbar V. State of Karnataka[27], opined that the
evidence of such a witness cannot be effaced or washed off the record
altogether, but the same can be accepted to the extent it is found to be
dependable on a careful scrutiny thereof.
30. In this context, we think it apt to reproduce some passages from
Rammi @ Rameshwar V. State of Madhya Pradesh[28], where the Court was
dealing with the purpose of re-examination. After referring to Section 138
of the Evidence Act, the Court held thus:
"There is an erroneous impression that re-examination should be confined to
clarification of ambiguities which have been brought down in cross-
examination. No doubt, ambiguities can be resolved through re-examination.
But that is not the only function of the re-examiner. If the party who
called the witness feels that explanation is required for any matter
referred to in cross-examination he has the liberty to put any question in
re-examination to get the explanation. The Public Prosecutor should
formulate his questions for that purpose. Explanation may be required
either when the ambiguity remains regarding any answer elicited during
cross-examination or even otherwise. If the Public Prosecutor feels that
certain answers require more elucidation from the witness he has the
freedom and the right to put such questions as he deems necessary for that
purpose, subject of course to the control of the court in accordance with
the other provisions. But the court cannot direct him to confine his
questions to ambiguities alone which arose in cross-examination.
Even if the Public Prosecutor feels that new matters should be elicited
from the witness he can do so, in which case the only requirement is that
he must secure permission of the court. If the court thinks that such new
matters are necessary for proving any material fact, courts must be liberal
in granting permission to put necessary questions".
31. We have reproduced the aforesaid paragraphs to highlight that when
the prosecution has such a right in the process of re-examination, as a
natural corollary, the testimony of a hostile witness cannot be brushed
aside. On the contrary, both the prosecution and the defence can rely for
their stand and stance. Emphasis on re-examination by the prosecution is
not limited to any answer given in the cross-examination, but the Public
Prosecutor has the freedom and right to put such questions as it deems
necessary to elucidate certain answers from the witness. It is not
confined to clarification of ambiguities, which have been brought down in
the cross-examination.
32. Mr. Jain, learned senior counsel has propounded that testimony of PW7
deserves to be discredited, and the learned trial Judge as well as the High
Court having not ignored have committed a grave error. We will be dealing
with the aspect whether the evidence of PW-7 should be totally ignored or
not while we will be dwelling upon the credibility and acceptability of his
testimony.
33. As a contention has been raised that once the informant has resiled
totally from his earlier statement no conviction can be recorded on the
basis of evidence of the trap witnesses, it required to be carefully
dwelled upon. In this regard, reference to the authority in Hazari Lal v.
State (Delhi Administration)[29] would be apt. In the said case a police
Constable was convicted under Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption
Act, 1947 on the allegation that he had demanded and received Rs.60/- from
the informant who was examined as PW-3 and had resiled from his previous
statement and was declared hostile by the prosecution. Official witnesses
had supported the prosecution version. Keeping in mind the evidence of the
official witnesses the trial Court had convicted the appellant therein
which was affirmed by the High Court. A contention was raised that in the
absence of any direct evidence to show that the police constable demanded
or accepted bribery no presumption under Section 4 of the Act, 1947 could
be drawn merely on the strength of recovery of the marked currency notes
from the said police constable. Chinnappa Reddy, J. speaking for the two-
Judge Bench observed as follows:-
"...It is not necessary that the passing of money should be proved by
direct evidence. It may also be proved by circumstantial evidence. The
events which followed in quick succession in the present case lead to the
only inference that the money was obtained by the accused from PW 3. Under
Section 114 of the Evidence Act the court may presume the existence of any
fact which it thinks likely to have happened, regard being had to the
common course of natural events, human conduct and public and private
business, in their relation to facts of the particular case. One of the
illustrations to Section 114 of the Evidence Act is that the court may
presume that a person who is in possession of the stolen goods soon after
the theft, is either the thief or has received the goods knowing them to be
stolen, unless he can account for his possession. So too, in the facts and
circumstances of the present case the court may presume that the accused
who took out the currency notes from his pocket and flung them across the
wall had obtained them from PW 3, who a few minutes earlier was shown to
have been in possession of the notes. Once we arrive at the finding that
the accused had obtained the money from PW 3, the presumption under Section
4(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act is immediately attracted."
34. It is pertinent to note here that in the aforesaid case the decision
rendered in Sita Ram v. State of Rajasthan[30] was pressed into service.
In the case of Sita Ram (supra) the complainant had turned hostile in the
court of Special Judge. However, the trial Judge convicted the accused who
was tried along with another accused, namely, Vikram Singh. The High court
on appreciation of the evidence acquitted Vikram Singh but maintained the
conviction against Sita Ram. This Court opined that the presumption under
Section 4(1) of the 1947 Act could not be drawn in the facts of the case.
The question, whether the rest of the evidence was sufficient to establish
that the accused had obtained the money from the complaint was not
considered. The Court in Hazari Lal (supra) distinguished the
pronouncement in Sita Ram (supra) by stating thus:-
"...The question whether the rest of the evidence was sufficient to
establish that the accused had obtained the money from the complainant was
not considered. All that was taken as established was the recovery of
certain money from the person of the accused and it was held that mere
recovery of money was not enough to entitle the drawing of the presumption
under Section 4(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The Court did not
consider the further question whether recovery of the money along with
other circumstances could establish that the accused had obtained
gratification from any person. In the present case we have found that the
circumstances established by the prosecution entitled the court to hold
that the accused received the gratification from PW 3. In Suraj Mal v.
State (Delhi Admn.)[31], also it was said mere recovery of money divorced
from the circumstances under which it was paid was not sufficient when the
substantive evidence in the case was not reliable to prove payment of bribe
or to show that the accused voluntarily accepted the money. There can be no
quarrel with that proposition [pic]but where the recovery of the money
coupled with other circumstances leads to the conclusion that the accused
received gratification from some person the court would certainly be
entitled to draw the presumption under Section 4(1) of the Prevention of
Corruption Act. In our view both the decisions are of no avail to the
appellant and as already observed by us conclusions of fact must be drawn
on the facts of each case and not on the facts of other cases."
35. In this context it would be germane to understand what has been
stated in M. Narsinga Rao v. State of A.P[32]. In the said case,
allegations against the accused- appellant were that one Satya Prasad, PW1
therein was to get some amount from Andhra Pradesh Dairy Development
Cooperative Federation for transporting milk to or from the milk chilling
centre at Luxettipet (Adilabad District). He had approached the appellant
for taking steps to enable him to get money disbursed. The appellant
demanded Rs.5000/- for sending the recommendation in favour of payment of
the amount due to PW1. As the appellant persisted with his demand PW1
yielded to the same. But before handing over the money to him he lodged a
complaint with DSP of Anti-Corruption Bureau. On the basis of the said
complaint all arrangements were made for a trap to catch the corrupt public
servant red-handed. Thereafter the Court adverted how the trap had taken
place. The court took note of the fact that PW1 and PW2 made a volteface
in the trial court and denied having paid any bribery to the appellant and
also denied that the appellant demanded the bribe amount. The stand of the
accused before the trial court under Section 313 of CrPC was that one Dr.
Krishna Rao bore grudge and had orchestrated a false trap against him by
employing PW1 and PW2. Be it stated, in his deposition PW1 had stated that
he had acted on the behest of one Dr. Krishna Rao. It was further the
stand of the accused-appellant that the tainted currency notes were
forcibly stuffed into his pocket. The trial court and the High Court had
disbelieved the defence evidence and found that PW1 and PW2 were won over
by the appellant and that is why they turned hostile against their own
version recorded by the investigating officer and subsequently by a
Magistrate under Section 164 of CrPC. The Special Judge ordered the
witnesses to be prosecuted for perjury and the said course suggested by the
trial Judge found approval of the High Court also. While dealing with the
controversy this court took note of the fact that the High Court had
observed that though there was no direct evidence to show that the accused
had demanded and accepted the money, yet the rest of the evidence and the
circumstances were sufficient to establish that the accused had accepted
the amount and that gave rise to a presumption under Section 20 of the
Prevention of Corruption Act that he accepted the same as illegal
gratification, particularly so, when the defence theory put forth was not
accepted. It was contended before this court that presumption under
Section 20 of the Act can be drawn only when the prosecution succeeded in
establishing with direct evidence that the delinquent public servant had
accepted or obtained gratification. It was further urged that it was not
enough that some currency notes were handed over to the pubic servant to
make it acceptance of gratification and it was incumbent on the part of the
prosecution to further prove that what was paid amounted to gratification.
In support of the said contention reliance was placed on Sita Ram (supra)
and Suraj Mal v. State (Delhi Admn.)[33]. The three-Judge Bench referred
to Section 20(1) of the Act, the pronouncements in Hawkins v. Powells
Tillery Steam Coal Co. Ltd[34] and Suresh Budharmal Kalani v. State of
Maharashtra[35] and adverted to the facts and came to hold as follows:-
"From those proved facts the court can legitimately draw a presumption that
the appellant received or accepted the said currency notes on his own
volition. Of course, the said presumption is not an inviolable one, as the
appellant could rebut it either through cross-examination of the witnesses
cited against him or by adducing reliable evidence. But if the appellant
fails to disprove the presumption the same would stick and then it [pic]can
be held by the court that the prosecution has proved that the appellant
received the said amount."
36. It is apt to note here the three-Judge Bench referred to the
observations in Hazari Lal (supra) and opined thus:-
"The aforesaid observation is in consonance with the line of approach which
we have adopted now. We may say with great respect to the learned Judges
of the two-Judge Bench that the legal principle on this aspect has been
correctly propounded therein."
37. In this regard Mr. Jain has placed reliance on the authority B.
Jayaraj (supra). In the said case the complainant did not support the
prosecution version and had stated in his deposition that the amount that
was paid by him to the accused was with a request that it may be deposited
in the bank as fee for renewal of his licence for the fair price shop. The
court referred to Section 7 of the Act and observed as follows:-
"Insofar as the offence under Section 7 is concerned, it is a settled
position in law that demand of illegal gratification is sine qua non to
constitute the said offence and mere recovery of currency notes cannot
constitute the offence under Section 7 unless it is proved beyond all
reasonable doubt that the accused voluntarily accepted the money knowing it
to be a bribe. The above position has been succinctly laid down in several
judgment of this Court. By way of illustration reference may be made to
the decision in C.M. Sharma v. State of A.P.[36] and C.M. Girish Babu v.
C.B.I.[37]"
After so observing, the court proceeded to state thus:-
"In the present case, the complainant did not support the prosecution case
insofar as demand by the accused is concerned. The prosecution has not
examined any other witness, present at the time when the money was
allegedly handed over to the accused by the complainant, to prove that the
same was pursuant to any demand made by the accused. When the complainant
himself has disowned what he had stated in the initial complaint (exbt. P-
11) before LW-9, and there is no other evidence to prove that the accused
had made any demand, the evidence of PW-1 and contents of Exbt. P-11 cannot
be relied upon to come to the conclusion that the above material furnishes
proof of the demand allegedly made by the accused. We are, therefore,
inclined to hold that the Ld. Trial court as well as the High Court was not
correct in holding the demand alleged to be made by the accused as proved.
The only other material available is the recovery of the tainted currency
notes from the possession of the accused. In fact, such possession is
admitted by the accused himself. Mere possession and recovery of the
currency notes from the accused without proof of demand will not bring home
the offence under Section 7. The above also will be conclusive insofar as
the offence under Section 13(1)(d)(i)(ii) is concerned as in the absence of
any proof of demand for illegal gratification, the use of corrupt or
illegal means or abuse of position as a public servant to obtain any
valuable thing of pecuniary advantage cannot be held to be established."
38. The said principle has been followed in M.R. Purushotham v. State of
Karnataka[38]. On an attentive and cautious reading of the aforesaid
decisions it is noticeable that the court disbelieved the story of the
prosecution as no other evidence was brought on record. In N. Narsinga Rao
case the accused was charged for the offences punishable under Sections 7
read with Section 13(1)(d) & (2) of the Act. The court, as we have stated
earlier, had referred to section 20(1) of the Act and opined that from the
proven facts the court can legitimately draw a presumption that the
delinquent officer had received and accepted money. As we notice, the
authorities in B. Jayaraj (supra) and M.R. Purushotam (supra) do not lay
down as a proposition of law that when the complainant turns hostile and
does not support the case of the prosecution, the prosecution cannot prove
its case otherwise and the court cannot legitimately draw the presumption
under Section 20 of the Act. Therefore the proposition, though
industriously, presented by Mr. Jain that when Baj Singh, PW5, the
complainant, had turned hostile the whole case of the prosecution would
collapse is not acceptable and accordingly hereby rejected.
39. Presently, we shall refer to the evidence of PW6, a clerk in the
office of Tehsildar, Rajpura. He has deposed that on 25.1.1995, on the day
of the raid, he joined the police party headed by Narinder Pal Kaushal,
DSP, on the instruction of Tehsildar. He was introduced to Baj Singh, the
complainant and Jagdish Verma, a shadow witness. Thereafter, the
complainant and the shadow witness, Jagdish Verma, were sent to the octroi
post and he stopped at some distance along with Narinder Pal Kaushal who
was waiting for signal and on receiving signal they went inside the octroi
post. As per his testimony Narinder Pal Kaushal introduced himself as DSP
and thereafter a glass of water was procured and sodium was added to it.
Both the hands of the accused were dipped in the glass of water and the
water turned pink. On search of the accused Rs.500/- in the denomination of
Rs.100/- were recovered. The numbers tallied with the numbers mentioned in
the memo, Ex. PE. The notes were taken into possession vide Ex. PH. As is
manifest that the said witness has supported the story of the prosecution
in toto. The submission of Mr. Jain is that he is merely a witness to
recovery and solely on the basis of recovery no conviction can be recorded.
There can be no quarrel over the proposition that on the basis of mere
recovery an accused cannot be found guilty. It is the settled principle
of law that mere recovery of the tainted money is not sufficient to record
a conviction unless there is evidence that bribe had been demanded or money
was paid voluntarily as bribe. In the absence of any evidence of demand
and acceptance of the amount as illegal gratification, recovery would not
alone be a ground to convict the accused. This has been so held in T.
Subramanian v. The State of Tamil Nadu[39], Madhukar Bhaskarrao Joshi v.
State of Maharashtra[40], Raj Rajendra Singh Seth v. State of Jharkhand and
Anr.[41], State of Maharashtra v. Dnyaneshwar Laxman Rao Wankhede[42], C.M.
Girish Babu v. C.B.I., Cochin[43], K. S. Panduranga v. State of
Karnataka[44] and Satvir Singh v. State of Delhi[45]. The fact remains
that PW6 has supported the recovery in entirety. He has stood firm and
remained unshaken in the cross-examination and nothing has been elicited to
dislodge his testimony. His evidence has to be appreciated regard being had
to what has been deposed by Jagdish Verma, PW7. In examination-in-chief he
has deposed that he had met the DSP, Narinder Pal Kaushal who had
introduced him to Sher Singh, PW6. He has further stated that he and PW5,
Baj Singh, went inside the octroi post where Vinod Kumar demanded bribe
from Baj Singh whereupon Baj Singh gave Rs.500/- to him, and at that
juncture, he gave the signal to the vigilance party to come inside where
after and they came and apprehended the accused. Apart from stating about
the demand and acceptance he had also stated that the hands of the accused
were dipped in that water and the colour of the water had turned light
pink. It was transferred into a quarter bottle and was sealed and was
taken into possession vide recovery memo Ex.PG which was attested by him
and Baj Singh. The amount of Rs.500/- was recovered from right side pant
pocket of the accused. After making the arrangement for the pant of the
accused, the right side pocket of the pant of the accused was dipped in the
mixture of water and sodium and its colour turned light pink. It was also
transferred into a quarter bottle which was duly sealed and was taken into
possession vide recovery memo Ex.PJ. The pant was also taken into
possession vide recovery memo Ex.PJ. The notes recovered from the accused
were compared with the numbers mentioned in the memo and those tallied.
The notes were taken into possession vide recovery memo Ex.PF. A sum of
Rs.310/- was recovered from the further search of the accused which was
taken into possession vide recovery memo Ex.PK. Thus, from the aforesaid
testimony it is absolutely clear that he has supported in entirety about
the demand, acceptance and recovery of money. It is necessary, though
painful, to note that PW7 was examined-in-chief on 30.9.1999 and was cross-
examined on 25.5.2001, almost after 1 year and 8 months. The delay in said
cross-examination, as we have stated earlier had given enough time for
prevarication due to many a reason. A fair trial is to be fair both to
the defence and the prosecution as well as to the victim. An offence
registered under the Prevention of Corruption Act is to be tried with all
seriousness. We fail to appreciate how the learned trial Judge could
exhibit such laxity in granting so much time for cross-examination in a
case of this nature. It would have been absolutely appropriate on the part
of the learned trial Judge to finish the cross-examination on the day the
said witness was examined. As is evident, for no reason whatsoever it was
deferred and the cross-examination took place after 20 months. The witness
had all the time in the world to be gained over. We have already opined
that he was declared hostile and re-examined. It is settled in law that
the testimony of a hostile witness can be relied upon by the prosecution as
well as the defence. In re-examination by the public prosecutor this
witness has accepted about the correctness of his statement in the court on
13.9.1999. He has also accepted that he had not made any complaint to the
Presiding Officer of the Court in writing or verbally that the Inspector
was threatening him to make a false statement in the Court. It has also
been accepted by him that he had given the statement in the Court on
account of fear of false implication by the Inspector. He has agreed to
have signed his statement dated 13.9.99 after going through and admitting
it to be correct. It has come in the re-examination that he had not stated
in his statement dated 13.9.99 in the Court that recovery of tainted money
was not effected in his presence from the accused or that he had been told
by the Inspector that amount has been recovered from the accused. He had
also not stated in his said statement that the accused and witnesses were
taken to the Tehsil and it was there that he had signed all the memos.
40. Reading the evidence in entirety, his evidence cannot be brushed
aside. The delay in cross-examination has resulted in his pre-varication
from the examination-in-chief. But, a significant one, his examination-in-
chief and the re-examination impels us to accept the testimony that he had
gone into the octroi post and had witnessed about the demand and acceptance
of money by the accused. In his cross-examination he has stated that he
had not gone with Baj Singh to the vigilance department at any time and no
recovery was made in his presence. The said part of the testimony, in our
considered view, does not commend acceptance in the backdrop of entire
evidence in examination-in-chief and the re-examination. The evidence of
PW6 and PW7 have got corroboration from PW8. He in all material
particulars has stated about the recovery and proven the necessary
documents pertaining to the test carried with phenolphthalein powder. The
fact remains that the appellant's pocket contained phenolphthalein smeared
currency notes when he was searched. It is apt to take note of the fact
that the currency notes that have been recovered from the right side of the
pant pocket were actually prepared by PW8 by smearing them with
phenolphthalein powder. The appellant was caught red-handed with those
currency notes. In is statement recorded under Section 313 of CrPC he has
taken the plea that he is innocent and has been falsely implicated due to
animosity. No explanation has been given as regards the recovery.
Therefore, from the above facts, legitimately a presumption can be drawn
that the accused-appellant had received or accepted the said currency notes
on his own volition. The factum of presumption and the testimony of PW6
and 7 go a long way to show that the prosecution has been able to prove
demand, acceptance and recovery of the amount. Hence, we are inclined to
hold that the learned trial Judge and the High Court have appositely
concluded that the charges leveled against the accused have duly been
proven by the prosecution. It is not a case that there is no other
evidence barring the evidence of the complainant. On the contrary there are
adequate circumstances which establish the ingredients of the offences in
respect of which he was charged.
41. Before parting with the case we are constrained to reiterate what we
have said in the beginning. We have expressed our agony and anguish the
manner in which trials in respect of serious offences relating to
corruption are being conducted by the trial courts. Adjournments are
sought on the drop of a hat by the counsel, even though the witness is
present in court, contrary to all principles of holding a trial. That
apart, after the examination-in-chief of a witness is over, adjournment is
sought for cross-examination and the disquieting feature is that the trial
courts grant time. The law requires special reasons to be recorded for
grant of time but the same is not taken note of. As has been noticed
earlier, in the instant case the cross-examination has taken place after a
year and 8 months allowing ample time to pressurize the witness and to gain
over him by adopting all kinds of tactics. There is no cavil over the
proposition that there has to be a fair and proper trial but the duty of
the court while conducting the trial to be guided by the mandate of the
law, the conceptual fairness and above all bearing in mind its sacrosanct
duty to arrive at the truth on the basis of the material brought on record.
If an accused for his benefit takes the trial on the path of total
mockery, it cannot be countenanced. The Court has a sacred duty to see
that the trial is conducted as per law. If adjournments are granted in
this manner it would tantamount to violation of rule of law and eventually
turn such trials to a farce. It is legally impermissible and
jurisprudentially abominable. The trial courts are expected in law to
follow the command of the procedure relating to trial and not yield to the
request of the counsel to grant adjournment for non-acceptable reasons. In
fact, it is not all appreciable to call a witness for cross-examination
after such a long span of time. It is imperative if the examination-in-
chief is over, the cross-examination should be completed on the same day.
If the examination of a witness continues till late hours the trial can be
adjourned to the next day for cross-examination. It is inconceivable in
law that the cross-examination should be deferred for such a long time.
It is anathema to the concept of proper and fair trial. The duty of the
court is to see that not only the interest of the accused as per law is
protected but also the societal and collective interest is safe-guarded.
It is distressing to note that despite series of judgments of this Court,
the habit of granting adjournment, really an ailment, continues. How long
shall we say, "Awake! Arise!". There is a constant discomfort. Therefore,
we think it appropriate that the copies of the judgment be sent to the
learned Chief Justices of all the High Courts for circulating the same
among the learned trial Judges with a command to follow the principles
relating to trial in a requisite manner and not to defer the cross-
examination of a witness at their pleasure or at the leisure of the defence
counsel, for it eventually makes the trial an apology for trial and compels
the whole society to suffer chicanery. Let it be remembered that law
cannot allowed to be lonely; a destitute.
42. In the ultimate analysis, we perceive no merit in the appeal and
consequently the same stands dismissed. As the appellant is on bail, his
bail bonds are cancelled. He be taken into custody forthwith to suffer the
sentence.
........................................J.
[DIPAK MISRA]
........................................J.
[ROHINTON FALI NARIMAN]
NEW DELHI
JANUARY 21, 2015.
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[1] (2013) 7 SCC 108
[2] AIR 1958 SC 376
[3] (2000) 5 SCC 668
[4] (2001) 5 SCC 667
[5] (1974) 4 SCC 560
[6] (2000) 8 SCC 571
[7] (2014) 4 SCALE 81
[8] (2014) 11 SCALE 467
[9] (1976) 1 SCC 727
[10] (1959) SCR 195
[11] (1962) 2 SCR 195
[12] (1969) 1 SCR 22
[13] (1995) 3 SCC 351
[14] (2009) 3 SCC 779
[15] (2010) 4 SCC 450
[16] AIR 1954 SC 322
[17] (1972) 3 All ER 1056
[18] (1973) 1 All ER 440
[19] (1976) 1 SCC 15
[20] (1996) 11 SCC 709
[21] (2004) 5 SCC 223
[22] AIR 1964 SC 221
[23] (2004) 5 SCC 230
[24] (1976) 1 SCC 389
[25] (1991) 3 SCC 627
[26] (1976) 4 SCC 233
[27] (1980) 1 SCC 30
[28] (1999) 8 SCC 649
[29] (1980) 2 SCC 390
[30] (1975) 2 SCC 227
[31] (1979) 4 SCC 725
[32] (2001) 1 SCC 691
[33] (1979) 4 SCC 725
[34] (1911) 1 KB 988 : 1911 WN 53
[35] (1998) 7 SCC 337
[36] (2010) 15 SCC 1
[37] (2009) 3 SCC 779
[38] 2014 (11) SCALE 467
[39] AIR 2006 SC 836
[40] (2000) 8 SCC 571
[41] AIR 2008 SC 3217
[42] (2009) 15 SCC 200
[43] AIR 2009 SC 2011
[44] (2012) 3 SCC 721
[45] (2014) 13 SCC 143
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