In the present case, the central question is whether the
prosecutrix was below 16 years of age at the time of the incident.
The prosecution in support of their case adduced two
certificates, which were the birth certificate and the middle
school certificate. The date of birth of the prosecutrix has been
shown as 29.08.1987 in the Birth Certificate (Ext. P/5), while
the date of birth is shown as 27.08.1987 in the Middle School
Examination Certificate. There is a difference of just two days in
the dates mentioned in the abovementioned Exhibits. The Trial
Court has rightly observed that the birth certificate Ext. P/5
clearly shows that the registration regarding the birth was made
on 30.10.1987 and keeping in view the fact that registration was
made within 2 months of the birth, it could not be guessed that
the prosecutrix was shown as under-aged in view of the
possibility of the incident in question. We are of the view that the
discrepancy of two days in the two documents adduced by the
prosecution is immaterial and the High Court was wrong in
presuming that the documents could not be relied upon in
determining the age of the prosecutrix.
This Court in the case of Mahadeo S/o Kerba Maske Vs.
State of Maharashtra and Anr., (2013) 14 SCC 637, has held
that Rule 12(3) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of
Children) Rules, 2007, is applicable in determining the age of
the victim of rape. Rule 12(3) reads as under:
“Rule 12(3): In every case concerning a child or
juvenile in conflict with law, the age determination
inquiry shall be conducted by the court or the Board
or, as the case may be, the Committee by seeking
evidence by obtaining –
(a) (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if
available; and in the absence whereof;
(ii) the date of birth certificate from the school (otherPage 8
8
than a play school) first attended; and in the absence
whereof;
(iii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a
municipal authority or a panchayat;
(b) and only in the absence of either (i), (ii) or (iii) of
clause (a) above, the medical opinion will be sought
from a duly constituted Medical Board, which will
declare the age of the juvenile or child. In case exact
assessment of the age cannot be done, the Court or
the Board or, as the case may be, the Committee, for
the reasons to be recorded by them, may, if
considered necessary, give benefit to the child or
juvenile by considering his/her age on lower side
within the margin of one year.
and, while passing orders in such case shall, after
taking into consideration such evidence as may be
available, or the medical opinion, as the case may be,
record a finding in respect of his age and either of the
evidence specified in any of the clauses (a)(i), (ii), (iii)
or in the absence whereof, clause (b) shall be the
conclusive proof of the age as regards such child or
the juvenile in conflict with law.”
This Court further held in paragraph 12 of Mahadeo S/o
Kerba Maske (supra) as under:
“Under rule 12(3)(b), it is specifically provided that only
in the absence of alternative methods described under
Rule 12(3)(a)(i) to (iii), the medical opinion can be
sought for. In the light of such a statutory rule
prevailing for ascertainment of the age of the juvenile
in our considered opinion, the same yardstick can be
rightly followed by the courts for the purpose of the
ascertaining the age of a victim as well.”
(Emphasis supplied)
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 442 OF 2010
State of Madhya Pradesh … Appellant
:Versus:
Anoop Singh … Respondent
Citation;(2015) 7 SCC773
Pinaki Chandra Ghose
1. The present Criminal Appeal has been preferred against the
judgment and order dated 10.07.2008 passed by the High Court
of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur in Criminal Appeal No.924 of
2006, whereby the High Court set aside the judgment of
conviction and order of sentence passed by the learned Trial
Court and acquitted the accused from all the charges levelled
against him.
2. The facts of the present matter are that on 03.01.2003, at
about 10:30 A.M. the prosecutrix was going to school along with
her sister. On realizing that she had left behind her practical
note book, she returned back and after taking the said note
book she once again headed towards the school. When she
reached near Tar Badi (wire fencing) near Hawai Patti, there was
an Ambassador car standing there and as alleged, the accused
respondent came out of the car, pulled the prosecutrix inside the
car and forced her to smell something, as a result of which the
prosecutrix became unconscious. As alleged by the prosecution,
the prosecutrix was taken to some unknown place thereafter.
3. On regaining consciousness, the prosecutrix felt pain in her
private parts. On the same day, she was admitted in the District
Hospital, Satna in an unconscious condition and information
about the incident was given to Laxmikant Sharma (P.W.8), the
uncle of the prosecutrix. On 10.01.2003, the prosecutrix was
discharged from the Hospital and sent back to her home where
she narrated the incident and thereafter an F.I.R was lodged.
During the course of investigation, the prosecutrix was sent for
medical examination and her clothes were seized and slides were
prepared. After receipt of the medical report, F.I.R was registered
and site map of the spot was prepared. The Investigating Officer
seized various articles which included the prosecutrix’s birth
certificate and certificate of the Middle School Examination,
2001. Along with that the relevant page (page No. 20) of the
register of the U.S.A Hotel was also seized. After due
investigation a charge-sheet was filed against the respondent for
offences under Sections 363, 366 and 376 of the Indian Penal
Code, 1860 (“I.P.C.”) and the statements of the prosecution
witnesses were recorded.
4. On 27.03.2003, the Judicial Magistrate, First Class Satna
registered the Criminal Case No.116/2003 and passed the
committal order. Accordingly, the case was transferred and was
received by the Upper District Sessions Judge-III, Satna for trial.
5. The IIIrd Additional Sessions Judge, Satna, by his order
dated 24.04.2006 passed in Special Case No.123/2003,
convicted the accused under Sections 363, 366 and 376 of I.P.C.
and held that all the offences against the respondent were
proved beyond reasonable doubt. The respondent was awarded 7
years’ rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs.500/- for the crime
under Section 363 I.P.C., 10 years’ rigorous imprisonment and
fine of Rs.1000/- for the crime under Section 366 I.P.C., and 10
years’ rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs.1000/- for the crime
under Section 376 I.P.C. with default clauses. All the
substantive sentences were directed to run concurrently.
6. Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment and order passed by
the IIIrd Additional Sessions Judge, Satna, the respondent
preferred an appeal under Section 374(2) of Cr.P.C. before the
High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur, which was
numbered as Criminal Appeal No.924 of 2006. The learned
Single Judge of the High Court, by impugned judgment and
order dated 10.07.2008, set aside the judgment and order of
conviction passed by the Trial Court against the respondent. The
High Court ruled that the decision of the Trial Court was not
sustainable solely on the ground that the prosecution had failed
to prove the fact that the girl was less than 16 years of age at the
time of the incident. The reasons that weighed heavily with the
ruling of the High Court were that, either the public prosecutor
or P.W.7 Pramod Kumar Sharma (father of the prosecutrix) tried
to file Ext. P/5 which was not part of the charge-sheet. Such
type of evidence could not be created by any person except the
Investigation Officer. It was for the prosecution to show that a
particular document was taken on record during investigation
but could not be filed. The prosecution could not create any new
evidence which was not part of the investigation. Ext. P/5 and
Ext. P/6 have variation in the date of birth of the prosecutrix. In
certificate Ext.P/5 the date of birth was disclosed as 29.8.1987,
whereas in certificate Ext.P/6 it has been disclosed as
27.8.1987. The High Court found this sufficient to disbelieve
that the prosecutrix was below 16 years of age at the time of the
incident. The High Court relied on the statement of PW-11 Dr.
A.K. Saraf who took the X-ray of the prosecutrix and on the
basis of the ossification test, came to the conclusion that the age
of the prosecutrix was more than 15 years but less than 18
years. Considering this the High Court presumed that the girl
was more than 18 years of age at the time of the incident. The
last ground taken by the High Court was that the girl was a
consenting party and was more than 18 years of age at the time
of the incident and thus, no offence against the accused has
been proved.
7. We have heard the learned counsel appearing for the
parties.
8. Before us, learned counsel for the State of Madhya Pradesh
has raised the contention that the High Court gave undue
importance to the difference of two days in the date of birth of
the prosecutrix as per the birth certificate and the certificate of
the Middle School Examination 2001, and erroneously held that
this difference is sufficient to disbelieve the age of the
prosecutrix. Further, the High Court ought to have appreciated
the law laid down by this Court that regarding the determination
of age, the birth certificate is the determining evidence.
9. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent, on the
other hand, argued that the prosecution story is concocted as
her evidence is not corroborated by the evidence of P.W.9
Jagdish Gupta, the Manager of the Hotel. Further, the
respondent states that the prosecutrix did not give any
resistance and there were no injury marks, which make it clear
that she was a consenting party. In addition, the learned
counsel argued that the prosecution did not explain as to why
the Investigating Officer did not seize the birth certificate during
the course of investigation.
10. We believe that the present case involves only one issue for
this Court to be considered, which is regarding the
determination of the age of the prosecutrix.
11. In the present case, the central question is whether the
prosecutrix was below 16 years of age at the time of the incident.
The prosecution in support of their case adduced two
certificates, which were the birth certificate and the middle
school certificate. The date of birth of the prosecutrix has been
shown as 29.08.1987 in the Birth Certificate (Ext. P/5), while
the date of birth is shown as 27.08.1987 in the Middle School
Examination Certificate. There is a difference of just two days in
the dates mentioned in the abovementioned Exhibits. The Trial
Court has rightly observed that the birth certificate Ext. P/5
clearly shows that the registration regarding the birth was made
on 30.10.1987 and keeping in view the fact that registration was
made within 2 months of the birth, it could not be guessed that
the prosecutrix was shown as under-aged in view of the
possibility of the incident in question. We are of the view that the
discrepancy of two days in the two documents adduced by the
prosecution is immaterial and the High Court was wrong in
presuming that the documents could not be relied upon in
determining the age of the prosecutrix.
12. This Court in the case of Mahadeo S/o Kerba Maske Vs.
State of Maharashtra and Anr., (2013) 14 SCC 637, has held
that Rule 12(3) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of
Children) Rules, 2007, is applicable in determining the age of
the victim of rape. Rule 12(3) reads as under:
“Rule 12(3): In every case concerning a child or
juvenile in conflict with law, the age determination
inquiry shall be conducted by the court or the Board
or, as the case may be, the Committee by seeking
evidence by obtaining –
(a) (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if
available; and in the absence whereof;
(ii) the date of birth certificate from the school (otherPage 8
8
than a play school) first attended; and in the absence
whereof;
(iii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a
municipal authority or a panchayat;
(b) and only in the absence of either (i), (ii) or (iii) of
clause (a) above, the medical opinion will be sought
from a duly constituted Medical Board, which will
declare the age of the juvenile or child. In case exact
assessment of the age cannot be done, the Court or
the Board or, as the case may be, the Committee, for
the reasons to be recorded by them, may, if
considered necessary, give benefit to the child or
juvenile by considering his/her age on lower side
within the margin of one year.
and, while passing orders in such case shall, after
taking into consideration such evidence as may be
available, or the medical opinion, as the case may be,
record a finding in respect of his age and either of the
evidence specified in any of the clauses (a)(i), (ii), (iii)
or in the absence whereof, clause (b) shall be the
conclusive proof of the age as regards such child or
the juvenile in conflict with law.”
13. This Court further held in paragraph 12 of Mahadeo S/o
Kerba Maske (supra) as under:
“Under rule 12(3)(b), it is specifically provided that only
in the absence of alternative methods described under
Rule 12(3)(a)(i) to (iii), the medical opinion can be
sought for. In the light of such a statutory rule
prevailing for ascertainment of the age of the juvenile
in our considered opinion, the same yardstick can be
rightly followed by the courts for the purpose of the
ascertaining the age of a victim as well.”
(Emphasis supplied)
This Court therefore relied on the certificates issued by thePage 9
9
school in determining the age of the prosecutrix. In paragraph
13, this Court observed:
“In light of our above reasoning, in the case on hand,
there were certificates issued by the school in which
the proseuctrix did her V standard and in the school
leaving certificate issued by the school under Exhibit
54, the date of birth has been clearly noted as
20.05.1990 and this document was also proved by PW
11. Apart from that the transfer certificate as well as
the admission form maintained by the Primary
School, Latur, where the prosecutrix had her initial
education, also confirmed the date of birth as
20.05.1990. the reliance placed upon the said
evidence by the Courts below to arrive at the age of
the prosecutrix to hold that the prosecutrix was below
18 years of age at the time of occurrence was perfectly
justified and we do not find any grounds to interfere
with the same.”
14. In the present case, we have before us two documents
which support the case of the prosecutrix that she was below 16
years of age at the time the incident took place. These
documents can be used for ascertaining the age of the
prosecutrix as per Rule 12(3)(b). The difference of two days in
the dates, in our considered view, is immaterial and just on this
minor discrepancy, the evidence in the form of Exts. P/5 and
P/6 cannot be discarded. Therefore, the Trial Court was correct
in relying on the documents.
15. The High Court also relied on the statement of PW-11 Dr.
A.K. Saraf who took the X-ray of the prosecutrix and on theP
basis of the ossification test, came to the conclusion that the age
of the prosecutrix was more than 15 years but less than 1Page 1
1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 442 OF 2010
State of Madhya Pradesh … Appellant
:Versus:
Anoop Singh … Respondent
J U D G M E N T
Pinaki Chandra Ghose
1. The present Criminal Appeal has been preferred against the
judgment and order dated 10.07.2008 passed by the High Court
of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur in Criminal Appeal No.924 of
2006, whereby the High Court set aside the judgment of
conviction and order of sentence passed by the learned Trial
Court and acquitted the accused from all the charges levelled
against him.
2. The facts of the present matter are that on 03.01.2003, at
about 10:30 A.M. the prosecutrix was going to school along with
her sister. On realizing that she had left behind her practical
note book, she returned back and after taking the said note
book she once again headed towards the school. When she
reached near Tar Badi (wire fencing) near Hawai Patti, there was
an Ambassador car standing there and as alleged, the accusedPage 2
2
respondent came out of the car, pulled the prosecutrix inside the
car and forced her to smell something, as a result of which the
prosecutrix became unconscious. As alleged by the prosecution,
the prosecutrix was taken to some unknown place thereafter.
3. On regaining consciousness, the prosecutrix felt pain in her
private parts. On the same day, she was admitted in the District
Hospital, Satna in an unconscious condition and information
about the incident was given to Laxmikant Sharma (P.W.8), the
uncle of the prosecutrix. On 10.01.2003, the prosecutrix was
discharged from the Hospital and sent back to her home where
she narrated the incident and thereafter an F.I.R was lodged.
During the course of investigation, the prosecutrix was sent for
medical examination and her clothes were seized and slides were
prepared. After receipt of the medical report, F.I.R was registered
and site map of the spot was prepared. The Investigating Officer
seized various articles which included the prosecutrix’s birth
certificate and certificate of the Middle School Examination,
2001. Along with that the relevant page (page No. 20) of the
register of the U.S.A Hotel was also seized. After due
investigation a charge-sheet was filed against the respondent for
offences under Sections 363, 366 and 376 of the Indian PenalPage 3
3
Code, 1860 (“I.P.C.”) and the statements of the prosecution
witnesses were recorded.
4. On 27.03.2003, the Judicial Magistrate, First Class Satna
registered the Criminal Case No.116/2003 and passed the
committal order. Accordingly, the case was transferred and was
received by the Upper District Sessions Judge-III, Satna for trial.
5. The IIIrd Additional Sessions Judge, Satna, by his order
dated 24.04.2006 passed in Special Case No.123/2003,
convicted the accused under Sections 363, 366 and 376 of I.P.C.
and held that all the offences against the respondent were
proved beyond reasonable doubt. The respondent was awarded 7
years’ rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs.500/- for the crime
under Section 363 I.P.C., 10 years’ rigorous imprisonment and
fine of Rs.1000/- for the crime under Section 366 I.P.C., and 10
years’ rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs.1000/- for the crime
under Section 376 I.P.C. with default clauses. All the
substantive sentences were directed to run concurrently.
6. Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment and order passed by
the IIIrd Additional Sessions Judge, Satna, the respondent
preferred an appeal under Section 374(2) of Cr.P.C. before the
High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur, which wasPage 4
4
numbered as Criminal Appeal No.924 of 2006. The learned
Single Judge of the High Court, by impugned judgment and
order dated 10.07.2008, set aside the judgment and order of
conviction passed by the Trial Court against the respondent. The
High Court ruled that the decision of the Trial Court was not
sustainable solely on the ground that the prosecution had failed
to prove the fact that the girl was less than 16 years of age at the
time of the incident. The reasons that weighed heavily with the
ruling of the High Court were that, either the public prosecutor
or P.W.7 Pramod Kumar Sharma (father of the prosecutrix) tried
to file Ext. P/5 which was not part of the charge-sheet. Such
type of evidence could not be created by any person except the
Investigation Officer. It was for the prosecution to show that a
particular document was taken on record during investigation
but could not be filed. The prosecution could not create any new
evidence which was not part of the investigation. Ext. P/5 and
Ext. P/6 have variation in the date of birth of the prosecutrix. In
certificate Ext.P/5 the date of birth was disclosed as 29.8.1987,
whereas in certificate Ext.P/6 it has been disclosed as
27.8.1987. The High Court found this sufficient to disbelieve
that the prosecutrix was below 16 years of age at the time of thePage 5
5
incident. The High Court relied on the statement of PW-11 Dr.
A.K. Saraf who took the X-ray of the prosecutrix and on the
basis of the ossification test, came to the conclusion that the age
of the prosecutrix was more than 15 years but less than 18
years. Considering this the High Court presumed that the girl
was more than 18 years of age at the time of the incident. The
last ground taken by the High Court was that the girl was a
consenting party and was more than 18 years of age at the time
of the incident and thus, no offence against the accused has
been proved.
7. We have heard the learned counsel appearing for the
parties.
8. Before us, learned counsel for the State of Madhya Pradesh
has raised the contention that the High Court gave undue
importance to the difference of two days in the date of birth of
the prosecutrix as per the birth certificate and the certificate of
the Middle School Examination 2001, and erroneously held that
this difference is sufficient to disbelieve the age of the
prosecutrix. Further, the High Court ought to have appreciated
the law laid down by this Court that regarding the determination
of age, the birth certificate is the determining evidence. Page 6
6
9. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent, on the
other hand, argued that the prosecution story is concocted as
her evidence is not corroborated by the evidence of P.W.9
Jagdish Gupta, the Manager of the Hotel. Further, the
respondent states that the prosecutrix did not give any
resistance and there were no injury marks, which make it clear
that she was a consenting party. In addition, the learned
counsel argued that the prosecution did not explain as to why
the Investigating Officer did not seize the birth certificate during
the course of investigation.
10. We believe that the present case involves only one issue for
this Court to be considered, which is regarding the
determination of the age of the prosecutrix.
11. In the present case, the central question is whether the
prosecutrix was below 16 years of age at the time of the incident.
The prosecution in support of their case adduced two
certificates, which were the birth certificate and the middle
school certificate. The date of birth of the prosecutrix has been
shown as 29.08.1987 in the Birth Certificate (Ext. P/5), while
the date of birth is shown as 27.08.1987 in the Middle School
Examination Certificate. There is a difference of just two days inPage 7
7
the dates mentioned in the abovementioned Exhibits. The Trial
Court has rightly observed that the birth certificate Ext. P/5
clearly shows that the registration regarding the birth was made
on 30.10.1987 and keeping in view the fact that registration was
made within 2 months of the birth, it could not be guessed that
the prosecutrix was shown as under-aged in view of the
possibility of the incident in question. We are of the view that the
discrepancy of two days in the two documents adduced by the
prosecution is immaterial and the High Court was wrong in
presuming that the documents could not be relied upon in
determining the age of the prosecutrix.
12. This Court in the case of Mahadeo S/o Kerba Maske Vs.
State of Maharashtra and Anr., (2013) 14 SCC 637, has held
that Rule 12(3) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of
Children) Rules, 2007, is applicable in determining the age of
the victim of rape. Rule 12(3) reads as under:
“Rule 12(3): In every case concerning a child or
juvenile in conflict with law, the age determination
inquiry shall be conducted by the court or the Board
or, as the case may be, the Committee by seeking
evidence by obtaining –
(a) (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if
available; and in the absence whereof;
(ii) the date of birth certificate from the school (otherPage 8
8
than a play school) first attended; and in the absence
whereof;
(iii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a
municipal authority or a panchayat;
(b) and only in the absence of either (i), (ii) or (iii) of
clause (a) above, the medical opinion will be sought
from a duly constituted Medical Board, which will
declare the age of the juvenile or child. In case exact
assessment of the age cannot be done, the Court or
the Board or, as the case may be, the Committee, for
the reasons to be recorded by them, may, if
considered necessary, give benefit to the child or
juvenile by considering his/her age on lower side
within the margin of one year.
and, while passing orders in such case shall, after
taking into consideration such evidence as may be
available, or the medical opinion, as the case may be,
record a finding in respect of his age and either of the
evidence specified in any of the clauses (a)(i), (ii), (iii)
or in the absence whereof, clause (b) shall be the
conclusive proof of the age as regards such child or
the juvenile in conflict with law.”
13. This Court further held in paragraph 12 of Mahadeo S/o
Kerba Maske (supra) as under:
“Under rule 12(3)(b), it is specifically provided that only
in the absence of alternative methods described under
Rule 12(3)(a)(i) to (iii), the medical opinion can be
sought for. In the light of such a statutory rule
prevailing for ascertainment of the age of the juvenile
in our considered opinion, the same yardstick can be
rightly followed by the courts for the purpose of the
ascertaining the age of a victim as well.”
(Emphasis supplied)
This Court therefore relied on the certificates issued by thePage 9
9
school in determining the age of the prosecutrix. In paragraph
13, this Court observed:
“In light of our above reasoning, in the case on hand,
there were certificates issued by the school in which
the proseuctrix did her V standard and in the school
leaving certificate issued by the school under Exhibit
54, the date of birth has been clearly noted as
20.05.1990 and this document was also proved by PW
11. Apart from that the transfer certificate as well as
the admission form maintained by the Primary
School, Latur, where the prosecutrix had her initial
education, also confirmed the date of birth as
20.05.1990. the reliance placed upon the said
evidence by the Courts below to arrive at the age of
the prosecutrix to hold that the prosecutrix was below
18 years of age at the time of occurrence was perfectly
justified and we do not find any grounds to interfere
with the same.”
14. In the present case, we have before us two documents
which support the case of the prosecutrix that she was below 16
years of age at the time the incident took place. These
documents can be used for ascertaining the age of the
prosecutrix as per Rule 12(3)(b). The difference of two days in
the dates, in our considered view, is immaterial and just on this
minor discrepancy, the evidence in the form of Exts. P/5 and
P/6 cannot be discarded. Therefore, the Trial Court was correct
in relying on the documents.
15. The High Court also relied on the statement of PW-11 Dr.
A.K. Saraf who took the X-ray of the prosecutrix and on thePage 10
10
basis of the ossification test, came to the conclusion that the age
of the prosecutrix was more than 15 years but less than 18
years. Considering this the High Court presumed that the girl
was more than 18 years of age at the time of the incident. With
respect to this finding of the High Court, we are of the opinion
that the High Court should have relied firstly on the documents
as stipulated under Rule 12(3)(b) and only in the absence, the
medical opinion should have been sought. We find that the Trial
Court has also dealt with this aspect of the ossification test. The
Trial Court noted that the respondent had cited Lakhan Lal Vs.
State of M.P., 2004 Cri.L.J. 3962, wherein the High Court of
Madhya Pradesh said that where the doctor having examined the
prosecutrix and found her to be below 18½ years, then keeping
in mind the variation of two years, the accused should be given
the benefit of doubt. Thereafter, the Trial Court rightly held that
in the present case the ossification test is not the sole criteria for
determination of the date of birth of the prosecutrix as her
certificate of birth and also the certificate of her medical
examination had been enclosed.
16. Thus, keeping in view the medical examination reports, the
statements of the prosecution witnesses which inspirePage 11
11
confidence and the certificates proving the age of the prosecutrix
to be below 16 years of age on the date of the incident, we set
aside the impugned judgment passed by the High Court and
uphold the judgment and order dated 24.04.2006 passed by the
IIIrd Additional Sessions Judge, Satna in Special Case
No.123/2003.
17. Accordingly, this appeal is allowed. We direct that the
respondent shall be taken into custody forthwith to serve out the
sentence.
……………………………..J
(Pinaki Chandra Ghose)
……………………………..J
(Uday Umesh Lalit)
New Delhi;
July 03, 2015. Page 12
12
ITEM NO.1C COURT NO.11 SECTION IIA
(For judgment)
S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Criminal Appeal No(s). 442/2010
STATE OF M.P. Appellant(s)
VERSUS
ANOOP SINGH Respondent(s)
Date : 03/07/2015 This appeal was called on for pronouncement of
judgment today.
For Appellant(s) Mr. Mishra Saurabh, AOR
For Respondent(s) Mr. M.P. Singh, Adv.
Mr. Rajeev Kumar Bansal, AOR
Hon'ble Mr. Justice Pinaki Chandra Ghose pronounced the
reportable judgment of the Bench comprising His Lordship and
Hon'ble Mr. Justice Uday Umesh Lalit.
The appeal is allowed and the respondent shall be taken into
custody forthwith to serve out the sentence in terms of the signed
reportable judgment.
(R.NATARAJAN) (SNEH LATA SHARMA)
Court Master Court Master
(Signed reportable judgment is placed on the file)
years. Considering this the High Court presumed that the girl
was more than 18 years of age at the time of the incident. With
respect to this finding of the High Court, we are of the opinion
that the High Court should have relied firstly on the documents
as stipulated under Rule 12(3)(b) and only in the absence, the
medical opinion should have been sought. We find that the Trial
Court has also dealt with this aspect of the ossification test. The
Trial Court noted that the respondent had cited Lakhan Lal Vs.
State of M.P., 2004 Cri.L.J. 3962, wherein the High Court of
Madhya Pradesh said that where the doctor having examined the
prosecutrix and found her to be below 18½ years, then keeping
in mind the variation of two years, the accused should be given
the benefit of doubt. Thereafter, the Trial Court rightly held that
in the present case the ossification test is not the sole criteria for
determination of the date of birth of the prosecutrix as her
certificate of birth and also the certificate of her medical
examination had been enclosed.
16. Thus, keeping in view the medical examination reports, the
statements of the prosecution witnesses which inspire
confidence and the certificates proving the age of the prosecutrix
to be below 16 years of age on the date of the incident, we set
aside the impugned judgment passed by the High Court and
uphold the judgment and order dated 24.04.2006 passed by the
IIIrd Additional Sessions Judge, Satna in Special Case
No.123/2003.
17. Accordingly, this appeal is allowed. We direct that the
respondent shall be taken into custody forthwith to serve out the
sentence.
……………………………..J
(Pinaki Chandra Ghose)
……………………………..J
(Uday Umesh Lalit)
New Delhi;
July 03, 2015.
Print Page
prosecutrix was below 16 years of age at the time of the incident.
The prosecution in support of their case adduced two
certificates, which were the birth certificate and the middle
school certificate. The date of birth of the prosecutrix has been
shown as 29.08.1987 in the Birth Certificate (Ext. P/5), while
the date of birth is shown as 27.08.1987 in the Middle School
Examination Certificate. There is a difference of just two days in
the dates mentioned in the abovementioned Exhibits. The Trial
Court has rightly observed that the birth certificate Ext. P/5
clearly shows that the registration regarding the birth was made
on 30.10.1987 and keeping in view the fact that registration was
made within 2 months of the birth, it could not be guessed that
the prosecutrix was shown as under-aged in view of the
possibility of the incident in question. We are of the view that the
discrepancy of two days in the two documents adduced by the
prosecution is immaterial and the High Court was wrong in
presuming that the documents could not be relied upon in
determining the age of the prosecutrix.
This Court in the case of Mahadeo S/o Kerba Maske Vs.
State of Maharashtra and Anr., (2013) 14 SCC 637, has held
that Rule 12(3) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of
Children) Rules, 2007, is applicable in determining the age of
the victim of rape. Rule 12(3) reads as under:
“Rule 12(3): In every case concerning a child or
juvenile in conflict with law, the age determination
inquiry shall be conducted by the court or the Board
or, as the case may be, the Committee by seeking
evidence by obtaining –
(a) (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if
available; and in the absence whereof;
(ii) the date of birth certificate from the school (otherPage 8
8
than a play school) first attended; and in the absence
whereof;
(iii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a
municipal authority or a panchayat;
(b) and only in the absence of either (i), (ii) or (iii) of
clause (a) above, the medical opinion will be sought
from a duly constituted Medical Board, which will
declare the age of the juvenile or child. In case exact
assessment of the age cannot be done, the Court or
the Board or, as the case may be, the Committee, for
the reasons to be recorded by them, may, if
considered necessary, give benefit to the child or
juvenile by considering his/her age on lower side
within the margin of one year.
and, while passing orders in such case shall, after
taking into consideration such evidence as may be
available, or the medical opinion, as the case may be,
record a finding in respect of his age and either of the
evidence specified in any of the clauses (a)(i), (ii), (iii)
or in the absence whereof, clause (b) shall be the
conclusive proof of the age as regards such child or
the juvenile in conflict with law.”
This Court further held in paragraph 12 of Mahadeo S/o
Kerba Maske (supra) as under:
“Under rule 12(3)(b), it is specifically provided that only
in the absence of alternative methods described under
Rule 12(3)(a)(i) to (iii), the medical opinion can be
sought for. In the light of such a statutory rule
prevailing for ascertainment of the age of the juvenile
in our considered opinion, the same yardstick can be
rightly followed by the courts for the purpose of the
ascertaining the age of a victim as well.”
(Emphasis supplied)
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 442 OF 2010
State of Madhya Pradesh … Appellant
:Versus:
Anoop Singh … Respondent
Citation;(2015) 7 SCC773
Pinaki Chandra Ghose
1. The present Criminal Appeal has been preferred against the
judgment and order dated 10.07.2008 passed by the High Court
of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur in Criminal Appeal No.924 of
2006, whereby the High Court set aside the judgment of
conviction and order of sentence passed by the learned Trial
Court and acquitted the accused from all the charges levelled
against him.
2. The facts of the present matter are that on 03.01.2003, at
about 10:30 A.M. the prosecutrix was going to school along with
her sister. On realizing that she had left behind her practical
note book, she returned back and after taking the said note
book she once again headed towards the school. When she
reached near Tar Badi (wire fencing) near Hawai Patti, there was
an Ambassador car standing there and as alleged, the accused
respondent came out of the car, pulled the prosecutrix inside the
car and forced her to smell something, as a result of which the
prosecutrix became unconscious. As alleged by the prosecution,
the prosecutrix was taken to some unknown place thereafter.
3. On regaining consciousness, the prosecutrix felt pain in her
private parts. On the same day, she was admitted in the District
Hospital, Satna in an unconscious condition and information
about the incident was given to Laxmikant Sharma (P.W.8), the
uncle of the prosecutrix. On 10.01.2003, the prosecutrix was
discharged from the Hospital and sent back to her home where
she narrated the incident and thereafter an F.I.R was lodged.
During the course of investigation, the prosecutrix was sent for
medical examination and her clothes were seized and slides were
prepared. After receipt of the medical report, F.I.R was registered
and site map of the spot was prepared. The Investigating Officer
seized various articles which included the prosecutrix’s birth
certificate and certificate of the Middle School Examination,
2001. Along with that the relevant page (page No. 20) of the
register of the U.S.A Hotel was also seized. After due
investigation a charge-sheet was filed against the respondent for
offences under Sections 363, 366 and 376 of the Indian Penal
Code, 1860 (“I.P.C.”) and the statements of the prosecution
witnesses were recorded.
4. On 27.03.2003, the Judicial Magistrate, First Class Satna
registered the Criminal Case No.116/2003 and passed the
committal order. Accordingly, the case was transferred and was
received by the Upper District Sessions Judge-III, Satna for trial.
5. The IIIrd Additional Sessions Judge, Satna, by his order
dated 24.04.2006 passed in Special Case No.123/2003,
convicted the accused under Sections 363, 366 and 376 of I.P.C.
and held that all the offences against the respondent were
proved beyond reasonable doubt. The respondent was awarded 7
years’ rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs.500/- for the crime
under Section 363 I.P.C., 10 years’ rigorous imprisonment and
fine of Rs.1000/- for the crime under Section 366 I.P.C., and 10
years’ rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs.1000/- for the crime
under Section 376 I.P.C. with default clauses. All the
substantive sentences were directed to run concurrently.
6. Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment and order passed by
the IIIrd Additional Sessions Judge, Satna, the respondent
preferred an appeal under Section 374(2) of Cr.P.C. before the
High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur, which was
numbered as Criminal Appeal No.924 of 2006. The learned
Single Judge of the High Court, by impugned judgment and
order dated 10.07.2008, set aside the judgment and order of
conviction passed by the Trial Court against the respondent. The
High Court ruled that the decision of the Trial Court was not
sustainable solely on the ground that the prosecution had failed
to prove the fact that the girl was less than 16 years of age at the
time of the incident. The reasons that weighed heavily with the
ruling of the High Court were that, either the public prosecutor
or P.W.7 Pramod Kumar Sharma (father of the prosecutrix) tried
to file Ext. P/5 which was not part of the charge-sheet. Such
type of evidence could not be created by any person except the
Investigation Officer. It was for the prosecution to show that a
particular document was taken on record during investigation
but could not be filed. The prosecution could not create any new
evidence which was not part of the investigation. Ext. P/5 and
Ext. P/6 have variation in the date of birth of the prosecutrix. In
certificate Ext.P/5 the date of birth was disclosed as 29.8.1987,
whereas in certificate Ext.P/6 it has been disclosed as
27.8.1987. The High Court found this sufficient to disbelieve
that the prosecutrix was below 16 years of age at the time of the
incident. The High Court relied on the statement of PW-11 Dr.
A.K. Saraf who took the X-ray of the prosecutrix and on the
basis of the ossification test, came to the conclusion that the age
of the prosecutrix was more than 15 years but less than 18
years. Considering this the High Court presumed that the girl
was more than 18 years of age at the time of the incident. The
last ground taken by the High Court was that the girl was a
consenting party and was more than 18 years of age at the time
of the incident and thus, no offence against the accused has
been proved.
7. We have heard the learned counsel appearing for the
parties.
8. Before us, learned counsel for the State of Madhya Pradesh
has raised the contention that the High Court gave undue
importance to the difference of two days in the date of birth of
the prosecutrix as per the birth certificate and the certificate of
the Middle School Examination 2001, and erroneously held that
this difference is sufficient to disbelieve the age of the
prosecutrix. Further, the High Court ought to have appreciated
the law laid down by this Court that regarding the determination
of age, the birth certificate is the determining evidence.
9. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent, on the
other hand, argued that the prosecution story is concocted as
her evidence is not corroborated by the evidence of P.W.9
Jagdish Gupta, the Manager of the Hotel. Further, the
respondent states that the prosecutrix did not give any
resistance and there were no injury marks, which make it clear
that she was a consenting party. In addition, the learned
counsel argued that the prosecution did not explain as to why
the Investigating Officer did not seize the birth certificate during
the course of investigation.
10. We believe that the present case involves only one issue for
this Court to be considered, which is regarding the
determination of the age of the prosecutrix.
11. In the present case, the central question is whether the
prosecutrix was below 16 years of age at the time of the incident.
The prosecution in support of their case adduced two
certificates, which were the birth certificate and the middle
school certificate. The date of birth of the prosecutrix has been
shown as 29.08.1987 in the Birth Certificate (Ext. P/5), while
the date of birth is shown as 27.08.1987 in the Middle School
Examination Certificate. There is a difference of just two days in
the dates mentioned in the abovementioned Exhibits. The Trial
Court has rightly observed that the birth certificate Ext. P/5
clearly shows that the registration regarding the birth was made
on 30.10.1987 and keeping in view the fact that registration was
made within 2 months of the birth, it could not be guessed that
the prosecutrix was shown as under-aged in view of the
possibility of the incident in question. We are of the view that the
discrepancy of two days in the two documents adduced by the
prosecution is immaterial and the High Court was wrong in
presuming that the documents could not be relied upon in
determining the age of the prosecutrix.
12. This Court in the case of Mahadeo S/o Kerba Maske Vs.
State of Maharashtra and Anr., (2013) 14 SCC 637, has held
that Rule 12(3) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of
Children) Rules, 2007, is applicable in determining the age of
the victim of rape. Rule 12(3) reads as under:
“Rule 12(3): In every case concerning a child or
juvenile in conflict with law, the age determination
inquiry shall be conducted by the court or the Board
or, as the case may be, the Committee by seeking
evidence by obtaining –
(a) (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if
available; and in the absence whereof;
(ii) the date of birth certificate from the school (otherPage 8
8
than a play school) first attended; and in the absence
whereof;
(iii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a
municipal authority or a panchayat;
(b) and only in the absence of either (i), (ii) or (iii) of
clause (a) above, the medical opinion will be sought
from a duly constituted Medical Board, which will
declare the age of the juvenile or child. In case exact
assessment of the age cannot be done, the Court or
the Board or, as the case may be, the Committee, for
the reasons to be recorded by them, may, if
considered necessary, give benefit to the child or
juvenile by considering his/her age on lower side
within the margin of one year.
and, while passing orders in such case shall, after
taking into consideration such evidence as may be
available, or the medical opinion, as the case may be,
record a finding in respect of his age and either of the
evidence specified in any of the clauses (a)(i), (ii), (iii)
or in the absence whereof, clause (b) shall be the
conclusive proof of the age as regards such child or
the juvenile in conflict with law.”
13. This Court further held in paragraph 12 of Mahadeo S/o
Kerba Maske (supra) as under:
“Under rule 12(3)(b), it is specifically provided that only
in the absence of alternative methods described under
Rule 12(3)(a)(i) to (iii), the medical opinion can be
sought for. In the light of such a statutory rule
prevailing for ascertainment of the age of the juvenile
in our considered opinion, the same yardstick can be
rightly followed by the courts for the purpose of the
ascertaining the age of a victim as well.”
(Emphasis supplied)
This Court therefore relied on the certificates issued by thePage 9
9
school in determining the age of the prosecutrix. In paragraph
13, this Court observed:
“In light of our above reasoning, in the case on hand,
there were certificates issued by the school in which
the proseuctrix did her V standard and in the school
leaving certificate issued by the school under Exhibit
54, the date of birth has been clearly noted as
20.05.1990 and this document was also proved by PW
11. Apart from that the transfer certificate as well as
the admission form maintained by the Primary
School, Latur, where the prosecutrix had her initial
education, also confirmed the date of birth as
20.05.1990. the reliance placed upon the said
evidence by the Courts below to arrive at the age of
the prosecutrix to hold that the prosecutrix was below
18 years of age at the time of occurrence was perfectly
justified and we do not find any grounds to interfere
with the same.”
14. In the present case, we have before us two documents
which support the case of the prosecutrix that she was below 16
years of age at the time the incident took place. These
documents can be used for ascertaining the age of the
prosecutrix as per Rule 12(3)(b). The difference of two days in
the dates, in our considered view, is immaterial and just on this
minor discrepancy, the evidence in the form of Exts. P/5 and
P/6 cannot be discarded. Therefore, the Trial Court was correct
in relying on the documents.
15. The High Court also relied on the statement of PW-11 Dr.
A.K. Saraf who took the X-ray of the prosecutrix and on theP
basis of the ossification test, came to the conclusion that the age
of the prosecutrix was more than 15 years but less than 1Page 1
1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 442 OF 2010
State of Madhya Pradesh … Appellant
:Versus:
Anoop Singh … Respondent
J U D G M E N T
Pinaki Chandra Ghose
1. The present Criminal Appeal has been preferred against the
judgment and order dated 10.07.2008 passed by the High Court
of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur in Criminal Appeal No.924 of
2006, whereby the High Court set aside the judgment of
conviction and order of sentence passed by the learned Trial
Court and acquitted the accused from all the charges levelled
against him.
2. The facts of the present matter are that on 03.01.2003, at
about 10:30 A.M. the prosecutrix was going to school along with
her sister. On realizing that she had left behind her practical
note book, she returned back and after taking the said note
book she once again headed towards the school. When she
reached near Tar Badi (wire fencing) near Hawai Patti, there was
an Ambassador car standing there and as alleged, the accusedPage 2
2
respondent came out of the car, pulled the prosecutrix inside the
car and forced her to smell something, as a result of which the
prosecutrix became unconscious. As alleged by the prosecution,
the prosecutrix was taken to some unknown place thereafter.
3. On regaining consciousness, the prosecutrix felt pain in her
private parts. On the same day, she was admitted in the District
Hospital, Satna in an unconscious condition and information
about the incident was given to Laxmikant Sharma (P.W.8), the
uncle of the prosecutrix. On 10.01.2003, the prosecutrix was
discharged from the Hospital and sent back to her home where
she narrated the incident and thereafter an F.I.R was lodged.
During the course of investigation, the prosecutrix was sent for
medical examination and her clothes were seized and slides were
prepared. After receipt of the medical report, F.I.R was registered
and site map of the spot was prepared. The Investigating Officer
seized various articles which included the prosecutrix’s birth
certificate and certificate of the Middle School Examination,
2001. Along with that the relevant page (page No. 20) of the
register of the U.S.A Hotel was also seized. After due
investigation a charge-sheet was filed against the respondent for
offences under Sections 363, 366 and 376 of the Indian PenalPage 3
3
Code, 1860 (“I.P.C.”) and the statements of the prosecution
witnesses were recorded.
4. On 27.03.2003, the Judicial Magistrate, First Class Satna
registered the Criminal Case No.116/2003 and passed the
committal order. Accordingly, the case was transferred and was
received by the Upper District Sessions Judge-III, Satna for trial.
5. The IIIrd Additional Sessions Judge, Satna, by his order
dated 24.04.2006 passed in Special Case No.123/2003,
convicted the accused under Sections 363, 366 and 376 of I.P.C.
and held that all the offences against the respondent were
proved beyond reasonable doubt. The respondent was awarded 7
years’ rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs.500/- for the crime
under Section 363 I.P.C., 10 years’ rigorous imprisonment and
fine of Rs.1000/- for the crime under Section 366 I.P.C., and 10
years’ rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs.1000/- for the crime
under Section 376 I.P.C. with default clauses. All the
substantive sentences were directed to run concurrently.
6. Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment and order passed by
the IIIrd Additional Sessions Judge, Satna, the respondent
preferred an appeal under Section 374(2) of Cr.P.C. before the
High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur, which wasPage 4
4
numbered as Criminal Appeal No.924 of 2006. The learned
Single Judge of the High Court, by impugned judgment and
order dated 10.07.2008, set aside the judgment and order of
conviction passed by the Trial Court against the respondent. The
High Court ruled that the decision of the Trial Court was not
sustainable solely on the ground that the prosecution had failed
to prove the fact that the girl was less than 16 years of age at the
time of the incident. The reasons that weighed heavily with the
ruling of the High Court were that, either the public prosecutor
or P.W.7 Pramod Kumar Sharma (father of the prosecutrix) tried
to file Ext. P/5 which was not part of the charge-sheet. Such
type of evidence could not be created by any person except the
Investigation Officer. It was for the prosecution to show that a
particular document was taken on record during investigation
but could not be filed. The prosecution could not create any new
evidence which was not part of the investigation. Ext. P/5 and
Ext. P/6 have variation in the date of birth of the prosecutrix. In
certificate Ext.P/5 the date of birth was disclosed as 29.8.1987,
whereas in certificate Ext.P/6 it has been disclosed as
27.8.1987. The High Court found this sufficient to disbelieve
that the prosecutrix was below 16 years of age at the time of thePage 5
5
incident. The High Court relied on the statement of PW-11 Dr.
A.K. Saraf who took the X-ray of the prosecutrix and on the
basis of the ossification test, came to the conclusion that the age
of the prosecutrix was more than 15 years but less than 18
years. Considering this the High Court presumed that the girl
was more than 18 years of age at the time of the incident. The
last ground taken by the High Court was that the girl was a
consenting party and was more than 18 years of age at the time
of the incident and thus, no offence against the accused has
been proved.
7. We have heard the learned counsel appearing for the
parties.
8. Before us, learned counsel for the State of Madhya Pradesh
has raised the contention that the High Court gave undue
importance to the difference of two days in the date of birth of
the prosecutrix as per the birth certificate and the certificate of
the Middle School Examination 2001, and erroneously held that
this difference is sufficient to disbelieve the age of the
prosecutrix. Further, the High Court ought to have appreciated
the law laid down by this Court that regarding the determination
of age, the birth certificate is the determining evidence. Page 6
6
9. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent, on the
other hand, argued that the prosecution story is concocted as
her evidence is not corroborated by the evidence of P.W.9
Jagdish Gupta, the Manager of the Hotel. Further, the
respondent states that the prosecutrix did not give any
resistance and there were no injury marks, which make it clear
that she was a consenting party. In addition, the learned
counsel argued that the prosecution did not explain as to why
the Investigating Officer did not seize the birth certificate during
the course of investigation.
10. We believe that the present case involves only one issue for
this Court to be considered, which is regarding the
determination of the age of the prosecutrix.
11. In the present case, the central question is whether the
prosecutrix was below 16 years of age at the time of the incident.
The prosecution in support of their case adduced two
certificates, which were the birth certificate and the middle
school certificate. The date of birth of the prosecutrix has been
shown as 29.08.1987 in the Birth Certificate (Ext. P/5), while
the date of birth is shown as 27.08.1987 in the Middle School
Examination Certificate. There is a difference of just two days inPage 7
7
the dates mentioned in the abovementioned Exhibits. The Trial
Court has rightly observed that the birth certificate Ext. P/5
clearly shows that the registration regarding the birth was made
on 30.10.1987 and keeping in view the fact that registration was
made within 2 months of the birth, it could not be guessed that
the prosecutrix was shown as under-aged in view of the
possibility of the incident in question. We are of the view that the
discrepancy of two days in the two documents adduced by the
prosecution is immaterial and the High Court was wrong in
presuming that the documents could not be relied upon in
determining the age of the prosecutrix.
12. This Court in the case of Mahadeo S/o Kerba Maske Vs.
State of Maharashtra and Anr., (2013) 14 SCC 637, has held
that Rule 12(3) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of
Children) Rules, 2007, is applicable in determining the age of
the victim of rape. Rule 12(3) reads as under:
“Rule 12(3): In every case concerning a child or
juvenile in conflict with law, the age determination
inquiry shall be conducted by the court or the Board
or, as the case may be, the Committee by seeking
evidence by obtaining –
(a) (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if
available; and in the absence whereof;
(ii) the date of birth certificate from the school (otherPage 8
8
than a play school) first attended; and in the absence
whereof;
(iii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a
municipal authority or a panchayat;
(b) and only in the absence of either (i), (ii) or (iii) of
clause (a) above, the medical opinion will be sought
from a duly constituted Medical Board, which will
declare the age of the juvenile or child. In case exact
assessment of the age cannot be done, the Court or
the Board or, as the case may be, the Committee, for
the reasons to be recorded by them, may, if
considered necessary, give benefit to the child or
juvenile by considering his/her age on lower side
within the margin of one year.
and, while passing orders in such case shall, after
taking into consideration such evidence as may be
available, or the medical opinion, as the case may be,
record a finding in respect of his age and either of the
evidence specified in any of the clauses (a)(i), (ii), (iii)
or in the absence whereof, clause (b) shall be the
conclusive proof of the age as regards such child or
the juvenile in conflict with law.”
13. This Court further held in paragraph 12 of Mahadeo S/o
Kerba Maske (supra) as under:
“Under rule 12(3)(b), it is specifically provided that only
in the absence of alternative methods described under
Rule 12(3)(a)(i) to (iii), the medical opinion can be
sought for. In the light of such a statutory rule
prevailing for ascertainment of the age of the juvenile
in our considered opinion, the same yardstick can be
rightly followed by the courts for the purpose of the
ascertaining the age of a victim as well.”
(Emphasis supplied)
This Court therefore relied on the certificates issued by thePage 9
9
school in determining the age of the prosecutrix. In paragraph
13, this Court observed:
“In light of our above reasoning, in the case on hand,
there were certificates issued by the school in which
the proseuctrix did her V standard and in the school
leaving certificate issued by the school under Exhibit
54, the date of birth has been clearly noted as
20.05.1990 and this document was also proved by PW
11. Apart from that the transfer certificate as well as
the admission form maintained by the Primary
School, Latur, where the prosecutrix had her initial
education, also confirmed the date of birth as
20.05.1990. the reliance placed upon the said
evidence by the Courts below to arrive at the age of
the prosecutrix to hold that the prosecutrix was below
18 years of age at the time of occurrence was perfectly
justified and we do not find any grounds to interfere
with the same.”
14. In the present case, we have before us two documents
which support the case of the prosecutrix that she was below 16
years of age at the time the incident took place. These
documents can be used for ascertaining the age of the
prosecutrix as per Rule 12(3)(b). The difference of two days in
the dates, in our considered view, is immaterial and just on this
minor discrepancy, the evidence in the form of Exts. P/5 and
P/6 cannot be discarded. Therefore, the Trial Court was correct
in relying on the documents.
15. The High Court also relied on the statement of PW-11 Dr.
A.K. Saraf who took the X-ray of the prosecutrix and on thePage 10
10
basis of the ossification test, came to the conclusion that the age
of the prosecutrix was more than 15 years but less than 18
years. Considering this the High Court presumed that the girl
was more than 18 years of age at the time of the incident. With
respect to this finding of the High Court, we are of the opinion
that the High Court should have relied firstly on the documents
as stipulated under Rule 12(3)(b) and only in the absence, the
medical opinion should have been sought. We find that the Trial
Court has also dealt with this aspect of the ossification test. The
Trial Court noted that the respondent had cited Lakhan Lal Vs.
State of M.P., 2004 Cri.L.J. 3962, wherein the High Court of
Madhya Pradesh said that where the doctor having examined the
prosecutrix and found her to be below 18½ years, then keeping
in mind the variation of two years, the accused should be given
the benefit of doubt. Thereafter, the Trial Court rightly held that
in the present case the ossification test is not the sole criteria for
determination of the date of birth of the prosecutrix as her
certificate of birth and also the certificate of her medical
examination had been enclosed.
16. Thus, keeping in view the medical examination reports, the
statements of the prosecution witnesses which inspirePage 11
11
confidence and the certificates proving the age of the prosecutrix
to be below 16 years of age on the date of the incident, we set
aside the impugned judgment passed by the High Court and
uphold the judgment and order dated 24.04.2006 passed by the
IIIrd Additional Sessions Judge, Satna in Special Case
No.123/2003.
17. Accordingly, this appeal is allowed. We direct that the
respondent shall be taken into custody forthwith to serve out the
sentence.
……………………………..J
(Pinaki Chandra Ghose)
……………………………..J
(Uday Umesh Lalit)
New Delhi;
July 03, 2015. Page 12
12
ITEM NO.1C COURT NO.11 SECTION IIA
(For judgment)
S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Criminal Appeal No(s). 442/2010
STATE OF M.P. Appellant(s)
VERSUS
ANOOP SINGH Respondent(s)
Date : 03/07/2015 This appeal was called on for pronouncement of
judgment today.
For Appellant(s) Mr. Mishra Saurabh, AOR
For Respondent(s) Mr. M.P. Singh, Adv.
Mr. Rajeev Kumar Bansal, AOR
Hon'ble Mr. Justice Pinaki Chandra Ghose pronounced the
reportable judgment of the Bench comprising His Lordship and
Hon'ble Mr. Justice Uday Umesh Lalit.
The appeal is allowed and the respondent shall be taken into
custody forthwith to serve out the sentence in terms of the signed
reportable judgment.
(R.NATARAJAN) (SNEH LATA SHARMA)
Court Master Court Master
(Signed reportable judgment is placed on the file)
years. Considering this the High Court presumed that the girl
was more than 18 years of age at the time of the incident. With
respect to this finding of the High Court, we are of the opinion
that the High Court should have relied firstly on the documents
as stipulated under Rule 12(3)(b) and only in the absence, the
medical opinion should have been sought. We find that the Trial
Court has also dealt with this aspect of the ossification test. The
Trial Court noted that the respondent had cited Lakhan Lal Vs.
State of M.P., 2004 Cri.L.J. 3962, wherein the High Court of
Madhya Pradesh said that where the doctor having examined the
prosecutrix and found her to be below 18½ years, then keeping
in mind the variation of two years, the accused should be given
the benefit of doubt. Thereafter, the Trial Court rightly held that
in the present case the ossification test is not the sole criteria for
determination of the date of birth of the prosecutrix as her
certificate of birth and also the certificate of her medical
examination had been enclosed.
16. Thus, keeping in view the medical examination reports, the
statements of the prosecution witnesses which inspire
confidence and the certificates proving the age of the prosecutrix
to be below 16 years of age on the date of the incident, we set
aside the impugned judgment passed by the High Court and
uphold the judgment and order dated 24.04.2006 passed by the
IIIrd Additional Sessions Judge, Satna in Special Case
No.123/2003.
17. Accordingly, this appeal is allowed. We direct that the
respondent shall be taken into custody forthwith to serve out the
sentence.
……………………………..J
(Pinaki Chandra Ghose)
……………………………..J
(Uday Umesh Lalit)
New Delhi;
July 03, 2015.
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