there was absolutely no justification on the
part of the Industrial Tribunal to deny back
wages to the respondent even when it is found
that the order of termination is void ab initio
in law for non-compliance of the mandatory
provisions under Section 6-N of the Act. Keeping
in view the fact that the period of termination
was in the year 1975 and the matter has been
unnecessarily litigated by the employer by
contesting the matter before the Industrial
Tribunal as well as the High Court and this
Court for more than 40 years, and further, even
after the Award/order of reinstatement was
passed by the Industrial Tribunal directing the
employer to give him the post equivalent to the
post of Tube-well Operator, the same has been
denied to him by offering the said post which is
not equivalent to the post of Tube-well Operator
and thereby, attributing the fault on the
respondent for non reporting to the post offered
to him, which is once again unjustified on the
part of the employer.
Thus, the principle “no work no pay” as
observed by this Court in the catena of cases
does not have any significance to the fact
situation of the present case as the termination
of the services of the workman from the post of
Tube-well Operator is erroneous in law in the
first place, as held by us in view of the above
stated reasons.
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2381 OF 2007
STATE OF U.P ………APPELLANT
Vs.
CHARAN SINGH ………RESPONDENT
Citation;(2015)8 SCC150
This appeal has been filed against the
impugned judgment and final order dated
18.07.2006, passed by the High Court of Judicature
at Allahabad, in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No.
2588 of 1998, whereby the High Court has upheld
and modified the Award passed by the Industrial
Tribunal dated 24.02.1997 in Adjudication Case
No.139 of 1992.
2.The factual matrix and the rival legal
contentions urged on behalf of the parties are
briefly stated hereunder with a view to find out
whether the impugned judgment and order of the
High Court warrants interference by this Court
in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.
3.The respondent was appointed as a temporary
Tube-well Operator w.e.f. 06.03.1974 by the
Assistant Director of Fisheries Department,
Meerut (U.P). His services were terminated vide
letter dated 22.08.1975 stating thereby that he
was a temporary employee and that his services
were no longer required by the Department. He
was given one month’s wages in lieu of the
notice. On 01.05.1976, the respondent filed a
petition before the Conciliation Officer,
Meerut, stating therein that the respondent’s
employment has been wrongfully terminated by the
appellant as he is a permanent employee of the
Fisheries Department and the provisions under
Section 6-N of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as
“the Act”), which are mandatory in nature, have
not been complied with and as such, the
termination of the services of the respondent by
the appellant is illegal. The matter was
transferred from the Conciliation Officer to thePage 3
3
Labour Commissioner, Kanpur for adjudication.
The respondent made several representations
before various high offices and courts including
this Court wherein, the same was forwarded to
the Secretary, U.P. State Legal Aid and Advisory
Board on 09.09.1986 to take necessary action in
this regard, which instead directed the
respondent to contact the Sabhapati, District
Judge, District Law Assistance and Consultant,
Civil Court premises, Meerut for consultation.
4.Thereafter, the respondent moved an application
before the State Government for the reference of
the industrial dispute under the provisions of
Section 4-K of the Act and the State Government
vide notification no.14499-502 MRIR OP 395/91,
dated 24.10.1992 referred the dispute to the
Industrial Tribunal, Meerut, thereby framing the
following questions for its determination:
i. Whether the services of the workman
has been illegally terminated, and
ii. Whether there is any violation of
Section 6-N of the Act?
5.The Industrial Tribunal after considering the
evidence on record and the rival legalPage 4
4
contentions of both the parties has answered the
questions referred to it, in favour of the
respondent, stating thereby that the termination
of the services of the workman was illegal and
was liable to be set aside. The Industrial
Tribunal directed the appellant to reinstate the
respondent on any post equivalent to the post of
Tube-well Operator. The Industrial Tribunal
passed an Award for the reinstatement of the
workman w.e.f. 24.02.1997. However, the workman
was not granted any back wages.
6.In Pursuance of the Award passed by the
Industrial Tribunal, the appellant offered a
letter of appointment to the respondent workman
vide its order dated 03.05.1999 to the post of
fisherman in the pay-scale of 2610-60-3150-65-
3400/-. However, the respondent workman did not
join his duties to the said post even after
repeated reminders from the appellant. The
appellant thereafter, filed a Misc. Writ
Petition before the High Court contending that
the respondent workman has been reinstated on
the post of “Machhuwa”, which they claimed was
equivalent to the post of Tube-well Operator.
Since the respondent workman did not respond to
several letters of the appellant which was
calling him back for work, he is not entitled to
any wages for the period 24.02.1997 to
31.01.2005 on the principle “no work no pay”.
The High Court however, rejected the contention
of the appellant and held that the State
Government had kept the workman out of job for
many years and therefore, the State Government
is liable to pay the entire amount due to the
workman for the above mentioned period.
7.Aggrieved by the said impugned judgment and
order, the present appeal is filed by the
appellant with a prayer to set aside the same
and requested this Court to pass such order as
this Court may deem fit and proper in the facts
and circumstances of the case by urging various
facts and legal contentions.
8.It has been contended by Mr. Gaurav Bhatia, the
learned Additional Advocate General (AAG) on
behalf of the appellant that the High Court has
erroneously disposed of the writ petition inPage 6
6
view of the fact that as per the order dated
03.05.1999 passed by the office of the Deputy
Director of Fisheries, Meerut, the respondent
was given appointment to the post of fisherman
(Machhua) in the pay-scale of 2610-60-3150-65-
3400/-, which is equivalent to the post of Tubewell
Operator. He has further contended that the
post held by the respondent as a Tube-well
Operator was temporary and was not a sanctioned
post as he was assigned the same as per the
availability of work in the Department. Even
after his appointment for the post of fisherman,
as per the above said order, the respondent did
not take charge of the aforesaid post stating
that it is not equivalent to the post of a Tubewell
Operator, in spite of several letters and
reminders sent by the appellant to him in
pursuance of the Award passed by the Industrial
Tribunal.
9. It has been further contended by the learned AAG
for the appellant that the Department of
Fisheries does not come under the definition of
“Industry” as defined under Section 2(k) of thePage 7
7
Act, as has been decided by this Court in the
cases of State of U.P. and Ors. v. Arun kumar
Singh1 and Bombay Telephone Canteen Employees
Association, Prabhadevi Tel. Exchange v. U.O.I
& Anr.2.
10. It has been further contended by the learned
AAG that the respondent has not contributed in
his services to the post of fisherman and
therefore, as per the “no work no pay”
principle, as held by this Court in a catena of
cases, the respondent is not entitled to any
monetary benefits under Section 6-H of the Act
for the period 24.02.1997 to 31.01.2005 as
awarded by the High Court. Thus, the findings of
both the courts below are erroneous and suffer
from error in law and therefore, the same cannot
be allowed to be sustained by this Court.
11. On the other hand, it has been contended by
Mr. G.V.Rao, the learned counsel on behalf of
the respondent that the termination of the
services of the respondent is bad in law as his
1
(1995) Supp (4) SCC 241
2
(1997) 6 SCC 723
services have been illegally terminated on the
ground that he is a temporary employee. He has
further contended that the services provided by
the appellant is fully covered within the ambit
of the Act and the termination of the services
of the respondent-workman from his services
amounts to retrenchment and since he has worked
for more than 240 days in one calendar year, he
is entitled to the benefits as provided under
the provision of Section 6-N of the Act. Since,
the appellant has not complied with the
provisions of the Act, as such, the termination
order of the respondent dated 22.8.1975 is
liable to be quashed and he is entitled for
reinstatement with back wages, as the post of a
fisherman is not equivalent to the post of Tubewell
Operator.
12. We have heard both the parties. On the basis
of the aforesaid rival legal contentions urged
on behalf of the parties and the evidence on
record, we have come to the conclusion that the
High Court has rightly held that the State is
liable to pay the entire amount due to the
workman for the period 24.2.1997 to 31.1.2005,
as the State has kept the workman out of job for
many years arbitrarily and unreasonably despite
the Award of reinstatement of the respondent on
an equivalent post which was passed by the
Industrial Tribunal. Thus, not reporting for the
duty of fisherman offered to him by the
appellant cannot be said to be unjustified on
the part of the respondent. In support of the
above said conclusions arrived at by us, we
record our reasons hereunder:-
It has already been rightly held by the
Industrial Tribunal that the Department of
Fisheries is covered under the definition of
“Industry” as defined under Section 2(k) of the Act
and also in accordance with the statement of R.W.1
and E.W.1, Shri. R.B.Mathur, on behalf of the
appellant before the Industrial Tribunal, because
the object of the establishment of the appellantdepartment
is fulfilled by engaging employees and
that the department is run on a regular basis. Thus,
the matter of termination of the services of the
workman of the said department can be legallyPage 10
10
adjudicated by the Industrial Tribunal as the matter
is covered under the provisions of the Act read with
the Second Schedule in Entry No.10. Thus, it has
been rightly held by the courts below that the
dispute raised by the workman in relation to the
termination of his services by the appellant is an
industrial dispute.
13. Further, it is a well established fact that
the respondent-workman has continuously worked
for 240 days in a calendar year and the
Industrial Tribunal has rightly recorded the
finding of fact on the basis of pleadings and
evidence on record holding that the work which
was being done by the respondent-workman still
continues to exist in the establishment of the
appellant, which fact has been admitted by the
respondent as well as the witnesses of the
employer before the Industrial Tribunal.
Further, Shri. R.B.Mathur has clearly deposed
before the Industrial Tribunal that the work of
Tube-well Operator has now been taken over by
other workmen, such as “Machhuwa” and that some
Tube-well Operators were appointed on otherPage 11
11
posts as well. Thus, in view of the statements
made above by him, it is amply clear that the
required conditions under the provisions of
Sections 6-N and 6-W of the Act were not
complied with by the appellant and the only
contention of the appellant-department is that
one month’s salary was paid to the workman
concerned treating him to be a temporary
employee. This contention of the learned AAG on
behalf of the appellant, however, is not
sustainable in law and the same has rendered the
order of termination of the services of the
respondent-workman illegal and therefore, both
the courts below have rightly set aside the same
and passed an Award of reinstatement and back
wages, respectively. However, not awarding back
wages to the respondent by the Industrial
Tribunal and awarding of the same by the High
Court for the period between 24.2.1997 to
31.1.2005 only, has been done without assigning
any cogent reason even though he is gainfully
employed and lawfully entitled for the same from
the date of termination from his services, i.e.Page 12
12
22.08.1975, which cannot be said to be valid in
law. Therefore, the judgment and Award passed by
the courts below with regard to his
reinstatement on a post equivalent to the post
of Tube-well Operator and denial of payment of
back wages from the date of his termination,
i.e. 22.08.1975 is wholly untenable in law as
the same is contrary to the well established
principles of law and the same is required to be
modified by awarding back wages.
14. The learned AAG has further contended that the
termination of the services of the workman was
made in view of the Government order dated
30.07.1975, by which the post of the Tube-well
Operator was abolished and the termination
letter was served on the respondent-workman as
he was a temporary employee. However, these
reasons were not stated in his termination
letter dated 22.08.1975 by the appellant and
instead, it was mentioned that his services were
no longer required which tantamount to
retrenchment of the respondent as defined under
Section 2(s) of the Act. Thus, the contention ofPage 13
13
the appellant cannot be accepted by us in this
regard, in view of the untenable reason stated
in the letter of termination of the services of
the respondent-workman. Further, the Government
order dated 30.07.1975, clearly stated that in
place of Tube-well Operator, the post of Nalkoop
Mechanic, class IV employee, was being created
that would carry out the work of the Tube-well
Operator. Hence, the post of the Tube-well
Operator was not abolished but only the name of
the post was changed, as rightly held by the
Industrial Tribunal.
15. Therefore, in view of the above stated facts
and also on a perusal of the reasons given by
the Industrial Tribunal in its Award on the
contentious point, the contention urged on
behalf of the appellant that the termination of
the services of the workman was done in
accordance with above mentioned Government order
cannot be accepted by us as the same is
erroneous in law. The fact that the persons
junior to him as well as his contemporaries are
still working for the appellant-department,Page 14
14
shows that the termination of the services of
the respondent has been done in an unreasonable
and unfair manner.
16. Now, coming to the question of the entitlement
of back wages to the respondent workman, the
same is answered in the positive, in view of the
fact that the workman had refused to accept the
new job as fisherman which was offered to him
pursuant to the Award passed by the Industrial
Tribunal on the ground that the said post is not
equivalent to the post of the Tube-well
Operator. Even though the appellant had agreed
to comply with the terms of the Award dated
24.02.1997 passed by the Industrial Tribunal and
had offered reinstatement to him, it is well
within the right of the workman to refuse the
new job offered to him and the same cannot be
said to be unjustified or erroneous on the part
of the respondent-workman.
17. In the present case, there has been an absence
of cogent evidence adduced on record by the
appellant to justify the termination of the
services of the respondent-workman, who has beenPage 15
15
aggrieved by the non-awarding of back wages from
the date of termination till the date of passing
the Award by the Industrial Tribunal. There is
no justification for the Industrial Tribunal to
deny the back wages for the said period without
assigning any cogent and valid reasons.
Therefore, the denial of back wages to the
respondent even though the Industrial Tribunal
has recorded its finding on the contentious
question no.1 in the affirmative in his favour
and in the absence of evidence of gainful
employment of the respondent during the relevant
period, amounts to arbitrary exercise of power
by the Industrial Tribunal for no fault of the
respondent and the same is contrary to law as
laid down by this Court in a catena of cases.
Hence, it is a fit case for this Court to
exercise its power under Order XLI Rule 33 of
the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, to award back
wages to the respondent, even though the
respondent has not filed a separate writ
petition questioning that portion of the Award
wherein no back wages were awarded to him by thePage 16
16
Courts below for the relevant period. The
respondent has got a right to place reliance
upon the said provision of the Civil Procedure
Code, 1908 and show to this Court that the
findings recorded by both the Courts below in
denying back wages for the relevant period of
time in the impugned judgment and Award is bad
in law as the same is not only erroneous but
also error in law. Therefore, in accordance with
the power exercised by this Court under Order
XLI Rule 33 of this Civil Procedure Code, 1908
and in the light of the judgment of this Court
in Delhi Electric Supply Undertaking v. Basanti
Devi and Anr3., we hold that the State
Government is liable to pay 50% of the back
wages to the respondent from the date of his
termination order dated 22.08.1975 till the date
of the Award passed by the Industrial Tribunal,
i.e. 24.02.1997. The relevant paragraphs of the
above referred judgment reads thus:
“17. In our approach we can also draw
strength from the provisions of Rule 33 of
Order 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure
3
(1999) 8 SCC 229Page 17
17
which is as under:
“33. Power of Court of Appeal.-The
appellate court shall have power to pass
any decree and make any order which ought
to have been passed or made and to pass or
make such further or other decree or order
as the case may require, and this power may
be exercised by the court notwithstanding
that the appeal is a part only of the
decree and may be exercised in favour of
all or any of the respondents or parties,
although such respondents or parties may
not have filed any appeal or objection and
may, where there have been decrees in
cross-suits or where two or more decrees
are passed in one suit, be exercised in
respect of all or any of the decrees,
although an appeal may not have been filed
against such decrees:
Provided that the appellate court shall not
make any order under Section 35-A, in
pursuance of any objection on which the
court from whose decree the appeal is
preferred has omitted or refused to make
such order.”
18. This provision was explained by this
Court in Mahant Dhangir v. Madan Mohan in
the following words:
“The sweep of the power under Rule 33 is
wide enough to determine any question not
only between the appellant and respondent,
but also between respondent and corespondents.
The appellate court could pass
any decree or order which ought to have
been passed in the circumstances of the
case. The appellate court could also pass
such other decree or order as the case may
require. The words ‘as the case may
require’ used in Rule 33 of Order 41 have
been put in wide terms to enable the
appellate court to pass any order or decree
to meet the ends of justice. What then
should be the constraint? We do not find
many. We are not giving any liberal
interpretation. The rule itself is liberalPage 18
18
enough. The only constraint that we could
see, may be these: That the parties before
the lower court should be there before the
appellate court. The question raised must
properly arise out of the judgment of the
lower court. If these two requirements are
there, the appellate court could consider
any objection against any part of the
judgment or decree of the lower court. It
may be urged by any party to the appeal. It
is true that the power of the appellate
court under Rule 33 is discretionary. But
it is a proper exercise of judicial
discretion to determine all questions urged
in order to render complete justice between
the parties. The court should not refuse to
exercise that discretion on mere
technicalities.”
18. Further, the learned counsel for the
respondent, in support of his legal submissions
with regard to back wages has rightly placed
reliance on the decision of Deepali Gundu
Surwase v. Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya4
,
wherein this Court has held thus:
“22. The very idea of restoring an employee
to the position which he held before
dismissal or removal or termination of
service implies that the employee will be
put in the same position in which he would
have been but for the illegal action taken
by the employer. The injury suffered by a
person, who is dismissed or removed or is
otherwise terminated from service cannot
easily be measured in terms of money. With
the passing of an order which has the
effect of severing the employer-employee
4
(2013) 10 SCC 324Page 19
19
relationship, the latter’s source of income
gets dried up. Not only the employee
concerned, but his entire family suffers
grave adversities. They are deprived of the
source of sustenance. The children are
deprived of nutritious food and all
opportunities of education and advancement
in life. At times, the family has to borrow
from the relatives and other acquaintance
to avoid starvation. These sufferings
continue till the competent adjudicatory
forum decides on the legality of the action
taken by the employer. The reinstatement of
such an employee, which is preceded by a
finding of the competent judicial/quasijudicial
body or court that the action
taken by the employer is ultra vires the
relevant statutory provisions or the
principles of natural justice, entitles the
employee to claim full back wages. If the
employer wants to deny back wages to the
employee or contest his entitlement to get
consequential benefits, then it is for
him/her to specifically plead and prove
that during the intervening period the
employee was gainfully employed and was
getting the same emoluments. The denial of
back wages to an employee, who has suffered
due to an illegal act of the employer would
amount to indirectly punishing the employee
concerned and rewarding the employer by
relieving him of the obligation to pay back
wages including the emoluments.”
(emphasis laid down by this Court)
19. He has further placed reliance on the decision
of Bhuvnesh Kumar Dwivedi v. Hindalco Industries
Ltd.5, wherein this Court has held thus:
5
(2014) 11 SCC 85Page 20
20
“36. On the issue of back wages to be
awarded in favour of the appellant, it has
been held by this Court in Shiv Nandan
Mahto v. State of Bihar that if a workman
is kept out of service due to the fault or
mistake of the establishment/company he was
working in, then the workman is entitled to
full back wages for the period he was
illegally kept out of service. The relevant
paragraph of the judgment reads as under:
“8. … In fact, a perusal of the
aforesaid short order passed by the
Division Bench would clearly show
that the High Court had not even
acquainted itself with the fact that
the appellant was kept out of
service due to a mistake. He was not
kept out of service on account of
suspension, as wrongly recorded by
the High Court. The conclusion is,
therefore, obvious that the
appellant could not have been denied
the benefit of back wages on the
ground that he had not worked for
the period when he was illegally
kept out of service. In our opinion,
the appellant was entitled to be
paid full back wages for the period
he was kept out of service.”
37. Further, in Haryana Roadways v. Rudhan
Singh, the three-Judge Bench of this Court
considered the question whether back wages
should be awarded to the workman in each
and every case of illegal retrenchment. The
relevant paragraph reads as under:
“8. There is no rule of thumb that
in every case where the Industrial
Tribunal gives a finding that the
termination of service was in
violation of Section 25-F of the
Act, entire back wages should be
awarded. A host of factors like the
manner and method of selection and
appointment i.e. whether after
proper advertisement of the vacancyPage 21
21
or inviting applications from the
employment exchange, nature of
appointment, namely, whether ad hoc,
short term, daily wage, temporary or
permanent in character, any special
qualification required for the job
and the like should be weighed and
balanced in taking a decision
regarding award of back wages. One
of the important factors, which has
to be taken into consideration, is
the length of service, which the
workman had rendered with the
employer. If the workman has
rendered a considerable period of
service and his services are
wrongfully terminated, he may be
awarded full or partial back wages
keeping in view the fact that at his
age and the qualification possessed
by him he may not be in a position
to get another employment. However,
where the total length of service
rendered by a workman is very small,
the award of back wages for the
complete period i.e. from the date
of termination till the date of the
award, which our experience shows is
often quite large, would be wholly
inappropriate. Another important
factor, which requires to be taken
into consideration is the nature of
employment. A regular service of
permanent character cannot be
compared to short or intermittent
daily-wage employment though it may
be for 240 days in a calendar
year.””
20. Thus, in view of the cases referred to supra,
there was absolutely no justification on the
part of the Industrial Tribunal to deny back
wages to the respondent even when it is found
that the order of termination is void ab initio
in law for non-compliance of the mandatory
provisions under Section 6-N of the Act. Keeping
in view the fact that the period of termination
was in the year 1975 and the matter has been
unnecessarily litigated by the employer by
contesting the matter before the Industrial
Tribunal as well as the High Court and this
Court for more than 40 years, and further, even
after the Award/order of reinstatement was
passed by the Industrial Tribunal directing the
employer to give him the post equivalent to the
post of Tube-well Operator, the same has been
denied to him by offering the said post which is
not equivalent to the post of Tube-well Operator
and thereby, attributing the fault on the
respondent for non reporting to the post offered
to him, which is once again unjustified on the
part of the employer.
21. Thus, the principle “no work no pay” as
observed by this Court in the catena of cases
does not have any significance to the fact
situation of the present case as the termination
of the services of the workman from the post of
Tube-well Operator is erroneous in law in the
first place, as held by us in view of the above
stated reasons.
22. The respondent and his family members have
been suffering for more than four decades as the
source of their livelihood has been arbitrarily
deprived by the appellant. Thereby, the Right to
Liberty and Livelihood guaranteed under Articles
19 and 21 of the Constitution of India have been
denied to the respondent by the appellant as
held in the case of Olga Tellis and Ors. v.
Bombay Municipal Corporation and Ors(1985)3 SCC 545, wherein
this Court has held thus:
“32. As we have stated while summing up the
petitioners’ case, the main plank of their
argument is that the right to life which is
guaranteed by Article 21 includes the right
to livelihood and since, they will be
deprived of their livelihood if they are
evicted from their slum and pavement
dwellings, their eviction is tantamount to
deprivation of their life and is hence
unconstitutional. For purposes of argument,
we will assume the factual correctness of
the premise that if the petitioners are
evicted from their dwellings, they will be
deprived of their livelihood. Upon that
assumption, the question which we have to
consider is whether the right to life
includes the right to livelihood. We see
only one answer to that question, namely,
that it does. The sweep of the right to
life conferred by Article 21 is wide and
far-reaching. It does not mean merely that
life cannot be extinguished or taken away
as, for example, by the imposition and
execution of the death sentence, except
according to procedure established by law.
That is but one aspect of the right to
life. An equally important facet of that
right is the right to livelihood because,
no person can live without the means of
living, that is, the means of livelihood.
If the right to livelihood is not treated
as a part of the constitutional right to
life, the easiest way of depriving a person
of his right to life would be to deprive
him of his means of livelihood to the point
of abrogation. Such deprivation would not
only denude the life of its effective
content and meaningfulness but it would
make life impossible to live. And yet, such
deprivation would not have to be in
accordance with the procedure established
by law, if the right to livelihood is not
regarded as a part of the right to life.
That, which alone makes it possible to
live, leave aside what makes life livable,
must be deemed to be an integral component
of the right to life. Deprive a person of
his right to livelihood and you shall have
deprived him of his life. Indeed, that
explains the massive migration of the rural
population to big cities. They migrate
because they have no means of livelihood in
the villages. The motive force which
propels their desertion of their hearths
and homes in the village is the struggle
for survival, that is, the struggle for
life. So unimpeachable is the evidence of
the nexus between life and the means of
livelihood. They have to eat to live: only
a handful can afford the luxury of living
to eat. That they can do, namely, eat, only
if they have the means of livelihood. That
is the context in which it was said by
Douglas, J. in Baksey that the right to
work is the most precious liberty that man
possesses. It is the most precious liberty
because, it sustains and enables a man to
live and the right to life is a precious
freedom. “Life”, as observed by Field, J.
in Munn v. Illinois means something more
than mere animal existence and the
inhibition against the deprivation of life
extends to all those limits and faculties
by which life is enjoyed. This observation
was quoted with approval by this Court in
Kharak Singh v. State of U.P.”
(emphasis laid down by this Court)
23. Therefore, with respect to the judicial
decisions of this Court referred to supra, we
hold that the appellant is liable to pay 50%
back wages in favour of the respondent from the
date of the termination order dated 22.08.1975
till the date of the Award passed by the
Industrial Tribunal, i.e. 24.02.1997.
24. In so far as the awarding of full back wages
to the respondent by the High Court in its
judgment and order dated 18.07.2006 for the
period 24.02.1997 to 31.01.2005 is concerned, we
retain the same. The appellant is further
directed to pay full back wages to the
respondent after computing the same on the basis
of the revised pay-scale and pay him all other
monetary benefits as well. The aforesaid
direction shall be complied with by the
appellant within four weeks from the date of
receipt of the copy of this order.
25. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed with
modification regarding back wages as mentioned
in the preceding paragraphs. The order dated
11.12.2006 granting stay shall stand vacated. No
costs.
……………………………………………………………J.
[V. GOPALA GOWDA]
……………………………………………………………J.
[R.BANUMATHI]
New Delhi,
March 26, 2015
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