this Court and some argument was advanced on the
basis of provisions of the Domestic Violence Act.
It was mainly submitted by the learned counsel for
the Petitioner that it is the contention of the
husband that the parties have taken divorce by
mutual consent and document of Khulanama has been
executed and so the proceeding is not tenable
under the provisions of Domestic Violence Act. To
ascertain as to whether even after the dissolution
of the marriage, proceeding can be filed, the
Scheme of the Domestic Violence Act needs to be
seen and particularly definitions of "domestic
relationship" given in Section 2(f) and "shared
household" given in Section 2(s) of the Act needs
to be considered. These two definitions show that
it is sufficient for the aggrieved person to show
that at any stage she had lived in a domestic
relationship with the respondent, husband. Then
the definitions of "aggrieved person" and
"domestic violence" need to be seen. They are
given in Section 2(a) and 2(g) of the Act. Section
2(g) shows that the meaning given in Section 3 of
the Domestic Violence Act needs to be considered.
Section 3(iv) of the Act shows that economic abuse
is included in the definition of "domestic
violence". Further, in Chapter IV there are
provisions made regarding Procedure for obtaining
reliefs. Section 20 of the Act is with regard to
monetary reliefs. This Court has no hesitation to
hold that Section 20(1)(c) of the Domestic
Violence Act can be used in a case like present
one.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
BENCH AT AURANGABAD
CRIMINAL WRIT PETITION NO.457 OF 2014
Syed Akram Ali Syed Sultan, Vs Rubina Begum Syed Akram Ali,
CORAM: T.V. NALAWADE, J.
DATE : 20TH NOVEMBER, 2014
Citation; 2015 CRLJ(NOC)484 Bom
1. Heard learned counsels for both the
parties.
2. The Petition is filed to challenge the
Judgment and Order passed in Criminal Appeal No.73
of 2012, which was pending in the Court of 3rd
Additional Sessions Judge, Aurangabad. In the
proceedings filed under the provisions of the
Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act,
2005 (for short "Domestic Violence Act"),
direction is given against the present Petitioner,
husband to return Dahej (Jahez) articles to the
Respondent or to pay Rs.2,00,000/ in lump sum
towards the price of those articles to the
present Respondent.
3. It is the case of the wife that the
articles given in Jahez, which include ornaments,
are in the custody of the husband and he has not
returned those articles though the parties are
living separate. In the proceedings filed under
Domestic Violence Act, many reliefs were claimed
but the aforesaid relief is granted by the
Sessions Court in Criminal Appeal. This relief was
refused by learned J.M.F.C. by making some
observations on the basis of the record of
compromise.
4. Both the sides showed relevant record to
this Court and some argument was advanced on the
basis of provisions of the Domestic Violence Act.
It was mainly submitted by the learned counsel for
the Petitioner that it is the contention of the
husband that the parties have taken divorce by
mutual consent and document of Khulanama has been
executed and so the proceeding is not tenable
under the provisions of Domestic Violence Act. To
ascertain as to whether even after the dissolution
of the marriage, proceeding can be filed, the
Scheme of the Domestic Violence Act needs to be
seen and particularly definitions of "domestic
relationship" given in Section 2(f) and "shared
household" given in Section 2(s) of the Act needs
to be considered. These two definitions show that
it is sufficient for the aggrieved person to show
that at any stage she had lived in a domestic
relationship with the respondent, husband. Then
the definitions of "aggrieved person" and
"domestic violence" need to be seen. They are
given in Section 2(a) and 2(g) of the Act. Section
2(g) shows that the meaning given in Section 3 of
the Domestic Violence Act needs to be considered.
Section 3(iv) of the Act shows that economic abuse
is included in the definition of "domestic
violence". Further, in Chapter IV there are
provisions made regarding Procedure for obtaining
reliefs. Section 20 of the Act is with regard to
monetary reliefs. This Court has no hesitation to
hold that Section 20(1)(c) of the Domestic
Violence Act can be used in a case like present
one. It runs as under:
"20. Monetary reliefs.(1) While disposing
of an application under subsection (1) of
section 12, the Magistrate may direct the
respondent to pay monetary relief to meet
the expenses incurred and losses suffered
by the aggrieved person and any child of
the aggrieved person as a result of the
domestic violence and such relief may
include, but is not limited to,
(a)................ (b)................
(c) the loss caused due to the
destruction, damage or removal of any
property from the control of the aggrieved
person."
5. Thus, in law there is nothing to prevent
the Magistrate to grant the relief of return of
Jahez articles. All these provisions are enabling
provisions and that object always needs to be kept
in mind by Court exercising the powers for the
interpretation of the aforesaid provisions.
6. The learned counsel for the Petitioner,
husband took this Court through the compromise
document. This document dated 26th May, 2008 shows
that the wife had agreed to return to the
matrimonial house and on the same day she returned
to the matrimonial house. There is a mention that
the wife was to take with her the ornaments which
were in her possession, to the matrimonial house.
This mention in the compromise document dated 26th
May, 2008 cannot lead to the inference that all
the ornaments were with her right from beginning,
and particularly ornaments given as Jahez
articles were also with her.
7. The execution of document like Khulanama
is also not disputed by the parties. The wife has
challenged Khulanama also, but that challenge need
not be considered for the purpose of present
proceeding. This document of Khulanama dated
25th August 2008 shows that Jahez articles as per
list were to be returned by the husband on 26th
August, 2008. It is not the case of the husband
that as per this promise he had returned Jahez
articles. In view of the aforesaid circumstances
the only point that remains is as to whether Jahez
articles as claimed in the Petition were given at
the time of marriage. A list of Jahez articles is
produced by the wife and which is apparently
signed by father of the husband. In the list, in
addition to the household articles, there is a
mention of gold and silver ornaments. The weights
of the ornaments are also mentioned. As the order
of return of these ornaments was made on 1st
March, 2014, it can be said that the value of the
ornaments was required to be ascertained as on 1st
March, 2014. In March 2014, the value of gold was
more than Rs.27,000/ per 10 gm. The value of
silver was around Rs.40,000/ per kg. Even today
the value of gold per 10 gm. is around Rs.27,000/
though the value of silver has come down upto
Rs.35,000/ per kg. If the value of the gold and
silver is calculated and the value of the
household articles given in the list is
calculated, then it can be said that amount of
Rs.2,00,000/ is not on higher side. There is no
other list with the husband to show that list
available with the wife is not correct one. In
view of these circumstances, this Court holds that
there is no possibility of interference in the
decision given by the Sessions Court.
8. Learned counsel for the Petitioner,
husband placed reliance on the case reported in
2010(3) Mh.L.J., Page No.305 (Jayesh Uttamrao
Khairnar and others vs. State of Maharashtra and
others). In that matter, protection order was
claimed when divorce was given by competent Court
in favour of the husband and during the relevant
period of one year or immediately before filing of
the application under this Act, there was no
conjugal relationship. The Court held that
provisions of Section 12, 16, 20 and 22 of
Domestic Violence Act were not available to the
wife. The facts were different. This reported case
is of no help to the present Petitioner, husband.
9. In the result, the Writ Petition stands
dismissed.
[T.V. NALAWADE, J.]
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