Though the Court is not separately defined under the Contempt of Courts Act, it is considered as a "Court" within the meaning of the Court defined under Section 2(e) of the Arbitration andConciliation Act, 1996. Under Section 2(d) of the Act, the "Arbitral Tribunal" is defined as "a sole arbitrator or a panel of arbitrators". Under Section 2(e) of the Act, a "Court" is defined as follows :
Sec.2(e): "Court" means the principal civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district, and includes the High Court in exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction, having jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subject-matter of the arbitration if the same had been the subject-matter of a suit, but does not include any civil Court of a grade inferior to such principal civil Court, or any Court of Small Causes".
Thus, this clearly shows that Arbitral Tribunal is not a Court and thus meaning of the Court for the purpose of contempt of Courts Act is to be restricted the definition of Court under Section 2(e) of the Act stricto-sensu and therefore the violation of the orders of Arbitrator unless it is specified can not be subjected under the Contempt of Courts Act.
Bombay High Court
Smt. Alka Chandewar vs Shamshul Ishrar Khan on 27 October, 2015
Bench: Mridula Bhatkar
Citation;2016(2)ALLMR 734
This Contempt Petition is filed on the basis of the arbitration order dated 5th May, 2014 passed by the Sole Arbitrator under Section 27 (5) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred as "the Act").
2. The arbitration proceedings was filed before the Arbitrator vide Arbitration Application No. 80 of 2010 for dissolution of the partnership and the assets and share in the partnership. The Vishal 1 / 25 906-cp-102-2015.doc Petitioner and the Respondent were the partners and a Power of Attorney was given to the ex-husband of the Petitioner who has allegedly committed the fraud and forgery in respect of sending letter of dissolution of the partnership on behalf of the Petitioner. The Petitioner subsequently divorced her husband who was the Power of Attorney of the firm. The Petitioner thereafter filed the proceedings for her share before the Arbitrator against the Respondent. The learned Arbitrator has passed the interim order on 7th October, 2010 directing that the Respondent shall not dispose of the Flats. However, the Respondent entered into the registered agreement of sale in respect of five Flats in the said buildings on 14 th October, 2010. Thus the order dated 7th October, 2010 was violated. Thereafter, the Petitioner moved an application No. "C-1" for demanding the documents and the accounts for the last 10 years from the Respondent and also filed the interim application No. "C-2" before the Tribunal for the appointment of Court Receiver to protect the Flats in one of the buildings constructed by the partnership firm. While deciding these applications, the Tribunal by its order dated 26 th March, 2012 has directed the Respondent in operative clause (v) not to dispose off/ transfer/ alienate or create any encumbrance in 2 / 25 906-cp-102-2015.doc respect of the unsold flats in the above building namely 'Sarla-Sadan'.
It also directed the Respondent to furnish the bank guarantee in favour of the claimant to the tune of Rs. 1.25 Crore. However, that order of the Tribunal was not complied and the Respondent violated the said order.
3. The Petitioner moved an application before the Tribunal for reporting contempt to the High Court of the orders dated 7 th October, 2010 and 26th March, 2012 and also prayed to strike off the defence filed by the Respondent. This application was moved on 19 th November, 2013. In the said application, the Respondent appeared and defended its act. However, the Tribunal rejected the defence of the Respondent and held that Respondent had committed willful disobedience of the Tribunal's order dated 26th March, 2012 and held that it may deem appropriate to take necessary action under Section 27(5) of the said Act.
4. While hearing the Petition following issues were arose:
(i) Whether the interim order passed by the Tribunal under Section 17 can be covered under Section 27(5) of the Act.
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(ii) Considering the scope of Section 27(5) of the Act, whether all orders passed by the Arbitral Tribunal can be covered under the Contempt of Court Act.
5. The learned counsel for the Petitioner has submitted that the reference is made by the Tribunal as the Tribunal himself was convinced that his interim order directing the Respondent not to dispose of the property was violated. Thus, it is a willful disobedience of the interim order of the Tribunal by the Respondent. He submitted that as on today though the award is passed by the learned Arbitrator, at the time of making representation to this Court the interim order was violated and therefore the reference was rightly made. He relied on para 6 of the Petition to show that five Flats were transferred by the Respondent in utter violation of the interim order dated 7 th October, 2010. He pointed out that for all the five Flats a registered agreement of sale was executed on 14th October, 2010 with intention to commit breach of the order which was passed only seven days earlier. No permission of the Tribunal was sought before disposing of the said property.
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6. While meeting on the point of maintainability of the order made by the Tribunal under Section 27(5) of the Act, the learned counsel for the Petitioner has argued that Section 27(5) of the Act is the only section available to the Tribunal to seek the assistance of the Court in the event of the contempt committed by the person during the arbitral proceedings. The learned counsel also referred Section 43 of the old Arbitration and Conciliation Act which was similar to Section 27(5)of the new Act. He submitted that under Section 43 of the old Act, the phrase used is "Parties and Witnesses". This phrase is changed in Section 27 by using one common word "Person", which obviously includes both. On this interpretation and application of 27(5) of the Act, he relied on the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of "Delta Distilleries Limited vs. United Spirits Limited and Another1. He further pointed out that in the case of "Union of India vs. M/s. Bhatia Tanning Industries, Kanpur 2, a view was taken in respect of Section 43 of the earlier Act that the Section is confined to witnesses and witnesses alone summoned for appearance before the Arbitrator. He elaborated that the said judgment is referred and discussed in the case of Delta Distilleries Limited (supra) and the
1. 2014 AIR (SC) 113.
2. AIR 1986 DELHI 195.
5 / 25 906-cp-102-2015.doc Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the word "Person" includes the "parties" and so also the "witnesses". He relied on the judgment of Bombay High Court in the cases of "Anuptech Equipments Private Limited vs. M/s. Ganpati Co-op. Housing Society Limitedand Others3 and Maharashtra State Electricity Board vs. Datar Switchgear Limited"4.
7. The learned counsel submitted that in the case of "Vimal Madhukar Wasnik (Dr.), Nagpur vs. Sole Arbitrator" 6 the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court has referred to the earlier judgment of "Anuptech Equipments Private Limited" (supra) in which one of them was a party. The Division Bench has mentioned that in the case of "Anuptech Equipments Private Limited" (supra), it went unnoticed that under Section 27(5) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, if a person is guilty of any contempt of Arbitral Tribunal during the conduct of arbitral proceedings, such person shall be subject to the like, disadvantages, penalties and punishments by order of the Court on the representation of the Arbitral Tribunal as they would
3. 1992(2) Bom. C.R. 331.
4. 2003(2) Bom. C.R. 81.
6. 2006(1) Bom. C.R. 419.
6 / 25 906-cp-102-2015.doc incur for the like offences in suits tried before the Court.
8. The learned counsel for the Petitioner placed heavy reliance on the judgment Delhi High Court in the case of "Sri Krishan vs. Anand"5. In the said case, learned Judge was dealing with the scope and powers under Section 9 and 17 of the Act. Due to non enforceability of the orders passed under Section 17 of the Act, the parties take steps under Section 9 of the Act before the Court.
However, the learned Judge held that the Section 17 can not be rendered otiose and redundant, but it would open floodgates under Section 9 of the Act. The Section 17 of the Act derives the powers of enforceability from Section 5 of the Act and he held that making any other default or being guilty of any contempt of the arbitral tribunal during the conduct of the proceedings are applicable to any proceedings including the interim order passed under Section 17 of the Act.
9. It is held as follows :
"Section 27(5) was not noticed in Sundaram Finance Ltd. or in Sumangal Services Pvt. Ltd. (supra). Perhaps, because
5. Decided on 18th August, 2009 in OMP.No. 597/2008.
7 / 25 906-cp-102-2015.doc it is hedged in the heading/title of Section 27. However, the said heading/title cannot limit or narrow the otherwise wide amplitude of sub-section (5) thereof. The default, contempt mentioned therein cannot be limited to that only in appearance of witnesses before the arbitral tribunal. To do so, would be to render the words "any other default"
and "guilty of any contempt" therein otiose. It may be highlighted that under Section 37(2)(b) of the Act the order of the arbitral tribunal under section 17 of the Act granting or refusing to grant an interim measure is appeable before the Court. The same also discloses the legislative intent of the same being in the exercise of the judicial functions."
It is held that the parties who choose to seek the relief under Section 17 of the Act are not entitled to seek same relief from the Court under Section 9 of the Act and the multiplicity of the proceedings is to be avoided in all causes.
10. Thus, the learned counsel for the Petitioner has submitted that the Tribunal has rightly made representation to the High Court under Section 27 (5) of the Act and asked to pass the orders on contempt committed by the Respondent in the arbitral proceedings.
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11. The learned senior counsel Ms. Rajani Iyer for the Respondent has argued that the Petitioner has no case. This Contempt Petition should be set aside on following grounds :
a) There is no order against which the contempt should lie.
b) There is no breach of any order of the Court for which the powers under theContempt of Court Act to be invoked.
c) Assuming there is contempt of the impugned order of the Tribunal, it is beyond limitation.
12. The learned senior counsel Ms. Rajani Iyer has submitted that the arbitral Tribunal is not a Court. This Court has to satisfied be independently on the issue of commission of contempt by the contemnor. She submitted that the final award is granted by the arbitrator giving direction to the Respondent to pay Rs. 8 Crores as full and final satisfaction to the Petitioner. She further submitted that it was a partnership firm and the husband of the Petitioner was the Power of Attorney holder whose signatures are appearing on the said registered sale deeds. Though the Respondent had signed it, the documents were got executed by the Power of Attorney and not by the Respondent and these agreements which are produced here were 9 / 25 906-cp-102-2015.doc not produced before the Arbitrator. She further submitted that under Section 27(5) of the Act, said representation can not be made for the violation of any interim order passed by the arbitrator because the section pertains to the contempt in respect of taking evidence. She relied on Section 43 of the earlier Act. She further relied on the Markanda's commentary on Section 43of the Act. She submitted that if Section 27 is read over as a whole, it clearly shows that it pertains to the steps taken in the recording of evidence and for that purpose the assistance of the Court can be obtained if the order of the Arbitrator is violated. She submitted that the sole purpose ofSections 43 and 27 is to ensure service or process upon the witnesses whom the Arbitrator desires to examine. She submitted that the order passed under Section 27 of the Act is neither a decision nor an order which can be challenged under Section 34 of the Act. She further argued that on these grounds, this Petition should fail.
13. The representation in the present matter is made under Section 27(5) of the Act. Therefore, the scope of Section 27(5) of the Act goes to the root of the matter. Section 27 reads as follows :
Section 27 : Court assistance in taking evidence -
10 / 25 906-cp-102-2015.doc (1) The arbitral tribunal, or a party with the approval of the arbitral tribunal, may apply to the Court for assistance in taking evidence.
(2) The application shall specify :-- (a) the names and addresses of the parties and the arbitrators; (b) the general nature of the claim and the relief sought; (c) the evidence to be obtained, in particular, (i) the name and address of any person to be heard as witness or expert witness and a statement of the subject-matter of the testimony required; (ii) the description of any document to be produced or property to be inspected.
(3) The Court may, within its competence and according to its rules on taking evidence, execute the request by ordering that the evidence be provided directly to the arbitral tribunal. (4) The Court may, while making an order under sub-section (3), issue the same processes to witnesses as it may issue in suits tried before it.
(5) Persons failing to attend in accordance with such process, or making any other default, or refusing to give their evidence, or guilty of any contempt to the arbitral tribunal during the conduct of arbitral proceedings, shall be subject to the like disadvantages, penalties and punishments by order of the Court on the representation of the arbitral tribunal as they would incur for the like offences in suits tried before the Court.
(6) In this section the expression "Processes" includes summonses and commissions for the examination of witnesses and summonses to produce documents.
11 / 25 906-cp-102-2015.doc Section 27 is included in Chapter V of the Act which deals with the conduct of the arbitral proceedings comprising from Section 18 to Section 27 of the Act. UnderSection 17 of the Act, the arbitral Tribunal has powers to pass interim measures. The Section 9 is also regarding the powers to pass the interim measures. However, the powers under Section 9 of the Act vest with the Court and not with the Arbitrator. Thus, Section 9 and 17 give powers to issue interim orders/measures, to different fora i.e. the Court and the Arbitrator.
This fact itself indicates that the arbitral Tribunal is not a Court but it is altogether a different entity. It is a creature of contract between the parties. Its functions are not judicial functions. The Contempt of Courts Act is applicable to the breach or the violation of the orders of the Court and pertains to the Civil or Criminal contempt which is defined under the Contempt of Courts Actcommitted by the parties causing interference in the judicial proceedings.
14. Though the Court is not separately defined under the Contempt of Courts Act, it is considered as a "Court" within the meaning of the Court defined under Section 2(e) of the Arbitration andConciliation Act, 1996. Under Section 2(d) of the Act, the 12 / 25 906-cp-102-2015.doc "Arbitral Tribunal" is defined as "a sole arbitrator or a panel of arbitrators". Under Section 2(e) of the Act, a "Court" is defined as follows :
Sec.2(e): "Court" means the principal civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district, and includes the High Court in exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction, having jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subject-matter of the arbitration if the same had been the subject-matter of a suit, but does not include any civil Court of a grade inferior to such principal civil Court, or any Court of Small Causes".
Thus, this clearly shows that Arbitral Tribunal is not a Court and thus meaning of the Court for the purpose of contempt of Courts Act is to be restricted the definition of Court under Section 2(e) of the Act stricto-sensu and therefore the violation of the orders of Arbitrator unless it is specified can not be subjected under the Contempt of Courts Act.
15. The arbitration is an alternative forum for redressal of the dispute between the parties and therefore the procedure before the Tribunal should not be tardy and complex. The work of the Arbitrator should not get involved in the procedural wrangles but should be 13 / 25 906-cp-102-2015.doc quick and smooth and result oriented. Therefore, it appears that no provision of appeal/revision is available to the parties though the interim measures/orders by the arbitration Tribunal under Section 17 are violated by either of the parties.
16. Obviously Section 17 of the Act comes into effect after the formation of the arbitral Tribunal. However, recourse to Section 9 of the Act can be taken by the parties pre and post arbitration. Keeping this in view, the procedure under Chapter IV is to be examined. The Section 17 of the Act is the source of the power of the arbitral Tribunal to pass interim measures. However, it is not included in Chapter V which is for the "conduct of arbitral proceedings.
17. The scheme of the Chapter V which is under the caption of conduct of arbitral proceedings indicates that it is mainly on the determination of the rules and proceedings of the arbitration, place of sitting, recording the statement of claimant and defence, commencing of hearing and written proceedings. The Section 25 of the Act is in respect of default of the party wherein it is mentioned that if claimant fails to communicate his statement of claim then the arbitral Tribunal 14 / 25 906-cp-102-2015.doc shall determine the proceedings and when Respondent fails to communicate his statement of defence, then Tribunal shall continue the proceedings. However, there is a rider that failure should not be teated as an default of the allegations by the Respondent and if the party fails to appear or produce documentary evidence, the arbitral Tribunal may continue the proceedings and make the Tribunal award on the evidence before it. Under Section 26 of the Act, the Tribunal has power to appoint an expert. Section 27 of he Act enables the arbitral Tribunal or a party to apply to the Court for assistance while taking the evidence. Section 27 is divided into 6 sub sections and they all pertain to the process of recording evidence and a party failing to attend or refuse to give evidence. Sub section 5 lays down different circumstances wherein the penalty and the punishment by the order of the Court can be imposed on such persons which are available to the Court while trying the suit. As per sub Section 5 of the Act, the circumstances are as follows :
(1) Persons failing to attend in accordance with such process OR (2) Making any other default OR (3) Refusing to give their evidence OR (4) Guilty of any contempt to the arbitral tribunal during the conduct 15 / 25 906-cp-102-2015.doc of arbitral proceedings.
Thus these are the four circumstances for which the representation can be made by the Tribunal to the Court and the assistance of the Court can be sought to facilitate its working effectively.
18. As per the submissions of the learned counsel Mr. Walawalkar the Tribunal is empowered to take action under the last clause which states that the person who is guilty of any contempt of the arbitral Tribunal can be subjected to the representation by the Tribunal before the Court. Much emphasis is given to the words "any contempt" and "during the conduct of arbitral proceedings". It was argued that the words "any contempt" includes disobedience or non compliance of interim orders passed by the Tribunal including the interim measures/orders passed under Section 17 of the Act. It was also argued that the said clause states about such contempt during the arbitral proceedings. In support of his submissions, he placed heavy reliance on the judgment of Delhi High Court in the case of Sri Krishan vs. Anand (supra). Rather the submissions of learned counsel are entirely based on the view taken by a single judge of the Delhi High Court while interpreting Section 27(5) of the Act. The learned 16 / 25 906-cp-102-2015.doc Judge was to decide the legality of the orders sought under Section 9 of the Act before the Court when such reliefs are already sought and obtained from the arbitral Tribunal. While dealing with the said issue, the learned Judge has refused to accept that Section 17 is a toothless section as there is no remedy provided under the Act in the event of its non compliance and therefore he laid down the ratio that the Section is hedged in the heading/title i.e. the Court assistance in taking evidence and therefore it is not to be given a narrow meaning.
19. With due respect to the single Judge of the Delhi High Court, I am not in agreement on the point of the interpretation of the said Section. To examine the language of the statute and to give its natural meaning is an appropriate way to interpret it. So also each word used by the legislature carries a particular meaning which can not be overlooked as even a coma in the statute is not redundant but speaks volumes.
20. Section 27 of the Act pertains to seeking assistance of the Court in taking evidence. Though while understanding the section the meaning should not be confined to its heading, the clause in the said 17 / 25 906-cp-102-2015.doc section can not be read in isolation or independently without taking into account context and the flow of the said section. Sub sections 1, 2 and 3 state about taking of evidence, calling the witnesses, production of documents and property for inspection and the Courts power to pass the orders accordingly. Sub section 4 of the Section 27 of the Act gives power to the Court to issue process to the witnesses which are similar to its powers to issue in suits tried before it. Sub section 5 of Section 27 of the Act is the key section, the contents of which are discussed above. In all the three sub clauses in sub section 5 of Section 27 of the Act state about the evidence and sub clause 4 which is a subject of the interpretation of the order states about committing contempt during the conduct of arbitral proceedings. Sub section 6 of Section 27 gives meaning of the expression 'process' which is used in sub sections as it includes summons and commission for examination of witnesses and summons to produce the documents. Thus, the word 'process' used in sub Section 5 and 4 is limited to the meaning in subSection 6 only. It supports that under sub clause 4 of sub Section 5 'guilty of any contempt' can not be understood that any act for breach or violation of any order of the Tribunal, the assistance of the Court can be sought by the Arbitrator.
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21. I would like to highlight the term that the legislature has used "during the conduct of arbitral proceedings". The phrase "guilty of any contempt of arbitral Tribunal during the arbitral proceedings" is not used. A specific term used is "during the conduct of arbitral proceedings" (emphasis placed).
22. Sections 18 to 27 of the Act constitute a group which is covered under the conduct of arbitral proceedings. The same phrase is repeated in clause 4 of sub section 5 of the said Section. Therefore, it is not the contempt committed by a person during the period of entire arbitral proceedings, but it is restricted to the contempt during the 'conduct' of arbitral proceedings which is necessarily limited to Section 18 to 27.
23. A question can be put to oneself whether issuing interim orders is not a part of arbitral proceedings ? The answer is 'Yes'.
However, the next question can be asked whether issuing interim orders is a part of 'conduct' of arbitral proceedings ? The answer is 'No'. Sections 16 and 17 of the Act are covered under Chapter IV which is captioned the "jurisdiction of the arbitral Tribunal". Thus 19 / 25 906-cp-102-2015.doc Section 17 is the source of power of the Tribunal to pass the interim orders/measures. The word "conduct" under the Chapter V connotes a limited specific meaning and that is applicable to proceedings under Sections 18 to 27.
24. It can be understood better if Section 25 of the Act is examined. The Section 25 of the Act is also in respect of default of a party though it is covered under the 'conduct' of the arbitral proceedings. However, it is not a contempt to the arbitral Tribunal.
Under Section 25 of the Act, the consequences of the default are mentioned and which does not empower the Tribunal to make representation of any such default in communication of the submission and defence to other party. The clause 4 in sub Section 5 is for making any other default for which the assistance of the Court can be taken. Thus, if the said clause is compared with Section 25 things became more clear. The default contemplated under sub Section 5 is a default pertaining to violating the order in respect of taking evidence and the default underSection 25 of the Act is not in respect of taking evidence though it is covered under conduct of arbitral proceedings. The word 'conduct' in legal proceedings means 20 / 25 906-cp-102-2015.doc to take steps. It signals Court's power to decide and to move. Thus by use of the word 'conduct' in sub clause 4 of sub Section 5 of Section 27 of the Act, the legislature has restricted its meaning to taking of evidence only and not any other contempt in arbitral proceedings.
25. The Supreme Court in the case of "Delta Distilleries Limited" has held in para 19 and 20 as under:
Para 19: "As soon from these two sections, Section 25(c) provides that in the event a party fails to appear at an oral hearing or to produce documentary evidence, the arbitral tribunal may continue the proceedings and make the arbitral award on the evidence before it. This evidence can be sought either from any third person or from a party to the proceedings itself. The substitution of he phrase "parties and witnesses" under Section 43 of the earlier act by the phrase any person cannot make any difference, or cannot be read whittle down the powers of the Arbitral Tribunal to seek assistance from the Court where any person who is not cooperating with the Arbitral Tribunal or where any evidence is required from any person, be it a party to the proceedings or others. It is an enabling provision, and it has to be read as such. The term any person appearing under Section 27(2)(c) is wide enough to cover not merely the witnesses, but also 21 / 25 906-cp-102-2015.doc the parties to the proceedings. It is undoubtedly clear that if a party fails to appear before the Arbitral Tribunal, the Tribunal can proceed ex-parte, as provided under Section 25(c). At the same time, it cannot be ignored that the Tribunal is required to make an award on the merits of the claim placed before it. For that purpose, if any evidence becomes necessary, the Tribunal ought to have the power to get the evidence, and it is for this purpose only that this enabling section has been provided.
Para 20: "The learned Judge seems to have been misled by the expression parties appearing in section 43. The word parties is used in the sense where the party itself is desired to be examined as a witness by the arbitrator or umpire. The expression witnesses used along with the word parties makes the meaning of the legislature abundantly clear. The principle of construction is that words of the same feather flock together."
Thus there is no ambiguity that the word "Person" includes "parties as well as witnesses". The submissions of the learned counsel for the Petitioner to that extent are correct.
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26. In the case of Anuptech Equipments Private Limited (supra), the learned single judge was dealing with the issue of distinction between final award and an order under Section 25(1)(a) and under Section 32(2) the termination of the arbitral proceedings.
So also the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution or Article 227 as the power of superintendence of this Court over Tribunals.
Incidentally the Court observed that if the interim relief is rejected by the Tribunal then the Appeal can be preferred under Section 37 before the Court and it can be referred under Section 27(5) of the said Act is having the power for the punishment for the contempt of the Tribunal. However, in the judgment of "Anuptech Equipments Private Limited" there is no ratio laid down in respect of Section 27(5) of the said Act. Hence, it is not useful to the Petitioner.
27. In the judgment of Vimal Madhukar Wasnik (supra), the main issue before the Division Bench was not the scope Section 27(5) of the Act but it was in respect of the exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India over the order passed by the learned Arbitrator. In the case of Vimal Madhukar Wasnik (supra), it mainly dealt with the powers of the High Court in 23 / 25 906-cp-102-2015.doc writ jurisdiction over the orders passed by the Tribunal. Therefore, passing reference or observation of the Division Bench can not be said as the ratio laid down by the Bench on scope of Section 27(5) of the Act. In the case of Anuptech Equipments (supra), it is held that when there is no remedy under Section 37 or 34 of the Act of 1996 in which case only the extraordinary jurisdiction of the Court will be invoked.
28. In the case of Datar Switchgear Limited (supra) the learned judge held that the power of the Court under Section 9 of the Act is wider than that of Arbitration Tribunal under Section 17 and Court can exercise the same prior to and even after the proceedings are initiated. The ratio laid down in the case of "Datar Switchgear Limited" is also thus not useful to the Petitioner.
29. In view of the above discussion, Section 27(5) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 does not empower the Tribunal to make representation to the Court for contempt if the orders including the interim orders passed by the Arbitrator except in respect of taking evidence are violated by the party. The Contempt Petition being the representation made by the Tribunal is beyond the period of 24 / 25 906-cp-102-2015.doc limitation and is not maintainable in law. Moreover, the final award of Rs. 8 Crores is granted in favour of the Petitioner by the Arbitrator.
30. Thus, Contempt Petition is not maintainable in law, hence dismissed.
(MRS.MRIDULA BHATKAR, J.) 25 / 25
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