Sunday, 25 December 2016

Whether court can extend time for payment of consideration amount in execution of consent decree?

 In the present case, there was a decree for a sum of Rs.1,04,50,000/-. On the judgment debtor's application, by consent of parties, a concession was granted to the judgment debtor to pay an amount of Rs.90,00,000/- in two instalments of Rs.45,00,000/- each in full and final settlement of the Plaintiff's claim. On failure of such payment, the order provided for the entire decretal amount becoming due and the decree being liable to be executed on that basis. The case clearly comes within the dicta of the Full Bench judgment of our court in the case of Waman Vishwanath. A clause providing for execution of the decree for the entire decretal amount on failure of payment of a concessional amount within a stipulated time is not in the nature of penalty or forfeiture and there is no question of this court relieving the judgment debtor of its consequences. Mr.Cama tries to distinguish the consent order in the present case as an order providing for payment of a larger amount in default of payment of the decretal sum in instalments. The submission is that the original decree was set aside and substituted by a decree for payment of a smaller sum and in default, for payment of the larger sum, i.e. the original decretal sum. The suggestion seems to be that to come within the principle of Waman Vishwanath, the original decree had to be retained and its satisfaction had to be provided in terms of payment in instalments of a lesser sum (i.e. the concessional sum). This is nothing but a matter of semantics. In substance, the original decree is given a go by only on the basis of a concessional payment, failure of such payment resulting into an entitlement to execution of the decree already passed, and that cannot be termed as a penalty or a forfeiture. The application for extension of time is, accordingly, rejected.
Bombay High Court
Sonal Deepak Shah vs Rachna Developers And Marketing ... on 30 August, 2016
Bench: S.C. Gupte
Citation:2016(6) ALLMR 222
. This Notice of Motion is taken out by the Applicants (Original Defendants) for setting aside an ex-parte decree passed on 19 December 2012 in the Summary Suit herein.
2 By this decree, the Defendants were ordered and decreed to pay a sum of Rs.1,04,50,000/- along with interest at the rate of 18 per cent per annum from the filing of the suit till payment or realization. When the Chittewan 2/17 NM-1487-14 Motion came up for hearing before a learned Single Judge, the parties settled the matter and filed consent terms. On 19 November 2015, the consent terms were taken on record and the Motion was disposed of in its terms. The consent terms provided for payment of a sum of Rs.90 lacs in two installments of Rs.45 lacs each by the Defendants to the Plaintiff in full and final settlement of the suit claim, the first installment becoming payable on or before 20 December 2015 and the second on or before 20 February 2016. In case of default, the Notice of Motion was to stand dismissed and the Plaintiff to be entitled to execute the decree. The short controversy today is this : The first installment being payable on 20 December 2015, which was a Sunday, the Defendants applied for a demand draft for Rs.45 lacs on the following Monday, i.e. on 21 December 2015, and got the same on 22 December 2015. The Plaintiff, however, refused to accept the demand draft on account of delay. The Defendants seek condonation of this delay of two days or, in other words, extension of time under Section 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Plaintiff opposes on the ground that she is not agreeable to any extension and without her consent, time cannot be extended by this Court. The question, thus, is of jurisdiction and power of the Court to grant extension of time for payment of decretal amount in a contested matter.
3 Mr. Tamboly, learned Counsel for the Plaintiff, submits that time fixed for payment in a decree cannot be extended by the Court unilaterally.
He further submits that a compromise decree cannot be interfered with or modified by the Court unless the parties agree to the same. Mr. Cama, learned Counsel for the Defendants, on the other hand, submits that consent terms, when made part of an order of the Court, get merged into Chittewan 3/17 NM-1487-14 the order and the time provided therein, which then amounts to time granted by the Court to do a thing, can always be extended by the Court.
He argues that this the Court can do at any stage or time.
4 The questions, which fall for the consideration of the court, may, at the outset, be correctly formulated. We are obviously at a stage where the Court is not in seisin of the matter stricto sensu. The suit has already been decreed. The decree, which is varied on consent of parties, provides for payment by installments by a particular time and in default, for execution of the decree for the entire decretal amount. The question is, is the Court empowered to order postponement of payment or grant time to the judgment-debtor without the consent of the decree-holder ? And if the answer to this question is in the affirmative, whether, in the facts of the present case, the Court would be justified in doing so.
5 Before we examine the judgments on the point, let us note the provisions of law dealing with the subject on hand. The first and foremost provision on the subject is Order 20 Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which deals with decrees, and post-decree orders, for payment by installments. The provision is quoted below :
Order 20 Rule 11: Decree may direct payment by instalments.- (1) Where and in so far as a decree is for the payment of money, the court may for any sufficient reason incorporate in the decree, after hearing such of the parties who had appeared personally or by pleader at the last hearing, before judgment, an Order that payment of the amount decreed shall be postponed or shall be made by instalments, with or without interest, notwithstanding anything contained in the contract under which the money is payable.
Chittewan 4/17 NM-1487-14 (2) Order, after decree, for payment by installments--After the passing of any such decree the court may, on the application of the judgment debtor and with the consent of the decree holder, Order that payment of the amount decreed shall be postponed or shall be made by installments on such terms as to the payment of interest, the attachment of the property of the judgment debtor, or the taking of security from him, or otherwise, as it thinks fit.
The other provision, which is of a more general nature, is Section 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Section is quoted below :
Section 148 : Where any period is fixed or granted by the Court for the doing of any act prescribed or allowed by this Code, the Court may, in its discretion, from time to time, enlarge such period not exceeding thirty days in total, even though the period originally fixed or granted may have expired.
Then we have Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which saves inherent powers of the Court and which is in the following terms :
Section 151 : Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent power of the Court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court.
6 As a plain reading of the provisions quoted above would suggest, whereas Section 151, as a saving provision, enables the Court to do something necessary in the interest of justice in a contingency not otherwise provided for in the Code of Civil Procedure (for the Code cannot be exhaustive so as to deal with each and every contingency arising in a civil proceeding), Section 148 provides generally for enlargement of time Chittewan 5/17 NM-1487-14 whenever the Court fixes any period or grants any time to do something which is either prescribed or allowed by the Code. Order 20 Rule 11, on the other hand, particularly provides for postponement or, in other words, granting of time to pay the amount decreed, sub-section (1) providing for granting of such time in the decree itself, and sub-section (2) providing for granting of time after the passing of the decree. As a matter of principle, whenever a law provides for a particular contingency it is that special provision which must be resorted to for dealing with such contingency rather than a general provision permitting the Court to do something in a wide range of cases. Thus, when the Court, after the passing of the decree, considers, as in this case, whether or not to grant time to pay the decretal amount on the application of the judgment-debtor, the answer must be looked for in the provisions of Rule 11 (2) of Order 20 rather than Sections 148 or 151 of the Code. Rule 11(2) requires as a condition for the exercise of powers thereunder that such application must be made "with the consent of the decree-holder". The Court cannot allow any application without such consent. That appears to be the plain meaning of the provision. Let us now see, if the decided cases hold otherwise.
7 A Full Bench of our Court considered the Court's power to enlarge time in the case of an instalment decree with a default clause in Waman Vishwanath Bapat Vs. Yeshwant Tukaram1. Before the Full Bench considered the matter in Waman Vishwanath's case, there were two conflicting views taken by our Court on the question. One was by Sir John Beaumont in Burjorji Shapurji Vs. Mdhavlal Jesingbhai 2, where the learned Chief Justice held that in a decree providing for payment of a 1 AIR (36) 1949 Bombay 97 2 AIR (21) 1934 Bom. 370 Chittewan 6/17 NM-1487-14 certain amount on specified dates and marking of satisfaction of the decree upon such payment and in default, the full amount of the decree becoming payable, the stipulation was not in the nature of a penalty and the Court could not relieve the judgment-debtor against the breach committed in the failure to pay the amount on the due date. Beaumont CJ, in keeping with this view, also held in Pari Chimanlal Dholidas Vs. Chimanlal Bhudardas Shah3 that there was no general power in courts of equity to disregard the agreement between the parties contained in a consent decree. The other view was held by another Chief Justice of this Court, Sir Norman Macleod, which he gave expression to in the case of Narayan Vs. Rajimal4. In that case, a consent decree provided for payment of a sum in certain fixed instalments. It also provided that on failure to pay two installments, the Plaintiff was entitled to take possession of certain lands. There was a delay of a few days in the payment of two instalments. The Plaintiff applied to get possession of the lands. The Division Bench of Sir Norman Macleod CJ and Coyajee J held that the default should be excused and the defendants relieved against the forfeiture. Sir Norman Macleod observed that it was the privilege of this Court to administer equity, and, in following the principles of equity, to relieve against forfeiture. The same view was taken by Sir Norman Macleod in Narsinha Gopal Vs. Balvant Madhav 5, another case of an installment decree with a default clause, holding that the delay should be excused and the judgment-debtor relieved from the consequences of the default. The Full Bench in the case of Waman Vishwanath disagreed with the view of Sir Norman Macleod, Chagla CJ, speaking for the Bench, 3 First Appeal No.244 of 1989, decided by Baumont C.J. And Sen J. on 29.11.1940.
    4   AIR (13) 1926 Bom.81
    5   AIR (9) 1922 Bom.170





     Chittewan                                            7/17                                     NM-1487-14

    observing as follows :   




                                                                                                   
"With greatest respect, what the learned Chief Justice overlooked was whether there was any penalty provided in the consent decree. It is not disputed and it cannot be disputed that a Court of equity can relieve against penalties or against forfeiture. But the question that has got to be determined is whether a certain obligation undertaken by a judgment-debtor is in the nature of a penalty or whether it is the result of a concession conferred upon him by the decree-holder."
The Full Bench agreed with the view of Sir John Beaumont and overruled the decisions in Narayan Vs. Rajmal and Narsinha Gopal Vs. Balwant Madhav.
8 Much later, in the case of Durga Mohan Joshi Vs. International Metal Industries6, a learned Single Judge of our Court (Sujata V. Manohar J, as the learned Judge then was), relying on the Full Bench decision in Waman Vishwanath, held that once a decree is passed in a suit, the Court cannot pass any further orders. There was but one exception in equity to this rule, namely, when in the case of a consent decree or a decree in invitum, there is a provision for penalty or forfeiture in the event of a default by the judgment-debtor. In such case, the Court in equity can grant relief against such penalty or forfeiture. The learned Judge held as follows :
Once a decree is passed in a suit the court cannot pass any further orders. There is only one exception in equity to this rule. In the case of consent decrees or decrees in invitum, if there are any provisions for penalty or forfeiture in the event of the judgment-debtor committing any default, then in equity the 6 AIR 1984 Bombay 314Chittewan 8/17 NM-1487-14 court has jurisdiction to give relief against penalty or forfeiture. Cases of relief against forfeiture usually are cases of decrees between landlord and tenant, where there is a provision that on the tenant's failure to pay rent, his tenancy is to be forfeited. Penal provisions in a decree were discussed in the case of Waman Vishwanath Bapat Vs. Yeshwant Tukaram, (1948) 50 Bom. .R 688, by a Full Bench of this High Court. It held that in a decree which is passed either by consent or in invitum, if there is any provision for payment of the decretal amount in installments and there is also a provision that on failure to pay one or more installments, the whole amount of the decree becomes payable at once, the Courts are bound, in the event of such failure, to execute the decree in accordance with its terms, and are not at liberty to relieve the judgment-debtor against the consequences of failure on equitable considerations. Chagla, C.J. held that such a provision in the decree could not be considered as a penal provision. On the contrary, a provision for payment of the decree by installments was a concession which was granted to the judgment-debtor by the decree-holder. There was no question, therefore, of the judgment-debtor being granted relief against any penal provision in the decree. In this judgment the High Court has cited with approval a decision of the Division Bench of this High Court in the case of Burjorji Shapurji Vs. Madhavlal Jesinghbhai, (1934) ILR 58 Bom 610. In this judgment a distinction is drawn between a concession and a penalty. "If there is an agreement to pay a sum of money by a particular date with a condition that if the money is not paid on that date a larger sum shall be paid, that condition is in the nature of a penalty against which a Court of equity can grant relief...... But if, on the other hand there is an agreement to pay a particular sum followed by a condition allowing to the debtor a concession, for example, the payment of a lesser sum, or payment by installments, by a particular date or dates, then the party seeking to take advantage of that concession must carry out strictly the conditions on which it was granted, and there is no power in the Court to relieve him from the obligation of so doing." (See in this connection also Gajanaj Govind Pathak Vs. Pandurang Keshav, (1951) 53 Bom LR 100 and Doshi Kantilal V. Modiya Chandulal, (AIR 1973 Guj.80). The provision in the present decree is for the payment of a lesser sum by installments. It is clearly a concession and not a penalty. There can be, therefore, no room for intervention on equitable grounds.
Chittewan 9/17 NM-1487-14 The learned Judge also considered whether there was power in the Court to grant extension of time for payment of installments under the decree, under Section 148 read with Section 151 of the Code. The learned Judge ruled that there was no such power in the Court, observing as follows :
Provisions of S.148 are attracted when under an order of the Court any time is fixed for the doing of any act prescribed or allowed by the Code. This provision enables a court which is seized of the matter and has control over it, to enlarge time for the doing of any act which is prescribed or allowed by the Code. Section 148 applies only to orders passed by a court while it still retains control over the matter. Once a decree is passed, the Court completes its task qua that matter. It does not retain any further control over the proceedings. Hence the provisions of S.148 cannot apply to final decrees of any court. Any time for payment which is laid down in a decree cannot be enlarged by resorting to Section 148. The only case where the provisions of S.148 can be applied to a decree is the case where the decree is of a preliminary nature and the court has retained control over the proceedings for the purpose of passing a final decree. Hence under S.148 there is no power in the court to extend the time for payment under a decree as in the present case.
The learned Judge also held that no such power existed even under Section 151, observing as follows :
It is also not possible to invoke the inherent power of the court under S.151 of the C.P.C. because the power under S.151 cannot be restored to in order to achieve a result which is not permitted by the express provisions of the Code. In the view of the provisions of O.XX, R.11, sub-rule (2) of the C.P.C., the court cannot grant any further extension of time after the passing of the decree without the consent of the decree-holder. The provisions of S.151 cannot be resorted to for the purpose of overcoming the bar of O.XX, R.11(2).
     Chittewan                                        10/17                                    NM-1487-14




    9           Learned   Counsel   for   the   Defendants   relies   on   the   decision   of   the 




                                                                                               
Supreme Court in the case of Periyakkal Vs. Dakshyani7. In that case, in execution of a decree, a certain property of the judgment-debtor was brought to sale. The decree-holder himself purchased the property. On the application of the judgment-debtor's legal heirs under Order 21 Rule 90 for setting aside the sale, the parties entered into a compromise with the leave of the Court. The compromise inter alia provided for deposit of a certain sum in full and final settlement of the decree by a particular date and in default, for confirmation of the sale. The judgment-debtors failed to deposit the amount in terms of the compromise order, and instead filed an application under Sections 148 and 151 of the Code for extension of time to make the deposit. The application was dismissed by the High Court. In appeal, the Supreme Court held that the time for deposit stipulated by the parties became the time allowed by the Court and this gave the Court the jurisdiction to extend the time in appropriate cases. The Supreme Court further held that time would not be extended ordinarily, nor for the mere asking, but it could always be extended in rare cases to prevent manifest injustice, observing as follows :
"True, the Court would not rewrite a contract between the parties but the Court would relieve against a forfeiture clause; And, where the contract of the parties has merged in the order of the Court, the Court's freedom to act to further the ends of justice would surely not stand curtailed."
10 It would seem, at the first blush, that this judgement supports the Defendants in the present case. It is, however, important to note that the 7 AIR 1983 SC 428 Chittewan 11/17 NM-1487-14 compromise order, with which the Court was concerned in Periyakkal's case, was an order passed in execution proceedings and not a final decree.
It was passed in an application under Order 21 Rule 90 for setting aside a sale in execution; It provided for payment by a particular date in satisfaction of the decree; and it provided, in default, for confirmation of the sale. What the Court did in that case was to relieve the judgment- debtor from the forfeiture resulting from his failure to pay and granted enlargement of time. The case was clearly covered under Section 148 and not under Order 20 Rule 11. That is precisely how the ratio of Periyakkal's case was explained by our Court in Durga Mohan Joshi's case and extension of time was refused to the judgment-debtor on his unilateral application under Order 20 Rule 11(2).
11 Even the other judgments relied upon by Mr. Cama for the Defendants deal with extension of time provided in orders of the Court for payment in cases other than decrees for payment of money under Order 20 Rule 11. Johri Singh Vs. Sukh Pal Singh8 was a case where the Court was concerned with a decree in a pre-emption suit. The plaintiff's claim for pre- emption was allowed subject to deposit of purchase money of Rs.41,082/- less the amount of 'zare-panjum' by a particular date. The plaintiff deposited the amount before the stipulated date and applied for possession of the land. The possession was actually delivered to him in pursuance of that application. In the meantime, however, the office of the Court reported that the amount deposited fell short of the decretal amount by Rs.100. The plaintiff decree-holder, in the premises, applied for condonation of the delay and permission to deposit the balance of Rs.100/-
8 (1989) 4 Supreme Court Cases 403 Chittewan 12/17 NM-1487-14 on the ground that there was an inadvertent arithmetical mistake on his part as also on the part of the Court Officials. The defendants, on the other hand, filed an application praying that there being short deposit, the decree was a nullity and the suit stood dismissed and accordingly, the land be restored to them. The first Court, namely, Senior Subordinate Judge, condoned the delay and granted ten days time to the plaintiff to deposit the balance of Rs.100/-. On a revision moved by the defendants under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the High Court set aside the order of the Senior Subordinate Judge and dismissed the decree-holder's application for condonation of delay and permission to deposit Rs.100/-.
The Supreme Court allowed the decree-holder's appeal holding that Section 148 of the Code empowered the Court to extend the time fixed by it even after the expiry of the period originally fixed and that the case was one where the court had to use this discretion and extend the time, since the mistake was bonafide and not indicative of any negligence or inaction. The court particularly held that in its decree the court had not specified the amount of zare-panjum and thus, had not quantified the purchase money, and as a result, an inadvertent error had crept in the arithmetical calculation; that the deficit of Rs.100/- was a very small fraction of the total payable amount which was paid very much within the time fixed for the same, and that there was no reason, except for the mistake, why the plaintiff would not have paid this Rs.100/- also within time; that the decree-holder's application for payment of the challan annexed was allowed by Court Officials without pointing out the mistake; and that the amount was deposited accordingly and even possession of the property was delivered to the decree-holder. This was clearly a case where the time was provided for by the court in a decree, stipulating dismissal of the suit in theChittewan 13/17 NM-1487-14 default clause, resulting in loss of the Plaintiff's pre-emption right. This stipulation was clearly in the nature of a penalty or forfeiture, and the court would relieve the decree-holder of the consequences thereof.
12 In Rizvi Nagar Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. vs. The Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay 9, our court was concerned with a consent decree in a suit for a declaration that an auction sale conducted by and between the defendants was illegal. The consent terms filed in the suit provided for payment of a certain sum with interest in instalments. The terms also provided that in case of default in payment of any of the instalments, the auction sale would stand automatically confirmed and the suit would stand dismissed without any further order. The last instalment was not paid on or before the stipulated date and as a result, the plaintiffs took out a chamber summons for condonation of delay. The defendants opposed enlargement of time and inter alia cited Periyakkai's case, referred to above. A learned Single Judge of our court held that as a result of non-payment of the last instalment by the stipulated date, the plaintiffs were loosing a valuable right in respect of the immovable property mentioned therein. The court held that the default clause, providing for dismissal of the suit and confirmation of the auction sale, was in the nature of forfeiture and granted relief to the plaintiffs against such forfeiture. This was clearly a case where as a result of non- payment, the plaintiffs lost valuable property by way of a penalty or forfeiture. The learned Judge was of the view that the decree could be altered on the grounds of equity by granting relief against such penalty or forfeiture.
    9 1993(1)Bom.C.R. 495





     Chittewan                                 14/17                                  NM-1487-14

    13         The case of  M/s.Jolly Steel Industries Pvt.Ltd. vs. Gupta Steel 
Industries10, referred to by Mr.Cama, concerned a consent decree passed in a suit for recovery of land and immovables. The consent decree provided for instalments and in default, dismissal of the suit filed by the plaintiffs.
There was a delay of less than four weeks in depositing the first instalment as per the consent terms, whereas the second instalment was correctly deposited. The plaintiffs explained the small delay, which explanation was not disputed by the defendants. Considering the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Periyakkai (supra), the court held that this was a case for extension of time under Sections 148, 149 and 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure and it was necessary to extend the time in order to avoid manifest and serious injustice to the plaintiffs. The court held the case to be an exceptional case, where, if the time was not extended, the plaintiffs would be losing not only rights provided under the consent terms, but the entire landed property and machinery belonging to them for a small fault. Again a case for relief against forfeiture or a penalty clause. It is interesting to note that when the order of the Division Bench in Jolly Steel Industries was carried in appeal before the Supreme Court, the Court disagreed, as a principle of law, with the High Court interfering with or modifying the consent decree without agreement for such modifiation between the parties, though the Supreme Court declined to interfere with the order at that distance of time. (see Gupta Steel Industries vs. Jolly Steel Industries Pvt.Ltd.11) 14 The case of Jabendra Nath Mishra vs. Smt.Manorama Debva 12 10 1997(1)Bom.C.R. 192 11 (1996) 11 SCC 678 12 AIR 1970 Calcutta 199 (V 57 C34) Chittewan 15/17 NM-1487-14 was a case where an ex-parte decree was passed in a suit for partition. On an application for setting aside that ex-parte decree under Order 9 Rule 13, consent terms came to be filed, under which the suit was restored to file and the ex-parte decree was set aside subject to payment of certain amount by the original defendants within a certain time. The default clause provided for dismissal of the miscellaneous application and affirmation of the ex-parte decree. On account of illness, the defendant could not make the deposit in time, with the result that the miscellaneous application stood dismissed and the ex-parte decree confirmed. The court held that as a result of non-deposit of money within time, the defendant was losing a valuable right in respect of immovable property, or in other words, it was a case of forfeiture and that relief against forfeiture could be granted.
15 None of these are cases of a money decree under Order 20 Rule 11, and all provided for loss of valuable property in default of the conditions stipulated therein. In Periyakkal's case, the compromise was entered into in execution to prevent a sale and the default clause provided for confirmation of the sale. In Johri Singh, the decree was for enforcement of the plaintiff's right of pre-emption in respect of certain land subject to payment, the default clause providing for dismissal of the suit and loss of the right of pre-emption. In Rizvi Nagar Society's case, the subject matter of the suit concerned an auction sale, the default clause providing for confirmation of the auction sale, whereas in Jolly Steel Industries, the consent decree was in a suit for recovery of land where the default clause provided for dismissal of the suit and loss of the land by the plaintiff. In Jabendra Nath Mishra's case, the default clause provided for confirmation of a decree of partition. All these cases, thus, come under the exception Chittewan 16/17 NM-1487-14 referred to by our Court in Waman Vishwanath and Durga Mohan Joshi, namely, the consent decree or decree in invitum providing for a penalty or a forfeiture and the Court relieving the party in breach from its consequences.
16 In the present case, there was a decree for a sum of Rs.1,04,50,000/-. On the judgment debtor's application, by consent of parties, a concession was granted to the judgment debtor to pay an amount of Rs.90,00,000/- in two instalments of Rs.45,00,000/- each in full and final settlement of the Plaintiff's claim. On failure of such payment, the order provided for the entire decretal amount becoming due and the decree being liable to be executed on that basis. The case clearly comes within the dicta of the Full Bench judgment of our court in the case of Waman Vishwanath. A clause providing for execution of the decree for the entire decretal amount on failure of payment of a concessional amount within a stipulated time is not in the nature of penalty or forfeiture and there is no question of this court relieving the judgment debtor of its consequences. Mr.Cama tries to distinguish the consent order in the present case as an order providing for payment of a larger amount in default of payment of the decretal sum in instalments. The submission is that the original decree was set aside and substituted by a decree for payment of a smaller sum and in default, for payment of the larger sum, i.e. the original decretal sum. The suggestion seems to be that to come within the principle of Waman Vishwanath, the original decree had to be retained and its satisfaction had to be provided in terms of payment in instalments of a lesser sum (i.e. the concessional sum). This is nothing but a matter of semantics. In substance, the original decree is given a go by only on the basis of a concessional payment, failure of such Chittewan 17/17 NM-1487-14 payment resulting into an entitlement to execution of the decree already passed, and that cannot be termed as a penalty or a forfeiture.
17 The application for extension of time is, accordingly, rejected.
A decree for full amount shall follow.
18 Learned Counsel for the Defendants / Applicants seeks continuation of the status quo granted on 23 December 2015. Learned Counsel for the Defendants / Applicants states that he shall not create any third party rights in respect of his property, or dispose of or alienate the property, otherwise than in the usual course of his business for the period for which status quo shall be continued. On his application and subject to his statement, which is accepted by the court, the status quo shall continue for a period of four weeks from today.
(S.C.GUPTE, J.)
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