Friday 16 June 2017

Whether unregistered lease deed can be used for collateral purposes?

 So   far   as   the   substantial   question   of   law   at   Serial   No.2
regarding   admissibility   of   document   at   Exhibit   50   in   evidence   is
concerned, though such document is an unregistered document, it can
be used for collateral purposes and the decision of the Apex Court in
the case of  Anthony  v.  K.C. Ittoop  & Sons and others, reported in
(2000) 6 SCC 394, throws light in para 16 thereof on such issue,
which is reproduced below :
“16. Taking   a   different   view   would   be   contrary   to   the
reality when parties clearly intended to create a lease though
the document which they executed had not gone into processes
of registration.   That lacuna had affected the validity of the
document,   but   what   had   happened   between   the   parties   in
respect of the property became a reality.   Non­registration of
the document had caused only two consequences.  One is that
no lease exceeding one year was created.   Second is that the
instrument became useless so far as creation of the lease is
concerned.   Nonetheless   the   presumption   that   a   lease   not
exceeding one year stood created by conduct of parties remains
unrebutted.”    

In view of above, the non­registration of document would not come in
the way of the Court to hold that the relationship of “Landlord and
Tenant” between the plaintiff and the defendant No.1 in the present
case has been established, coupled with the other evidence available
on record.  The substantial questions of law at Serial No.2 is answered
accordingly.
There is no substance in this second appeal, and the same is
dismissed.  
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR
Second Appeal No.24 of 2002
Ganesh s/o Ramkisan Bairagi,

V
 Parwatabai wd/o Tukaram Appa Landge,

Coram : R.K. Deshpande, J.
Dated  : 16th June, 2016
Citation: AIR 2017 (NOC) 61 Bom

1. Regular   Civil   Suit   No.63   of   1986   filed   for   eviction   and
possession of the suit property from the tenant on the basis of the
notice issued under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882
was dismissed by the Trial Court on 23­7­1993.  The plaintiff preferred
Regular Civil Appeal No.172 of 1993, which has been allowed by the
learned Joint District Judge, Amravati, on 7­11­2001 by setting aside
the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court and granting a
decree for eviction and possession of the suit property in favour of the

plaintiff along with the arrears of Rs.810/­ and ordering an enquiry
under   Order   XX,   Rule   10(1)   of   the   Code   of   Civil   Procedure   for
determination of the future mesne profits from the date of filing of the
suit till the delivery of the possession.  Hence, the original defendant
No.2 is before this Court in this second appeal.
2. The Trial Court recorded a finding that the tenancy between
the plaintiff and the defendant No.1 in respect of the suit property
created on 16­4­1984 has not been proved by the plaintiff, so also the
claim   regarding   arrears   of   rent   of   Rs.810/­   for   the   period   from
15­7­1985 to 14­4­1986.  The lower Appellate Court has reversed this
finding and it is held that the plaintiff has established the relationship
of “Landlord and Tenant” between him and the defendant No.1, and
the   tenancy   was   validly   terminated,   and   hence   the   decree   for
possession as well as for arrears of rent of Rs.810/­ has been passed.
3. This Court framed the following substantial questions of law
while admitting this second appeal on 7­7­2015 :
“1. Whether the document styled as agreement of lease
(Ex.50)   is   sufficient   to   hold   that   the   present   appellant

surrendered his tenancy and therefor his father i.e. original
defendant No.1 became tenant of suit property.
2. Whether Ex.50 was inadmissible in evidence.
3. Whether evidence of P.W.2 – Govindrao Dharam can
be relied upon to hold that the agreement of lease at Ex.50 is
proved.”
4. The plaintiff came up before the Trial Court with the case
that an agreement was entered into for creation of monthly tenancy
between him and the defendant No.1­Ramkisan Motidas Bairagi on
16­4­1984 on rent of Rs.90/­ per month.  The defendant No.1 failed to
make   the   payment   of   rent   for   the   period   of   nine   months   from
15­7­1985 to 14­4­1986 at the rate of Rs.90/­ per month, and hence
by issuing the notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act
on 26­2­1986, the tenancy of the defendant No.1 was terminated.  The
suit was filed on 16­4­1986.   The defendant No.2­Ganesh Bairagi is
the son of the defendant No.1, and as per the averment made in the
plaint, he was joined as the party to avoid the further complications.  
5. The defendant No.2 filed his written on 30­10­1986 denying

the case of the plaintiff and taking the stand that he is the tenant and
in possession of the suit property since the year 1977 on the monthly
rent of Rs.60/­ (Rs.30/­ to be paid towards rent and Rs.30/­ to be paid
towards supply of electricity and water).  The defendant No.2 came up
with the stand in one place in his written statement that since last two
years, he is paying the rent of Rs.90/­ per month, and in another
place, that from the month of February 1986, he is compelled to pay
the rent of Rs.90/­, as the water and electricity supply to the premises
was stopped.  However, the money order sent came back to him.
6. The defendant No.1, who is the father of the defendant No.2,
filed   his   written   statement   on   28­11­1986   denying   the   averments
made   in   the   plaint   and   also   the   tenancy,   as   was   alleged   by   the
plaintiff.  It was the specific stand taken by the defendant No.1 in the
written statement that it is the defendant No.2, who is the tenant in
respect   of  the   suit   property   and   the   defendant   No.1   is  not   at   all
concerned with it.
7. The original plaintiff died during the pendency of the suit
and his daughter­in­law came on record and entered the witness­box
to depose that the agreement dated 16­4­1984 was at Exhibit 50 was

entered   into   between   the   plaintiff   and   the   defendant   No.1.     The
plaintiff proved the notice at Exhibit 47 and its acknowledgement by
the   defendant   No.1   at   Exhibit   48.     The   plaintiff   also   examined
PW 2­Govindrao Waindeshkar, the attesting witness, to agreement of
lease at Exhibit 50.  The defendant No.1 did not enter the witness­box,
but the defendant No.2 entered the witness­box and stated that in the
month of February 1986, the rent was increased to Rs.90/­, which was
sent by money order and accepted by the plaintiff.  The said receipt is
produced on record at Exhibit 55.  He further stated that in the month
of March 1986, he sent Rs.60/­ by way of money order to the plaintiff,
because the plaintiff stopped the supply of water and electricity, which
returned to him, as it was refused.
8. Before the Trial Court, the following issues were framed and
answered as under :
Sr.No. Issues Findings
i Does the plaintiff prove that he leased out
the suit premises to the defendant no.1 on
15.4.1984   and   deft.   executed   the
agreement to that effect.
No
ii Does he further prove that the deft.no.1 is
in arrears of Rs.810/­ towards the rent for
the period 15.7.85 to 14.4.86?
No

iii Does he prove that he validly and legally
terminated   the   tenancy   of   the   defendant
with effect from the                       midnight
of 14.4.86?
No
iv (Deleted) Does the deft. 2 prove that the
deft.   no.1   alone   is   the   tenant   of   suit
premises?
Deleted
v Does   the   deft.   no.2   prove   that   he   paid
Rs.1000/­   to   the   plaintiff   as   Pagdi
(Advance)?
No
vi Does he prove that he paid the rent upto
the month of February 1986?
Yes
vii Does   he   further   prove   that   the   rent   was
enhanced   to   Rs.90/­   from   Rs.60/­   p.m.
from the month of February 1986?
Yes
viii Is plaintiff entitled to claim the possession
of suit­premises?
No
ix Is he entitled to reliefs claimed? No
x What decree, order and costs? As per final order
Issue No.(iv) was deleted by consent of the parties.  The Trial Court
answered Issue No.(v) in the negative to the effect that the defendant
No.2 has failed to prove that he has paid Rs.1,000/­ to the plaintiff as
Pagdi  (Advance).   The Trial Court also recorded the finding in the
affirmative   on   Issue   No.(vi)   holding   that   the   defendant   No.2   has
proved that he paid the rent upto the month of February 1986.  The

defendant No.2 denied in his written statement the enhancement of
rent from Rs.60/­ to Rs.90/­ per month, and the Trial Court recorded
the finding that the rent was at the rate of Rs.90/­ per month.
9. On the substantial question of law at Serial No.1, though the
Trial Court recorded the finding that the tenancy between the plaintiff
and the defendant No.1 with effect from 16­4­1984 has not been
established, the lower Appellate Court reverses this finding and it is
held that such a tenancy between the plaintiff and the defendant No.1
has been established.   The reliance is placed upon Exhibit 50, the
agreement of lease.   The plaintiff was not alive to lead evidence to
prove the document at Exhibit 50.  The daughter­in­law, who came on
record,   could   not   depose   about   the   execution   of   this   document.
PW 2­Govindrao Deshkar, the attesting witness, has deposed that the
agreement bears his signature and the defendant No.1 has also signed
the said document in his presence and he identifies the signature of
the defendant No.1.  He says that the rent note was written by one
scribe­Bapu Deshmukh and it bears his own signature, the signature of
the   plaintiff,   and   that   of   the   defendant   No.1.
Shri   V.V.   Bhangde,   the   learned   counsel   appearing   for   the
appellant/defendant   No.2,   has   invited   my   attention   to   the

cross­examination of this witness where he states that at the time of
writing the document at Exhibit 50, he was present along with the
plaintiff   and   the   scribe­Bapu   Deshmukh.   He   states   in   the
cross­examination that except Bapu Deshmukh, no other person has
signed the document in his presence.
10. The lower Appellate Court has recorded the finding that the
defendant   No.1   has   not   entered   the   witness­box   to   refute   the
document at Exhibit 50.   The execution of this document has been
spoken about by the plaintiff in her evidence at Exhibit 46 and the
document   goes   to   show   that   from   16­4­1984   onwards,   it   is   the
defendant No.1, who represented the lease­hold rights in respect of
the   suit   property.     The   lower   Appellate   Court   has   taken   into
consideration the evidence of the attesting witness.  It has also taken
into consideration that the defendant Nos.1 and 2 are the father and
son and this relationship cannot be forgotten.  On such findings, the
lower Appellate Court has held that the document at Exhibit 50 has
been proved.  Apart from this, the Trial Court has recorded the finding
that   the   defendant   No.2   has   failed   to   prove   that   he   has   paid
Rs.1,000/­ to the plaintiff as Pagdi (Advance) and the rent at the rate
of Rs.90/­ per month was paid upto the month of February 1986.  It is

not the case of the defendant No.2 that he paid the rent at the rate of
Rs.90/­ till February 1986.  Thus, there is other evidence available on
record in support of the findings of the lower Appellate Court.   The
findings are based on evidence available and its appreciation.  At any
rate it is a possible view of the matter and no substantial question of
law arises for consideration out of such findings.
11. It is no doubt true that the plaintiff has pleaded in his plaint
by   way   of   amendment   that   the   defendant   No.2   was   initially   the
tenant, who surrendered his tenancy on 15­4­1984, and with effect
from 16­4­1984, the defendant No.1 was considered as the tenant in
respect of the suit property.  This was introduced in view of the stand
taken   by   the   defendant   Nos.1   and   2   in   their   separate   written
statement that it is the defendant No.2 who is the tenant and not the
defendant No.1. In fact, the Trial Court deleted the issue as to whether
the defendant No.2 proves that the defendant No.1 alone is the tenant
of the suit property.  Since the defendant No.2 has surrendered such
an issue, the consequential amendment of pleadings by the plaintiff
loses its significance.   It was, therefore, not necessary for the lower
Appellate Court to decide the question as to whether the surrender of
tenancy was proved or not.  The substantial questions of law at Serial

Nos.1 and 3 are, therefore, answered accordingly.
12. So   far   as   the   substantial   question   of   law   at   Serial   No.2
regarding   admissibility   of   document   at   Exhibit   50   in   evidence   is
concerned, though such document is an unregistered document, it can
be used for collateral purposes and the decision of the Apex Court in
the case of  Anthony  v.  K.C. Ittoop  & Sons and others, reported in
(2000) 6 SCC 394, throws light in para 16 thereof on such issue,
which is reproduced below :
“16. Taking   a   different   view   would   be   contrary   to   the
reality when parties clearly intended to create a lease though
the document which they executed had not gone into processes
of registration.   That lacuna had affected the validity of the
document,   but   what   had   happened   between   the   parties   in
respect of the property became a reality.   Non­registration of
the document had caused only two consequences.  One is that
no lease exceeding one year was created.   Second is that the
instrument became useless so far as creation of the lease is
concerned.   Nonetheless   the   presumption   that   a   lease   not
exceeding one year stood created by conduct of parties remains
unrebutted.”    

In view of above, the non­registration of document would not come in
the way of the Court to hold that the relationship of “Landlord and
Tenant” between the plaintiff and the defendant No.1 in the present
case has been established, coupled with the other evidence available
on record.  The substantial questions of law at Serial No.2 is answered
accordingly.
There is no substance in this second appeal, and the same is
dismissed.  No order as to costs.
13. At this stage, Shri V.V. Bhangde, the learned counsel for the
appellant/defendant   No.2,   submits   that   his   arguments   that   the
document at Exhibit 50 has not been proved, the view taken by the
lower Appellate Court is not even a possible view of the matter, and
the findings recorded by the lower Appellate Court are perverse, have
not been dealt with in this judgment, which is dictated in open Court.
He, therefore, insisted that the said points be dealt with.   I think
whatever   arguments   have   been   understood   are   dealt   with   in   this
judgment.  If any points are left out, Shri Bhangde was asked to place
on record the written notes of arguments, which can be dealt with
subsequently while checking the judgment.  Since there is insistence
on the part of Shri Bhangde to deal with such points now, I make it

clear that the consciousness of this Court about such admissions of the
attesting witness is reflected in the judgment.  This Court has held that
it   is   a   possible   view   of   the   matter   which   is   taken   by   the   lower
Appellate Court and such, the argument that the findings of the lower
Appellate court are perverse, has also been dealt with.   There is no
other point which Shri Bhangde has urged.  
14. Again, at this stage, Shri V.V. Bhangde, the learned counsel
for the appellant/defendant No.2, submits that the office be given
direction not to list the matters in which he is appearing for any of the
parties before this Court.   In other words, he submits that I should
recuse   from   taking   up   the   matters   wherein   Shri   V.V.   Bhangde   is
appearing   for   any   of   the   parties.   The   submission   shocks   my
conscience,   particularly   when   it   suddenly   came   from   a   regular
practitioner   from   this   Court,   who   was   being   looked   at   as   an
experienced   and   responsible   officer   of   the   Court.     The   entire
arguments   in   this   matter   went   on   smoothly,   patiently   and   with
interest. After conclusion of the arguments, both the learned counsels
were   asked   as   to   whether   they   intend   to   make   any   additional
submissions, and thereafter the dictation commenced as per the usual
practice.  I need not delve upon any further and I refrain from making

any comments against Shri V.V. Bhangde.   However, the increasing
trend need to be commented upon; so as to caution the lawyers and
the litigants about the consequences of it, which can be avoided.
15. A lawyer has his own choice of appearing before the Court
presided over by a particular Judge to conduct the matter.   If his
matter is listed before the Court where he does not want to appear, he
is at liberty *to return such matter and/or fees to his client and can
ask him to engage some other lawyer or he may refuse to accept the
matter if he has not already filed his vakalatnama.  A Judge may also
recuse himself from taking up the matters of the lawyers with whom
he is closely related or where his conscious does not permit him to
take up the matters of some lawyers.  In these situations, there may
not be any problem either with a Judge or a lawyer, but where the
Court passed an order against a particular lawyer not to appear in his
Court, it takes a colour of penalty or punishment to such a lawyer,
which may result in taking some disciplinary action against him by the
Bar Council of India or of State, which issued him a Sanad of Practice.
Such a stage by a Court may be construed of blacklisting of a lawyer.
Seldom, such event occurs, and the Courts also normally avoid it.
*Corrected
as   per
Hon'ble
Court's  order
dated
27­7­2016.

16. A tendency has started growing amongst lawyers to dictate a
Judge to recuse from taking up his matters when the decision goes
against his client or his wavelength does not match with the Judge or
he does not find comfort in conducting the matter or for some such
reasons.  This is an insult personally to a Judge.  Such reactions are
normally experienced when the lawyers take heavy fees from their
clients with an assurance to bring the result of the cases in their favour
or to impress upon the clients sitting in the court room during the
course of hearing, the boldness which he possesses to browbeat the
Court.  If a lawyer exercises his choice of not conducting the matter,
he loses his client and fees, which he does not want to do.  If a Judge
accedes   to   such   demand   of   a   lawyer   for   recusal,   the   effect   is
three­fold ­ (i) the confidence of a lawyer to browbeat the Court is
boosted, (ii) a lawyer gets rid of the Court where he finds discomfort
in conducting the matter, and (iii) it creates an additional source of
income for him, from the other lawyers and the litigants, who do not
want their matters listed or dealt with by such a Judge.  This promotes
the practice of bench­hunting.  No system of justice can tolerate such
practice   by   a   lawyer   and   the   same   is   required   to   be   curbed   and
deprecated. 

17. Recently, in the judgment, which I have delivered in Civil
Revision Application No.26 of 2016 on 6­6­2016 (Satish Mahadeorao
Uke v. The Registrar, High Court of Bombay, Bench at Nagpur, Nagpur),
I have observed in para 25 thereof as under :
“25. A Judge may recuse at his own choice from a case
entrusted to him by the Chief Justice and it would be a matter
of his own choosing.  But recusal at the asking of the litigating
party, unless justified, must never be acceded to.  This is what
the Apex Court has held recently in NJAC case instituted by the
Supreme Court Advocates­on­Record ­ Association and another
v.   Union   of   India,   reported   in   2015   (11)   SCALE   1.   The
question of recusal is normally decided by a Judge on the basis
of his personal or private interest in the subject­matter of the
litigation, his intimacy with the party/parties to a lis before
him, his perception about conflict of interest in taking up the
matter, and his own conscience.  Such decision does not depend
upon the dictates of lawyers or litigants. ...”
18. Recusal to take the matters to be conducted by some lawyers,
is a matter of Judge's own choosing and it cannot be at the dictates of
the lawyers.  What a Judge has to see is that he performs his duty of
deciding the matters before him without fear or favour, affection or
ill­will.  He has to keep in mind the principle that the justice should

not only be done, but it must appear to have been done.  The decision
of recusal to take the matters of lawyers, depends upon the Judge's
personal   relations   or   intimacy   with   such   lawyers,   and   his   own
conscience to decide a case by observing the oath which he has taken
while occupying the position as a Judge. Ultimately, a Judge is also a
human­being and the Judges come from different strata of the Society,
having   their   own   views,   ideas,   angle   or   perception,   based   on   the
varied individual experience in life, which may or may not match with
each others or with some lawyers or litigants.  However, this cannot be
a reason to avoid conducting the matters listed before such a Judge or
the Judges.  Once the constitutional authority of a Judge or the Judges
to adjudicate the matters is accepted, it cannot be lowered down by
asking him or them to recuse to hear and decide the matter. 
19. To prevent a Judge or the Judges from performing his or
their   duties   in   this   fashion   causes   distraction   of   attention   in   the
judicial proceedings, which amounts to interference in the course of
justice.  Merely because a lawyer, litigant or public at large feels that
the approach adopted or a decision is wrong, the authority or the force
of the decision does not get eroded.  A wrong decision in the matter is
equally enforceable like a correct decision.  If the Constitution and the

laws provide a remedy to get such decision corrected in a higher
forum, such a remedy can be availed.  Even a wrong decision becomes
final, binding and enforceable like a correct decision, if there is no
remedy available.  The lawyers, litigants or public at large cannot run
away from such decision and they have to be cautioned about the
authority of the Courts.

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