Community Service for Avoiding Jail Sentence
60. Convicts in various countries, now, voluntarily come forward to serve the community, especially in crimes relating to motor vehicles. Graver the crime greater the sentence. But, serving the society actually is not a punishment in the real sense where the convicts pay back to the community which he owes. Conduct of the convicts will not only be appreciated by the community, it will also give a lot of solace to him, especially in a case where because of one’s action and inaction, human lives have been lost.
61. In the facts and circumstances of the case, where six human lives were lost, we feel, to adopt this method would be good for the society rather than incarcerating the convict further in jail. Further sentence of fine also would compensate at least some of the victims of such road accidents who have died, especially in hit and run cases where the owner or driver cannot be traced. We, therefore, order as follows: 1) Accused has to pay an amount of Rs.50 lakh (Rupees Fifty lakh) to the Union of India within six months, which will be utilized for providing compensation to the victim of motor accidents, where the vehicle owner, driver etc. could not be traced, like victims of hit and run cases. On default, he will have to undergo simple imprisonment for one year. This amount be kept in a different head to be used for the aforesaid purpose only.
Supreme Court of India
State Tr.P.S.Lodhi Colony,New ... vs Sanjeev Nanda on 3 August, 2012
3. The solitary question that arises for our consideration in this appeal is whether respondent accused deserves to be held guilty of commission of offence under Section 304 Part II of the Indian Penal Code (for short IPC) or the conviction and sentence awarded to him by the High Court of Delhi, under Section 304 A of the IPC should be held to be good and legally tenable.
4. On 12.04.2010, limited notice was issued to the respondent by this Court, which reads as under:
“Issue notice confining to the nature of offence”.
Facts shorn of unnecessary details as unfolded by prosecution are mentioned hereinbelow:
5. On the intervening night of 9/10.01.1999, an unfortunate motor accident took place involving BMW Car No.M-312LYP. At the relevant point of time, it is no more in dispute that offending vehicle BMW was being driven by respondent. As per prosecution story, the said vehicle was coming from Nizamuddin side and was proceeding towards Lodhi Road. Just at the corner from where Lodhi Road starts, seven persons were standing on the road at about 4.00 a.m. In the said car, Manik Kapur and Sidharth Gupta (since discharged) were also sitting.
6. As per prosecution story, Manoj Malik (P.W.2) had started from his house to leave friends Nasir, Mehendi Hasan and his friend Gulab at Nizamudin Railway Station on foot. When they reached the petrol pump of Lodhi Road, three police officials of checking squad, Constables Rajan, Ram Raj and Peru Lal, stopped them and started checking. In the meantime, BMW car driven rashly and negligently came from Nizamuddin side at a high speed and dashed violently against them. The impact was so great and severe, that they flew in the air and fell on the bonnet and wind screen of the car. Some of them rolled down and came beneath the car. On account of this, accused lost control of the vehicle which swerved to right side of the road and ultimately hit the central verge. The persons who had come under the car were dragged up to that point. Manoj (P.W.2) who had fallen on the bonnet fell down at some distance but did not come under the wheels. After hitting the central verge, car finally stopped at some distance, respondent came out from the car and inspected the gruesome site. It is said that co-passenger Manik Kapur asked the accused to rush from the scene of occurrence. Injured persons were shouting and crying for help. But ignoring them, he drove away the car at high speed towards Dayal Singh College, even though there were still some persons beneath the car. In the said accident ultimately six of them were killed and Manoj (P.W.2) was injured. Accused then took the car to his friend Sidharth Gupta’s house at 50, Golf Links, New Delhi.
7. Prosecution story further goes to show that there another accused Rajeev Gupta, father of Sidharth Gupta with the help of two servants, accused Shyam and Bhola washed the car and destroyed the material evidence.
8. Prosecution alleges that PW.1 Hari Shankar, attendant at the petrol pump saw the accident and immediately informed telephonically his employer Brijesh Virmani, (P.W.70) who in turn informed the PCR at No.100. On getting the necessary information, police acted with promptitude. The telephonic information was recorded as DD No. 27-A.
9. Pursuant to the information being received, SI Kailash Chand reached the spot. By that time few PCR vans had already reached as the news about the accident was flashed. First to reach the spot was A.S.I. Devendra Singh (P.W.36), who carried Manoj Malik to the hospital. The other PCR vans took the remaining injured /deceased persons to the hospital.
10. S.I. Kailash Chand (P.W.58) wrote a Rukka describing the scene of crime. As per his description, he had found three persons, two constables Ravi Raj and Rajan and one person dead on the spot. He also came to know that other four injured persons were taken in another PCR van to the hospital. He found one broken number plate and other broken parts of the car. When plate was reassembled, the number read as M312LYP BMW. One black colour piece of bumper and rear view mirror were found scattered between 100 to 150 feet. Head of one person was found crushed. There were skid marks of the tyres of the vehicle on the spot for a long distance. The body of another constable namely, Ram Raj was found crushed and his right leg was found at a distance of 10 to 15 feet away. Abdomen of Constable Rajan Kumar was completely ripped open and blood was oozing out on the road. All the three dead bodies were sent to All India Institute of Medical Sciences (AIIMS) by ambulance.
11. Thus, it was clear to SI Kailash Chand that offending vehicle was a black colour BMW car having the aforesaid number plate. Looking to the nature of crime said to have been committed, he recommended registration of FIR under Section 338/304 IPC. The said Rukka was dispatched to the Police Station, where formal FIR was registered.
12. S.I. Jagdish Pandey (P.W.13) also reached the spot. He found a trail of oil on the road starting from the scene of offence. He, thus followed the trail and was able to reach 50 Golf Links. The gate of the house was closed. Jagdish P.W.13 peeped through the side hinges of the gate, and found accused Rajeev Gupta, Bhola Nath and Shyam Singh washing damaged black BMW car. He tried to get the gate opened, but failed. He then gave a message to SHO Lodhi Colony, Ms. Vimlesh Yadav who reached there with S.I. Kailash Chand and the gate was then got opened. This car was not having any number plate. The broken pieces collected from the spot matched with BMW car, other parts collected from the scene fitted well, at the respective places where the car was damaged. Some blood was also noticed in the rear left wheel of the car. On enquiries being made, accused Rajeev informed that car belonged to respondent Sanjeev Nanda, a friend of his son Sidharth Gupta.
13. Thereafter, S.I. Ulhas Giri went to the house of the accused Sanjeev Nanda at Defence Colony. He brought accused Sanjeev Nanda, Manik Kapur and Sidharth Gupta to 50 Golf Links. All the accused were sent for their medical examination. Respondent accused had sustained an injury on the lip as noticed by Dr. T.Milo (P.W. 10) who had prepared the MLC. He also recorded that he was informed by Head Constable with regard to history of consuming alcohol previous night. He also noted that a smell of alcohol was present even though, the speech of accused Sanjeev was coherent but gait unsteady. Sample of blood was taken on the same day at about 12.00 noon which was sent for medical examination and after testing, alcohol presence of 0.115% milligram per 100 millilitre was recorded. This has been proved by Dr. Madhulika Sharma (P.W. 16).
14. It is pertinent to mention that no Breath Analyzer or Alco meter was used. Prosecution has not assigned any cogent or valid reasons for this default.
15. After completion of the investigation, charge sheet was filed against the accused in the Court of Additional Sessions Judge, New Delhi. Respondent was charged under Sections 201, 304 (I), 308 read with 34 of the IPC. The case was registered as Sessions Case No. 25/1999.
16. It is important to mention here that in fact, all the material witnesses had turned hostile. P.W.1 Hari Shankar, the alleged eye witness, P.W.2 Manoj Malik, the injured witness turned hostile and did not support the prosecution story. The infamous Sunil Kulkarni was examined as court witness, who alone supported the prosecution story and has been believed by the Trial Court as trustworthy. Trial Court recorded that testimony of this witness alone as to how the accident took place is worthy of credence and the same is well corroborated by the scene of crime.
17. On conclusion of trial, after appreciating the evidence available on record, the trial court found respondent guilty of commission of offence under Section 304 Part II of the IPC and awarded him a jail sentence of five years. He was acquitted of other charges. However, accused Rajeev Gupta, Shyam Singh and Bhola Nath were convicted under Section 201 IPC. Rajeev Gupta was sentenced to undergo a sentence of one year and Bhola Nath and Shyam Singh to undergo a sentence of six months each.
18. Feeling aggrieved by the said judgment and order of conviction, respondent filed Criminal Appeal No. 807 of 2008 in the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi. Co-accused, Rajeev Gupta, Bhola Nath and Shyam filed Criminal Appeals No. 767 of 2008 and 871 of 2008 respectively against their conviction and sentences awarded to them under section 201 of the IPC.
19. The learned Single Judge considered the matter at great length and thereafter found the accused Sanjeev Nanda guilty of commission of offence under Section 304 A of the IPC and reduced the sentence to two years. While converting the conviction of said accused from Section 304 Part II to 304 A, the High Court has disbelieved the testimony of Sunil Kulkarni which was the basis for the trial court to come to a conclusion that the case fell under section 304 Part II. The High Court has also held that though the act of accused amounted to rashness and negligence endangering the lives of others, since there was no intention or knowledge of causing death, no case for conviction of accused under section 304 Part II was made out.
20. Other accused Rajeev Gupta, Shyam and Bhola were found guilty of commission of offence under Section 201 of the IPC and were awarded six months’ and three months’ RI respectively. As mentioned hereinabove, they have preferred separate appeals against the said judgment and order of conviction, which were heard separately. Their appeals have been allowed and they have been acquitted of the charge under Section 201 of the IPC.
21. Even though lengthy arguments have been advanced by learned Additional Solicitor General Mr. Harin P. Raval, to show the manner in which the investigation was conducted, suggesting many lacunae were left in the same, at the instance and behest of respondent accused, who not only happens to be a rich person but influential as well. Much was also argued assigning the reasons as to how relevant and material witnesses (P.W.1) Hari Shankar, and (P.W.2) Manoj, injured witness, had turned hostile. It was also then argued that the matter was carried to higher court against every order. Thus, Respondent tried his best to see to it that Sessions Trial is not concluded early. All these facts have been mentioned not only by the Trial Court but have been reiterated by learned Single Judge also.
22. In the light of this, we have heard Mr. Harin P.Raval learned Additional Solicitor General ably assisted by Mr. Siddharth S. Dave, Advocate for Appellant and Mr. Ram Jethmalani learned Senior Counsel with Mr. S. Kapur, Advocate and other Advocates for the respondent and have microscopically examined the materials available on record.
23. The arguments of Mr. Raval are as follows:
a) Admittedly respondent was not holding any valid Indian licence to drive a vehicle in India.
b) As per the evidence of (P.W.10) Dr. T. Milo, and (P.W.16) Dr. Madhulika, he was in an intoxicated condition, at the time of accident.
c) He was driving a powerful machine like BMW in excessive speed in a rash and negligent manner and certainly beyond reasonable control over it.
d) His negligence coupled with intoxication would lead to culpable homicide with knowledge.
e) He knew that persons have been crushed and some of them were underneath his car, yet he continued to drive the vehicle till all the injured were disentangled from the vehicle.
f) He fled away from the scene of crime, did not render any help to the injured. Not only this, he did not report the matter to the police and tried to obliterate the evidence available.
g) Even if intention may not be attributed to him but at least he had knowledge of what he had done, thus ingredients mandated under Section 304 Part II IPC were fully met.
h) Thus, High Court committed grave error in interfering with a well reasoned order of the Trial Court. Respondent should thus be held guilty of commission of offence under Section 304 Part II IPC and sentence be awarded accordingly.
24. We have been taken through almost the entire documentary and oral material evidence adduced by prosecution. Following authorities have been cited by the Appellant to show that such type of acts would fall precisely under Section 304 Part II of the IPC and not under Section 304 A, as has been held by the learned Single Judge in the impugned order.
25. These authorities are reported as under:
a) (1976) 1 SCC 889 State of Gujarat Vs. Haidarali Kalubhai where distinction has been drawn with regard to case falling under Sections 304 A and 304 Part II of the IPC. In the said judgment, proper and correct effect of Sections 299 and 300 of the IPC has also been discussed. This judgment has been followed by this Court in 2008 (1) SCC 791 Naresh Giri Vs. State of M.P.
b) (1981) 4 SCC 245 Kulwant Rai Vs. State of Punjab, highlights main and basic ingredients of Section 304 Part II.
c) (2000) 5 SCC 82 Dalbir Singh Vs. State of Haryana, has been cited to show that as far back as in the year 2000, drunken driving was heavily criticized and a warning was issued to all those who may be in the habit, to be more careful and cautious. It further went on to say that no benefit to the accused found guilty, can be granted under the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958.
d) (2004) 1 SCC 525 State of Maharashtra Vs. Salman Salim Khan was cited to show that in identical circumstances where the accused was not holding a valid motor driving licence and was under influence of alcohol, he would be held to have committed offence under section 304 Part II of the IPC.
e) The last in the series is (2012) 2 SCC 648 Alister Anthony Pareira Vs. State of Maharashtra to show that this Court has already taken a stern view where person involved in commission of such offence was driving a vehicle in a drunken condition and has to be dealt with severely so as to send proper and correct message to the society.
26. On the other hand, Mr. Ram Jethmalani, learned Senior Counsel appearing for respondent/accused contended that looking to the facts and features of the case and taking into consideration the following mitigating circumstances, no case for interference is made out:
a) Offence was said to have been committed in the year 1999, almost 13 years back.
b) Respondent was aged 21 years at that time, and was prosecuting his course in foreign country. He had come to India on a short holiday.
c) He has already undergone the sentence of two years awarded by High Court and only thereafter, after the period of limitation of filing the appeal had expired, he got married to his long time love, now they are blessed with a daughter.
d) His behaviour and conduct in jail was extremely good, which is evident from the two affidavits filed in support of the respondent by two NGOs.
e) Fact cannot be given a go-by that it was a cold wintry night of 9/10th January, 1999, thus possibility cannot be ruled out that visibility must have been poor due to fog. f) He had neither any previous criminal record nor has been involved in any criminal activity ever since then. The case of Alister Anthony (supra) does not apply to the facts of this case.
g) It was contended that respondent has already learnt sufficient lesson at young age and no useful purpose would be served, if he is sent to jail again.
h) The victim and/or families of deceased have been paid handsome amount of compensation of Rs.65 lacs, in the year 1999 itself, i.e. Rs. 10 lacs each to the families of the deceased and Rs.5 lacs to the injured.
i) It would not only be humiliating but great embarrassment to the respondent, if he is again sent to jail for little more period, over and above the period of two years awarded and undergone.
j) He had neither intention nor knowledge of the ultimate consequences of the offence said to have been committed. Learned Senior Counsel for the Respondent Mr. Ram Jethmalani further contended that it would not fall within the parameters of Section 304 Part II, IPC. The impugned judgment and order calls for no interference. Even otherwise, looking to facts and features of the case, no case for taking any other view is made out.
After having critically gone through the evidence available on record, we have no doubt in our mind that accident had occurred solely and wholly on account of rash and negligent driving of BMW car by the respondent, at a high speed, who was also intoxicated at that point of time. This fact has been admitted by the Respondent- Accused at the Appellate stage in the High Court that at the relevant point of time, Respondent was driving the vehicle and had caused the accident but even then, it would be only his rash and negligent act, attracting Section 304A of IPC only. Even though it is difficult to come to the aforesaid conclusion, since he was in an inebriated condition. For the simple reason that he had already driven almost 16 kms from the place where he had started, to the point where he actually met with the accident without encountering any untoward incident would not go absolutely in favour of the Respondent. There is no evidence on record that they had consumed more liquor on their way also. No such material objects were recovered from the vehicle, to suggest that even while driving they were consuming liquor. One may fail to understand if one could drive safely for a distance of 16 kms, then whether the effect of intoxication would rise all of a sudden so as to find the respondent totally out of control. There is nothing of that sort but it cannot be denied that he must have been little tipsy because of the drinks he had consumed some time back. It is, indeed, extremely difficult to assess or judge when liquor would show its effect or would be at its peak. It varies from person to person.
28. As mentioned hereinabove, prosecution failed to use either the Breath Analyser or Alco Meter to record a definite finding in this regard. Evidence of (P.W.10) Dr. Milo and (P.W.16) Dr. Madhulika shows that certain amount of alcoholic contents was still found on examination of his blood at 12.00 noon, next day.
29. It is a settled principle of law that if something is required to be done in a particular manner, then that has to be done only in that way or not, at all. In AIR 1936 PC 253 (2) Nazir Ahmad Vs. King Emperor, it has been held as follows:
“......The rule which applies is a different and not less well recognized rule, namely, that where a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way the thing must be done in that way or not at all. ......”
30. It has also come on record that seven persons were standing close to the middle of the road. One would not expect such a group, at least, at that place of the road, that too in the wee hours of the morning, on such a wintry night. There is every possibility of the accused failing to see them on the road. Looking to all this, it can be safely assumed that he had no intention of causing bodily injuries to them but he had certainly knowledge that causing such injuries and fleeing away from the scene of accident, may ultimately result in their deaths.
31. It is also pertinent to mention that soon after hitting one of them, accused did not apply the brakes so as to save at least some of the lives. Since all the seven of them were standing in a group, he had not realized that impact would be so severe that they would be dragged for several feet. Possibility also cannot be ruled out that soon after hitting them, respondent, a young boy of 21 years then, might have gone into trauma and could not decide as to what to do until vehicle came to a halt. He must have then realized the blunder he committed.
32. Respondent, instead of rendering helping hand to the injured, ran away from the scene, thus adding further to the miseries of the victims. It is not a good trend to run away after causing motor road accidents. An attempt should be made to render all possible help, including medical assistance, if required. Human touch to the same has to be given.
33. An aspect which is generally lost sight of in such cases is that bodily injuries or death are as a consequence of accidents. ‘Accident’ has been defined by Black’s Law Dictionary as under: “Accident: An unintended and unforeseen injurious occurrence; something that does not occur in the usual course of events or that could not be reasonably anticipated.”
Thus, it means, if the injury/death is caused by an accident, that itself cannot be attributed to an intention. If intention is proved and death is caused, then it would amount to culpable homicide.
34. It is to be noted that in Alister Anthony Pareira’s case, the earlier two judgments of this Court reported in (1976) 1 SCC 889 State of Gujarat Vs. Haiderali Kalubhai, and 2008 (1) SCC 791 Naresh Giri Vs. State of M.P., both rendered by bench of two learned Judges of this Court, were neither cited nor have been referred to. Thus, the ratio decidendi of these cases has not at all been considered in Alister’s case.
35. In the former case, it has been held in paras 4 and 5 as under: “4. Section 304-A carves out a specific offence where death is caused by doing a rash or negligent act and that act does not amount to culpable homicide under Section 299 IPC or murder under Section 300 IPC. If a person wilfully drives a motor vehicle into the midst of a crowd and thereby causes death to some persons, it will not be a case of mere rash and negligent driving and the act will amount to culpable homicide. Each case will, therefore, depend upon the particular facts established against the accused.
5. The prosecution in this case wanted to establish a motive for committing the offence against the sarpanch. It was sought to be established that there was enmity between the sarpanch and the accused and his relations on account of panchayat elections. Some evidence was led in order to prove that the accused and his relations were gunning against the sarpanch for some time after the latter's election as sarpanch. Even an anonymous letter was received by the sarpanch threatening his life which was handed over to the police by the sarpanch. Both the Sessions Judge as well as the High Court did not accept the evidence appertaining to motive. Mr. Mukherjee, therefore, rightly and very fairly did not address us with regard to that part of the case. Even so, the learned Counsel submits that the act per se and the manner in which the vehicle was driven clearly brought the case under Section 304 Part II IPC.”
It is further held in the same judgment at para 10 as under :
“10. Section 304-A, by its own definition totally excludes the ingredients of Section 299 or Section 300, I.P.C. Doing an act with the intent to kill a person or knowledge that doing of an act was likely to cause a person's death are ingredients of the offence of culpable homicide. When intent or knowledge as described above is the direct motivating force of the act complained of, Section 304 A has to make room for the graver and more serious charge of culpable homicide.”
It is interesting to note that this judgment had been a sheet anchor of arguments of both the learned senior counsel appearing for parties. They have read it differently and have tried to put different interpretations to the same.
In the latter case of Naresh Giri it has been held in the Head note as under:
“Section 304 A IPC applies to cases where there is no intention to cause death and no knowledge that the act done in all probability will cause death. The provision is directed at offences outside the range of Sections 299 and 300 IPC. Section 304 A applies only to such acts which are rash and negligent and are directly the cause of death of another person. Negligence and rashness are essential elements under Section 304-A.
Section 304 A carves out a specific offence where death is caused by doing a rash or negligent act and that act does not amount to culpable homicide under Section 299 or murder under Section 300. If a person willfully drives a motor vehicle into the midst of a crowd and thereby causes death to some person, it will not be a case of mere rash and negligent driving and the act will amount to culpable homicide. Doing an act with the intent to kill a person or knowledge that doing an act was likely to cause a person’s death is culpable homicide. When intent or knowledge is the direct motivating force of the act, Section 304 A has to make room for the graver and more serious charge of culpable homicide.”
We may profitably deal with definition of ‘Reckless’ as defined in Lexicon, which reads as under:-
“Characterized by the creation of a substantial and unjustifiable risk of harm to others and by a conscious (and sometimes deliberate) disregard for or indifference to that risk; heedless; rash. Reckless conduct is much more than mere negligence: it is a gross deviation from what a reasonable person would do. (Black, 7th Edn. 1999)
Intention cannot exist without foresight, but foresight can exist without intention. For a man may foresee the possible or even probable consequences of his conduct and yet not desire them to occur; none the less if he persists on his course he knowingly runs the risk of bringing about the unwished result. To describe this state of mind the word “reckless” is the most appropriate.”
36. For our own benefit it is appropriate to reproduce Section 304 of the IPC, which reads thus:
“304. Punishment for culpable homicide not amounting to murder –
Whoever commits culpable homicide not amounting to murder shall be punished with imprisonment for life, or imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine, if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death, or of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, or with fine, or with both, if the act is done with the knowledge that it is likely to cause death, but without any intention to cause death, or to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death.”
37. Critical and microscopic analysis thereof shows that once knowledge that it is likely to cause death is established but without any intention to cause death, then jail sentence may be for a term which may extend to 10 years or with fine or with both.
38. Now, we have to consider if it is a fit case where conviction should be altered to Section 304 Part II of IPC and sentence awarded should be enhanced.
39. We are of the considered view that looking to the nature and manner in which accident had taken place, it can safely be held that he had no intention to cause death but certainly had the knowledge that his act may result in death.
40. Thus, looking to the matter from all angles, we have no doubt in our mind that knowledge can still be attributed to accused Sanjeev that his act might cause such bodily injuries which may, in ordinary course of nature, be sufficient to cause death but certainly he did not have any intention to cause death. He was not driving the vehicle with that intention. There is nothing to prove that he knew that a group of persons was standing on the road he was going to pass through. If that be so, there cannot be an intention to cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. Thus, in our opinion, he had committed an offence under Section 304 Part II IPC. We accordingly hold so.
41. Now the greater question that arises for consideration is if sentence deserves to be suitably enhanced or the same can be maintained as awarded by the High Court, the period which the Respondent has already undergone.
42. To do complete justice between the parties we have to weigh aggravating and mitigating circumstances to find out on which side justice tilts more.
43. In fact, the aggravating and mitigating circumstances have been mentioned in detail in the preceding paras. We have given our serious thought to the whole matter and are of the considered opinion that mitigating circumstances as mentioned in para 26 hereinabove are heavier than the aggravating circumstances. The balance of justice tilts more in favour of the accused.
44. In the case in hand, no useful purpose is going to be served by sending the respondent accused Sanjeev Nanda to jail once again. Even though in the facts and circumstances of the case, jail sentence awarded to him may not be just and appropriate but as mentioned hereinabove, the mitigating circumstances tilt heavily in favour of the accused.
45. In the light of the aforesaid discussion, the appeal is partly allowed. The judgment and order of conviction passed by Delhi High Court is partly set aside and the order of conviction of Trial Court is restored and upheld. Accused is held guilty under Section 304 Part II of the IPC. Looking to the facts and circumstances of the same, we deem it appropriate to maintain the sentence awarded by the High Court, which he has already undergone. However, we make it clear that this has been held so, looking to very peculiar facts and features of this particular case and it may not be treated as a precedent of general proposition of law on the point, for other cases.
46. Appeal stands allowed to the aforesaid extent. Accused has already undergone the sentence awarded to him by the High Court. Thus, he need not undergo any further sentence.
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