According to Section 9(A), if an objection is raised to the jurisdiction of the Court at the hearing of an application for grant of, or for vacating, interim relief, the Court should determine that issue in the first instance as a preliminary issue before granting or setting aside the relief already granted. An application raising objection to the jurisdiction to the court is directed to be heard with all expedition. Sub-rule (2), however, says that the command in sub- rule(1) does not preclude the Court from granting such interim relief as it may consider 18
necessary pending the decision on the question of jurisdiction. In our opinion, the provision merely states the obvious. It makes explicit what is implicit in law. Just because an objection to the jurisdiction is raised, the Court does not become helpless forthwith - not does it become incompetent to grant the interim relief. It can. AT the same time, it should also decide the objection to jurisdiction at the earlier possible moment. This is the general principle and this is what Section 9A reiterates.
Bombay High Court
Both Bombay, Indian Inhabitant, ... vs All Indian Inhabitants, Residing ... on 17 November, 2009
Bench: P. B. Majmudar, R. C. Chavan
Ghanshyam Jamnomal Shewakramani,
V/s.
Lachmandas Tulsiram Nayar (HUF),
CORAM : P.B.MAJMUDAR &
R.C.CHAVAN, JJ.
DATE : NOVEMBER 17, 2009
ORAL JUDGMENT : ( PER P.B.MAJMUDAR, J. )
1. This is a thoroughly misconceived appeal filed by the
appellants who have been subsequently added as defendant Nos.4 and 5 in
Suit No.5866 of 1999. The respondent No.1 is the owner of a building
known as "Shiv Sadan", situated at 'C' Road, Netaji Subhaschandra Road,
Marine Drive, Mumbai - 400 020. The aforesaid respondent No.1/original
plaintiff has filed the said suit bearing No.5866 of 1999 originally against
Tilak Raj Bedi and his son Surjiv as original defendant Nos.1 & 2 on the 3
ground that the said defendants were the trespassers, having no right to
retain the possession of the suit premises. While Tilak Raj died on
10-09-2007 and Surjiv died on 16-07-2006, Mahendra, Mausaben and
Tapan Zaveri were initially arrayed as defendant No.3 to 5, as the plaintiffs
apprehended that they may be inducted in the suit premises by defendant
Nos.1 and 2. They had been subsequently deleted from array of
defendants. It is the case of the plaintiff that one Lachhmandas, father of
Ramgopal and Ors., left behind his widow namely Pushpavati through his
second marriage. The said Pushpavati had her permanent residence at
2/3 Model Town, Delhi, where she was normally residing. But she used
to pay visits to Mumbai also and the plaintiff actually allowed her to stay
at Mumbai whenever she visits Mumbai as a matter of courtesy without
charging any rent or licence fee or compensation in the suit flat. It is the
case of the plaintiff that the said Pushpavati had no other right except that
she was allowed to stay as and when she visits Mumbai. It is not in
dispute that there was no issue from the wedlock of Lachhmandas with
Pushpavati. The said Pushpavati died on 14-10-1987. According to the
plaintiff, in view of the death of Pushpavati, the right given to her to stay
during her visits at Mumbai, came to an end. It is the case of the plaintiff
that Pushpavati was not co-parcenor of the said HUF and she was only
having limited right to say during her visits at Mumbai. 4
2. It is the case of the plaintiff that after the death of
Pushpavati, the original defendant No.1 Tilak Raj, started visiting the said
premises at Mumbai, though his permanent address is Model Town, Delhi.
It is the case of the plaintiff that defendant No.1 had no right to occupy
the premises in any manner. It is the case of the plaintiff that the
defendant No.1 was a nephew of Pushpavati, being her sister's son. It is
the case of the plaintiff that in the year 1992, the original defendant No.1
inducted original defendant No.2 without the consent of the plaintiff. It is
the case of the plaintiff that original defendant No.2 is merely a trespasser
in the suit premises and neither defendant Nos1. & 2 have any right, title
and interest in the suit premises.
3. It seems that the plaintiff apprehended that the defendant
Nos.1 & 2 wanted to transfer the property to original defendant Nos.3, 4 &
5 ( i.e. Zaveri's) without consent of the plaintiff. On these and such other
averments, plaintiff therefore, filed a suit with a prayer that decree for
possession may be passed against the defendants, treating them as
trespassers. Plaintiff also preferred a Notice of Motion for interim
injunction and the learned Single Judge by his order dated 11-12-2000,
granted injunction by passing following order : -
"1. In the suit of the plaintiffs the reliefs prayed for amongst other is for eviction of the defendants from the suit premises on the ground that the 5
defendants have no right, title and interest in the suit property. Plaintiffs have also taken out motion contending that they apprehend on account of the incidents that have taken place the defendants may induct third parties into the suit premises.
2. On behalf of the defendants the defendant No.2 has filed an affidavit. It is contended that they are in lawful possession and entitled to continue to remain so. The incident which purportedly occurred on 3rd December and 5th December, 2000 have been denied. It is therefore, submitted that the relief as prayed for should be rejected.
3. Prima facie, the plaintiffs on the avermens in the plaint have been able to show that they have
an interest in the property. No doubt there is a dispute as to whether the defendants in fact are
seeking to create third party rights. Once the plaintiffs have come to the court apprehending that the defendants may create third party rights, the status quo as prevailing on the date of the suit will have to be maintained. Considering that the plaintiffs are entitled to protect the property. Hence, motion made absolute in terms of prayer
clause (b). There shall be no order as to costs. Both parties to act on an ordinary copy of this order duly authenticated by the Associate of this Court. P .A. to give ordinary copy of this order to the parties.
4. During the pendency of the suit, since the original
defendant Nos.1 and 2 died, the plaintiff took out a Chamber Summons
No.801 of 2008 for bringing heirs of original defendant Nos.1 and 2 on
record. The learned Single Judge permitted respondent Nos.1 to 3 as
heirs of defendant Nos.1 and 2 to be brought on record and added as 6
defendant Nos.1 to 3. Cause title of the plaint was ordered to be amended
accordingly.
5. It is the case of the plaintiff that the original defendant No.
2 Surjiv, tried to induct some other persons in breach of the injunction
order granted by this Court. This fact came to their knowledge only after
the defendant No.2 died. The learned Single Judge while disposing of the
Chamber Summons on 11-12-2008, permitted the plaintiff to take out
notice of motion for further reliefs if so required. The appellants who have
been subsequently arrayed as defendant Nos.4 and 5 claimed that original
defendant No.2, Surjiv Bedi, claiming to be tenant of the premises
transferred his tenancy rights to them by a document dated 27-04-2006
for a sum of Rs.1.75 crores.
6. Subsequently, plaintiff took out Notice of Motion No.15 of
2009 on the ground that in spite of the order of injunction, the original
defendant No.2 has transfered the suit property in favour of defendant
Nos.4 & 5. It is the case of the plaintiff that the suit is filed against the
original defendants on the basis of trespass and even though, a specific
injunction order is passed by this Court on 11-12-2000, restraining the
defendants from parting with the possession of the suit premises, the
original defendant No.2 Surjiv, has created third party rights and
inducted defendant Nos.4 and 5 in the portion of the suit premises 7
admeasuring 1500 sq.ft., in violation of the injunction order granted by
this Court. The present defendant Nos.1 to 3 continue to occupy
remaining portion of the suit premises of about 1000 sq.ft. There is also
an order of injunction restraining defendant Nos.1 to 3 from creating any
third party interest in connection with the suit property.
7. The plaintiff while taking out Notice of Motion No.15 of
2009 also prayed that Court Receiver may be appointed in respect of
entire suit flat. It is the case of the plaintiff that since original defendant
Nos.1 and 2 were trespassers, on that basis, the heirs of defendants who
have been brought on record subsequently as defendant Nos.1 to 3,
should also be treated as trespassers and decree should be passed against
them. Interim injunction was pressed into service which is granted by the
learned Single Judge of this Court.
8. At the time of deciding the notice of motion, no reply was
filed by the defendant Nos.1 to 3. However, defendant Nos.4 and 5 who
have been inducted subsequently, in breach of the injunction, filed their
reply resisting the said prayer on the ground that no case is made out for
appointment of the Court Receiver. It is the case of the defendant Nos.4
and 5 that original defendant Nos.1 and 2 were occupying the premises as
licencees and therefore, the suit is not maintainable on the Original Side of
this Court in view of Section 41 of The Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 8
1882, as the suit is required to be filed with the Small Causes Court, at
Mumbai and therefore, the order of injunction granted by this Court is
without jurisdiction.
9. The learned Single Judge found that the defendant Nos.4
and 5 have been inducted in the suit premises in breach of the order of
injunction of this Court and accordingly, they have no right to use the suit
flat at all. The learned Single Judge further directed that the Court
Receiver shall take possession of the suit premises occupied by the
aforesaid defendant Nos.4 and 5. The remaining portion was allowed to
continue with the defendant Nos.1 to 3, though the Court Receiver was
appointed even for this portion. The learned Single Judge also directed
that defendant Nos.1 to 3 shall not create any further rights or induct any
person in the suit premises. It is the aforesaid order of the learned Single
Judge which is challenged by way of this appeal by the original defendant
Nos.4 and 5, who have been inducted in the suit premises.
10. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellants and
the respondent No.1 at considerable length, learned counsel for other
respondents had nothing to add. We have gone through the record and
proceedings of this case.
11. Mr.Sakhare, the learned counsel for the appellants/original
defendant Nos.4 and 5, vehemently submitted that looking to the plaint, it 9
is clear that the original defendant Nos.1 and 2 were occupying the
premises as licencees and therefore, in view of the provisions of Section
41 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882, it is the Small Causes
Court, which has jurisdiction to try the proceedings against the licencees
and the suit filed on the Original Side of this Court is not maintainable. It
is submitted on behalf of the appellants that as per mandate of Section
9(A) of the Code of Civil Procedure, which is applicable to State of
Maharashtra, before deciding the notice of motion in question, the learned
Single Judge should have decided the issue about the jurisdiction as a
preliminary issue and therefore, the learned Single Judge gravely erred in
deciding the notice of motion without deciding the preliminary issue about
the jurisdiction. It is submitted by Mr.Sakhare that defendant Nos.1 to 3
being the licencees, no decree for eviction could be passed in a regular
suit, as these proceedings are required to be decided under Section 41 of
the Act. The learned counsel for the appellants further submitted that
while deciding the question of jurisdiction, the Court is also required to
consider the averments made in the written statement and averments
made in the plaint alone, cannot be decisive of the matter. It is contended
by the learned counsel for the appellants that defendant Nos.4 and 5 were
not aware about the injunction order passed by this Court when they
entered into the transaction with defendant Nos.1 to 3 and in view of the 10
same, defendant Nos.4 and 5 may be allowed to reside in the suit premises
as an agent of the Court receiver, as they invested large amount. It is
further submitted that if they are evicted from the suit premises, they will
be put to great hardship. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the
appellants that though it is true that original defendant Nos.1 and 2 ( or
even their heirs present defendant Nos.1 to 3) have not filed any written
statement, but since the present appellants i.e. original defendant Nos.4
and 5 are occupying the premises, they have right to raise all the points
including the point of jurisdiction. Since the mandatory provisions of
Section 9(A) have not been followed by the learned Single Judge before
disposing of the notice of motion, the order below notice of motion may be
set aside and the matter may be remanded to the learned Single Judge
with a direction to decide the question of jurisdiction and then decide the
notice of motion. In order to substantiate his case, the learned counsel for
the appellants has relied upon certain judgments, to which reference will
be made later on.
12. Mr.D'vitre, the learned Counsel for respondent No.1, on the
other hand, submitted that as per averments in the plaint, the original
defendant No.1 Tilak Raj Bedi had absolutely no right title and interest in
the suit property and the suit is filed as simplicitor suit treating him as
trespasser. He further submitted that Pushpavati was allowed to occupy 11
the premises at Mumbai, even though she was residing at Delhi and
because of sympathy towards her, she was permitted to reside at the suit
premises during her visits to Mumbai. The learned counsel for the
respondent No.1 further submitted that after the death of Pushpavati,
original defendant Nos.1 and 2 were using the suit premises, for which
they had no right and in view of the same, suit is filed against them as
trespassers to vacate the premises as they were occupying the premises
intermittently, without there being any legal right. It is submitted by the
learned counsel for the respondent that even from Pushpavati, no amount
was charged in any manner and she was allowed to occupy the premises
only by way of grace. It is submitted by Mr.Devitre that Pushpavati was
never a member of HUF and even otherwise, so far as original defendant
Nos.1 and 2 i.e. Tilak Raj Bedi and Surjiv Tilaj Raj Bedi, they had
absolutely no right, title and interest in any manner in the suit premises
and they were distant relatives of Pushpavati, as according to him, original
defendant No.2 was a nephew of Pushpavati.
13. The learned counsel for the respondent further contended
that after the death of original defendant No.1 and 2, their heirs have no
title over the suit property, but since, they were inducted in the suit
premises, they were joined as heirs of original defendant No.2, who
expired on 16-07-2006. Present defendant No.1 is the widow of original 12
defendant No.2 Surjiv Bedi and present defendant Nos.2 & 3 are brought
on record now as the daughter and son of original defendant No.2 and
that is how they are brought on record.
14. It is submitted on behalf of the learned counsel for the
respondent that in view of the injunction granted by this Court, it was not
open for original defendant No.2 to part with the possession of the suit
property in any manner in favour of present defendant Nos.4 and 5. It is
submitted by him that even in the past, the plaintiff was apprehending
that the original defendant Nos.1 and 2 may part with the possession and
that is why defendant Nos.3 to 5 (Zaveri's) were joined in the suit. But,
subsequently, it was found that they have no concern with the suit
premises, they were deleted from the proceedings. Mr.Devitre further
submitted that provisions of Section 9(A) are not at all applicable in the
present proceedings. According to him, the original defendant Nos.1 and 2
have not filed any written statement contesting the suit. The defendant
Nos.4 and 5, who have entered into the transaction in spite of the
injunction order, cannot claim any better title in the property than original
defendant No.2 Surjiv, through whom they have derived their rights on the
basis of an agreement. It is contended by the learned counsel for the
respondent that in a given case, the Court could decide the question of
interim relief, even though the point of jurisdiction is raised and thereafter, 13
may proceed to decide the question of jurisdiction at the earliest, and not
to wait for deciding the issue along with the suit.
15. It is submitted on behalf of the respondent that defendant
Nos.4 and 5 having entered into the premises in breach of injunction, they
cannot be permitted to say that the defendant Nos.1 and 2 were the
licencees and not trespassers. It is submitted that even if for the sake of
argument, the order of injunction could be said to be without jurisdiction,
then also, proceedings for breach of injunction are maintainable and it is
not open for any party to flout the order. Considering the aforesaid
aspect, no sympathy should be shown in favour of the appellants who have
come in the possession by way of violation of injunction order. It is
vehemently submitted on behalf of the respondent that defendant Nos.4
and 5 are having another house and at present they are staying at Sett
Minar Apartment, Peddar Road, Mumbai, which is clear from the affidavit
at Page 36. It is submitted by him that the defendant Nos.4 and 5 are
holding up the premises only with a view to defeat the claim of the
original plaintiff. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the respondent
that the learned Single Judge is perfectly justified in passing the impugned
order. He further submitted that the defendant Nos.4 and 5 cannot be
allowed to occupy the suit flat even as an agent of the Court Receiver, as
they have entered into the premises in breach of the injunction order and 14
they are not required to be protected in any manner. It is further
submitted that such transaction, which is in violation, should be treated as
null and void, as if the same is not in existence at all, and the position
prevailing prior to entering into such transaction may be maintained. The
learned counsel for the respondent submitted that if the appellants are
allowed to occupy the suit premises, it will be giving a premium to a
person who has taken advantage of the situation by flouting the orders of
the Court. It is lastly submitted that the points raised in the appeal were
never pressed into service before the learned Single Judge and in fact, no
submissions were made in the manner they are now made before the
learned Single Judge and therefore, those points should not be allowed to
be agitated in this appeal. Considering the aforesaid arguments, it is
submitted by the learned counsel for the respondent that the appeal may
be dismissed with costs.
16. It is required to be noted that earlier the Division Bench of
this Court by an order dated 05-08-2009, directed the appellants to
deposit Rs.50,000/- per month with effect from 27th April, 2006. The
Division Bench further directed that the appeal may be decided finally at
the admission stage itself. The learned counsel for the appellants states
that in view order dated 05-08-2009, the appellants have deposited Rs.
50,000/- with effect from 27th April, 2006 and that amount has been 15
deposited every month till date.
17. The principal question which requires consideration by this
Court is as to whether the order passed by the learned Single Judge is
unsustainable on the ground that the defendant Nos.4 and 5 have raised
the point of jurisdiction to the effect that the suit is not maintainable
before this Court and the same is barred under Section 41 of the
Presidency Small Cause Courts Act. It is true that this point has not been
raised before the learned Single Judge. But, since it is a jurisdictional
point, we have examined the said question in the present appeal. At this
stage, reference is required to be made to the provisions of Section 9(a) of
the Code of Civil Procedure, which reads as under : -
9(A) : Where at the hearing of application relating to interim relief in a suit, objection to jurisdiction is taken, such issue to be decided by the Court as a preliminary issue. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Code or any other law for the time being in force, if, at the hearing of any application for granting or setting aside an order granting any interim relief, whether by way of stay, injunction, appointment of a receiver or otherwise, made in any suit, an objection to the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain such a suit is taken by any of the parties to the suit, the Court shall proceed to determine at the hearing of such application the issue as to the jurisdiction as a preliminary issue before granting or setting aside the order granting the interim relief. Any such application shall be heard and disposed of by the Court as expeditiously as possible and shall not in any case be adjourned to the hearing of the suit. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub- 16
section (1), at the hearing of any such application, the Court may grant such interim relief as it may consider necessary pending determination by it of the preliminary issue as to the jurisdiction.
18. The provisions of Section 9(A) of CPC, as also the
enforceability of injunction orders issued by a Court which was
subsequently found to be without jurisdiction, has been considered by the
Supreme Court in the case of Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla and Anr., V/s.
Hind Rubber Industries Pvt. Ltd., etc., AIR 1997 SC 1240. While
considering the scheme of Section 9(A), the Supreme Court has observed
in Para No.14, 16 and 21, thus :
14.The first and foremost question in this appeal is whether the High Court was right in holding
that since it has been found ultimately that the
Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit, the interim orders made therein are non est and hence defendants 1 and 2 cannot be punished for their violation even if they had flouted and disobeyed the said interim orders when they were in force. We are of the considered opinion that the High Court was not
right in saying so. The landlord-plaintiff came forward with the suit alleging that by virtue of the fire resulting in the destruction of the suit house, the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties has come to an end and, therefore, he requested the Court to injunct the
defendants from carrying on any construction on
the suit premises without their permission and without obtaining the sanction from Municipal Corporation. The defendants questioned the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain the 17
suit. According to them, the building was not totally destroyed and that, in any event, the relationship of landlord and tenant has not come
to an end on that account. The defendants plea
was rejected by the Civil Court. It held that it did have the jurisdiction to try the said suit. On appeal, however, the High Court disagreeing with
the decision of another High Court, held that relationship of landlord and tenant has not come
to an end for the reason suggested by the plaintiff and that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit in view of Section 28 of the Bombay Rent Act. All this took about six years i.e. from 1991 to 1996. It is not suggested nor can it be suggested that the suit was filed by the plaintiff in the City Civil Court only with a view to avoid the Rent Control Court nor can it be suggested that they approached the Civil Court knowing full well that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to try that suit. It is evident that they approached the Civil Court bona fide, thinking that it had jurisdiction to try their suit. They were confirmed in their view by the Civil Court.
It is true that ultimately the High Court found against them but even then, must be noticed, they did so disagreeing with a decision of the Kerala
High Court. It therefore, cannot be said that the plaintiffs did not approach the Civil Court bona
fide.
16. According to Section 9(A), if an objection is raised to the jurisdiction of the Court at the hearing of an application for grant of, or for vacating, interim relief, the Court should determine that issue in the first instance as a preliminary issue before granting or setting aside the relief already granted. An application raising objection to the jurisdiction to the court is directed to be heard with all expedition. Sub-rule (2), however, says that the command in sub- rule(1) does not preclude the Court from granting such interim relief as it may consider 18
necessary pending the decision on the question of jurisdiction. In our opinion, the provision merely states the obvious. It makes explicit what is implicit in law. Just because an objection to the jurisdiction is raised, the Court does not become helpless forthwith - not does it become incompetent to grant the interim relief. It can. AT the same time, it should also decide the objection to jurisdiction at the earlier possible moment. This is the general principle and this is what Section 9A reiterates. Take this very case. The plaintiff asked for temporary injunction. An ad interim injunction was granted. Then the defendants came forward objecting to the grant
of injunction and also raising an objection to the jurisdiction of the Court. The Court overruled the objection as to jurisdiction and made the interim injunction absolute. The defendants filed an appeal against the decision on the question of jurisdiction. While that appeal was pending, several other interim orders were passed both by
the Civil Court as well as by the High Court. Ultimately, no doubt, High Court has found that
the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit but all this tool about six years. Can it be said that orders passed by the Civil Court and the High Court during this period of six years were all no est and it is open to the defendants to flout
them merrily, without fear of any consequence. Admittedly, this could not be done until the High Court's decision on the question of jurisdiction. The question is whether the said decision of the
High Court means that no person can be punished for flouting or disobeying the interim/interlocutory orders while they were in force, i.e. for violations and disobedience committed prior to the decision of the High Court on the question of jurisdiction. Holding that by virtue of the said decision of the High Court (on the question of jurisdiction), no one can be punished thereafter for disobedience or violation 19
of the interim orders committed prior to the said decision of the High Court, would indeed be subversive of rule of law and would seriously erode the dignity and the authority of the Courts. We must repeat this is not even a case where a
suit was filed in wrong court knowingly or only
with a view to snatch an interim order. As pointed out hereinabove, the suit was file din the Civil Court bona fide. We are of the opinion that in such a case the defendants cannot escape the
consequences of their disobedience and violation
of the interim injunction committed by them prior to the High Court's decision on the question of jurisdiction.
21. In Nalla Senapati Sarkarai Mandariar
Pallayakottai V . Shri Ambal Mills, AIR 1966 Mad 53, similar view has been expressed - without of
course deciding the question finally. Quoting Oswald on Contempt (1910) Edn.at 106), the Court observed "an order irregularly obtained cannot be treated as a nullity, but must be implicitly obeyed, until by a proper application, it is discharged".
(emphasis supplied)
19. The Supreme Court thus clearly laid down the proposition
of law that even when objection to jurisdiction is raised, the court is not
powerless and court can decide the interim relief application and
thereafter, may decide the question of jurisdiction later without deferring
it upto the trial of the suit. A Division Bench of this Court has considered
this question as well as the judgment of the Supreme Court in Tayabbhai
(supra), in the case of Royal Palms (India) Pvt. Ltd. And Ors., V/s.
Bharat Shantilal Shah & Ors., 2009(2) Bom.C.R.622, wherein it was 20
held that as per the mandate of Section 9(A) of C.P.C., the court has to
decide the question of jurisdiction before deciding the interim application.
The Division Bench accordingly sent back the matter to decide the
question of jurisdiction first before disposing of the prayer for interim
injunction. Various other Division Bench judgments have been cited before
us in connection with the interpretation of Section 9(A) of C.P.C. However,
in our view, at this stage, it is not necessary to refer all these judgments in
the present appeal.
20. The question whether the learned Single Judge could have
granted only ad-interim relief, but could not have disposed of the motion
by granting interim relief, is only of academic importance as rightly
submitted by the learned Advocate for the respondents. The real question
is whether a Court is powerless to grant interim relief in view of provision
of Section 9(A) of the C.P.C., when an objection to jurisdiction is raised, till
such objection is decided. And, in Tayabbhai (supra), the Supreme Court
has categorically held that the Court can grant interim relief whether such
injunction is described as interim or ad-interim injunction or whether a
matter is kept pending or it is disposed of, is unlikely to have any bearing
on the consequences flowing from decision on jurisdictional issue. If the
Court is held to lack the jurisdiction, the injunction - whether ad-interim
or interim, would stand vacated. It is not that prayer for interim 21
injunction can never be touched till the jurisdiction is decided.
21. It is however, not necessary to go into these questions as it
is required to be noted that the original defendant Nos.1 and 2, against
whom the suit was filed treating them as trespassers, had not filed any
written statement challenging the claim of the plaintiff. Even
subsequently, when their heirs are brought on record i.e. defendant No.1
to 3 herein, they have not challenged the averments made in the plaint
and as on today, no written statement is filed. Subsequently, in view of
breach of injunction alleged by the plaintiff, a Notice of Motion was taken
out wherein the impugned order has been passed by the learned Single
Judge. So far as the defendant Nos.4 and 5 are concerned, it is irrefutable
that they entered into transaction in violation of the injunction order and
the said fact has not been disputed by the learned counsel for the
appellants. It is not disputed by Mr.Sakhare that once it is found that the
possession of the suit premises has been obtained in violation of injunction
order of this Court, it is the bounden duty of the Court to take remedial
measures in this behalf, as the majesty of law is required to be upheld. In
the case of Surjit Singh and Ors. V/s. Harbans Singh and Ors., AIR
1996 SC 135, the Supreme Court has considered the effect of a restraint
order. The observations of the Supreme Court in this behalf, reads as
under : -
22
"4. As said before, the assignment is by means of a registered deed. The assignment had taken place after the passing of the preliminary decree in which Pritam Singh has been allotted 1/3rd share. His right to property to that extent stood established. A decree relating to immovable property worth more than hundred rupee, if being assigned, was required to be registered. That has instantly been done. It is per se property for it relates to the immovable property involved in the suit. It clearly and squarely fell within the ambit of the restraint order. In sum, it did not make any appreciable difference whether
property per se had been alienated or a decree pertaining to that property. In defiance of the restraint order, the alientation/assignment was made. If we were to let it go as such, it would defeat the ends of justice and the prevalent public policy. When the Court intends a particular state of affair to exist while it is in seisin of a lis, that state of affairs is not only required to be maintained, but it is presumed to exist till the Court orders otherwise. The Court, in these circumstances has the duty, as also the right, to treat the alienation/assignment as having not taken place at all for its purposes. Once that is so, Pritam Singh and his assignees, respondents
herein, cannot claim to be impleaded as parties
on the basis of assignment. Therefore, the assignees-respondents could not have been impleaded by the trial Court as parties to the suit, in disobedience of its orders. The principles of lis pendens are altogether on a different footing. We do not propose to examine their involvement presently. All what is emphasised is that the assignees in the present facts and circumstances
had no cause to be impleaded as parties to the
suit. On that basis, there was no cause for going into the question of interpretation of paragraphs 13 and 14 of the settlement deed. The path treaded by the Courts below was, in our view, out 23
of their bounds. Unhesitatingly, we upset all the three orders of the Courts below and reject the
application of the assignees for impleadment under Order 22 Rule 10 CPC".
22. In our view, the defendant Nos.4 and 5, who have been
inducted into the premises by having entered into the transaction
subsequently, cannot be permitted to say that before passing the impugned
order, the learned Single Judge should have decided the question of
jurisdiction and thereafter, notice of motion should have been disposed of,
as it is not in dispute that in violation of injunction order they have now
been brought on property and as the present defendant Nos.1 to 3 have
not taken any plea that there was no breach of injunction on the part of
their predecessor, original defendant No.2 Surjiv Kumar. If that be so, the
point raised by the present appellants is not required to be examined at
their instance, as whatever rights they are claiming, are only through
original defendant Nos.1 and 2 and when the original defendant Nos.1
and 2 have not contested the suit by filing written statement, it is not open
for the present appellants to raise this point in the appeal.
23. At this stage, it is pertinent to note that an agreement of
transfer of tenancy/occupancy right is executed in favour of defendant
Nos.4 and 5 by the original defendant No.2. As per the said agreement, the
original defendant No.2 is shown as a tenant/occupier of the suit premises 24
and that the said rights are transferred in favour of defendant Nos.4 and 5.
The said agreement was executed on 27-04-2006 and the plaintiff came to
know about the fact only in the year 2008, when the question of bringing
heirs on record came for up consideration. Immediately thereafter, they
have filed notice of motion praying that since defendant Nos.4 and 5 have
obtained such rights in violation of injunction order, Court Receiver should
be appointed. It is the case of the plaintiff that even in the past, there was
such apprehension and therefore, restraint order was passed. In spite of
the said fact, the original defendant No.2 entered into such transaction. It
is interesting to note that in the said agreement, the status of original
defendant No.2 is described as a tenant. There is nothing on record to
suggest that original defendants have ever occupied the premises as
tenant. Not only no such plea is raised by the original defendant No.2, as
the suit was originally filed against him and original defendant No.1 and
the suit is filed against him treating him as trespasser and the averments in
the plaint has not been denied by filing by written statement. It is
surprising to note that when the status of defendant No.2 was of
trespasser, he could not have executed any agreement in favour of
defendant Nos.4 and 5. Even if we accept the submission of Mr.Sakhare to
the effect that the defendant Nos.4 and 5 may not be aware about the
injunction order, it is required to be noted that the defendant Nos.4 and 5 25
are not laymen. The Court is informed that they are having lucrative hotel
business and in fact, they must have done this at their own risk,
presumably after making enquires. Tendency of the people to purchase
the property in violation of the injunction order is increasing day by day
and when a person is investing huge amount, it was expected of them to
know the title of a person through whom they are getting the tenancy
rights. If the original defendant No.2 had no tenancy right, he could not
have transferred such right in favour of defendant Nos.4 and 5. They
have taken such risks and they must therefore, be ready to face the
consequences in this behalf. When this fact came to the knowledge of the
plaintiff, they have moved the notice of motion. It has to be reiterated that
even though, the order of injunction, in a given case, may be without
jurisdiction, unless that order is set aside, the party cannot flout the
injunction order. Here it is not that the order of injunction granted by the
learned Single Judge is without jurisdiction. No question of of jurisdiction
was raised by the original defendant Nos.1 and 2 questioning their
description as trespassers in the plaint or claiming to be gratuitous
licencees (or tenants, as the defendants Nos.4 & 5 would submit).
24. Considering the aforesaid aspects, we are of the opinion
that at the instance of the defendant Nos.4 and 5, it is not possible to set
aside the order and ask the learned Single Judge to decide the question of 26
jurisdiction first and to determine whether original defendant Nos.1 and 2
are trespassers or not, especially when they have not raised this point. If
any transaction was entered into in breach of the injunction order, in view
of the decisions of the Supreme Court quoted above, the said transaction is
required to be ignored in toto, as if it is no transaction worth the name.
So far as assigning rights are concerned, it is discussed by us earlier and in
our view, the defendant Nos.4 and 5 merely had taken a chance by
entering into such transaction. It is not possible for us to believe that
without verification of the title of the suit property, they entered into such
transaction. It is required to be noted that the learned Single Judge has
allowed retention of the remaining portion by defendant Nos.1 to 3 by
asking them to act as an agent of the Court Receiver. This is not a case in
which any premium can be given to defendant Nos.4 and 5 by allowing
them to retain possession even for a day as they have obtained the
possession by flouting the order of injunction. The prayer of Mr.Sakhare
that they may be allowed to reside as an agent of the Court Receiver,
would amount to adding insult to injury.
25. It is the duty of the Court to see that the things are put into
proper order in case the breach of the injunction order is brought to the
notice of the Court. Considering the aforesaid aspect & in the facts and
circumstances of the case, we do not find any justification in the argument 27
of Mr.Sakhare that since the question of jurisdiction which has been raised,
the Court was bound to decide the status of original defendant Nos.1 and
2, in view of the mandate of Section 9(A) and till then, the notice of
motion is required to be kept pending. If such course is adopted, it may
amount to encouraging the people to enter into transactions in violation of
the Court's order and to allow the matter to remain pending for a
considerable time. Even otherwise, as stated earlier, this question is not
required to be examined at the instance of the present appellants, as they
cannot get any better title than the person through whom they derive
rights in the property. None of the present defendant Nos.1 to 3 have
ever raised this point and before them their predecessors in title have also
not raised this point to the effect that they are not trespassers.
26. Considering the matter from the aforesaid angle, we are of
the opinion that the order of the learned Single Judge is not required to be
interfered with in this appeal, as the appellants have no right to take such
point which is not raised by the original defendant Nos.1 to 3 before the
learned Single Judge. The appellants having entered into the premises by
virtue of the transaction which is detrimentally carried out in violation of
the injunction of this Court, the agreement is required to be ignored totally
and things are required to be put in its proper perspective.
27. To sum up, (i) Pushpavati, through whom all the 28
defendants claim, was a mere licensee, (ii) Apart from the fact that neither
original defendant No.1 and 2, nor present defendant Nos.1 to3 have been
able to show as to how they inherit property of Pushpavati, she had a mere
license to occupy and no interest in the property which was heritable; (iii)
when original defendant No.1 and 2 were restrained by an injunction on
11-12-2000, question of jurisdiction of jurisdiction had not been raised by
any of the defendants, nor had defendant Nos.1 and 2 claimed to have
been tenants; (iv) original defendant No.2 purported to transfer his rights
as "tenant" to present defendant No.4 and 5, in spite of the injunction; (v)
Mere raising of jurisdictional plea does not disable a Court from granting
temporary injunction, in view of express provision of Section 9(A)(2), as
interpreted by Supreme Court in the case Tayabbhai (Supra); (vi) if
defendant Nos.4 & 5 succeed in their challenge to jurisdiction, the
temporary injunction would obviously be vacated. Hence, it cannot be
said that the learned Single Judge erred in granting discretionary relief, it
does not call for any interference.
28. At this stage, Mr.Sakhare submitted that the amount which
the appellants have deposited, may be allowed to be refunded to the
appellants. However, it is not in dispute that since the time of agreement,
the appellants are occupying the premises, ultimately question of mesne
profits may arise for determination of the learned Single Judge. At this 29
stage, it would not be proper to pass any order in this behalf. The amount
deposited by the appellants may be invested in a fixed deposit by the
Prothonotary and Senior Master, initially for a period of three years, which
may be renewed from time to time till the decision of the suit. Such
deposit shall abide by the final outcome of the Suit.
29. In view of what is stated above, the appeal is dismissed
with costs quantified at Rs.25,000/-. In view of the disposal of the appeal,
the notice of motion No.2360 of 2009 does not survive and the same is
disposed of accordingly.
30. At the request of the learned counsel for the appellants, the
Court Receiver is directed not to take physical possession of the suit
property for a period of five weeks from today.
( R.C.CHAVAN, J. ) ( P.B.MAJMUDAR, J.)
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