Thursday 3 January 2013

Plea that executant was illiterate should not be after thought


In judgment reported in AIR 1992 Madhya Pradesh 22 (Ramjan Khan 
& Ors. Vs. Baba Raghunath Dass & Ors), it has been held that the burden 
was on the person who was relying upon the document to prove that the 
same were read and explained to the illiterate person who is said to have 
thumb marked it. The ratio of the above-cited judgment  does not apply to 
the facts of the present case as the plea of Gurmukh Singh being an illiterate 
person is not taken in the plaint and is an after thought. It has been simply 
stated in the plaint by the appellants that the father of respondent had 
obtained signatures of Gurmukh Singh on blank papers by deceitful means. 
It has not been explained as to under what circumstances Gurmukh Singh 
was made to sign blank papers by father of the respondents. After having 
admitted the signatures of Gurmukh Singh on the agreement to sell and the 
receipts Ex. DW-1/1 to DW-1/7, appellants cannot be permitted to wriggle 
out of the same. Once the signatures of Gurmukh Singh on agreement to sell 
Ex. DW-1/1 and receipts Ex. DW-1/1 to DW-1/7 are admitted by the 
appellants, the burden of proof that these documents were blank when 
Gurmukh Singh had signed, shifts upon the appellants and they have failed 
to discharge the burden. No plausible reason is given by the respondent as to 
why husband of appellant No. 1 would sign blank documents at the instance 
of the father of the respondents who is admittedly in possession of the suit 
property since the year 1959. The agreement to sell Ex.DW-1/1 is dated 
29.09.59 and father of the respondent is in possession of the suit property 
since the year 1959 and irresistible conclusion is that he is in possession of 
the suit property in part performance of the agreement to sell and the 
evidence of part performance are the receipts Ex. DW-1/2 to DW-1/7 which 
are admittedly signed by Gurmukh Singh, husband of  appellant No. 1 and these receipts are in token of money received by Gurmukh Singh from father 
of respondents for payment of instalments to Rehabilitation Department.

IN  THE  HIGH  COURT  OF  DELHI  AT  NEW  DELHI 
SUBJET :  SUIT FOR POSSESSION 
Date of Judgment: 21.03.2011 
RSA No.21/2003 
PRITAM KAUR & ORS.    ………..Appellants 

Versus 
SHRI KRISHAN GOPAL & ANR.   ……….Respondents 


1   This appeal has impugned the judgment and decree dated 19.09.2002 
which had endorsed the findings of the trial Judge dated 14.08.1997 whereby 
the suit filed by the plaintiff i.e. legal representatives of deceased Gurmukh 
Singh seeking possession of quarter No. B-34, double storey, Motia Khan, 
Delhi had been dismissed.  
2 The case of the plaintiff is that their successor Gurmukh Singh had 
purchased quarters No. B-33 and B-34, Block B, Motia Khan, Delhi vide 
sale deed of November, 1975. Sardari Lal the father of the defendants had 
deceitfully got signatures of Gurmukh Singh appended on blank papers; 
Gurmukh Singh had always treated Sardari Lal as a tenant and in fact an 
eviction petition had also been filed against him.  No agreement dated 
22.09.1959      was ever executed between the parties; in para 10 it has been 
averred that the plaintiff is an illiterate man and he had put his signatures on 
blank papers at the instance of Sardari Lal; this document was deceitfully converted into an agreement to sell which in fact was not executed between 
the parties.  
3 The defendant in the written statement had denied this averment. It 
was pointed out that the agreement to sell had in fact been entered into 
between the parties whereby the plaintiff vide agreement to sell dated 
22.09.1959 had agreed to sell the aforenoted property to the defendant and 
the defendant is also in possession of the said property. This agreement had 
been proved on record as Ex. DW-1/1. That apart, the defendant had also 
relied upon receipts Ex.DW-1/2 to Ex. DW-1/7 i.e. receipts of intervening 
period from 22.09.1959 to 26.10.1973 which have also been executed by 
Gurmukh Singh evidencing receipts of payment from Sardari Lal. The last 
of these documents is Ex. DW-1/7 dated 26.10.1973. It is not in dispute that 
Gurmukh Singh had died in the year 1976.  
4 Trail Judge on the basis of oral and documentary  evidence had 
dismissed the suit of the plaintiff. It was held that the plaintiff is not entitled 
for possession as vide aforenoted agreement to sell Ex. PW-1/1 he had 
agreed to sell the suit property to the defendant and thereafter receipts of 
payment i.e. Ex. DW-1/2 to Ex. DW-1/7 had evidenced this fact; protection 
under Section 53 A of the Transfer of Property Act was available in favour 
of the defendant; he could not be evicted. The Trial Judge in para 21 of the 
judgment had noted the submission of the plaintiff  that the signatures of 
Gurmukh Singh were obtained on blank papers and it had returned a finding 
that the signatures of Gurmukh Singh were never disputed; the plaintiff has 
failed to prove that these signatures were obtained on blank papers. That 
apart the receipts executed by the plaintiff Ex. DW-1/2 to Ex. DW-1/7 had 
also been adverted to dismiss the claim of the plaintiff. This finding was 
returned while disposing of issues No. 5 to 7 which were disposed of by a 
common discussion.  
5 The impugned judgment had endorsed this finding.  The finding 
returned is on para 8, relevant extract which reads as under:- 
“8 I am in respectful agreement with the legal position stated in the 
above-cited judgments. I proceed to examine the evidence on record in the 
light of legal position stated in the above-referred judgments. There is no 
denial in the pleadings by the respondents that Gurmukh Singh, husband of 
appellant No. 1 became the owner of the suit premises by virtue of lease of 
conveyance in November, 1975. It was pleaded by the appellants that the 
father of the respondents had taken suit premises on rent in the year 1959 but the evidence led by the appellants is to the effect that the father of 
respondent used to teach the children of appellant  No. 1 and later-on , 
unauthorisedly occupied the suit premises and this  evidence is contrary to 
the pleadings of the appellants and thus has been rightly rejected by the 
learned trial court. It is a matter of record that  the aforesaid husband of 
appellant No. 1 during his lifetime has filed eviction petitions Ex. DW-1/8 
and DW-1/9 against the father of the respondents and the said petitions were 
dismissed. It is not in dispute that Sh. Gurmukh Singh, husband of appellant 
No. 1 had signed documents Ex. DW-1/1 to DW-1/7 but the appellants have 
tried to wriggle out of this by stating that the father of respondents had 
obtained the signatures of Gurmukh Singh on blank papers and the plea 
taken by them is that Sh. Gurmukh Singh was an illiterate person. It is not 
stated in the plaint by the appellants that Gurmukh Singh was an illiterate 
person and therefore, this plea cannot be accepted.  
9 In judgment reported in AIR 1992 Madhya Pradesh 22 (Ramjan Khan 
& Ors. Vs. Baba Raghunath Dass & Ors), it has been held that the burden 
was on the person who was relying upon the document to prove that the 
same were read and explained to the illiterate person who is said to have 
thumb marked it. The ratio of the above-cited judgment  does not apply to 
the facts of the present case as the plea of Gurmukh Singh being an illiterate 
person is not taken in the plaint and is an after thought. It has been simply 
stated in the plaint by the appellants that the father of respondent had 
obtained signatures of Gurmukh Singh on blank papers by deceitful means. 
It has not been explained as to under what circumstances Gurmukh Singh 
was made to sign blank papers by father of the respondents. After having 
admitted the signatures of Gurmukh Singh on the agreement to sell and the 
receipts Ex. DW-1/1 to DW-1/7, appellants cannot be permitted to wriggle 
out of the same. Once the signatures of Gurmukh Singh on agreement to sell 
Ex. DW-1/1 and receipts Ex. DW-1/1 to DW-1/7 are admitted by the 
appellants, the burden of proof that these documents were blank when 
Gurmukh Singh had signed, shifts upon the appellants and they have failed 
to discharge the burden. No plausible reason is given by the respondent as to 
why husband of appellant No. 1 would sign blank documents at the instance 
of the father of the respondents who is admittedly in possession of the suit 
property since the year 1959. The agreement to sell Ex.DW-1/1 is dated 
29.09.59 and father of the respondent is in possession of the suit property 
since the year 1959 and irresistible conclusion is that he is in possession of 
the suit property in part performance of the agreement to sell and the 
evidence of part performance are the receipts Ex. DW-1/2 to DW-1/7 which 
are admittedly signed by Gurmukh Singh, husband of  appellant No. 1 and these receipts are in token of money received by Gurmukh Singh from father 
of respondents for payment of instalments to Rehabilitation Department. 
10 Appellants have not even pleaded nor led any evidence to the effect 
that the alleged tenancy of Sardari Lal (father of the respondent) or of the 
respondents was oral and documentary in shape of rent receipts etc. It has 
come in the evidence of appellant No. 1 that she has been depositing yearly 
instalments of Rs.1,200/- with the Rehabilitation Department in respect of 
the suit property but no documentary proof in support of the abovesaid 
deposition has been furnished by the appellants. The agreement to sell and 
the receipts indicating part performance of the said agreement have been put 
to appellant No. 1 in her cross-examination. There is no evidence on record 
to the effect that the agreement to sell is in violation any of the covenant of 
deed of conveyance in favour of Gurmukh Singh (husband of appellant No. 
1). It has not been specifically put to the respondent in cross-examination 
that the amount mentioned in the receipts Ex. DW-1/2 to Ex DW-1/7 was 
not received by said Gurmukh Singh.  
11. From the evidence on record, it can be easily concluded that the father 
of the respondents had done part performance of agreement to sell by 
making payment to Gurmukh Singh vide receipts Ex. DW-1/2 to DW-1/7. In 
judgment reports in  AIR 2002 Supreme Court 960 (Shrimati Shamrao 
Suryavanshi & Anr. Vs. Prahlad Bhairoba Suryavanshi (dead) by L.Rs. and 
Ors.), following observations have been made:- 
‘A perusal of Section 53-A shows that it does not forbid a defendanttransferee from taking a plea in his defence to protect his possession over the 
suit property obtained in part performance of a contract even though the 
period of limitation to bring a suit for specific performance has expired. In 
absence of such a provision, Court has to interpret the provisions of Section 
53-A in a scientific manner.’ 
12 The plea of part performance is a mixed question of fact and law. In 
order to attract provisions of Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, 
the property must be owned by the plaintiff. There should be an agreement 
to sell (or otherwise to transfer) by the plaintiff in favour of the defendant 
for consideration, and , in pursuance of that agreement, the defendant should 
have been in possession of the immovable property or part thereof and the 
defendant must have done something more in furtherance of the contract and 
he himself should be ready and willing to perform his part of the contract 
from the date of the agreement. 
13. In view of the legal position as highlighted above regarding the 
interpretation of Section 53-A of Transfer of Property Act and the evidence 
on record, I hold that by admission of the appellants of signatures of Gurmukh Singh on agreement to sell Ex. DW-1/1 and receipts regarding 
payment DW-1/2 to DW-1/7, existence of these documents stands proved as 
plea of appellants of Gurmukh Singh signing blank papers is not at all 
plausible. The possession of the suit property by father of respondents and 
thereafter by the respondents stands protected as the appellants have failed to 
prove as to what more was to be done by the respondents or their father for 
performance of the agreement to sell in question. Learned trial court has 
rightly relied upon the observations made in judgment reported in 1997 RLR 
(Patel Natwarlal Vs.K.G.K.V.)  in para 26 of the impugned judgment to hold 
that the respondent is entitled to protection under Section 53-A of Transfer 
of Property Act.  
14 In view of the above discussion, it is held that the appellants are not 
entitled to possession of suit property. As a consequence, impugned 
judgment & decree is upheld and the present appeal is dismissed with costs. 
Decree sheet be accordingly drawn and thereafter, appeal file be consigned 
to the record room and trial court record be returned forthwith.” 
6 On behalf of the appellant, it has been urged that the findings in the 
impugned judgment are perverse for the reason that  the plaintiff has all 
along stated that the agreement to sell although signed by Gurmukh Singh, 
yet it was on a blank paper; the admission of the signatures on a document is 
not proof of the contents of the document. This has raised a substantial 
question of law. That apart the defendant has not examined Harbans Lal in 
whose favour Sardari Lal had executed a power of attorney; only the son of 
Sardari Lal had been examined as DW-1. He had no know-how of the 
transaction between the parties.  
7 Arguments have been countered. It is pointed out by learned counsel 
for the respondents that no interference is called for in the two concurrent 
findings of fact. 
8 Vehement contention of learned counsel for the appellant is that the 
impugned judgment has returned a finding against the plaintiff holding that 
the plaint had never averred that Gurmukh Singh was an illiterate man and 
this is controverted by the specific averment made in para 10 wherein the 
plaintiff had stated that the plaintiff is an illiterate man and his signatures 
had been obtained on blank paper.  
9 This argument of learned counsel for the appellant is bereft of any 
force. This argument had been noted by both the courts below. The trial Judge had in fact held that this submission of the  plaintiff has not been 
substantiated. The impugned judgment had noted that there has been no 
specific averment in the plaint that Gurmukh Singh  was an illiterate man 
although in para 10 there is a bald statement that  Gurmukh Singh was 
illiterate; however this was not the reason stated by the plaintiff to aver that 
the contents of this document were not known to him; in fact this was never 
the case of the plaintiff; it was never his case that the contents of this 
document were not known to him.  
10 Ex. PW-1/1 is a registered document. It runs into four pages. The first 
party has been described as Gurmukh Singh and second party is Sardari Lal. 
Vide the aforenoted document, Gurmukh Singh had accepted the offer of the 
Government to purchase two quarters i.e. quarters No. B-33 and B-34, Block 
B, Motia Khan, Delhi for a sum of Rs.1,720/- and reserve price was 1/5th of 
this total amount. One half of this 1/5th amount i.e. for quarter No.34 have 
been paid by Sardari Lal i.e. the defendant. Further in terms of the 
aforenoted document, the second party Sardari Lal had agreed to pay a 
compensation of Rs.4,298/- to Gurmukh Singh as cost of this property i.e. 
quarter No. B-34, Block B, Motia Khan, Delhi. The phases and the manner 
of payment of instalments had also been detailed. The last instalment has 
been paid by Sardari Lal to Gurmukh Singh vide Ex. DW-1/7 which is dated 
20.10.1973. It is also relevant to state that these documents i.e. Ex.DW-1/2 
to Ex.DW-1/7 had been proved through the version of DW-1 who was the 
son of the defendant; (defendant Sardari Lal having since expired); in the 
entire cross-examination of DW-1 not even a suggestion has been given to 
this witness that these documents had not been executed by Gurmukh Singh 
or that these documents are false or fabricated. It does not now lie in the 
mouth of the plaintiff/ appellant to assert otherwise. Both the fact finding 
courts had returned a concurrent finding against the plaintiff which calls for 
no interference.  
11 This court is not a third fact finding court. Substantial questions of 
law have been embodied at page 2 of body of the appeal.  
12 No such substantial question of law has arisen. There is no merit in 
this appeal. Dismissed.  
              Sd/- 
       INDERMEET KAUR, J. 

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