Applying the aforesaid law laid down by the Apex Court to the facts of the case in hand, it is clear that the subject-matter of the earlier Writ Petition and the subject-matter of appeal before the Hon'ble Supreme Court were identical. The entire order of the Division Bench was taken in appeal to the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court was pleased to pass the order dated 4.8.1998 extracted herein-above. Thus, in our considered opinion, the earlier order of the Division Bench of this Court lost its existence in the eye of law and the same stood superseded with that of the Supreme Court order.
47. If the submissions canvassed by the petitioners were to be accepted, then the order of the Supreme Court would be rendered a mere 'paper order'. It will be an order in futility. It will be an infructuous order. No such meaning can be assigned to the order of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. It is well-known principle of construing judgment and order of the Court that no such construction should be put upon the order or judgment which would lead to manifest absurdity or futility, palpable injustice or absurd inconvenience or anomaly. The duty of the Court is to assign executable meaning to the order without finding fault with it much less while construing the order of the Apex Court , since it is binding under Article 141 of the Constitution of India.
Bombay High Court
Kaikhosrou (Chick) Kavasji vs The Union Of India, New Delhi on 17 June, 2009
Bench: V.C. Daga, Mridula Bhatkar
1. The present writ petition is filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India challenging the notice dated 31st July, 2001, ("the impugned notice") issued by the respondent No.2 to the petitioners under sections 4(1) and 2B(i) of the Public Premises Premises Act"), whereby and whereunder the petitioners are called upon to show cause why the order of eviction should not be made against them, holding them to be unauthorised occupants, under the provisions of the Public Premises Act. According to the petitioners, the impugned notice is without authority of law, without jurisdiction and ultra virus the Public Premises Act and it involves serious disputed questions of title to the premises comprising of the land admeasuring 21,168 sq.ft. ("the said land") out of the larger property (including residential bungalow) admeasuring in all about 1.52 acres situated at Survey No.417, B.No.17, Dr.Coyaji Road (formerly known as Elphinston Road), Pune- 411 001 ("the subject property").
PAST HISTORY :
2. The present litigation has a chequered past history. The respondent- Union of India through the Under Secretary to the Government for and on behalf of the President of India had addressed a notice dated 21st January, 1971 to late Kawasji Kaikhushru Sorabji Framji through whom the petitioners are claiming interest in the subject property being his legal heirs and representatives, seeking to resume the subject property alleging that the same belongs to the President of India and that the same was held by the noticee late Framji on "Old Grant Terms" under which Government was entitled to resume the said land and bungalow a portion of which was under requisition of the Government. 3
3. The noticee late Framji filed writ petition being Special Civil Application No.634/1974 under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to challenge the aforesaid notice dated 21st January, 1971 claiming to be the owner of the said property sought to be resumed by the Government of India. The main challenge to the notice dated 21st January, 1971 was on the ground that it threatened resumption of the petitioners' property without any authority of law and that it was given without observing principles of natural justice. The petitioner's case was that the property was purchased by his father Kaikhushroo Sorabji Framji from one Mohomedbhoy Hajibhoy under a conveyance dated 28th November, 1923. The said Mohd Hajibhoy had purchased the said property from one Burjorji Gustadji and Cooverbhai Homi Karani by a conveyance dated 1st March, 1920 in a public auction held on 12th October, 1919. According to the late Framji, the said land was a freehold land and that it was never held by him or his predecessors in title on any Military or Cantonment Tenure or under any grant or licence from the Government of India or east India Company.
4. On being noticed, the present respondents had appeared in that petition and filed their affidavit in reply dated 24th September, 1971 contending that the land belonged to them and was the property of the Central Government. It was resumable at the pleasure of the Central Government as the same was held by the petitioner late Framji and his predecessors in title on Old Grant Terms (Ordinary Cantonment Tenure) under the Government General Order No.14 dated 6th January, 1827.
5. At this juncture, it is relevant to mention similar notice of resumption was issued to MR Phiroj Temulji Ankalesaria who challenged in Special Civil Application No.1286/1972 raising identical contentions sketched hereinabove. That petition was allowed and the notice of resumption involved therein was quashed by the Division Bench presided 4
over by Justice Rege (as he then was) vide their Judgment dated 5 th February, 1979 reported as (P. T. Anklesaria V. H.C.Vashishta in AIR 1980 Bom 9).
6. The writ petition filed by late Framji was heard simultaneously by the same Bench. It was decided on 6th February, 1979; wherein the leaned Division Bench relying upon its judgment in the case of P.T.Anklesaria (supra) for the reasons stated therein held that the said notice dated 21st January, 1971, was bad and illegal and issued a writ of mandamus restraining the respondents from acting under the said notice and resuming the subject property or any part thereof in pursuance of the said notice. While deciding the petition, one more contention, advanced by the respondents therein in defence that the settlement was subject to rules and regulations of Cantonment as to the tenure of the land giving them right of resumption, was also brushed aside by the Division Bench holding it to be without any substance.
7. The above judgments of the Division Bench, one in the case of P.T.Anklesaria, and another in the case of late Framji, (the predecessor-in- title of the present petitioners) were subject matter of appeal before the Hon'ble Supreme Court along with number of other petitions arising out of transfer cases; wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court was pleased to pass orders from time to time, which are reproduced hereinbelow:
"Order dated 20th July, 1988
TRANSFERRED CASES NOS.67-72/85 & 11-12 OF 1987
Union of India & Ors. ... Appellants.
Versus
P.T.Ankleshwar (dead) by Lrs.
& Ors. etc. ... Respondents.
5
ORDER
We are disposing of this cases with the agreement and consent of the counsel for the parties.
These transferred cases are remitted back to the High Court for disposal, keeping in view the following directions:
"1. While considering the merit of the case the High Court shall not place any reliance upon the Division Bench Judgment of the High Court consisting of D.H.Rege and R.A.Jahagirdar, JJ, rendered in Special Civil Application No. 1286/72 decided on 5/6 February 1979 against which appeals are pending in this Court."
2. While considering the case, if the High Court finds that the trial Court or the first appellate Court has placed reliance or made any reference to the aforesaid judgment of the Division Bench, it shall ignore that judgment, to that extent, and the High Court shall decide the matter afresh in
accordance with law without taking into consideration or being influenced by the aforesaid judgment of the Division Bench.
3. The parties will be at liberty to adduce additional evidence before the High Court within the period fixed by the High Court.
4. The High Court will make every effort to dispose of the cases within six months from the date of the receipt of the record.
. The transferred cases stand disposed of accordingly.
. Office is directed to take immediate steps for sending back the records of the cases to the High Court within one week.
Order dated 25th March, 1992
Civil Appeal No.608-621 of 1980
Union of India and Ors. ... Appellants
Versus
P.T.Anklesaria (dead) by Lrs
and Ors. ... Respondents.
(with Appln for directions)
6
Date : 25.3.1992
Coram : Hon'ble Mr.Justice T.K.Thoman
Hon'ble Mr.Justice S.C.Agrawal
For the Petitioner(s)/Appellants(s):
Mr.J.S.Jain, Sr.Adv. Mr.I.S.Goyal, Adv.
Ms.A.Subhashini, Adv.(N.P.)
For the Respondent(s)/Opposite Party:
Mr.Y.A.Bobde, Sr.Adv.
Dr.Sumant Bhardwaj, Adv.
Mr.Sunil Goyal, Adv. for
M/s.Gagrat & Co.
Upon hearing counsel the Court made following
ORDER
. The appeals are dismissed as
infructuous in terms of the signed order
placed on the file.
-----
Order dated 13th January, 1995
REVIEW PETITIONS NOS.1773-86 OF 1993.
IN
CIVIL APPEALS NOS.608-21 OF 1980
Union of India & Ors. ... Appellants
Versus
P.T.Anklesaria(D) by Mrs.
and Ors. ... Respondents.
ORDER
These are the Petitions for review of the order dated March, 25, 1992 whereby Civil Appeals Nos.608 to 621 of 1980 were dismissed as having become infructuous. The reason given for the said order was the
observations made by this Court on July, 20,1988 in
Transferred Cases Nos.67 to 72 and 11- 12 of 1987. It has been submitted that out of the 14 appeals which
7
were disposed of by this Court by the orders passed by the High Court in Transferred Cases, namely, O.A.Nos. 608, 612 and 619-620 of 1988 and these appeals along could be dismissed as infructous for the reason given in the said order. As regards the other appeals the said reason does not apply in these circumstances the order dated March, 25, 1992 is modified and it is confirmed in its application to C.A.Nos.608, 612, 619, 620 of 1980. So far as the other appeals are concerned the order dated March, 25, 1992 is recalled and the
matters are restored. The other appeals will be listed before the Court for hearing in the normal course.
I.A.No.15 in C.A.No.614/80.
I.A.No.15 is allowed and the legal representatives of the deceased respondents are brought on record.
-----
Order dated 4th August, 1998
CIVIL APPEAL NOS.609-11 OF 1980
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NOS.613-18, 621/80
Union of India & Ors. ... Appellants
Versus
P.T.Anklesaria & Ors. ... Respondents.
WITH
C.A.4697/89, SLP(C) No.5428/90,
C.A. 588/81, 3681/82, SLP(C) 10997/92,
6438/86.
ORDER
Learned Solicitor General states that the Union of India would seek dispossession of the respondent-occupants from the properties involved in accordance with law and if need be, through a Civil Court by filing suits. In case such steps are taken, any observations made by the High Court which would tend to defeat the remedies sought would not stand in its way. On such stance of the Union of India, Civil Appeals as also the special leave petitions stand disposed of accordingly. 8
8. The last order dated 4th August 1998 appearing in the aforesaid catalogue, passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court relates to the case of Framji, relevant to the present Litigation. The appeal came to be disposed of on the basis of the statement made by learned Solicitor General that the Union of India would seek dispossession of the respondents- occupants from the properties involved in accordance with law and if need be, through a Civil Court by filing suits. It was also made clear by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that if such steps are taken, any observations made by the High Court, which would tend to defeat the remedies sought, would not stand in the way of Union of India. Accordingly civil appeals as well as special leave petitions were disposed of. Much legal debate was raised on the sweep of the aforesaid order to which reference is made in detail in latter part of this judgment.
9. The respondents herein armed with the aforesaid order dated 4th August 1998 passed by the Apex Court sought to evict the petitioners from the subject property resorting to the provisions of the Public Premises Act, as a result of which, the impugned notice dated 31st July, 2001, came to be issued to the petitioners. The said notice is a subject matter of challenge in this petition as stated in the opening part of this Judgment.
RIVAL SUBMISSIONS :
10. In persuasive address on behalf of the petitioners, Mr.D.J.Khambata, learned senior Counsel while challenging the aforesaid impugned notice dated 31st July, 2001 mainly raised two contentions; Firstly, the impugned notice is without jurisdiction and ultra virus the Public Premises Act since condition precedent to its issue that the premises should be "public premises" has not been established. In his submission under the Public Premises Act, the Estate Officer has to, prima facie; satisfy himself before issuing notice under section 4 about 9
the three jurisdictional pre- requisites; (a) that the premises are "public premises"; (b) that the noticee is in unauthorised occupation of the such public premises; and (c) that the noticee should be evicted. Reliance is placed on the Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Minoo Framroze Balsara v. Union of India, AIR 1992 Bom. 375. Secondly, that the the bonafide disputed question of title cannot be decided in the proceedings under the Public Premises Act which provide for summary eviction of the persons by the Government. In his submission, the impugned notice itself recognises that there is serious long standing unresolved dispute with regard to the title of the subject property which can only be adjudicated by the Civil Court. In support of his submission, he placed reliance on the judgment and order dated 6th February, 1979 of the Division Bench of this Court in Special Civil Application No. 364/1971 (K.K.Framji case).
11. In nut shell, the submission which has been pressed by the learned senior counsel for the petitioners is that the present case involves complicated questions of title and the respondents could not be permitted to resort to summary proceeding under the Public Premises Act. Learned counsel for the petitioners has also placed reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in State of U.P. v. Zia Khan, (1998) 8 SCC 483 and pressed into service para-3 thereof and went on to urge that the provisions of the U.P.Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1972 are in pari materia with the provisions of the Public Premises Act. He has also placed reliance on some other judgments of the Apex Court in the case of Union of India v. Sitaram Garodia, (1996) 11 SC 578 and State of A.P. v. T.K.Rao, (1982) 2 SCC 134 to contend that if there is bonafide dispute to the title of the property, the government cannot take unilateral decision in its favour that the property belongs to it.
10
12. Mr. Khambata would contend that the correct procedure which needs to be followed by the respondents is that they should file suit in Civil Court and obtain declaration of their title to the said land and get the dispute as to the title decided and after obtaining declaration of title in their favour, they can resort to a fresh resumption proceedings.
13. Mr. Khambata heavily relied upon the judgments in the case of P.T.Anklesaria and K.K.Framji (supra) delivered by the Division Bench of this Court presided over by Justice Rege (as he then was) and went on to urge that plain reading of these judgments do indicate several areas of dispute as to whether the said land was held by the petitioners under any Old Grant from the Union of India and if so, whether the premises of such alleged Grant authorised the Union of India to resume possession of the said land.
14. Mr.Khambata further went on to urge that the judgment of this Court in the case of K.K.Framji has not been set aside and that it is binding on the Union of India even today. In his submission, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has not set aside the judgment. It merely recorded the statement of learned Solicitor General made on behalf of the Union of India that it would seek dispossession of the respondent- occupants from the properties involved in accordance with law and if need be, through a Civil Court by filing suits. Upon such statement, Court directed that if such steps are taken, any observations made by the High Court, which would tend to defeat the remedies sought, would not stand in its way. According to Mr.Khambata, reading of this order, no one can infer even merger of the judgment of the Division Bench (in K.K.Framji case) in the order of the Supreme Court dated 4th August, 1998. In his submission, looking to the nature of the above order of the Supreme Court and its subject matter, it is clear that neither the merits of the judgment of Division Bench of this Court nor the reasons recorded therein or the law 11
laid down therein was gone into by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as such doctrine of merger is not attracted. Reliance is placed on the S.Shan Mugaval Nadar v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2002) 8 SCC 361.
15. Mr. Khambata, in order to buttress his submission, has also relied upon the judgment of the learned single Judge of this Court (Khanvilkar, J.) dated 23rd July, 2001 in Writ Petition No.2079/1995 (Union of India v. Smt.Banu Jahangir Coyajee); wherein the learned single Judge held that the order passed by the Supreme Court did not result in setting aside the order of the earlier Division Bench, which had set aside the resumption notice and that the same holds good even today.
16. Mr.Khambata strongly canvassed that once it is demonstrated that there is a serious dispute about title, then such dispute cannot be resolved under the Public Premises Act. He pressed into service Division Bench judgment of this Court in W.P.No.1552/2000 (M/s.Durga Trading Co. v. Union of India) decided on 6th February, 2003 and another Judgment of the Division Bench in W.P.No.5554/2004 (Framroze Navroji Darukhanwala v. Union of India) decided on 3rd April, 2006 (both unreported). In addition to these judgments, he has also relied upon the judgment of the three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Government of A.P. v. T.K.Rao (cited supra).
17. Lastly, we were taken through the judgments delivered in the cases of P.T.Anklesaria and K.K.Framji together with various orders passed by the Supreme Court in the related matters to contend that the impugned notice is barred by principles of res judicata and that the respondents have no title to the subject property as such proceeding is liable to be quashed and set aside leaving the Union of India to seek declaration of their title in the Civil Court.
12
18. Per contra, Mr.Rajguru, learned counsel appearing for the Union of India with all vehemence at his command tried to counter the submissions made by Mr.Khambata. He contends that whether or not the subject property is a public premises; whether or not petitioners are unauthorised occupants of the subject property; and whether or not the noticee should be evicted, all these questions can only be resolved on the basis of evidence which the parties can lead before the Estate Officer appointed under the provisions of the Public Premises Act. In his submission all these questions are the questions arising out of the provisions of the Public Premises Act, they can only be decided by the authorities created under the said Act. The same cannot be gone into in writ jurisdiction of this Court being disputed question of fact requiring to be decided on the basis of documentary and oral evidence.
19. Mr. Rajguru further submits that the petitioners are trying to defeat the remedy of the Union of India by pressing into service the Division Bench judgments in the case of P.T.Anklesaria as also K.K.Framji which is not permissible in view of the clear-cut observation of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, which, in unequivocal terms, has observed that any observation made by the High Court which would tend to defeat the remedies sought by the respondents would not stand in its way. He, thus, submits that the Union of India is following due process of law by approaching the competent forum created under the Public Premises Act for eviction of the Petitioner and all the questions sought to be raised herein with regard to the validity of notice can alone be gone into by the Estate Officer, whose orders could be the subject matter of the appeal before the District Judge of the district in which the public premises are situated or such other judicial officer of that district having not less than 10 years standing as the District Judge may designate.
13
20. Mr.Rajguru further submits that issuance of the notice under section 4 of the Public Premises Act amounts to taking steps for eviction of the petitioners in accordance with law as permitted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in its order dated 4th August, 1998, hence the impugned notice including action based thereon is perfectly legal and valid.
21. Mr.Rajguru also urged that the order dated 6th February, 1979 passed in Special Civil Application No.364/1971 in the case of K.K.Framji has merged into the order dated 4th August, 1999 passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. He placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of M/s.Gojer Bros. (Pvt.)Ltd. v. Ratan Lal Singh, (1974) 2 SCC 453 in support of his submission to contend that there cannot be at one and the same time, more than one operative order in the same Lis governing the same subject matter. In his submission, the judgment of the inferior court, if subjected to an examination by the superior court, ceases to have existence in the eye of law and is treated as being superseded by the judgment of the superior court. In other words, the judgment of the inferior court loses its identity by its merger with that of the order of the superior court. He, thus, submits that this Court cannot rely upon the judgment either in the case of P.T.Anklesaria or in K.K.Framji.
22. Mr.Rajguru heavily relied upon the observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court with regard to the Division Bench judgment of this Court presided over by Justice Rege (as he then was) in Special Civil Application No.1286/72 and pressed into service following observations of the Apex Court to contend that none of them have a presidential value:
"While considering the case, if the High Court finds that the trial court or the first Appellate Court has placed reliance or made any reference to the aforesaid judgment of the Division 14
Bench, it shall ignore the Judgment to that extent and the High court shall decide the matter afresh in accordance with law without taking into consideration or being influenced the aforesaid judgment of the Division Bench."
(Emphasis supplied)
23. Mr. Rajguru further submits that the Division Bench judgment has not only lost its presidential value but none of the observations made therein can be allowed to be pressed into service to defeat the remedy sought by the respondents. In his submission, the order of the Supreme Court dated 4th August, 1998 alone is holding the field and based on that the impugned notice and the action of the respondents is legal and valid.
24. Mr.Rajguru further submits that two Division Bench judgments sought to be relied upon by the petitioners one in the case of Durga Trading Co. and another in the case of Framji Nanjee Darukhanwala (supra) were decided on the facts of those cases and are per in curium as it was not brought to the notice of the Court the specific bar created by Section 15 of the Public Premises Act, whereunder no Court can have jurisdiction to entertain the proceeding in respect of the eviction of any person, who is in unauthorised occupation of any public premises.
25. Mr.Rajguru took us through the various documents available on record to demonstrate title in favour of the Union of India and went on to press into service some of the recitals contained in the registered documents including one undertaking given by Mohmmedbhoy Rajeebhoy vide his letter dated 26th January, 1920 addressed to the Secretary, Cantonment Committee, Poona reading as under:
12, Cuffe Parade,
Bombay,
15
26th January 1920
From :
The Hon'ble Mr.Mohmmedbhoy Rajeebhoy.
To
The Secretary,
Cantonment Committee,
Poona.
Sir,
I have the honour to inform you that I have contracted to purchase Bungalow No.17, Elphinstone Road, Poona from Mr.Burjorjee Goostadjee and Bai Cooverbai, Executor and Executrix of the late Goostadjee Dhunjishaw. I understand that my Vendors will apply to you to sanction the transfer of the above property to me, and with a view to such sanction being obtained I undertake that the bungalow will always be available for occupation by a Military officer on duty in the Station, and that, if so required, I will not, as owner, claim to reside in it.
I have the honour to be
Sir,
Your most obedient servant,
Sd/-
Mahomed Hajeebhoy.
26. Mr.Rajguru contends that the land and bungalow can always be resumed by the Union of India for the occupation by the military officers on duty in station. In his submission it is sufficient if the Union of India demonstrates that any premises belong to the Central Government. He placed reliance on section 2(e) of the Public Premises Act; wherein public premises is defined.
27. Mr.Rajguru also relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Annamallai Club v. Government of Tamilnadu, AIR 1997 SC 3650 which upheld the observations made by the Madras High Court. 16
28. Mr.Rajguru also relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Chitrakumari v. Union of India, AIR 2001 SC 1237 and Chief Executive Officer v. Surendra Kumar Vakil, AIR 1999 SC 2294 together with judgment in the case of Pune Cantonment Committee v. Dhondiram, (Appeal No.108/1885) and Framji Dorabji Ghaswala v. Secretary, State for India in Council represented by the Kirkee Cantonment Committee (Appeal No.15/1897) and Kaikhusru Aderji Ghaswala v. Secretary of State for India in Council (1991) 38 Indian Appeals 204 (PC) and that of Secretary of State for India in Council v. Satish Chandra Sen, (1930) 57 Indian Appeals 339 (PC) to contend that the subject premise belongs to the Central Government. He also tried to distinguish various judgments cited by the petitioners, especially, Express Newspapers v. Union of India (supra).
29. At this juncture, it is relevant to mention that both parties tried to advance their contentions beyond the canvass of the issue involved. The petitioners tried to demonstrate at length as to how there is serious dispute of title with regard to the subject property and that there is no title in favour of the Central Government. The petitioners are claiming title unto themselves. As against this, the respondents are asserting their title based on various documents which the petitioners tried to demolish on the basis of the findings recorded in the judgments in f P.T.Anklesaria and K.K.Framji. Both parties tried to press into service various provisions of the cantonment regulations and legislations to demonstrate how subject property belongs to them and tried to counter each other, the details of which are not necessary for the view taken.
30. The crux of the dispute sought to be raised by the petitioners is that the dispute relates to the title to the said land as such, Union of India must be relegated to the remedy of civil suit to establish their title 17
and prove that the land constitutes public premises within the meaning of section 2(e) of the Public Premises Act and, only after obtaining declaration of title, the respondents can be permitted to take recourse to the Public Premises Act which the respondents tried to counter as stated hereinabove.
BACKGROUND OF THE PUBLIC PREMISES ACT:
31. Before proceeding to deal with the rival contentions raised by the parties, it is necessary to refer to the scheme of the subject enactment, namely, Public Premises Act, which has bearing on the topic of discussion before us.
32. The Public Premises Eviction Act, 1971 received the assent of the President on August 23, 1971 but it is deemed to have come into force on September 16, 1958 for certain "historical" reasons which are not relevant for our purposes. The Act provides for the eviction of "unauthorised occupants" from "public premises" and for certain incidental matters. Section 2(c) defines "premises" to mean "any land or any part of a building and to include garden, grounds and outhouses appurtenant to the building or fittings affixed thereto". The expression "public premises" has been defined in Section 2(e) of the Act. This definition is in three parts. Sub-clause (1) of clause (e) takes in premises belonging to, or taken on lease or requisitioned by, or on behalf of, the Central Government, as well as premises placed by that Government under the control of either House of Parliament for providing residential accommodation to the members of the staff of the Secretariat of either House of Parliament. Sub-clause (3) of clause (e) takes in premises belonging to certain local authorities in the Union Territory of Delhi. Sub-clause (2) of clause (e) brings in premises belonging to or taken on lease by, or on behalf of, various kinds of bodies, such as Universities, Institutes of Technology, 18
Board of Trustees of Major Port Trusts and the Bhakra Management Board. It takes in any premises belonging to or taken on lease by, or on behalf of, a government company or its subsidiary. It also takes in - and this is what we are concerned with here - premises of "any corporation (not being a company as defined in Section 3 of the Companies Act, 1956 or a local authority) established by or under a Central Act and owned or controlled by the Central Government".
33. The Act contemplates the appointment of an Estate Officer who is a highly placed officer of the Government or of the relevant statutory authority in respect of public premises controlled by that authority. The Act enables the Estate Officer to call upon "unauthorised occupants" of public premises (meaning persons occupying such premises without authority or continuing in occupation after the authority to do so has expired or has been determined for any reason) to show cause why they should not be evicted and to proceed to evict them, if need be, after considering the cause, if any, shown by the persons concerned in response to a notice served on them. It also contains powers to remove unauthorised constructions, demolish unauthorised constructions, dispose of property left on public premises by unauthorized occupants, require payment of rent or damages in respect of public premises and so on. An order passed by the estate officer, under the provisions of the Act, it appealable, the Appellate Authority being the District Judge or such other judicial officer of not less than 10 years' experience as a District Judge and subject to the above right of appeal, the orders passed by the estate officer are final. Section 15 bars the jurisdiction of courts to entertain any suits or proceedings in respect of, inter alia, the eviction of any person who is in unauthorised occupation of public premises. This, broadly, is the outline of the Public Premise Act. 19
CONSIDERATION:
34. Having heard rival oral contentions advanced at length, supported by the written submissions, we, at this sage, must observe that the present litigation came to be initiated at the threshold to challenge the show- cause notice issued under section 4 of the Public Premises Act, without even filing reply thereto. Rival pleadings on merits are yet to be crystallized. The parties to the petition canvassed their contentions raising large spectrum of controversy, which, in our considered opinion, need not be gone into at this premature stage of the litigation.
35. What is required to be considered is: whether or not the Estate Officer, appointed under section 3 of the Public Premises Act, has a jurisdiction to entertain and try the present eviction proceeding initiated by the respondents? Once the proceeding is initiated, the Estate Officer has to satisfy that the facts giving rise to its jurisdiction have been established. If the Tribunal appointed under the Act is vested with jurisdiction to try cases arising under the said Act, the Tribunal is also vested with powers to decide existence or non-existence of the facts giving rise to its jurisdiction, the findings of which can be assailed only before the higher authorities, if any, under the Act.
36. Having said so, before going into the merits of the issue, it is necessary to consider the effect of previous litigation together with the decision thereon, the historical background of which has already been sketched in paragraphs 2 to 7 supra.
37. In the earlier Writ Petition being Special Civil Application No. 634/1974 filed by late Framji the challenge was to the notice of resumption dated 21.1.1971 and consequent action thereof; wherein the Division Bench of this Court was pleased to find absence of power to resume in favour of the Respondents. Consequently, the notice and order of resumption was declared to be without authority of law and of no legal consequence. In turn, this Court was pleased to restrain the 20
respondents from acting under the said notice or from resuming the subject-property or any part thereof in pursuance of the said notice. The said judgment of the Division Bench was basically founded on the earlier Division Bench judgment in the case of P.T. Anklesaria (cited supra).
38. The above matter was carried to the Hon'ble Supreme Court at the instance of the respondents. The Hon'ble Supreme Court was pleased to grant leave to Appeal and the order of the High Court was substituted with that of the order of the Supreme Court dated 4.8.1998 extracted in paragraph 7 supra.
39. As on date, the basic question arising from the rival contentions is: which order would hold the field? Whether the order of the High Court or that of the Hon'ble Supreme Court? Another allied question would be : to what extent the order of the High Court dated 6th February,1979 would survive? Both parties tried their best to interpret the above orders to suit their respective contentions.
40. The petitioners would contend that the order of the earlier Division Bench has not been set aside and that it is binding on the Union of India- the respondents-herein. In their submission, the order of Hon'ble Supreme Court merely records the statement of the learned Solicitor General and that the order of the High Court did not merge into the order of the Supreme Court. In support, reliance is placed on the observations of the learned single Judge of this Court in the case of Union vs. Smt. Banu Jahangir Coyajee (cited supra).
41. As against above submission, the respondents would contend that the order of the High Court stood merged into the order of the Supreme Court in view of the doctrine of "Merger". In the submission of the respondents, there cannot be, at one and the same time, more than one operative order in the lis governing the same subject-matter. According to 21
them, the judgment of the inferior Court, if subjected to an examination of the superior Court, cease to have existence in the eye of law and is treated as being superseded by the judgment of the superior Court. In other words, it loses its identity by its merger with the judgment of the superior Court. Thus, the ultimate submission is that the order of the Hon'ble Supreme Court dated 4th August, 1998 is the only order which will govern the present litigation.
42. This Court, faced with the above rival submissions, has to find out an answer to the question posed. To answer, it will be profitable to turn to the Apex Court judgment in the case of C. Balchandran vs. State of Kerala reported in 2009 (3) SCC 179, wherein the Apex Court ruled that the judgment must be read in its entirity and it should not be read as a provision of a statute. In the case of State of Rajasthan vs. Ganeshilal 2008 (1) CLR 431 the Hon'ble Apex Court has said as under :
"Reliance on the decision without looking into the factual background of the case before it is clearly impermissible. A decision is a precedent on its own facts. Each case presents its own features. It is not everything said by a Judge while giving a judgment that constitutes a precedent. The only thing in a Judge's decision binding a party is the principle upon which the case is decided and for this reason it is important to analyze a decision and isolate from it the ratio decidendi. According to the well-settled theory of precedents, every decision contains three basic postulates : (i) findings of material facts, direct and inferential. An inferential finding of facts is the inference which the Judge draws from the direct, or perceptible facts; (ii) statements of the principles of law applicable to the legal problems disclosed by the facts ; and (iii) judgment based on the combined effect of the above. A decision is an authority for what it actually decides. What is of the essence in a decision is its ratio and not every 22
observation found therein nor what logically flows from the various observations made in the judgment. The enunciation of the reason or principle on which a question before a Court has been decided is alone binding as a precedent. (See : State of Orissa vs. Sudhansu Sekhar Misra and others. (AIR 1968 Sc 647) and Union of India and others vs. Dhanwanti Devi and others {1996 (6) SCC 44}. A case is a precedent and binding for what it explicitly decides and no more. The words used by Judges in their judgments are not to be read as if they are words in Act of Parliament. In Quinn v. Leathen (1901) AC 495(HL). Earl of Halsbury LC observed that every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which are found there are not intended to be exposition of the whole law but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are found and a case is only an authority for what is actually decides."
43. Keeping in mind the above observations, let us turn to the order of the Hon'ble Supreme Court dated 4.8.1998, which was passed in the previous litigation, which is being quoted herein- below, at the cost of repetition:-
Order
Datd.4.8.1998
" Learned Solicitor General states that the Union of India would seek dispossession of the respondent-occupants from the properties involved in accordance with law and, if need be, through a Civil Court by filing suits. In case such steps are taken, any observations made by the High Court which would tend to defeat the remedies sought would not stand in its way. On such stance of the Union of India, Civil Appeals as also the Special Leave Petitions stand disposed of accordingly." (Emphasis supplied)
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44. The question as posed is : whether the order of the Division Bench can be said to have been merged in the order of the Supreme Court? In order to answer the question, it is necessary to turn to para 11 in the case of M/s Gojer Bros.( Pvt) Ltd. vs. Shri Ratan Lalsingh (1974) 2 SCC 453, wherein the Apex Court has observed as under :
"11. The juristic justification of the doctrine of merger may be sought in the principle that there cannot be, at one and the same time, more than one operative order governing the same subject- matter. Therefore, the judgment of an inferior Court, if subjected to an examination by the superior court, cease to have existence in the eye of law and is treated as being superseded by the judgment of the superior court. In other words, the judgment of the inferior court loses its identity by its merger with the judgment of the superior Court."
(Emphasis supplied)
45. In the case of V M Salgaocar & Bros. Pvt. Ltd. vs. CIT ( 2000) Vol.5 SCC 373, the Apex Court held that different considerations apply when Special Leave Petition under Article 136 of the Constitution of India is simply dismissed by saying "dismissed" and an appeal provided under Article 133 is dismissed also with the words "the appeal is dismissed". In the former case, it has been ruled that when a Special Leave Petition is dismissed, the Court does not comment on the correctness or otherwise of the order from which leave to appeal was sought. In other words, what the Court meant was that it did not consider it to be a fit case for exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution. The Court further ruled that certainly could not be so when an appeal is dismissed though by a non-speaking order since the doctrine of 'merger' applies. As per this judgment, the doctrine of merger does not apply in the case of dismissal of a Special Leave Petition under Article 146, but when an appeal is dismissed, the order of the High Court merges with that of the Supreme 24
Court. The Court quoted following paragraph from its earlier judgment in the case of Supreme Court Employees' Welfare Assn. v. Union of India (SCC pp. 206-207, Para 22) reading as under :-
"22. It has been already noticed that the Special Leave Petitions filed on behalf of the Union of India against the said judgments of the Delhi High Court were summarily dismissed by this Court. It is now a well-settled principle of law that when a Special Leave Petition is summarily dismissed under Art.136 of the Constitution,by such dismissal, this Court does not lay down any law, as envisaged by Art.141 of the Constitution, as contended by the learned Attorney General. In India Oil Corp. Ltd. v. State of Bihar (1986) 4 SCC 146 it has been held by this Court that the dismissal of a Special Leave Petition in limine by a non-speaking order does not justify any inference that, by necessary implication, the contentions raised in the Special Leave Petition on the merits of the case have been rejected by the Supreme Court. It has been further held that the effect of non-speaking order of dismissal of a Special Leave Petition without anything more indicating the grounds or reasons of its dismissal must, by necessary implication, be taken to be that the Supreme Court had decided only that it was not a fit case where Special Leave Petition should be granted. In Union of India vs. All India Service Pensioners' Assn. (1988) 2 SCC 580 this Court has given reasons for dismissing the Special Leave Petition. When such reasons are given, the decision becomes one which attracts Art.141 of the Constitution which provides that the law declared by the Supreme Court shall be binding on all the courts within the territory of India. It, therefore, follows that when no reason is given, but a Special Leave Petition is dismissed simpliciter, it cannot be said that there has been a declaration of law by this Court under Art.141 of the Constitution."
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46. Applying the aforesaid law laid down by the Apex Court to the facts of the case in hand, it is clear that the subject-matter of the earlier Writ Petition and the subject-matter of appeal before the Hon'ble Supreme Court were identical. The entire order of the Division Bench was taken in appeal to the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court was pleased to pass the order dated 4.8.1998 extracted herein-above. Thus, in our considered opinion, the earlier order of the Division Bench of this Court lost its existence in the eye of law and the same stood superseded with that of the Supreme Court order.
47. If the submissions canvassed by the petitioners were to be accepted, then the order of the Supreme Court would be rendered a mere 'paper order'. It will be an order in futility. It will be an infructuous order. No such meaning can be assigned to the order of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. It is well-known principle of construing judgment and order of the Court that no such construction should be put upon the order or judgment which would lead to manifest absurdity or futility, palpable injustice or absurd inconvenience or anomaly. The duty of the Court is to assign executable meaning to the order without finding fault with it much less while construing the order of the Apex Court , since it is binding under Article 141 of the Constitution of India.
48. If the petitioners are right in their submissions that the order of the Division Bench is operating as res judicata between the parties; then certainly no eviction proceedings can be initiated by them to resume the subject property; no legal proceeding of any nature could be taken up by the respondents against the petitioners to dispossess them from the subject-property. If that be so, there cannot be any cause of action for the respondents to initiate proceedings for eviction. As a matter of fact, in case of appeal the Appellate decision and not the trial Court's decision which operates as res judicata. The finding on an issue in the earlier suit to operate as res judicata should not have been only directly and 26
substantially in issue but it should have been necessary to be decided as well. When a decision is taken in appeal, the rule is that it is the appellate decision and not the decision of the trial court that operates as res judicata. Consequently, where a suit is decided both on merits and on technical grounds by the trial Court and if the suit was disposed of in appeal not on merits but for want of jurisdiction or for being barred by time or for being defectively constituted, then the finality of the findings recorded by the trial Court on merits stands destroyed as the suit having been found to be bad for technical reasons it becomes operative from the date the decision was given by the trial Court, thus, rendering any adjudication on merits impliedly unnecessary. In such a situation, the findings on merits of the trial Court cannot operate as res judicata in subsequent proceedings. On the same touchstone, if the order of the Hon'ble Supreme Court dated 4.8.1998 is examined then it would be clear that findings on issue recorded by the Division Bench were directly and substantially in issue, but none of them were considered by the Apex Court on merits. The Appeal was disposed of not on merits but on the statement of the learned Solicitor General that Union of India would resort to the remedy known to or recognized by law. Considered from this angle, it is clear that what was kept alive was only the cause of action germane from the notice of resumption dated 21.1.1971 giving liberty to the Union of India to resume the property in accordance with law or by resorting to the remedy recognized by or known to law. If the view canvassed by the learned senior counsel for petitioners is to be accepted, then the liberty granted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court will have to be held as ineffective. No proceedings much less suit could be filed. The submission made, in our considered opinion, is fallacious and unsustainable. We cannot subscribe to the view canvassed by learned counsel appearing for the petitioners. The judgment of the High Court had lost its identity by its merger in view of the order of the superior Court. There cannot be two orders holding the field in the same litigation. The order of the Hon'ble Supreme Court dated 4.8.19198 alone holds the field. 27
49. Having recorded this finding, some fruitful meaning will have to be assigned to the above order of the Hon'ble Supreme Court dated 4.8.1998. This order is based on the statement made by the learned Solicitor General that Union of India would seek to dispossess all the respondent/occupants from the properties involved in accordance with law and if need be, through Civil Court by filing suit. This statement of the learned Solicitor General was in consonance with the law laid down by the Apex Court as back as in the year 1989 in the case of State of U.P vs. Maharaja .
Dharmander Pd.Singh: ( AIR 1989 SC 997) wherein the Apex Court ruled that a lessor, with the best of title, has no right to resume possession extra-judicially by use of force, from a lessee, even after the expiry of earlier termination of the lease by forfeiture or otherwise. The use of the expression 'pre-entry' in the lease deed does not authorize extra-judicial possession and forcible dispossession is prohibited; a lessee cannot be dispossessed otherwise than in due course of law.
50. The statement made by the learned Solicitor General of India, if considered in its proper perspective, in the light of the law holding the field, one has to conclude that the Union of Indian had sought liberty to invoke the remedy known to or recognized by law, which the Apex Court was pleased to grant. The Court went a step ahead in observing that, in the event of such remedy is resorted to, any observations made by the High Court which would stand to defeat the remedies sought, would not stand in its way. It is, thus, clear from the aforesaid order of the Supreme Court that the Union of India was permitted to resort to the remedies known to law to resume possession of the subject property. If this be so,obviously, on the same cause of action, the Union of India was permitted to adopt remedy known to or recognized by law.
51. For the reasons recorded herein-above, we reiterate our considered view that the earlier Division Bench order stood merged with the order of the Supreme Court dated 4.8.1998.
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52. Now the question which needs determination is: What is the effect of the order of the Apex Court? In our opinion, the first part of the order has resulted in granting liberty to the Union of India to seek dispossession of the respondent/occupants from the property involved in accordance with law and, if need be through the Civil Court by filing suit and the second part of the order takes away the effect of the findings and observations made by the High Court to the extent it would tend to defeat the remedies sought. In other words, the earlier judgment of the Division Bench cannot be put into service to defeat the remedy resorted to by the Union of India-respondents herein. The said judgment no longer holds the field. It cannot be relied upon. P.T. Ankalesaria's judgment relied in the said judgment also no longer holds good. It has lost its precedential value. As a matter of fact, no reliance can be placed on the said judgment as observed by the Supreme Court which is binding on this Court. The very basisor substratum of the earlier Division bench judgment was taken away by the Supreme Court vide its order dated 4.8.1998.
53. At this stage, it is relevant to mention that learned Senior counsel appearing for petitioners forcefully canvassed, insisted and reiterated in his written submission that the serious dispute of title is involved and it cannot be resolved by the Estate Officer appointed under the Public Premises Act. Reliance was placed on the unreported judgment of the Division Bench in the case of Durga Trading Co. ( cited supra). We were also taken through the said judgment. But this judgment, in our opinion, is of no assistance to the petitioners.
54. In Durga Trading Co.'s case, a categorical finding was recorded in paragraph (11) that the petitioner was not an unauthorized occupant within the meaning of Section 2 (g) of the Public Premises Act. That being so, there was no justification to proceed for eviction under Public Premises Act. In the light of this undisputed fact, the Division Bench was 29
pleased to observe that the Estate Officer had no authority or jurisdiction to evict the petitioner under sec.5(2) of the Public Premises Act. While recording this finding, an observation is made that there seems to be a serious dispute about the title which dispute cannot be resolved under Public Premises Act. These observations cannot be read out of context. Thus, the judgment is of no help to the petitioners.
55. The learned senior Counsel for the petitioners has also placed reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Government of Andhra Pradesh vs. Thannala Krishna Rao reported in (1982) 2 SCC 134 wherein the Apex Court while dealing with the Tenancy and Land Laws in general and A.P. Land Encroachment Act, 1905 ( AP Act 3 of 1905 ), observed that summary proceedings can be initiated only where unauthorized occupation of Government property is not disputed, but where title to the said land is bona fide disputed by the occupant, such dispute must be adjudicated not by the summary proceedings but by civil suit. Bona fides of the occupant's claim can be inferred from his occupation for a long period. So far as the law laid down by the Apex Court in the said judgment is concerned, is the settled principle of law, with which no dispute could be raised. In that judgment, the Apex Court was mainly concerned with the provisions of the A.P. Land Encroachment Act, 1905 dealing with the removal of encroachment on the Government properties. In that judgment, the Apex Court observed that the respondents had a bona fide claim to litigate and they could not be evicted save and except by the due process of law. The summary remedy prescribed by Section 6 of the said Act was not the kind of legal process suited to an adjudication of complicated questions of title. The procedure prescribed, therefore, was held not answering the requirement of the due course of law meant for evicting the respondents.
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56. What is meant by due course of law? The due course of law in each particular case means an exercise of the powers by duly constituted Tribunal or Court in accordance with the procedure established by law providing for adequate safeguards to protect individual rights. A course of legal proceedings according to the rules and principles which have been established to our system of jurisprudence for the enforcement and protection of private rights. To give such proceedings any validity, there must thus be a Tribunal competent by its constitution, that is by law of its creation, to pass upon the subject matter of the suit or proceeding; and, if that involves merely a determination of the personal liability of the defendant, it must be brought within its jurisdiction by service of process within the State, or his voluntary appearance. Due course of law implies the right of the person affected thereby to be present before the Tribunal which pronounces judgment upon the question of life, liberty or property in its most comprehensive sense; to be heard, by testimony or otherwise and to have the right determination of the controversy by proof, every material fact which bears on the question of fact of liability be conclusively proved or presumed against him. This is the meaning of due course of law in a comprehensive sense.
57. The Apex Court in para 29 in the case of Lallu Yeshwant Singh vs. Rao Jagdish Singh, AIR 1968 SC 620, approved the dictum of the Privy Council in Midnapur Zamindary Co. Ltd. vs. Kumar Naresh Narayan Roy, AIR 1924 PC 144 and held that persons are not permitted to take forcible possession. They must obtain such possession as they are entitled to by proper course of law. In our jurisprudence governed by the rule of law even an unauthorized occupant can be ejected only in the manner provided by law.
58. Having said so, once again side by side we propose to turn to the provisions of the A.P. Land Encroachment Act,1905 and the Public Premises Act for comparative study.
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59. If one turns to the provisions of the A.P. Land Encroachment Act, 1905, the said Act was enacted in 1905. It was amended in 1950 by the Madras Land Encroachment Act, 1950 and, was further amended by the A.P. Land Encroachment (Amendment) Act, 1980. The said Act was brought on the Statute Book to provide measures for checking unauthorized occupation of the lands which are the property of Government. Section 14 provides for bar of jurisdiction of Civil Courts to the extent of decision made or order passed or proceedings taken by any Officer or authority or State Government under the Act, not being the decision, order or proceeding affecting the title to the land of a person. In other words, wherever the dispute relating to the title of the land of a person is involved the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is kept intact. As against this, as already pointed out, the Public Premises Act provides for a specific bar of jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain any suit or proceeding in respect of eviction of any person who is in unauthorized occupation of any public premises.
60. As against above, let us take complete survey of the Public Premises Act to find out whether or not, it answers the requirement of due course of law. Section 4 requires the Estate Officer to issue show cause notice to the person concerned before ordering eviction. Section 5 requires him to take the evidence that may be adduced by the parties concerned, give them fair and reasonable opportunity of being heard and then pass an order in which reasons are required to be recorded in writing. 30 days' time is required to be given before the order of eviction could be enforced. The Appellate authority's powers are not circumscribed in any way by Section 9. On the other hand, sub-section (4) of Section 9 requires the Appellate Authority to dispose of the appeal as expeditiously as possible. Under the ordinary law, the appellate authority's power to take additional evidence is somewhat restricted by order XLI Rule 27 CPC. There is no such such restriction on the power of the District Judge in appeal under section 9 to direct the taking of additional evidence. His 32
powers are very wide indeed. It is true that the procedure to be followed either by the Estate Officer or by the District Judge, while hearing the appeal, is not provided in the Act but is required to be provided under the Rules made by the Central Government u/s 13 of the Act. The rules show that while taking evidence, the Estate Officer is not bound to record the evidence verbatim but may record a mere summary of the evidence. Though the Rules confer on Estate Officer to record a mere summary of evidence, it is always open for the party to make a request to record evidence verbatim in special circumstances. Even if the Estate Officer rejects such a prayer, the District Judge as Appellate Authority can cure the defect. Thus, by requiring a speedy hearing of the dispute by the Estate Officer and providing an appeal to a senior judicial officer like a District Judge and making adequate provisions for fair hearing for all parties, the Act confers a distinct benefit, and cannot be said to be prejudicial to the occupants. The provisions of the Act fully comply with the requirement of due course of law. The Estate Officer though an Executive Officer is required to decide the matter judiciously by a reasoned order after giving the person affected reasonable chance of presenting his entire case and the appeal is provided to ordinarily constituted Court of District Judge. Section 15 has taken away complete jurisdiction of the civil court to entertain suit for eviction of any person, who is in unauthorised occupation of the public premises.
61. Having taken a survey of the provisions of the Public Premises Act, we have no hesitation to hold that it provides complete due machinery answering the test of due course of law. As against this, no such comprehensive provisions are to be found in the A.P. Land Encroachment Act,1905 and that there was no bar to file civil suit to remove encroachment from the Government land. Thus, the case of T.K.Rao (supra) is also distinguishable on comparative provisions of the Act. It is thus not necessary for Respondents to first go to civil court to seek declaration of their title and thereafter resort to the provisions of Public 33
Premises Act. The submission made in this behalf is hopelessly misconceived and misplaced.
62. The Apex Court in the case of M/s Annamalai Club vs. Govt. of Tamil Nadu (AIR 1997 SC 3650) had an occasion to consider the provisions of Tamil Nadu Public Premises Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants ) Act (1 of 1976) which contains provisions more or less similar to the Public Premises Act. The Apex Court in the said judgment was pleased to hold that there was no need for the State to file a suit for eviction and that the notice in compliance with the principles of natural justice would be sufficient giving reasonable 10 to 15 days to vacate the premises and to deliver the vacant and peaceful possession and thereafter Government would be free to resume possession. In the aforesaid view of the matter reliance placed on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Govt. of A.P. vs. T K Rao (supra), is misplaced, in our considered view.
63. According to us, the Estate Officer appointed under S.3 of the said Act as well as the Appellate Authority under S.9 thereof have only to satisfy themselves that the facts giving rise to their jurisdiction have been established.
64. On the factual matrix, the Estate Officer will have to determine as to whether or not, the present premises would fall within the expression "belonging to the Central Government" in the definition of "public premises" in S.2 (e) of the said Act. There is no doubt that expression "belonging to" does not mean the same thing as " owned by". The two expressions have two different connotations. The expression "belonging to" will take within its sweep not only ownership but also rights lesser than that of ownership. It must be remembered in this connection that the expressions used in the statute are to be interpreted and given meaning in the context in which they 34
are used. The present Act has been placed on the statute book to give a summary remedy to the Government to evict persons in occupation of public premises to obviate the long ordeal of trial in a Civil Court and of further proceedings thereafter. Hence a wider meaning will have to be given to the expressions used in the Act for defining the concept of public premises.
65. In AIR 1965 SC 1923 ( Mamomed Amir Ahmed Khan Vs. Municipal Board of Sitapur), the Supreme Court was called upon to consider the expression "belonging to me" used by the tenant in an application to the Compensation Officer under Act 26 of 1948 for the Rehabilitation of Refugees. While commenting upon this in para 14 of the judgment the Court observed as follows :-
"Now to revert to paragraphs 2,5 and 8 which the learned Judges considered amounted to a clear and unequivocal denial of the Government's title, they referred in para 2 to the words 'belonging to me' as constituting a disclaimer of the tenancy and a repudiation of the landlord's title. We do not agree with that this is only a proper construction which the words are capable of bearing. Though the word "belonging " no doubt is capable of denoting an absolute title, is nevertheless not confined to connoting that sense. Even possession of an interest less than that of full ownership could be signified by that word. In Webster 'belong to' is explained as meaning inter alia ' to be owned by, be the possession of'. The precise sense which the word was meant to convey can therefore be gathered only by reading the document as a whole and adverting to the context in which it occurs. .... ...."
In Stroud's Judicial Dictionary at page 269 the word 'belonging' has been defined as follows:
35
"Property 'belonging' to a person has two general meanings, (1) ownership, (2) the absolute right of user: 'A road may be said, with perfect propriety to belong to a man who has the right to use it as of right, although the soil does not belong to him."
66. The Estate Officer will be well within its jurisdiction to first consider whether or not the subject premises would fall within the expression "public premises". He will have to consider whether could it be legitimately held that the Government has an absolute right of user of the premises in question. If this is so, then the premises can properly be said to "belong to" the government. Since we have already observed that the expression "belonging to" does not merely include the right of ownership but also something less than that and since further the premises of which the absolute right of user vests in a person can be said to belong to him. He will have to consider whether or not the present premises will squarely be embraced by the definition of "public premises" within the meaning of the said Act. It is not necessary for Estate Officer to determine ownership or title to the premises.
67. We may usefully refer, in this connection, to two authorities. In (1950) 52 Bom L R 688: (AIR 1951 Bom 205), Laxmipat Singhania v.Larsen and Toubro Ltd.), the facts were that the plaintiff had filed a suit for eviction against the defendants who were a Company to whom a portion of the building was let out. The plaintiff's predecessor had taken on lease the land from the Port Trust for constructing the building. After constructing the building, he had let out a portion of the same to the defendants. The question was whether the building belonged to the Port Trust or to the plaintiff. If it belonged to the Port Trust the Rent Court had no jurisdiction in view of S.4 (1) of the Bombay Rent Act. While holding that the building belonged to the plaintiff the Court observed as follows (at P.209 of AIR ):-
36
"These decisions in my opinion establish that there may be in relation to property a dual ownership for a limited period of time; and it would be possible to say in such cases that even a person who was not the absolute owner but had a right of ownership limited to that period was a person to who the property belonged. No doubt these cases related to movable property; but I do not conceive that the principle is any different when we are dealing with immovable property. The tests as to whether for a limited period of time a temporary ownership has been created is according to the cases (1) whether there is a demise of property ; (2) whether there is full dominion and control over the property in the demisee and (3) whether the risk of the property falls on the demisee, or the absolute owner."
68. Once the basic facts are established it is open for the Estate Officer to assume jurisdiction. Not only that but their finding that such facts do exist and therefore give them the jurisdiction can only be challenged by the procedure laid down in the said Act and not in a separate proceeding. If a Tribunal appointed under an Act is vested with jurisdiction to try cases arising out of the said Act, the Tribunal is also vested with the power to decide the existence or non-existence of facts giving rise to such jurisdiction, and the Tribunal's finding thereon even if wrong can be assailed only before the authorities if any under the Act. We may, in this connection refer to few oldest relevant authorities.
In AIR 1950 SC 222 (Province of Bombay v. Khushaldas S. Advani) at Page 242 in para 78 of the judgment the Court has observed as follows:-
"One other question arises in this connection and that relates to the second and alternative contention raised by the learned Attorney- General. When the legislature delegates powers to an authority, and 37
lays down that the powers could be exercised only if a certain state of facts exists, obviously the authority cannot act if the condition is not fulfilled. If it wrongly holds or assumes that the condition exists although it actually does not exist, its assumption of jurisdiction would be unsupportable, and could be removed by a writ of certiorari. The Legislature however may entrust the authority with a jurisdiction which includes the jurisdiction to determine whether the preliminary state of facts exists. In such cases even if the authority makes a wrong decision either of facts or law, it can be corrected by an appellate tribunal if there is any, but not by a writ of certiorari, as every authority if it acts within the jurisdiction is competent to decide both rightly or wrongly, Per Esher L.J., in Queen v. Commrs. For Special Purposes of the Income -tax ( 1988) 21 QBD 313 at p.319".
69. This authority therefore clearly lays down that where the Legislature entrusts an authority with a jurisdiction also to determine whether the preliminary state of facts exist, even if the authority makes a wrong decision whether of fact or law,it can be corrected by in Appellate Tribunal if there is any, but not by a Writ of Certiorari, as every authority is competent to decide both rightly or wrongly so long as it is given jurisdiction to do so.
70. In AIR 1955 SC 661 (Bengal Immunity Co.Ltd. v. State of Bihar ) which reiterates what is stated in the above case, it is observed in paragraph 144 as follows :-
"..... ..... We are not here concerned with a statute whose 'vires' is not in question, and which confers jurisdiction on any authority to take proceedings if certain facts exist and the inquiry directed by the authority is as to whether those facts exist. The determination in such a case is incidental to the effective exercise by the authority of its 38
undisputed jurisdiction and if, as a result of that inquiry, it came to an erroneous conclusion, there is no error of jurisdiction, and it might well be contended in that case that the remedy of the party aggrieved was to resort to the machinery provided in the statute itself by way of appeal or revision, and that a writ of prohibition would be misconceived."
71. A scrutiny of these authorities shows that the Tribunal appointed under a special Act has to satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction to pass orders. The Tribunal is not the last person to decide the question whether the jurisdictional fact has been rightly or wrongly decided. If the decision is without evidence, perverse, contrary to facts or without application of mind, it can be corrected by the higher forum.
72. We have no manner of doubt that the Estate Officer will exercise powers as indicated herein-above and shall proceed to try the proceedings in accordance with law. The jurisdiction of every judicial or quasi judicial Tribunal is derived from and limited by the statute or other instrument by which it has been created and every judicial or quasi judicial Tribunal has power to determine the boundaries of its own jurisdiction. Indeed it has been said that every such Tribunal should, of its own motion, consider the question of jurisdiction over any matter brought before it even though it is not raised by the parties. It is well recognized practice of the Courts that when person challenges the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, the Court declines to examine the question until that has been examined and pronounced upon by the Tribunal itself. The superior Court is not expected to proceed on the assumption that the Tribunal will go beyond its jurisdiction and should, therefore, refrain from interfering before the inferior Tribunal has had an opportunity of considering whether any of the matters in controversy between the parties fall within its jurisdiction. 39
73. For these reasons, we are of the opinion that the prayer for issuance of writ of mandamus was incompetent and that the application for issue of writ of prohibition was premature. The petition is, therefore liable to be dismissed with costs.
74. We have prima facie considered the question of survival of cause of action in favour of the respondents to initiate eviction proceedings under the provisions of the Public Premises Act leaving the question open for being tried by the authorities under the Act on its own merits. As stated, lengthy arguments were advanced with regard to the rights of the rival parties in the subject property which, in our considered opinion, will have to be considered by the Estate Officer while finding out whether or not the subject property could be well within the sweep of the 'Public Premises' as defined under the provisions of the Act. Any expression of ours - or any observations direct or indirect, should not be construed as an expression of opinion on merits. All rival contentions are kept open.
75. Having said this, so far as prayer clause (iii) is concerned, we could not find any pleading relating to any demand having been made for change of classification by the petitioners to the concerned authorities except making request to record them as owners of the subject property. In absence of demand, no writ of mandamus can be issued to change the classification of subject land. Apart from this, unless factual aspect is investigated and resolved, the said prayer cannot be considered either way. Needless to say, in the writ jurisdiction, disputed question of fact cannot be gone into. Hence, we are unable to grant prayer clause (iii) in this petition. The prayer for reclassification of land is thus kept open so as to enable the petitioners to agitate the same before the appropriate forum in an appropriate proceeding.
76. In the above view of the matter, we have no option but to dismiss the petition directing the petitioners to file their reply to the show cause notice issued by the Estate Officer within four weeks from today. The Estate 40
Officer is directed to proceed with the proceedings with expeditious despatch and conclude the same within a period of one year from the date of receipt of writ of this judgment. These directions are necessary considering the pendency of the litigation for more than nine years.
77. In the result, for the reasons recorded, Rule is discharged. Petition is dismissed with costs, quantified in the sum of Rs. 25,000/- (Rupees Twenty five thousand), payable by the petitioners to the respondents.
78. At this stage, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners prayed for continuation of stay, which was already operating during the pendency of the petition. The prayer is strongly opposed by the learned Counsel appearing for the respondents. However, considering the fact, that the stay was operating during the pendency of the petition, stay is extended for another period of six weeks from today.
(MRIDULA BHATKAR, J.) (V.C.DAGA, J.)
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