The contempt of Courts Act, 1971 does not contain any provision for review of a judgment.It is further added that while adjudicating the controversy under the Act, ordinarily, court has to look into the matter keeping in view the letter and spirit of the order which a litigant had prayed for compliance. In case court feels that order has been complied with, then while deciding a contempt proceeding, the finding should be recorded as to how and in what manner the contemner has complied with the order passed by the court. Mere a statement that the order has been complied with substantially or otherwise, shall not be sufficient to fulfil the obligation under the Act. The order must the speaking and reasoned and not vague and non-speaking. From the order, litigant must understand as to how and on what ground, the court has dropped the contempt proceeding. The observations made by the Tribunal that the order has been sufficiently complied with, seems to be not sufficient being vague in nature.
11. Now, it is well settled principle of law that every order passed by quasi-judicial authority, must be speaking and reasoned vide, K.R. Deb Vs. The Collector of Central Excise,
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
Lucknow Bench Lucknow
Mahaveer Prasad Verma Vs Central Administrative Tribunal Lucknow
2. Since pure question of law is involved, Sri I. H. Farooqui, does not intend to file counter affidavit. Hence with the consent of parties counsel, we proceed to decide the writ petition at the admission stage.
3. Instant writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, has been preferred against the impugned order passed by Central Administrative Tribunal, rejecting the petitioner's application for review/recall of order dated 10.1.2012, passed in Civil Contempt Petition No.22/2009.
4. By the order dated 10.1.2012, the contempt petition filed by the petitioner, was dismissed in his absence on the ground that the petitioner respondent has not moved any application to bring on record the successor since the contemner was transferred. Tribunal noted that an application for recall of an order passed in a contempt proceeding, is not maintainable. So far as the finding of Tribunal that recall/review application is not maintainable, seems to be correct. Virtually, recalling of the order dated 10.1.2012, will amount to review of earlier decision was was passed with the finding on merit to the extent that successor officer has not been brought on record. Review/recall or appeal are the statutory remedies, vide AIR 1966 SC 641, Harbhajan Singh v. Karam Singh and others, 1988 (14) ALR 706, Vijai Bahadur Vs. State of U.P., 1995 (26) ALR 627, Ram Jiwan Singh and others Vs. The District Inspector of Schools, Kanpur and others, 1979 (5) ALR 168, 1998 (33) ALR 456, New India Assurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Smt. Bimla Devi and others, 1997 (88) RD 562, Smt. Shivraji and others Vs. Dy. Director of Consolidation, Allahabad and others, AIR 1970 SC 1273, Patel Narshi Thakershi and others Vs. Pradyumansinghji Arjunsinghji, 1987 (13) ALR 680, Dr. (Smt.) Kuntesh Gupta Vs. Mgt. of Hindu Kanya Mahavidyalaya, Sitapur etc., AIR 1964 SC 436, Laxman Purushottam Pimputkar Vs. The State of Bombay and others, and AIR 1965 SC 1457, Patel Chunibhai Dajibha etc. Vs. Narayanrao Khanderao Jambekar and another. Unless provided under the Act, no application for review/recall may be moved. The contempt of Courts Act, 1971 does not contain any provision for review of a judgment. Hence the impugned order dated 13.9.2012 does not seem to suffer from any impropriety or illegality.
5. However, the original order dated 10.1.2012, seems to suffer from substantial illegality. The proceeding under the contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (in short the Act), deals with the individual liability with regard to compliance of court's order. A person is accountable for non-compliance of a court's order, may be punished under Section 12 of the Act. Section 2 (b) defines civil contempt and Section 2 (c) defines criminal contempt. For convenience, Section 2 (b) and 2 (c) of the Act, are reproduced as under:-
Section 2 (b) and (c) of the Act:-
(b) "civil contempt" means wilful disobedience to any judgement, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a court or wilful breach of an undertaking given to a court;
(c) "criminal contempt" means the publication (whether by words, spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible representation, or otherwise) of any matter or the doing of any other act whatsoever which--
(i) scandalizes or tends to scandalise, or lowers or tends to lower the authority of, any court, or
(ii) prejudices, or interferes or tends to interfere with the due course of any judicial proceeding , or
(iii) interferes or tends to interfere with, or obstructs or tends to obstruct, the administration of justice in any other manner."
6. For civil contempt, a person may be liable to be punished under Section 12 of the Act. For convenience, Section 12 of the Act is reproduced as under:-
"12. Punishment for contempt of court-
(1) Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act or in any other law, a contempt of court may be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to two thousand rupees, or with both;
Provided that the accused may be discharged or the punishment awarded may be remitted on apology being made to the satisfaction of the court.
Explanation - An apology shall not be rejected merely on the ground that it is qualified or conditional if the accused makes it bona fide.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, no court shall impose a sentence in excess of that specified in sub section for any contempt either in respect of itself or of a court subordinate to it.
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in this section, where a person is found guilty of a civil contempt, the court, if it considers that a fine will not meet the ends of justice and that a sentence of imprisonment is necessary shall, instead of sentencing him to simple imprisonment, direct that the he be detained in a civil prison for such period not exceeding six months as it may think fit.
(4) Where the person found guilty of contempt of court in respect of any undertaking given to a court is a company, every person who, at the time the contempt was committed, was in charge of, and was responsible to, the company for the conduct of business of the company, as well as the company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the contempt and the punishment may be enforced, with the leave of the court, by the detention in civil prison of each such person.
Provided that nothing contained in this sub section shall render any such person liable to such punishment if he proves that the contempt was committed without his knowledge or that he exercised all due diligence to prevent its commission.
(5) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub section (4) where the contempt of court referred to therein has been committed by a company and it is provided that the contempt has been committed with the consent or connivance of, or is attributable to any neglect on the part of, any director, manger, secretary or other officer of the company, such director, manager, secretary or other officer shall also be deemed to be guilty of the be contempt and the punishment may be enforced, with the leave of the court, by the detention in civil prison of such director, manager, secretary or other officer.
Explanation - For the purpose of sub sections (4) and (5)-
(a) "company "means any body corporate and includes a firm or other association of individuals, and
(b) "director" in relation to a firm, means a partner in the firm."
7. Legislature to their wisdom, has provided that accused may be punished or may be exonerated by the court subject to establishment of charges on tendering apology to the satisfaction of the court. The definition clause (supra) as well as provisions contained under Section 12 of the Act, indicate the initiation of proceeding against a person who may be held liable for contempt of courts. In case prima facie a case is made out, appropriate court may issue notice to contemner and may be summoned. In case a notice is issued, then contemner shall not be deemed to be discharged from the contempt proceeding unless, he or she is held to be not guilty or otherwise discharged. Merely because an officer has been transferred during the pendency of contempt proceeding, he or she shall not be deemed to be discharged under the Act. Accordingly, only because the contemner was transferred, he shall not be deemed to be discharged. In case successor officer has not been brought on record, the contempt petition shall not become infructuous. The court should proceed against the original contemner who has been summoned on account of violation of order of the court. In case the contemner is found guilty, he may be punished.
8. The successor officer or the officer who has joined in place of the contemner, may be summoned in case sufficient material is brought on record and it is pointed out by the aggrieved person that the order of the court was brought to the notice of the successor officer and he or she, has also not complied with the court's order. Mere joining at the place of contemner, shall not prima facie make out a case to summon an officer. As held, in case attention of the successor officer is brought to the order passed by the court and he or she fails to comply with it, then court may summon and prosecute for contempt of court. In any case, the successor officer shall not substitute the original contemner but he or she shall be additionally tried under the Act for committing contempt of court along with original contemner.
9. In view of the above, the order dated 10.1.2012, seems to suffer from substantial illegality. The observations made by the Tribunal that contempt proceeding cannot proceed against the incumbent who has already been transferred, is not sustainable.
10. It is further added that while adjudicating the controversy under the Act, ordinarily, court has to look into the matter keeping in view the letter and spirit of the order which a litigant had prayed for compliance. In case court feels that order has been complied with, then while deciding a contempt proceeding, the finding should be recorded as to how and in what manner the contemner has complied with the order passed by the court. Mere a statement that the order has been complied with substantially or otherwise, shall not be sufficient to fulfil the obligation under the Act. The order must the speaking and reasoned and not vague and non-speaking. From the order, litigant must understand as to how and on what ground, the court has dropped the contempt proceeding. The observations made by the Tribunal that the order has been sufficiently complied with, seems to be not sufficient being vague in nature.
11. Now, it is well settled principle of law that every order passed by quasi-judicial authority, must be speaking and reasoned vide, K.R. Deb Vs. The Collector of Central Excise, Shillong, AIR 1971 SC 1447; State of Assam & Anr. Vs. J.N. Roy Biswas, AIR 1975 SC 2277; State of Punjab Vs. Kashmir Singh, 1997 SCC (L&S) 88; Union of India & Ors. Vs. P. Thayagarajan, AIR 1999 SC 449; and Union of India Vs. K.D. Pandey & Anr., (2002) 10 SCC 471; (JT 2010(4) SC 35, Assistant Commissioner, Commercial, Tax Department, Works, Contract and Leasing, Quota Vs. Shukla and Brothers, 2010 (4) SCC 785, CCT Vs. Shukla and Brothers.
12. In the case of Shukla and Brothers (supra), their lordships held that the reason is the very life of law. When the reason of a law once ceases, the law itself generally ceases. Such is the significance of reasoning in any rule of law. Giving reasons furthers the cause of justice as well as avoids uncertainty, to quote:-
"Reasons are the soul of orders. Non-recording of reasons could lead to dual infirmities; firstly, it may cause prejudice to the affected party and secondly, more particularly, hamper the proper administration of justice. These principle are not only applicable to administrative or executive actions, but they apply with equal force and, in fact, with a greater degree of precision to judicial pronouncements."
The concept of reasoned judgement has become an indispensable part of the basic rule of law ans , in fact, is a mandatory requirement of the procedural law."
13. In one other case, reported in JT (2010 (4) SC 35: Assistant Commissioner, Commercial, Tax Department, Works, Contract and Leasing, Quota. Vs. Shukla and Brothers, their lordships of Hon'ble Supreme Court held that it shall be obligatory on the part of the judicial or quasi judicial authority to pass a reasoned order while exercising statutory jurisdiction. Relevant portion from the judgment of Assistant Commissioner (supra) is reproduced as under:-
"The principle of natural justice has twin ingredients; firstly, the person who is likely to be adversely affected by the action of the authorities should be given notice to show cause thereof and granted an opportunity of hearing and secondly, the orders so passed by the authorities should give reason for arriving at any conclusion showing proper application of mind. Violation of either of them could in the given facts and circumstances of the case, vitiate the order itself. Such rule being applicable to the administrative authorities certainly requires that the judgment of the Court should meet with this requirement with high degree of satisfaction. The order of an administrative authority may not provide reasons like a judgment but the order must be supported by the reasons of rationality. The distinction between passing of an order by an administrative or quasi-judicial authority has practically extinguished and both are required to pass reasoned orders."
14. Thus, it is well settled proposition of law that not only judicial or quasi-judicial order but even the administrative order affecting the civil rights of the citizens, should be reasoned one to cope with the requirement of Article 14 of the Constitution. Unreasoned order creates unstability and distrust in people's mind towards the administration or the authority who has passed such order. In democratic polity, there is no scope to pass an order affecting civil rights of the citizens which may be unreasoned. It is constitutional obligation and right of the citizens to know the reasons in the decision making process affecting their right or cause.
15. Accordingly, the writ petition is partly allowed. A writ in the nature of certiorari is issued quashing the impugned order dated 10.1.2012, passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal in Civil Contempt Petition No.22/2009 with consequential benefit. Tribunal is further commanded to restore the Civil Contempt Petition No.22/2009 to its original number and decide the same afresh. In case any application is moved to bring on record the successor officer and case is made out against him, then Tribunal shall consider such application in accordance with law.
No order as to costs.
[Justice Dr. Satish Chandra] [Justice Devi Prasad Singh]
Order Date :- 17.1.2013
Rajneesh AR-PS)
Print Page
11. Now, it is well settled principle of law that every order passed by quasi-judicial authority, must be speaking and reasoned vide, K.R. Deb Vs. The Collector of Central Excise,
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
Lucknow Bench Lucknow
Mahaveer Prasad Verma Vs Central Administrative Tribunal Lucknow
Citation;2013 CRLJ (NOC)559 allah1
1. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner Sri Anoop Srivastava, Sri I.H. Farooqui, learned counsel for Union of India. 2. Since pure question of law is involved, Sri I. H. Farooqui, does not intend to file counter affidavit. Hence with the consent of parties counsel, we proceed to decide the writ petition at the admission stage.
3. Instant writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, has been preferred against the impugned order passed by Central Administrative Tribunal, rejecting the petitioner's application for review/recall of order dated 10.1.2012, passed in Civil Contempt Petition No.22/2009.
4. By the order dated 10.1.2012, the contempt petition filed by the petitioner, was dismissed in his absence on the ground that the petitioner respondent has not moved any application to bring on record the successor since the contemner was transferred. Tribunal noted that an application for recall of an order passed in a contempt proceeding, is not maintainable. So far as the finding of Tribunal that recall/review application is not maintainable, seems to be correct. Virtually, recalling of the order dated 10.1.2012, will amount to review of earlier decision was was passed with the finding on merit to the extent that successor officer has not been brought on record. Review/recall or appeal are the statutory remedies, vide AIR 1966 SC 641, Harbhajan Singh v. Karam Singh and others, 1988 (14) ALR 706, Vijai Bahadur Vs. State of U.P., 1995 (26) ALR 627, Ram Jiwan Singh and others Vs. The District Inspector of Schools, Kanpur and others, 1979 (5) ALR 168, 1998 (33) ALR 456, New India Assurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Smt. Bimla Devi and others, 1997 (88) RD 562, Smt. Shivraji and others Vs. Dy. Director of Consolidation, Allahabad and others, AIR 1970 SC 1273, Patel Narshi Thakershi and others Vs. Pradyumansinghji Arjunsinghji, 1987 (13) ALR 680, Dr. (Smt.) Kuntesh Gupta Vs. Mgt. of Hindu Kanya Mahavidyalaya, Sitapur etc., AIR 1964 SC 436, Laxman Purushottam Pimputkar Vs. The State of Bombay and others, and AIR 1965 SC 1457, Patel Chunibhai Dajibha etc. Vs. Narayanrao Khanderao Jambekar and another. Unless provided under the Act, no application for review/recall may be moved. The contempt of Courts Act, 1971 does not contain any provision for review of a judgment. Hence the impugned order dated 13.9.2012 does not seem to suffer from any impropriety or illegality.
5. However, the original order dated 10.1.2012, seems to suffer from substantial illegality. The proceeding under the contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (in short the Act), deals with the individual liability with regard to compliance of court's order. A person is accountable for non-compliance of a court's order, may be punished under Section 12 of the Act. Section 2 (b) defines civil contempt and Section 2 (c) defines criminal contempt. For convenience, Section 2 (b) and 2 (c) of the Act, are reproduced as under:-
Section 2 (b) and (c) of the Act:-
(b) "civil contempt" means wilful disobedience to any judgement, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a court or wilful breach of an undertaking given to a court;
(c) "criminal contempt" means the publication (whether by words, spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible representation, or otherwise) of any matter or the doing of any other act whatsoever which--
(i) scandalizes or tends to scandalise, or lowers or tends to lower the authority of, any court, or
(ii) prejudices, or interferes or tends to interfere with the due course of any judicial proceeding , or
(iii) interferes or tends to interfere with, or obstructs or tends to obstruct, the administration of justice in any other manner."
6. For civil contempt, a person may be liable to be punished under Section 12 of the Act. For convenience, Section 12 of the Act is reproduced as under:-
"12. Punishment for contempt of court-
(1) Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act or in any other law, a contempt of court may be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to two thousand rupees, or with both;
Provided that the accused may be discharged or the punishment awarded may be remitted on apology being made to the satisfaction of the court.
Explanation - An apology shall not be rejected merely on the ground that it is qualified or conditional if the accused makes it bona fide.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, no court shall impose a sentence in excess of that specified in sub section for any contempt either in respect of itself or of a court subordinate to it.
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in this section, where a person is found guilty of a civil contempt, the court, if it considers that a fine will not meet the ends of justice and that a sentence of imprisonment is necessary shall, instead of sentencing him to simple imprisonment, direct that the he be detained in a civil prison for such period not exceeding six months as it may think fit.
(4) Where the person found guilty of contempt of court in respect of any undertaking given to a court is a company, every person who, at the time the contempt was committed, was in charge of, and was responsible to, the company for the conduct of business of the company, as well as the company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the contempt and the punishment may be enforced, with the leave of the court, by the detention in civil prison of each such person.
Provided that nothing contained in this sub section shall render any such person liable to such punishment if he proves that the contempt was committed without his knowledge or that he exercised all due diligence to prevent its commission.
(5) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub section (4) where the contempt of court referred to therein has been committed by a company and it is provided that the contempt has been committed with the consent or connivance of, or is attributable to any neglect on the part of, any director, manger, secretary or other officer of the company, such director, manager, secretary or other officer shall also be deemed to be guilty of the be contempt and the punishment may be enforced, with the leave of the court, by the detention in civil prison of such director, manager, secretary or other officer.
Explanation - For the purpose of sub sections (4) and (5)-
(a) "company "means any body corporate and includes a firm or other association of individuals, and
(b) "director" in relation to a firm, means a partner in the firm."
7. Legislature to their wisdom, has provided that accused may be punished or may be exonerated by the court subject to establishment of charges on tendering apology to the satisfaction of the court. The definition clause (supra) as well as provisions contained under Section 12 of the Act, indicate the initiation of proceeding against a person who may be held liable for contempt of courts. In case prima facie a case is made out, appropriate court may issue notice to contemner and may be summoned. In case a notice is issued, then contemner shall not be deemed to be discharged from the contempt proceeding unless, he or she is held to be not guilty or otherwise discharged. Merely because an officer has been transferred during the pendency of contempt proceeding, he or she shall not be deemed to be discharged under the Act. Accordingly, only because the contemner was transferred, he shall not be deemed to be discharged. In case successor officer has not been brought on record, the contempt petition shall not become infructuous. The court should proceed against the original contemner who has been summoned on account of violation of order of the court. In case the contemner is found guilty, he may be punished.
8. The successor officer or the officer who has joined in place of the contemner, may be summoned in case sufficient material is brought on record and it is pointed out by the aggrieved person that the order of the court was brought to the notice of the successor officer and he or she, has also not complied with the court's order. Mere joining at the place of contemner, shall not prima facie make out a case to summon an officer. As held, in case attention of the successor officer is brought to the order passed by the court and he or she fails to comply with it, then court may summon and prosecute for contempt of court. In any case, the successor officer shall not substitute the original contemner but he or she shall be additionally tried under the Act for committing contempt of court along with original contemner.
9. In view of the above, the order dated 10.1.2012, seems to suffer from substantial illegality. The observations made by the Tribunal that contempt proceeding cannot proceed against the incumbent who has already been transferred, is not sustainable.
10. It is further added that while adjudicating the controversy under the Act, ordinarily, court has to look into the matter keeping in view the letter and spirit of the order which a litigant had prayed for compliance. In case court feels that order has been complied with, then while deciding a contempt proceeding, the finding should be recorded as to how and in what manner the contemner has complied with the order passed by the court. Mere a statement that the order has been complied with substantially or otherwise, shall not be sufficient to fulfil the obligation under the Act. The order must the speaking and reasoned and not vague and non-speaking. From the order, litigant must understand as to how and on what ground, the court has dropped the contempt proceeding. The observations made by the Tribunal that the order has been sufficiently complied with, seems to be not sufficient being vague in nature.
11. Now, it is well settled principle of law that every order passed by quasi-judicial authority, must be speaking and reasoned vide, K.R. Deb Vs. The Collector of Central Excise, Shillong, AIR 1971 SC 1447; State of Assam & Anr. Vs. J.N. Roy Biswas, AIR 1975 SC 2277; State of Punjab Vs. Kashmir Singh, 1997 SCC (L&S) 88; Union of India & Ors. Vs. P. Thayagarajan, AIR 1999 SC 449; and Union of India Vs. K.D. Pandey & Anr., (2002) 10 SCC 471; (JT 2010(4) SC 35, Assistant Commissioner, Commercial, Tax Department, Works, Contract and Leasing, Quota Vs. Shukla and Brothers, 2010 (4) SCC 785, CCT Vs. Shukla and Brothers.
12. In the case of Shukla and Brothers (supra), their lordships held that the reason is the very life of law. When the reason of a law once ceases, the law itself generally ceases. Such is the significance of reasoning in any rule of law. Giving reasons furthers the cause of justice as well as avoids uncertainty, to quote:-
"Reasons are the soul of orders. Non-recording of reasons could lead to dual infirmities; firstly, it may cause prejudice to the affected party and secondly, more particularly, hamper the proper administration of justice. These principle are not only applicable to administrative or executive actions, but they apply with equal force and, in fact, with a greater degree of precision to judicial pronouncements."
The concept of reasoned judgement has become an indispensable part of the basic rule of law ans , in fact, is a mandatory requirement of the procedural law."
13. In one other case, reported in JT (2010 (4) SC 35: Assistant Commissioner, Commercial, Tax Department, Works, Contract and Leasing, Quota. Vs. Shukla and Brothers, their lordships of Hon'ble Supreme Court held that it shall be obligatory on the part of the judicial or quasi judicial authority to pass a reasoned order while exercising statutory jurisdiction. Relevant portion from the judgment of Assistant Commissioner (supra) is reproduced as under:-
"The principle of natural justice has twin ingredients; firstly, the person who is likely to be adversely affected by the action of the authorities should be given notice to show cause thereof and granted an opportunity of hearing and secondly, the orders so passed by the authorities should give reason for arriving at any conclusion showing proper application of mind. Violation of either of them could in the given facts and circumstances of the case, vitiate the order itself. Such rule being applicable to the administrative authorities certainly requires that the judgment of the Court should meet with this requirement with high degree of satisfaction. The order of an administrative authority may not provide reasons like a judgment but the order must be supported by the reasons of rationality. The distinction between passing of an order by an administrative or quasi-judicial authority has practically extinguished and both are required to pass reasoned orders."
14. Thus, it is well settled proposition of law that not only judicial or quasi-judicial order but even the administrative order affecting the civil rights of the citizens, should be reasoned one to cope with the requirement of Article 14 of the Constitution. Unreasoned order creates unstability and distrust in people's mind towards the administration or the authority who has passed such order. In democratic polity, there is no scope to pass an order affecting civil rights of the citizens which may be unreasoned. It is constitutional obligation and right of the citizens to know the reasons in the decision making process affecting their right or cause.
15. Accordingly, the writ petition is partly allowed. A writ in the nature of certiorari is issued quashing the impugned order dated 10.1.2012, passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal in Civil Contempt Petition No.22/2009 with consequential benefit. Tribunal is further commanded to restore the Civil Contempt Petition No.22/2009 to its original number and decide the same afresh. In case any application is moved to bring on record the successor officer and case is made out against him, then Tribunal shall consider such application in accordance with law.
No order as to costs.
[Justice Dr. Satish Chandra] [Justice Devi Prasad Singh]
Order Date :- 17.1.2013
Rajneesh AR-PS)
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