Bombay High Court
The State Of Maharashtra vs Krishnaawatar Daulatsingh Madan on 2 March, 2012
Bench: B. P. Dharmadhikari, P. D. Kode
CORAM : B.P.DHARMADHIKARI
AND P.D. KODE, JJ.
JUDGEMENT. (Per B.P. Dharmadhikari, J)
By this appeal filed under Section 96 of the Civil Procedure Code, the appellant- State has questioned the judgment and decree passed by the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Yavatmal in Special Civil Suit No. 4/1981 on 31.12.1990, decreeing the suit of respondent/plaintiff for amount of Rs. 61,41,048/- and rejecting appellant/defendant's counter claim of Rs. 15,00,000/-. Trial Court has directed the appellant/defendant to pay interest at 12% p.a., from the date of suit till realization of the amount. This Court has admitted the appeal on 02.05.1991 and after hearing both the sides, stayed the execution of the decree on 28.10.1991. This stay order was sought to be reviewed by filing Civil Application No. 782/1992 which is rejected on 08.12.1993. Respondent (original plaintiff) then approached the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 324/1995 and it was dismissed on 02.01.1995. On 08.12.1993, while rejecting another review application this Court had directed expeditious disposal of the appeal.
2. We have heard Shri C.S. Kaptan, learned Special Counsel for the appellant/defendant- State. He has taken us through entire material on record in an attempt to persuade us to comprehend Fa152.91
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injustice done to the defendants. We, therefore, find it necessary to reproduce his arguments in little details. Shri Anand Parchure, learned Counsel has opposed him on behalf of the respondent/plaintiff contractor.
3. Shri Kaptan, learned Counsel at the outset has pointed out that suit claim was only for Rs. 18,86,564/- and thus the decree granted is for amounts not claimed by the plaintiff. He further states that it was basically a suit for accounts and as such suit by a contractor is not maintainable, it needed dismissal. The plaintiff accepted receipt of entire money for work executed by him in accordance with the contract at Exh.62 between the parties, in pursuance of 12th running bill raised by him. After 12th running bill, he abandoned the work and it was completed departmentally. In view of his admission, the suit could not have been decreed. The learned Counsel states that a document referred to as revised estimate or re-revised estimate, not duly proved and not exhibited, has been made the basis by the plaintiff for pressing his claim. That document at Article-I has been accepted by the Trial Court ignoring the mandate of Section 63 read with Section 65 of the Evidence Act, and by treating rates therein as applicable, the suit has been decreed. His contention is, the contract at Exh.62 never underwent any change and still by placing reliance upon an Fa152.91
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inadmissible piece of evidence, the suit has been decreed. He contends that all leads and lifts were included in contract rate agreed between the parties and Clause 38[2] of document at Exh.62 also took care of excess work. In this situation, the Court below has committed an error in relying upon the documents which did not bind the parties and which did not regulate the work executed by the plaintiff.
4. He contends that the tender advertisement in this respect was published on 03.11.1976 and offer of plaintiff 10% above the estimated rate fixed in tender was accepted. Accordingly agreement at Exh.62 was reached between the parties on 24.06.1977. The work was to be completed by 30.12.1978. Plaintiff stopped the work on 01.04.1978 and again continued with it from 16.10.1978. On 12.02.1979, he stopped the work. On 25.7. 1979, he issued notice under Section 80 CPC, and thereafter on 12.11.1979 there were some negotiations between the plaintiff and the defendants before the Hon'ble Minister. On 26.11.1979, he again resumed work. On 23.01.1980, 12th running bill was paid to the plaintiff and from 016.03.1980 he abandoned the work. He invites attention to the evidence of plaintiff to urge that at the time of abandonment, he had completed about 50% of the work, and in this background he invites attention to paragraph no.31 in plaint to point out the claim as made. Fa152.91
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This position has been totally overlooked by the Trial Court, which has preferred to go beyond pleadings of plaintiff and to decree the suit for claims not included in the plaint. He points out that after the plaintiff abandoned, the remaining work was required to be completed departmentally and for filing counter claim a document was prepared which is at Exh.138. The document separately indicated the work completed by the plaintiff and balance work completed by the defendant/appellant. The plaintiff never disputed the exact quantity of work completed by him and inspite of this position, the Trial Court has proceeded to pay him for the work completed by the defendant. He contends that the basic burden to maintain accounts of his day to day work and to show progress therein, was upon the plaintiff and admittedly the plaintiff did not maintain any such document, though he was required to do it by Exh.62.
5. Our attention has been invited to issues as framed by the Trial Court to show that there was no issue regarding any re-revised estimate or Article-I and inspite of that only because of that document, amount in excess of contract rate has been paid to plaintiff. The Trial Court has noted the estimate prepared prior to issuance of the tender notice in 1974 at Exh.132 and the re-revised estimated at Article-I. He has invited attention to paragraph no.19 of the judgment of Trial Court Fa152.91
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to show how Trial Court has found that the defendant/ appellant failed to produce revised estimate although it was required and called upon to produce the same vide notice to produce document Exh. Nos. 19, 51, 127 and 149. The learned Counsel states that the defendant pointed out to Trial Court vide Exh.128 that the draft of re-revised estimate was missing since June, 1981 and doubt that it was removed by the plaintiff, was also expressed before the Trial Court. The evidence of plaintiff in this respect clearly shows that he did not get copy from any authentic source and he also did not explain how copy marked as Article- I came in his custody. The Assistant Engineers of defendant, Mr. Rewatkar, examined by the plaintiff as his witness at P.W.2, had stated that original re-revised estimate was submitted to Executive Engineer by Assistant Engineer and it was also brought on record that such re- revised estimate has no force till it is approved by the Superintending Engineer. Plaintiff also accepted this position. Shri Kaptan, learned Counsel therefore, states that preparation of some document by the department does not assume any importance till contract at Exh.62 undergoes a change or novation. Mere admission that such a document was prepared, therefore, does not tantamount to substitution of Exh.62 to that extent. The Court below therefore, could not have relied upon said document. The fact that re-revised estimate was sent to Superintending Engineer does not mean that the rates mentioned Fa152.91
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therein or quantity mentioned therein, became binding. There was no extra item and preparation of "extra item rate list" [EIRL] as per Clause 14 of Exh.62 therefore, could not have been relied upon by the Trial Court for any purpose. The Trial Court has unnecessarily drawn adverse inference and treated Article-I as a contract between the parties by ignoring admission given by the plaintiff himself. The document at Exh.137 shows work done and payments effected therefor and finding that it is faulty, is perverse and there was no such case pleaded by the plaintiff. The inference that original estimates are faulty is, totally unsustainable.
6. To further substantiate this contention, he has invited attention to plaint to demonstrate how the plaintiff has attempted to show initial estimates prepared, were faulty and how he has attempted to introduce story of preparation of tentative revised estimates. The learned Counsel states that there is an emphatic assertion about such revised estimate and submission of those estimates to higher authorities for appropriate decision is admitted by the plaintiff. Without pointing out any further developments and without even proving novation of contract, straightway plaintiff has attempted to justify his claim as per that estimate. The story of utilization of available material at 90% and actual measurement of such utilization at Fa152.91
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100% in paragraph no.26 is, also pressed into service by him for this purpose.
7. Evidence of P.W.1 (Plaintiff), is read out to show how plaintiff claims that revised estimate was prepared when he wrote letter and how he got knowledge thereof from the Assistant Engineer and Executive Engineer. He claimed that revised estimated covered number of items for making extra payment and he was not given any payment accordingly. He deposed that he gave a notice under Section 80 Code of Civil Procedure on 25.07.1979 for said payment, but it was then withdrawn. His evidence that he did not get document at Article-I officially, or absence of signature of any officer of defendant/appellant on that document, has not been properly appreciated. Plaintiff expressly accepted that Article-I did not get any legal value or sanctity till it is approved by the Government. Shri Kaptan, learned Counsel states that plaintiff also accepted return of re-revised estimate by the Superintending Engineer, without according approval and it's not forwarding to State Government at any time.
8. In this background, evidence of P.W.2 - Mr. Rewatkar who happened to be Assistant Engineer in employment with defendant is relied upon by Shri Kaptan, to show that Exhibit No.62 was only Fa152.91
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contract, and the statement of witness in chief that Article-I was revised estimate, prepared before issuing tender has not been correctly looked into. In cross-examination this witness stated that his signature did not exist on any part of Article-I and this witness also clarified that Article-I was in no way concerned with the contract Exh.62. He has denied that he prepared revised estimate to see that the plaintiff is paid at higher rates. He accepted original estimate Exh.132 and was not in a position to state whether the contract Exh.62 was prepared prior to Article-I. This witness accepted that CSR mentioned in Article-I is of the year 1977-78.
9. Evidence of P.W.3- Mr. Vasant Ratnaparkhi, Executive Engineer in employment with the defendant is also shown to this Court. This witness stated that revised estimate was prepared in respect of the contract Exh.62 by Mr. Rewatkar, and it was then sent to the higher authority. The revised estimate was as per CSR of 1977-78 and it was prepared as increase in cost was more than 5%. In cross-examination, he accepted that after contract is entered into, there are no powers either with the Executive Engineer or the Chief Engineer to change the rates therein and he also accepted that Article-I did not bear his signature. He also could not say whether Article-I on record was as per the original revised estimate or not. This witness also pointed out that Fa152.91
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Clause 38[2] of Exh.62 contained a provision for making extra payment for extra quantum of work.
10. Shri Kaptan, learned Counsel then invites attention to Section 63 of the Evidence Act to show that above evidence demonstrates that Article-I is not covered under Section 63[2] or under Section 63[3]. It is contended that the suit therefore, could not have been decided on the strength of revised estimate at all. He invited attention to evidence of D.W.2 Mr. Kelkar, retired Executive Engineer who stated that he had not seen any re-revised estimate and revised estimate also. His clear assertion that revised estimate or re-revised estimate were irrelevant, is also pressed into service by Shri Kaptan, learned Counsel. Attention is invited to cross-examination in paragraph no.22 to show that there, this witness has not admitted contents of Article-I and inference of such acceptance drawn by the Trial Court is, therefore, misconceived. Learned Counsel states that all these material facts have not been put to P.W.2 - Rewatkar by the plaintiff and hence, the Trial Court could not have accepted the same.
11. Judgment of learned Single Judge of this Court reported at AIR 1983 Bom. 1 (Om Prakash Berlia and another .vrs. Unit Trust of India and others), is pressed into service to urge that it was for the Fa152.91
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plaintiff to prove truth of contents of Article-I. Learned Counsel further states that unless and until existence of another valid and legal contract changing liabilities or obligations cast by Exh.62 was proved on record, the secondary evidence in the shape of Article-I is totally inadmissible. He is relying upon the judgment reported at 2007 [5] SCC 730 (J. Yashoda .vrs. K. Shobharani). He also points out that P.W.2 - Rewatkar who claims to be author of re-revised estimate, has clearly stated that Article-I is not as per original. Learned counsel therefore, states that the entire decree in favour of plaintiff because of said Article-I, needs to be quashed and set aside.
12. Document of contract Exh.62 is also relied upon by him to urge that arrangement therein is, final and binding. He points out that it is percentage or rate basis contract and plaintiff had quoted 15% above the tendered rate. However, later on he reduced it to 10%, accordingly agreement has been executed between the parties and hence, CSR becomes irrelevant. Clause 2.3 therein which cast obligation upon the tenderer [plaintiff] to examine all documents, forms, statements, special conditions, schedule drawings etc., and obliges him to get fully acquainted with physical details of sites, its location, location of quarries, labour conditions, prior to tendering for work, is heavily relied upon. Clause 2.4 expressly stipulating that no increase in Fa152.91
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rate shall be granted in any circumstances, and rate shall be exclusive of all taxes, is also relied upon. Condition requiring plaintiff to sigh each page of Exh.62 and its fulfillment is also shown. Clause 2.10 specifically stipulated that rates quoted by the plaintiff are inclusive of all leads and lifts involved, even if the material is required to be brought from areas other than one shown in the quarry charts with the agreement and cast burden upon plaintiff to get his doubts clarified, is read out to the Court. Clause 3.3.1 expecting plaintiff to get acquainted with all site conditions, results of trial pits, is also pressed into service. Clause 3.3.3 pointed out to plaintiff the work likely to be departmentally executed, though included in the tender. The position of approach roads is disclosed in Clause 3.8 and absence of pucca roads for procurement of stones for rubble, masonry is also pointed out. Duty to construct and burden of its maintenance is placed upon plaintiff. Clause 3.12 regarding availability of good quality stone within 5 kms. is also read out. Non-availability of payment for extra leads and lifts as per said clause, is also relied upon. Clause 4.1 of Exh.62 defines term "Engineer-In-charge"; Clause 4.3 about drawing and specifications and duty cast upon the plaintiff not to take advantage of any kind because of errors and omissions; Clause 4.9 to employ sufficient machinery and employees and Clause 4.17 dealing with quantities of work, are relied upon by learned Counsel to show how the Fa152.91
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document binds plaintiff in this respect. Clause 4.18 giving right to Engineer In-charge in the matter of excavations and about removal of discrepancies, seeking rectification is also relied. Maintenance of field book, longitudinal sections and cross sections and effect of contractor failing to sign them, are taken care of by Clause 4.21 . Clause 4.30 making provision for advance against construction, equipment and its recovery; Clause 4.49 providing for hiring of Government machinery or construction equipments and recovery of hire charges, are also pressed into service by the learned counsel for appellant. The obligation of contractor to be in readiness to take up the work of gorge filling during season ending May, 1978 with all necessary labour and equipments and declaration given by the contractor are all relied upon by the learned Counsel to show how binding character and impact of Exh.62 has been lost sight of by the Trial Court.
13. General Rules applicable to this contract at page 49 of Ex. 62, particularly Rule 10 prohibiting plaintiff from claiming enhanced rate for any item under contract; Rule 14 about use of Government machinery and recovery of hire charges and how Executive Engineer has accepted the contract at Ex. 62 for and on behalf of the Governor of Maharashtra, are all pressed into service. Learned Counsel argues that therefore, this is a contract regulated by Article 299 of the Constitution Fa152.91
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of India and unless and until there is an express renovation, the reliance upon any other document, like document at Article-I is, misconceived. Conditions of contract appended below these Rules (page 56 of Ex.62) about compensation for delay, provision for rescinding contract and right of Government to complete the balance work, procedure to be followed after such rescinding, as incorporated in General Conditions are read out. Clause 3 speaking of forfeiture, Clause 4 permitting action when progress of any particular portion of work is unsatisfactory; obligation and responsibility cast upon the contractor in that case and power to take possession incorporated in Clauses 4 and 5, are also shown to this Court. Clause 6 dealing with extension of time in appropriate cases and dis-entitling the contractor to any compensation for delayed handing over of site, are also read out. Clause 8 provides for payment of R.A. bills and final bill. Clause 10 requiring monthly submission of bills, is also explained. Clause 14 dealing with alterations or additions to the original specification and completion of work at same rate, provision to determine rate when such work is not specified in schedule of rates (CSR) contained in Clause 14, and clause 15 about liability of Government to pay compensation in cases of suspension, curtailment or stoppage of work are also relied upon by Shri Kaptan. Procedure to be followed if suspension has to continue beyond 90 days, rights available to plaintiff in that situation flowing from Clause 15 (2) Fa152.91
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and (3) are also pointed out. Clause 29 which shows control and position of Superintending Engineer, Clause 38 prohibiting any revision in tendered rate for (tolerable) variation in quantity upto 25% or monetary difference of not more than Rs.5000/- is also relied upon by him. If excess work is beyond limits mentioned above, procedure stipulated under contract in Clause 38.2, is to be adopted. It is further stated that if plaintiff was disputing any of these terms and conditions, he could not have tendered at all and for that purposes, learned Counsel is placing reliance upon Clause 45.
14 . Attention is invited to Schedule-B which is at page No.96 of Exh.62 to demonstrate how while dealing with the relevant tender items, like 2,3,7,8,9 to 11 etc., contract specifically stipulates that rates quoted by the plaintiff are inclusive of all leads and lifts. It is also pointed out that the quantity available for hearting and required to be borrowed, is also separately mentioned in it. Learned Counsel states that when these terms and conditions have not undergone any change, the learned Trial Court could not have accepted case of extra borrowing or more leads and lifts. Our attention has been invited to page 116 of Exh.62 to show how strata has been classified into soft strata and hard strata and how decision of Engineer in-charge regarding it is made final. The interpretation of unit price about leads and lifts given at page 120 Fa152.91
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is, also relied upon. Section 4 of Exh.62, particularly Clause 4.2 dealing with materials and prohibiting extra lead or claim for material borrowed from area other than specified one, has been relied upon to show dis-entitlement of plaintiff to any extra leads in this respect. Section 6 deals with rubble pitching makes similar provision to bar any claim for extra leads or lifts. Section 6.3 specifying mode of measurement of pitching work also expressly stipulates that rate is inclusive of all leads and lifts. Section 7 (Clause 7.1) obliging contractor to bring required quantity for pitching for toe drains from approved quarries and barring extra payment therefor, is also relied upon. Learned Counsel states that this contract which takes care of all such details is, therefore binding and determinative.
15. According to Shri Kaptan, learned counsel appearing for appellant State, looking into an otherwise inadmissible document like Article-I, overlooking Article 299 and ignoring the legal and binding document like Exh.62, has vitiated the entire application of mind by Trial Court. Because of this, it has ignored the purport of suit as suit for accounts and though there was no amendment made, amounts not claimed or in excess of what was claimed, have been decreed. He therefore, contends that this manifest error which shows non- application of mind, and has materially affected the entire judgment is, Fa152.91
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sufficient to set aside the same and to dismiss the suit.
16. Learned Counsel for Appellant points out that the Trial Court has dealt with issue No.1, where the plaintiff claimed amount of Rs.1,82,160/- on account of hard strata for period upto 31.03.1980. He claimed that he was paid for about 9000 cubic meters of hard strata. Shri Kaptan, learned Counsel states that reliance by him has been upon document at Exh.138 which infact is chart of measurement undertaken by the defendant/appellant's after plaintiff abandoned the work. Document at Exh.85 is pointed out by him to show quantity of hard strata available as per classification. This document has been explained by P.W.2 and it is dated 13.12.1978. Shri Kaptan, learned Counsel explains that this document shows quantities which may be available and does not mention work executed. The Trial Court therefore, could not have treated and read this document as indicating total quantity required or used. It's presumption in paragraph no.34 of the judgment that 41000 cubic meters of hard strata work has been completed is, therefore, erroneous. He invites attention to plaint pleadings in this respect to show that in plaint except for bare statement in this respect, there is no other plea to demonstrate completion of said quantity and plaintiff has not produced any material for that purpose. He has invited attention to evidence of P.W.2 - Rewatkar to show how in Fa152.91
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revised estimate the increase to 41000 cubic meters was shown approximately and how P.W.3 had given breakup thereof to P.W.2. Learned Counsel states that there is no suggestion given by the plaintiff regarding alleged breakup to P.W.3 Ratnaparkhi and P.W.2 has no where stated that 41000 cubic meter of work of hard strata was completed by the plaintiff. Learned Counsel states that in this background, the entire appreciation of material on record by the Trial Court gets vitiated. The alleged simple mathematical calculation by the Trial Court in paragraph no.33, therefore, shows basic error and quantification of unpaid hard strata at 19240 CUM (cubic meters) is, therefore, misconceived. He contends that D.W.-Gadekar, has also not admitted any such fact. He has invited attention to document at Exh.75-A with evidence of P.W.3, to show that the said document quantifies only portion of waste-wear as hard strata and it cannot be construed that, therefore, the remaining part also needed to be classified as hard strata. Learned Counsel states that, specified portion was the only hard strata available at site and if the plaintiff wanted to show that there was more hard strata, the witnesses produced by him should have deposed accordingly.
17. Rate application undertaken by the Trial Court in paragraph no.36 is also show to be faulty by the learned Counsel. According to Fa152.91
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him in 1977-78 relevant rate(CSR) had come down to Rs. 18.40 per cum. from tendered rate of Rs. 18.90 and plaintiff had accepted this position. The communication sent by the plaintiff on 31.07.1978 accepting that rate at Exh.71 is relied upon for that purpose.
18. After this material on record, pleadings in this respect as contained in the plaint are shown to this Court to point out how the case stands on shaky substrata. The pleading of 19260 cum. of hard strata contained in paragraph no.9, payment for work of 5200 cum. and excess work of about 9000 cum. of hard strata is pointed out. Pleading about further work of about 7000 cum. is also shown. Learned Counsel states that looking to the document Exh.75A, evidence of Ratnaparkhi and communication of plaintiff at Exh.71, this plea could not have been accepted by the Trial Court. Quantification in Section 80 notice issued on 25.7.1979 is, also shown for this purpose. Learned Counsel points out that therein hard strata claimed was only 13000 cum. Plaint paragraph no.31 pointing out work of hard strata not measured upto 31.03.1980 at 9000 cum. and demand for Rs.1,82,160/- is relied upon to contradict the claim of Rs.2,63,190/- in Section 80 Civil Procedure Code notice. Learned Counsel argues that no break up in this respect has been pleaded and only basis is, document at Exh.75-A, which is totally irrelevant and does not support Fa152.91
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such claim. There is no assertion anywhere of execution of 40000 cum. of hard strata work. In this light, our attention is drawn to evidence of plaintiff to show that he had excavated about 3000 to 4000 cum. of hard strata. In his communication at Exh.63, he had stated that he had to import 30000 to 35000 cum. from borrow pits for hearting and casing. He mentions increase of hard strata to 41000 cum. in revised estimate and relies upon a communication dated 18.01.1978 which shows need to borrow about 46110 cum. for tender item no. 3. About hard strata it was pointed out to him that for executing work above 25% of the estimated quantity, he has to negotiate the rate and then start work of excavating it. Learned counsel states that the plaintiff has founded his claim only upon document at Exh.85, which is nothing but an estimate and hence, not even a corroborative evidence to support his claim. His statement that he has done work of hard strata to the extent of 8000 cum. and difference was of Rs.1,28,480/- as contained in paragraph no.8 of his evidence, payment of Rs. 1,82,160/- claimed by him for hard strata work of 9000 cum. work in next paragraph is also pointed out. His cross examination showing that original quantity of hard strata in contract was 82.8 cum. and he was to be paid for about 103 cum. of excavation as per tender rate in paragraph no.11 is then shown to the Court. The receipt of payment by him at agreed rate for accepted quantity and his admission about that receipt is also Fa152.91
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shown. His admission that his demand is based upon re-revised estimate of work is also pressed into service. His admission in paragraph no.12 that he has not maintained any register showing excavation of 9000 cum. and his claim is based upon Exh.85, as contained in paragraph no.12, is also relied upon. Receipt of payment for work of 8216.54 cum. of hard strata work in December, 1978 admitted by him, no objection or protest lodged by him at that time, his signature on measurement book till 12th running bill are all admitted by him in paragraph no.13 of his cross examination. In paragraph no.15, he has admitted that he has received payment for hard strata work of 23042.50 cum. in January, 1980 and it was payment for work upto date. Shri Kaptan, learned Counsel has also urged that after giving this admission, witness has attempted to explain the word "upto date" used by him. His cross examination in paragraph no.17 in this respect is again pointed out to show that he claims that work of 9000 cum. of hard strata of which payment is not received by him was done before November-December, 1978. He has accepted that the measurement of work in approach channel and tail channel till 12th running bill were taken in his presence and he had not submitted any bill for this quantity. He further accepted that had he submitted any such bill, it would have been verified by the Engineer In-charge. Shri Kaptan, learned Counsel contends that this material available on record Fa152.91
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has not been properly appreciated and though there is no admission by D.W.-2, Trial Court has, in paragraphs 33 of its judgment ,erroneously relied upon the same, as admission. He reiterates that there is nothing on record to support use of 41000 cum. of hard strata.
19. He has invited our attention to documents on record. Exh.68 dated 10.04.1978 shows excavation of 10000 cum. of hard strata and this is during period of stoppage. The communication dated 24.01.1978 at Exh. 78 only shows the knowledge of plaintiff that 46110 cum. material was expected to be brought from borrow area, and therefore, he had correctly understood communication dated 18.01.1978 at Exh.64. The communication at Exh.69 dated 28.06.1978 shows payment of 1600 cum. of hard strata. This is reiterated in Exh.17 dated 13.07.1978 and communication dated 05.03.1978 at Exh.89 forwarded by the plaintiff mentioning the excavation of about 9000 cum. upto December, 1978 and about 7000 cum. thereafter. The payment of 5200 cum. upto 30.12.1978 was also accepted and it was mentioned that payment for 3800 cum. + 7000 cum. was still in balance. In Section 80 C.P.C., notice dated 25.07.1979 at Exh.90, release of payment for 6000 cum. in 1978 and earlier payment for 1600 cum. has been accepted. In this notice, claim is for 13000 cum. of hard strata. Learned Counsel therefore, argues that all calculations Fa152.91
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undertaken by the Trial Court in the light of this material and by referring to Exh.138 are unsustainable. The Trial Court has also found quantity mentioned in Exh.138 about departmental work wrong while it was not the case of the plaintiff at all. He urges that 12th R.A. bill quantity of hard strata work was final and Trial Court could not have overlooked it.
20. Taking up IssueNo. 10, our attention has also been invited to paragraph nos. 37 and 38 of the impugned judgment, where the Trial Court has allowed claim for difference in rate of soft and hard strata for quantity of 8000 cum. Shri Kaptan, learned Counsel states that total quantity of hard strata at 40000 cum. arrived at in earlier paragraphs, while discussing issue No.1 is used even for answering this issue. He invites attention to evidence of plaintiff particularly paragraph no.8 to urge that claim for hard strata work allegedly done has not been substantiated. The departmental work to certain extent in soft rock has been relied upon by plaintiff to point out discrimination in rate at which he was paid. However, this complaint of discrimination was not the part of plaint claim and of notice under Section 80 C.P.C. The period of work is claimed to be from 1978 to January 1980, and payment upto date has been accepted without any protest by the plaintiff. The Trial Court, therefore, has not correctly answered even this issue 10. Fa152.91
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21. Shri Kaptan, learned Counsel thereafter has touched issue No.4 which deals with claim of lead for casing beyond 2 km. Learned Counsel states that this claim is contrary to the express agreement between the parties vide Exh.62, and this is overlooked by the Court. The fact that plaintiff could not give any concrete figure and his claim was based upon only presumption, has not been properly appreciated. The admission by the plaintiff that he was claiming amount on account of extra lead, though there was no evidence that material was brought from distance of 2 km. has been over looked. Plaintiff has relied upon Article-I to substantiate this claim. The contract at Exh.62 and stipulation therein that rate was inclusive of all leads and lifts is accepted by the plaintiff. The letter dated 18.01.1978 at Exh.64 does not enable the plaintiff to claim any extra amount. Learned Counsel therefore, argues that in absence of any material on record, the Trial Court has erroneously granted the claim. He relies upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported at (2008) 13 SCC 80 --AIR 2009 SC (Supp) 717 -- "Delhi Development Authority v. M/s. R. S. Sharma and Co. to demonstrate that the provisions in contract at Exh.62 are determinative and decisive even in present facts.
22. Finding recorded on issue nos. 7 and 9 by the Trial Court Fa152.91
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towards difference of hearting and casing on account of leads and hearting is also challenged on similar grounds. The learned Counsel states that general conditions dated 21.05.1963 ( Exh.156), about extra item rate list have no relevance, as there is no such extra item rate list here. It is pointed out that the Trial Court has erroneously read Exh.64 dated 18.01.1978 as admission of quantity of material to be borrowed. Learned Counsel states that said communication pointed out possibility of borrowing 46110 cum. and burden was upon the plaintiff to demonstrate that he had actually borrowed that much quantity. According to him, entire thrust of Trial Court in consideration of this issue is based upon surmises. Exh.64 does not show and cannot show work already executed. Similarly, the Trial Court could not have applied the ratio of 3 : 1 in absence of concrete evidence warranting it, and could not have relied upon the revised estimate Article-I. Comparison of document at Exh.62-A and Exh.170 is urged to be totally wrong and on irrelevant base for this purpose. Learned counsel states that recourse to Exh.138 is again unnecessary because it contains total of work executed by the plaintiff as also executed departmentally. Re- revised estimate looked into in paragraph no.57 by the Trial Court has therefore, vitiated the entire exercise. He has invited attention to Exh.104 dated 30.01.1978 to urge that no extra work was permitted and he was informed that there was no question of preparing extra item Fa152.91
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list.
23. IssueNo. 8 is then taken up by Shri Kaptan, learned counsel. He has invited attention to its consideration in paragraph no.54 of its judgment by the Trial Court. He points out that the claim of Rs.37,440/- is on account of utilization of hard strata in casing zone. While answering issue No.2, Trial Court has found that it has been utilized, even for this purpose. Hence, for very same reason, finding on this issue also needs to be reversed. It is further pointed out that extra lead rate of Rs. 3.28 per cum. has been allowed by the Trial Court, which is contrary to plaintiff's claim and much more than the plaint claim.
24. Attention is then invited to consideration of additional issue No.4 by the Trial Court in paragraph nos.61 to 64 of its judgment. Claim of plaintiff is based upon shrinkage and price escalation. Shri Kaptan, learned Counsel states that the findings that unpaid hard strata and utilization at 90% and loss of 10% are the grounds or circumstances for granting relief. He has also challenged the finding of average rate of hearting and casing and then increasing it by 10%. He contends that finding that there is no cross-examination of P.W.1 in this respect, is incorrect. Our attention has been invited to price escalation Fa152.91
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as considered by the Trial Court in paragraph no.64 and learned counsel states that he would like to address on this aspect little later, along with other connected issues.
25. Additional issue No.5 is, then taken up. It is pointed out that through this issue Trial Court deals with unrelated aspects about extra lifts and over looks express bar to such payment in Exh.62. Moreover, calculation of 6 slabs as extra lift is, also faulty. At this stage, Shri Parchure, learned counsel appearing for respondent upon instructions, has stated that Trial Court should have treated 4 lifts as extra for hearting and 6 lifts as extra for casing. Shri Kaptan, learned counsel has invited attention to plaint to urge that there is no such claim at all in it. Moreover, there is no ambiguity in this respect in contract at Exh.62. Length of Dam was known to the contractor, quantity to be lifted was disclosed in Schedule-II of Exh.62 and plaintiff contractor, a technical expert, was aware that entire quantity to be used could not have been laid in height of 1.5 meters. Contract obliged the Plaintiff to visit the spot and to gather all necessary data personally by using his expertise and in case of doubts, get it resolved by contacting officers of the defendants. In this situation, grievance about extra lifts being made is, misconceived and unsustainable. It is contended that Schedule-II at page no.98 of Exh.62 which mentions item no.7 (hearting) and item Fa152.91
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no.8 (casing), included all lifts and plaintiff' was aware of this position. For this t, support is being taken from judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported at Ch. Ramalinga Reddy v. Superintending Engineer, - (1999) 9 SCC 610. Our attention has been invited to paragraph no.68 of the judgment of Trial Court to show how wrong rate has been erroneously applied and huge sum not claimed has been awarded. Learned counsel states that there is no proof of execution of soft strata work of 18000 cum. The use of Exh.138 by the Trial Court in this respect is shown to be erroneous and contrary to the evidence on record. The document clearly reveals that the department had completed 80000 cum. of work against item nos. 7 and 8 and D.W.2 no where accepted that the departmental had completed only 62000 cum. works. Trial Court therefore, has erred in concluding that alleged shortfall or about 18000 cum. of works was done by the plaintiff. Shri Kaptan, learned counsel reiterates that burden in this respect was upon plaintiff and though contract required him to maintain records, he has failed to do so. According to him, consideration in paragraph no.69 by the Trial Court is, therefore, erroneous and unsustainable. Learned counsel points out express answer given in cross examination by D.W.2 Kelkar that plaintiff did not carry out balance work of 18000 cum. as sought to be inferred. Thus by erroneous application of mind, the Trial Court has granted total amount of Rs. 33,69,286/- to plaintiff as against this Fa152.91
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additional issue No.5.
26. Thereafter, the learned counsel has taken up issue No.3. He points out that basically amount of Rs. 59,858/- was claimed for this purpose and Trial Court in paragraph no.45 has erroneously found that in suit for accounts no preliminary decree was necessary. He relies upon Exh.62 to urge that all leads and lifts are included in rates tendered and while answering this issue, the Trial Court is again influenced by Article-I. Its consideration in this respect in paragraph nos. 47 and 48 is, therefore, erroneous. The plaintiff was aware of distance to be traveled, that his transport vehicle would return empty to the spot of loading after unloading and hence, reasons given by the Trial Court for granting relief for extra leads and for "to and fro distance" are clearly erroneous and shows total non application of mind. He contends that there is no admission by D.W.2 about any extra lead of 5 km. and as also by P.W.3 - Shri Ratnaparkhi. The lead of 5 km. has been looked into while framing estimate before issuing tender notice. For this purpose, learned counsel is relying upon page no.22 item no.6 of Exh.132. Shri Kaptan, learned counsel states that in paragraph no.50 the Trial Court found that Article-I is not an executed document, but then secondary evidence as also oral evidence in relation thereto has been acted upon. He invites attention to paragraph no.19 Fa152.91
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of cross examination of P.W.1 [plaintiff] to show that he had no document to show any such extra lead of 5 km. Judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported at (2006) 2 SCC 285 -- 2006 (2) Mah.L.J. 769 - AIR 2006 S. C. 811 "K. C. Skaria v. Govt. of State of Kerala" is relied upon to show that it is the duty of the plaintiff to maintain his own measurements and records and to prove his claim. Ce ntral Coalfields
Ltd. v. Mining Construction and Multi Contract (P) Ltd., (1982) 1 SCC 415, is also relied upon to show that when plaintiff has signed all running bills up to 12th running bill without any protest or objection, he cannot raise such claim in violation of contract at Exh.62. He has to adhere to works as recorded and cannot attempt to show anything over and above it.
27. On Issue nos. 2 and 5, it is contended that the Trial Court has proceeded under an impression that work was discontinued by the defendants. He invites attention to the communications at Exh. 64, 104 and 75 to argue that there was no such stoppage at any point of time. He contends that in plaint, amount of Rs. 3,49,200/- was claimed for this purpose, while in Section 80 notice amount of Rs. 1,20,000/- was claimed. While making actual claim in paragraph no.31, amount claimed was Rs.3,49,200 + Rs.62,750/-. In its written statement, the defendant/appellant pointed out that the plaintiff had brought only 4 Fa152.91
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trucks and one road roller. Thereafter he brought some more trucks on hire. He kept the machinery idle deliberately for want of repairs. Advance payment of Rs.2,45,000/- against this machinery is accepted by P.W.1. In communication at Exh.77, he had demanded amount of Rs. 3,49,200/- for period from 01.04.1978 to 15.04.1978. In cross examination P.W.1 accepted that he had not filed any documents to support his claim on this count, and he was not given letter by any Engineer to keep his machinery idle. He invites our attention to communication at Exh.104 where the defendant had pointed out that the machinery brought by the plaintiff was inadequate, insufficient and resulted in backlog. According to Shri Kaptan, in this situation, when stoppage is not shown to be for any fault on the part of the Defendant / Appellant, issue nos. 2 and 5 could not have been answered in favour of the plaintiff. Shri Kaptan, learned Counsel points out the 1st running bill was cleared on 14.09.1977; 2nd on 30.09.1977; 3rd on 09.11.1977 and thereafter plaintiff wrote letter Exh.63 on 08.12.1977, but then said letter does not contain a grievance that work was not available or was directed to be discontinued. Thereafter 4th running bill has been paid on 12.12.1977, 5th running bill on 03.01.1978 and it shows that work was continued. On 18.01.1978 appellants wrote to the plaintiff vide Exh.64 and again this shows that work was continuing. It was mentioned in this communication that nearly 46110 cums. was Fa152.91
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required to be brought from borrow area. On 19.01.1978 plaintiff wrote vide Exh.65 and in it he has accepted that work was going on. Threat to stop work comes vide Exh.66 dated 24.01.1978 for the first time, where he mentioned that if payment was not released, he would stop work. 6th running bill was then cleared on 19.02.1978. Plaintiff wrote on 24.02.1978 vide Exh.67 making grievance about not classifying the strata and again expressed that it would not be possible for him to continue the job of excavation of hard strata. This shows that the work was continuing and other work was also available. 7th running bill has been cleared on 31.03.1978 and thereafter work was stopped by the plaintiff from 01.04.1978. On 10.04.1978 vide Exh.68 plaintiff wrote and stated that as per alleged verbal permission, excavation of about 10000 cums., of hard strata was completed. However, he further stated that 65000 cums. was remaining and out of it only 5000 cums. may be soft strata while remaining 60000 cums., was hard strata. The learned Counsel for appellant states that this quantity disclosed is contrary to assertion of plaintiff and consideration of his case while deciding issue No.15 by the Trial Court. This communication also shows that he communicated his unwillingness to execute the work of excavation below the existing level. He further stated that about 35000 cums. earth work was required from borrow pit which necessitated preparation of extra item list. This communication Fa152.91
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does not show that work was not available. In this background, 8th running bill was cleared on 05.05.1978.
28. Vide Exh.69 dated 28.06.1978 plaintiff made a grievance that gorge filling work was required to be deferred and further accepted that rate prescribed for item no.8 was waited rate. He claimed idle charges for the first time in this communication, and also pointed out actual length required to be followed i.e. circuitous route required to be adopted between two points as extra leads. According to the learned counsel on 28.06.1978 stage of gorge filling was not reached. Grievance about idle charges was repeated on 13.07.1978 vide Exh.70. However, on 31.07.1978 vide Exh.71, plaintiff accepted to execute excess quantity of hard rock excavation under Clause 38(2) of the agreement at Exh.62. On 10.08.1978 vide Exh.72, he stated that he was ready for work of gorge filling. On 17.08.1978 vide Exh.75 the appellant directed him to continue the work of excavation in hard rock by clarifying that payment would be as per clause 38[2] of the contract. On 28.08.1978, plaintiff wrote vide Exh.73 and he complained that work of gorge filling was required to be forgotten/forgone. He further stated that it could be undertaken in next season and claimed advance for reserving the labour gang, overhauling machinery etc. He also complained of idle charges for last working season on that account. He Fa152.91
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then wrote on 25.09.1978 vide Exh.76 to the appellant in this respect and complained that work of gorge filling could have been completed upto safe stage prior to commencement of next rainy season and it was required to be postponed to next season. He raised 4 demands i.e. release of payment for additional quantity of item of hard rock excavation, for additional leads, settlement of rate for excavation of casing for embankment and for extra lead involved in execution of item of embankment.
29. Shri Kaptan, learned Counsel invited attention to communication Exh.104 forwarded by the Assistant Engineer to the plaintiff on 30.01.1978 to urge that insufficient labour force and machinery indicated therein clearly revealed that the claim for idle period was misconceived. Though the plaintiff examined P.W.2- Shri Rewatkar as his witness, no questions about stoppage or idle period were put to him. Attention is invited to Exh.77 dated 03.10.1978 to show how the reason of alleged absence of decision on many issues given by the plaintiff is incorrect. List of machineries given therein with claim of Rs. 3,49,200.00/- for idle charges is also relied upon. Learned Counsel states that the Superintending Engineer had on 21.10.1978 already informed the plaintiff that rate for excess quantity of hard strata was already settled on 17.08.1978. Contents of plaint are relied upon in Fa152.91
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this background to show how in notice under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which has been later on withdrawn, the compensation of Rs. 3,49,200/- claimed was reiterated in the plaint. It is contended that the settlement of rate as alleged in plaint paragraph no.9 [c] in December, 1978 is, erroneous. Learned Counsel has urged that most of this period when work remained stopped, was occupied by rainy season and in his cross-examination in paragraph no.14, plaintiff himself has disclosed effect of such rains on work. It is contended that the defendants / appellants are not responsible for any delay in this respect.
30. Circular dated 06.04.1981 at Exh.160 is then relied upon to urge that circumstances warranting withdrawal of work, as envisaged therein were not existing in present matter. The impugned judgment is then pointed out to urge that reference to alleged admission of D.W. 2 in paragraph no.41 of said judgment is misconceived. It is urged that D.W.2- Shri Rewatkar assumed charge in October, 1978 and Shri Ratnaparkhi (P.W.3) had already classified the strata in August, 1978. The Trial Court has ignored letter at Exh.75 sent by Shri Ratnaparkhi. The Trial Court also committed error in paragraph no.42 when it observed that Exh.106 admitted that machineries were lying idle. In absence of any material on record to work out damages for alleged idle period, the Trial Court has resorted to comparison with rates charged Fa152.91
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by the Government for use of its machineries. Shri Kaptan, learned Counsel argues that said comparison is bad, as number and type of vehicles made available to the plaintiff by government and the period for which they were used have not come on record. The Trial Court also erred in granting this compensation merely because work was not withdrawn. The appellants argues that the plaintiff no where claimed idle charges, as work was not withdrawn under Clause 15.
31. The discussion undertaken by the Trial Court from paragraph no.43 onwards upto paragraph no.45 to answer issue No.5 in this respect in affirmative is alleged to be erroneous and perverse. Period for which the same is claimed i.e., 10.04.1979 to 10.05.1979 or then from 10.04.1979 to 10.06.1979 or 10.06.1979 to 10.07.1979 and number of vehicles, is inconsistent. Learned Counsel further states that 9th R.A. bill was paid on 22.11.1978, while 10th R.A. bill was paid on 30.12.1978. Hence, reference to 10th R.A. bill and comparison with it while answering this issue by the Trial Court is erroneous. It is further contended that there is no admission by D.W.2 Shri Kelkar, even in this respect, and Exh.109 by which stoppage of work has been communicated is dated 13.02.1979. The recourse to provision of clause 15[3] of Exh.62 in paragraph no.45 by the Trial Court is urged to be perverse. The learned counsel contends that payment claimed could Fa152.91
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have been from 30.12.1978 to 12.02.1979. Exh.79 dated 24.11.1978 is relied upon to show that on 24.11.1978, though the plaintiff states that he received permission to continue with the work, but it is erroneous. The communication dated 09.11.1978 at Exh.106 was not the permission as claimed by the plaintiff, but it was reiteration of earlier settlement of rate already communicated to the plaintiff. Shri Kaptan, learned Counsel states that claim in Exh.79 is for excavation of hard strata.
32. Reply dated 11.05.1980 at Ex. 126(B) sent by the appellants to notice under Section 80 of Code of Civil Procedure, is relied upon to point out that including adjustments in 13th running bill, plaintiff was paid for 26,537.87 cum., and plaintiff had claimed excavation of only 10,000 cum. till November, 1978.
33. Letter written by the Executive Engineer on 09.11.1978 pointing out that in future classification of strata would be during the actual excavation and the communication dated 29.11.1978 at Exh.107 by the plaintiff expressing readiness to take up gorge filling in current season, are pointed out to show that work was not started till then. The need of 10 vehicles communicated by the plaintiff to department is also pressed into service to show that the plaintiff did not have necessary Fa152.91
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vehicles and his claim for idle charges is misconceived. Communication at Exh.108 dated 28.12.1978 asking plaintiff to furnish unconditional consent for gorge filling, reply of plaintiff dated 04.01.1979 at Exh.80 seeking funds, are also pointed out. Attention is invited to Exh.159- a telegram dated 10.02.1979 by which the plaintiff stopped work and report at Exh.109 dated 13.02.1979 about this stoppage w.e.f. 12.02.1979. Shri Kaptan, learned Counsel points out that vide Exh.82 on 26.01.1979 plaintiff suggested forwarding of bills to Bank and arrangement of funds through Bank and he had sought reply till 01.02.1979 from appellants. That reply was given on 31.01.1979 itself by the present appellants vide Exh.84, and inspite of this the work was discontinued from 12.02.1979.
34. Letter of plaintiff at Exh.83 dated 21.02.1979 making grievance about not referring to higher authorities its major claim i.e. alleged compensation for idleness of labour and machinery and extra item of casing zone. Reply sent by the Executive Engineer on 23.02.1979(Exh.102) to plaintiff to do excavation properly and submit bills and the communication of plaintiff dated 05.03.1979 at Exh.89, expressing surprise over a direction to start work within 10 days, are also pointed out. Shri Kaptan, learned Counsel states that in this reply the plaintiff has itself accepted that in monsoon period, for about 4-5 Fa152.91
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months, work cannot be undertaken in full swing. He also relies upon this communication to show that the plaintiff was aware of the departmental work, and also expressed his readiness and willingness to start again if his difficulties [as alleged] were resolved. This communication also contains incorrect statement that final decision about hard strata. Payment for 5200 cum. till then and alleged non payment for 3800 cum. + 7000 cum. is also urged inconsistent.
35. The communication Exh.111 dated 07.04.1979 by the Executive Engineer imposing penalty of Rs.30/- per day, Exh.112 dated 19.04.1979 communicating to the plaintiff that upto date payments for work done were already effected, are also pointed out. Shri Kaptan, learned Counsel states that in this background work was again stopped from 08.05.1979 and hence, on 19.05.1979 vide Exh.113 penalty of Rs.100/- per day was imposed as per clause 2 of the agreement Exh.62. Shri Kaptan, learned Counsel states that this penalty is approved by the Superintending Engineer.
36. On 19.05.1979 vide Exh.114 the plaintiff was informed that he had restarted work on 24.07.1979 and discontinued on 06.05.1979. The progress was very poor. He was called upon to remain present at work site on 28.05.1979 for taking final measurements. He was Fa152.91
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informed that said work was to be handed over to some other agency. As Plaintiff did not turn up, it was given option on 29.05.1979 vide Exh.115 to contact Assistant Engineer for acceptance of upto date measurements till stoppage or then to submit his bills after taking measurements through his technical staff to the office of the appellants. Shri Kaptan, learned Counsel contends that these communications at Exhs. 114 and 115 or its impact has not been considered by the Trial Court. On 04.06.1979, vide Exh.158, plaintiff was called upon to attend site for acceptance of measurements recorded and for signing 11th running bill. The plaintiff did not respond and on 25.07.1979 forwarded Exh.90 a notice under Section 80 of Code of Civil Procedure. He points out that in the said notice he claimed excavation of 13000 cum. of hard strata and claimed amount of Rs. 2,63,120/-. There was "to and fro" demand for leads, for casing and amount claimed was Rs. 1,89,000/-. He points out that this notice was withdrawn by him and he issued another notice dated 09.04.1980 at Exh.180.
37. Shri Kaptan, learned Counsel points out that on 29.08.1979 vide Exh.116, the Executive Engineer increased penalty to 1% of estimated cost of work because of failure of plaintiff to start and complete the work despite several notices. On 12.11.1979 the Hon'ble Minister (State) and Contractor had discussion and thereafter on Fa152.91
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19.11.1979 Exh.117, plaintiff wrote to the Executive Engineer communicating his request to extend time limit from 30.06.1979 till 30.08.1980. On same day, he also forwarded another communication vide Exh.91 and requested to waive the fine already imposed for delay in completion of work. He also communicated that the Government machinery had arrived at the site and he hoped that it is for him and he would pay hire charges for it. On 26.11.1979, the Executive Engineer wrote to plaintiff vide Exh.92 and extended time up to 31.12.1979 as and till appropriate decision in this respect was taken by the Competent Authority. Time was extended to keep the agreement in force. Plaintiff was also informed that some of his claims would be reconsidered and recommended to the Government. He was informed that only claims to be considered were about extra lead for rubble for pitching and no other claims were assured consideration on 12.11.1979. It was informed that his claim regarding extra lead for utilization of spoils was inconsistent, as actual lead undertaken fairly tallied with the estimate. He was given opportunity to substantiate his case for additional lead in this respect. In the backdrop of this material, attention is invited to evidence of plaintiff to show how there is no material to prove such extra lead or substantiate the idle charges. His admission that for work done, he had received payment at agreed rate, is also pressed into service. Plaintiff's had no proof of idleness of Fa152.91
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machinery and it did not forward any report about machinery or labour force lying idle. The work was closed from 12.02.1979 till 07.04.1979 and Plaintiff's also accepted that hypothecated machinery was in deteriorated condition as work had remained closed for 1 ½ years. Shri Kaptan, learned Counsel contends that this evidence clearly revealed the falseness in the claim for idle charges.
38. In this background, Shri Kaptan, learned Counsel points out that 4 measurements looked into by the Trial Court in paragraph no.43 are infact not inconsistent. Witness who had taken measurement on 23.02.1979 (at Article-II) was examined as P.W.2 by the plaintiff and these measurements were not put to him. The last sentence in paragraph no.43 of the judgment is stated to be confusing, revealing non application of mind. Learned Counsel contends that cross- examination of D.W.2 Shri Kelkar to whom these measurement were put does not show any manipulation. He also argues that there was no complaint of any less payment, deduction or wrong recording in measurement books by plaintiff.
39. Shri Kaptan, learned counsel thereafter has taken up issue No.6 to point out that amounts claimed against it was only Rs.10,000/- while the Trial Court has proceeded to grant Rs. 33,000/-. The Fa152.91
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payment has been ordered totally because of Article-I by adding 10% to it. In plaint as also in first notice under Section 80, the claim was only for Rs.10,000/- and even in evidence the plaintiff claimed Rs. 10,000/-.
40. Learned Counsel points out that though issueNo. 11 is answered in favour of appellant/defendant and claim for damages of Rs.1 lac has been denied. The Trial Court has erroneously recorded a finding that there was breach of contract on the part of Government. He relies upon material already pointed out above in an effort to demonstrate how this consideration is erroneous.
41. He has then resumed arguments on additional issue No.4 He points out that though there is no demand as such expressly either in plaint or in notice under Section 80, relief has been granted without undertaking actual exercise of calculation. He invites attention to Government Resolution at Exh.173 issued on 06.06.1984 to show that it has been issued after the contract between the parties had come to an end, and it's Clause B, contemplated that work and contract should be in existence on 01.04.1979 as per the original terms of contract. Attention is also invited to Clause 4 to show that no claim for compensation or escalation thereunder can be entertained, if there was failure on the part of the contractor to complete the work within Fa152.91
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contracted period. Shri Kaptan, learned Counsel contends that plaintiff who had abandoned the work, therefore, was not eligible and could not have been given any relief by the Trial Court. Attention is invited to cross-examination of plaintiff's witness 1 -para 15, where he has accepted that Plaintiff's/he had left the work incomplete. His admission in last sentence of his cross examination that contract at Exh.62 does not contain any provision on price escalation, is also pressed into service. In plaint paragraph no.28 for price escalation only accounts were claimed and there was no such request in Section 80 CPC notice at Exh.180. Learned Counsel has also stated that there is difference in amount claimed in plaint in paragraph no.31, in claim in paragraph no.28 and also in suit notice at Exh.180 in this connection. In plaint against item no.3 about lead for pitching, amount of Rs. 59,858/- has been claimed. While in Section 80 notice, that amount was only Rs. 29,929/-. Against item no.4 dealing with lead, amount of Rs. 3,78,378/- has been claimed for lead above two kms., while in Section 80 notice amount of Rs. 1,89,189/- was claimed. Against Item no.9 in plaint towards lead for hearting (to and fro) amount of Rs. 2,56,960/- was claimed, while in Section 80 Notice amount claimed was Rs. 1,28,480/-. He points out that total of amounts claimed under Section 80 works out to Rs. 12,72,506/-, while in plaint it was Rs. 18,86,000/-. The calculations of escalation submitted by the appellants to Trial Court Fa152.91
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are also shown with contention that the same do not confer any right upon the plaintiff.
42. Shri Kaptan, learned Counsel has then taken up additional issueNo. 2, which deals with action taken by the defendants under Clause 3[b] of Exh.62 . He submits that this has relevance when grant of damages and idle charges by Trial Court is to be appreciated. The pre-requisites for such action noted by the Trial Court in paragraph nos. 76 and 77 of its judgment are pointed out and the learned Counsel states that finding that there was not a single warning by the defendant to plaintiff is perverse. He points out that fine of Rs.30/- per day, Rs. 100/- per day was imposed after 20.12.1978, because of consistent neglect by the plaintiff and it was hiked to 1% penalty thereafter. He also states that finding that these steps are illegal because they are taken after 28.12.1978 as on that date contract had come to an end, is again perverse. Strata classification was already done on 17.08.1978 as per Exh.75 and on 13.12.1978 vide Exh.85, plaintiff was informed that during excavation as and when occasions arise, exercise of classification would be undertaken. He states that this material and its impact is lost sight of by the Trial Court. Reference to P.W.D. Manual in this background and alleged admissions of Shri Kelkar, about not following procedure prescribed thereunder, are urged to be irrelevant. Fa152.91
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Reasons for holding departmental action under Clause 3[b] of Exh.62 as illegal, are stated to be erroneous. He contends that the entire material on record and conduct of plaintiff ought to have been noted by the Trial Court. He further submits that admission of Kelkar, that there was statutory lapse on his part in not complying with the P.W.D. Manual, during the cross examination by the plaintiff, itself shows that such admissions needed to be evaluated carefully by the Trial Court.
43. He contends that first action against the plaintiff was in August, 1978 at the time of first stoppage. 2nd action was after May, 1979 when the plaintiff had stopped work after its re-commencement in March, 1979. During this stoppage time of 10 days to start work, fine of Rs. 30/-, Rs. 100/- and then 1% penalty were imposed. Last action in 3rd stage was taken after plaintiff abandoned on 16.03.1980. Relevant terms and conditions in Exh.62 are also pointed out. It is urged that as per Clause-4 in Exh.62, the plaintiff is not entitled to any idle charges. Attention is also invited to clause 5 to show that the contractor remains liable even if there is no action against him.
44. Communication dated 03.12.1979 at Exh.93 is pointed out to show the action taken and its knowledge to plaintiff. It is pointed out that the plaintiff had requested for waiving these penalties, but then Fa152.91
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that waiver never took place. Vide Exh.94 on 17.12.1979, action under Clause 3[a] was withdrawn, but then it was informed to him that he had made no arrangement for re-start of work. He was also informed that gorge filling work could not be taken up shortly, as the work had then not begun. Attention is also invited to communication dated 13.02.1980 at Exh.118 pointed out to plaintiff that as nala cleaning was not done, work of gorge filling could not have been taken up and asking it to act fast. Shri Kaptan, learned Counsel states that the work was started by the plaintiff on 26.11.1979 and at that time even preliminaries necessary for gorge filling were not over. He also points out that 11th running bill was paid to the plaintiff on 25.12.1979 and 12th running bill was paid on 23.01.1980. Exh.119 dated 29.01.1980 pointing out to plaintiff that it/he had again discontinued work and direction to him to engage sufficient labour so as to facilitate taking up work of gorge filling, is also relied upon. Letter containing similar message sent on 1.3.1980 vide Exh.120 warning plaintiff that he left department with no alternative but to accelerate progress by engaging additional labour and additional machineries in exercise of its right, as per Exh.62 is cited. Reply dated 04.03.1980 at Exh.121, sent by the appellant to plaintiff is pointed out to show that the plaintiff had only 10 labour and he needed additional man power. He was also informed that except his claim towards extra lead for rubble pitting no Fa152.91
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other claims were to be referred to the State Government. He was also informed that he had accepted payment of 12th running bill without any protest. Vide Exh.122 dated 04.03.1980, Executive Engineer rejected his claim for additional lead for bringing hearting material. Vide Exh.123 also dated 04.03.1980, the appellants informed plaintiff about his lapses and wrongfully pursuing making unsustainable demands. Vide Exh.124 dated 10.03.1980, he was directed to engage additional labour and more vehicles to complete the work. Time till 14.03.1980 was given to him and he was warned that in default action under Clause 4 of agreement would be taken from 15.03.1980. Vide Exh.125 on 24.03.1980 he was informed that he had not made any arrangement to continue the work of gorge filling. He was informed that the department was finding it necessary to supplement the work by employing departmental machinery and labour. He was also informed that from 16.03.1980, Sub Divisional Officer was asked to carry out works departmentally. He was warned that all this was being done at his cost and risk. This communication sent by D.W.2 Shri Kelkar, was not disputed by the plaintiff and he did not cross examine D.W.2 about it. It is in this background, that plaintiff issued notice under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure on 09.04.1980.
45. Examination-in-chief of D.W.2 Kelkar in paragraph nos. 5 Fa152.91
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and 6 and effort made by the plaintiff in his cross-examination to bring on record his hostile attitude, is also shown to this Court. Learned Counsel states that though action under Clause 3[a] of Exh.62 was withdrawn and plaintiff was permitted to proceed ahead, penalties were not withdrawn.
46. Shri Kaptan, learned Counsel has invited attention to consideration of issueNo. 15 by the Trial Court. It is appellant's counterclaim of Rs. 10,16,892.30 ps. towards extra expenditure under clause 3[b] for completion of work left incomplete by the plaintiff. The Trial Court has mostly relied upon evidence of D.W.2 Kelkar for negativing it. Its earlier finding that action by department under Clause 3[b] of Exh.62 was illegal, is also one of the grounds.
47. In Written Statement in paragraph no.14 the appellant has pointed out that after issuing letters i.e. dated 13.02.1980, 29.02.1980, 04.03.1980 and 31.03.1980 as also telegram on 01.03.1980, its Executive Engineer issued notice on 10.03.1980 and warned plaintiff that minimum 200 labour force and 5 trucks needed to be arranged before 14.03.1980. He was informed that otherwise department would undertake the part of work from 16.03.1980. These communications were under Clause 3[b] read with Clause 4 of the agreement. As Fa152.91
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Plaintiff did not pay any attention, the Executive Engineer by letter dated 24.03.1980 informed the plaintiff that work was directed to be taken up departmentally from 16.03.1980 and he would be liable to pay extra expenditure incurred by Appellant's towards its completion. Rs. 10,16,892.70 has been claimed accordingly. The defendant has also claimed balance hire charges of Rs. 36,893/-. They point out that for completion of remaining work, as establishment of one Sub Divisional Officer was required to be maintained by the defendant which consisted of an Engineer and other staff, defendants incurred expenditure of Rs. 2,33,943/- towards that establishment. The loss of irrigation revenue estimated at Rs. 35,250/- which defendant could have earned after timely completion of project is also claimed. Towards various other difficulties faced and losses including notional loss, the defendants claimed amount of Rs. 1 lac as general damages. Total counter claim was thus for Rs. 15,13,978.30/- as given in paragraph no.45 of the written statement.
48. Shri Kaptan, learned Counsel argues that if Trial Court is presumed to be right in holding that the contract Exh.62, did not subsist after 30.12.1978, the plaintiff also could not have claimed thereunder and his remedy in that case would be under Section 72 of the Contract Act. He contends that the Trial Court forgot the extension upto Fa152.91
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30.12.1979. This extension was interim extension and plaintiff had prayed for time till 30.08.1980 and what happened to this request has not come on record.
49. Consideration of hire charges claimed by the defendants from plaintiff in paragraph no.96 of its judgment by the Trial Court is urged to be erroneous. Learned Counsel states that hire charges which plaintiff had paid were not in dispute and its comparison and co- relation with the hire charges claimed by defendants or finding that same constituted 81% of the amount spent for completion of less than 10% of the project work, is misconceived. He invites attention to the documents on record for this purpose. Exh.136 is relied upon to show statement of deposits by plaintiff with defendants and Exh.137 is also relied upon to show how net amount recoverable from plaintiff is worked out by the defendants. The break up and 5 heads under which said recovery is sought given in Exh.139 is also relied upon to show that it carries certificate of a responsible officer which has not been disputed. Exh.140 showing details of hire charges and machineries along with vouchers and date, as also the amount debited actually to the plaintiff again is heavily relied upon for this purpose. Exh.141 showing hire charges of civil machinery, Exh.142 showing expenditure incurred on completion of work through nominal muster Fa152.91
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role are also relied upon with contention that the only amount proportionately recoverable from the plaintiff has been debited to its account. Exh.143 showing expenditure on work done through piece workers and Exh.144 giving accounts of material issued for contractor's works executed by the department are also relied upon for the said purpose. The statement showing hire charges to be recovered from the plaintiff till 20.03.1980 at Exh.145 is also pressed into service. It is pointed out that all these documents are produced and proved by D.W.1.
50. By inviting attention to cross examination of D.W.2- Shri Kelkar, he points out the relevance of answers given by said witness. The appellant/ defendant had produced measurement books in the Court. Similarly, Exhs. 139 to 144 were produced by D.W. 1 in court and he proved contents thereof. In cross examination also he has confirmed the same. He has stated that he looked into log book, muster roll, contractor bills, measurement books and field books. He has not been subjected to any cross examination in this connection thereafter. Shri Kaptan, learned counsel urges that though 13th running bill was not prepared and measurements therefor were not recorded after notice to plaintiff, that is not sufficient to disbelieve its correctness. Witness -D.W.2 has pointed out that work of gorge filling needed to be Fa152.91
53
undertaken urgently and that urgency was never in dispute. This witness has pointed out that between 13.2.1980 to 29.02.1980, plaintiff had done work of about 4000 cum. in gorge and department completed remaining work by 13.06.1980. He has also stated that quantum of work in gorge filling was 27000 cum., and total quantity was 89000 cum. The balance work of about 62000 cum. was completed by the department. His answer in para.14 that 10% of project work at the most had remained to be done does not imply that 90 % of work was done by the plaintiff. His answers given about clauses in Maharashtra Public Works Manual are also sought to be explained by contending that the same have no relevance in so far as the present dispute is concerned. Counsel points out that notice under section 80 CPC was given in present matter on 09.04.1980 and the fact that the appellant/defendant completed the balance work is not in dispute. Shri Kaptan also contends that the plaintiff could have furnished his measurements and can not take advantage of the fact that after abandonment, it/he was not called for measurement. Work completion required top priority because of abandonment and hence, the plaintiff cannot be allowed to take any advantage thereof. He contends that therefore, issueNo. 15 needed to be answered in favour of the appellant.
Fa152.91
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51. Attention is then invited to consideration of issue nos. 16, 17 and 18 by the Trial Court. It is pointed out that the claim of Rs. 36893/- made by the defendant towards hire charges has been erroneously looked into and negated because of finding that 13th R.A. bill is not a minus bill. The claim towards expenditure on establishment of one sub-division from 01.04.1980 to 31.01.1981 also needed to be decreed, as defendants were required to maintain said establishment only because of abandonment of the work by the plaintiff. The timely completion would have enabled the defendants to earn revenue from Farmers and hence, counter claim on that amount also needed to be allowed. Our attention is also invited to Exh.146 to show expenditure on establishment from 01.04.1980 to 31.01.1981.
52. Serious objection is taken to grant of 12% interest to plaintiff from the date of suit till realization. Learned counsel for the appellants/defendant states that finding on additional issue No.1 needed to be in favour of the appellant and as plaintiff abandoned the work, no interest could have been awarded to it. Learned counsel states that the entire approach of Court below is vitiated, as there was no plea and claim towards escalation, towards additional lifts and towards to and fro lead. According to him, cause of action not mentioned in Section 80 notice and relief not appearing in it, cannot be Fa152.91
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added to plaint. He points out that while answering issue nos. 7 and 9, there is error apparent, because according to the plaintiff 22000 cum. was transferred from hearting to casing and Article -I provided revised rate of Rs. 10.28 per cum. for casing. Earlier rate for casing was Rs. 4.15 per cum. Old rate for hearting was Rs. 6.12. Plaintiff has been paid at old rate for hearting. Therefore, even if revised rate as per Article-I of Rs. 10.28 is presumed to be applicable, Trial Court needed to find out difference payable to plaintiff by deducting Rs. 6.12 from Rs. 10.28. According to learned counsel, Trial Court has deducted amount of Rs. 4.15 per cum. which is old rate towards casing and this has resulted in granting excess amount to the plaintiff. He has invited attention consideration in this respect in paragraph no.56 of the judgment of Trial Court. He has further added this quantity of 22000 cum. needed deduction from quantum in Ex.138 to arrive at the correct quantity of hearting work.
53. He has relied upon judgment of learned Single Judge of Himachal Pradesh High Court reported at AIR 1956 HP 9 - (Gajjan Singh, v. Union of India and others), particularly paragraph no.20 to contend that notice under section 80 of C.P.C. has to correctly indicate cause of action and also relief claimed. As in present matter there was no claim on account of escalation or additional lift, or to and fro lead, Fa152.91
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this judgment of learned Single Judge is squarely applicable. For same purpose he has also relied upon judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported at AIR 1963 SC 424- (Amar Nath Dogra v. Union of India). He points out that the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that such notice needs to be construed reasonably, but the Authority on whom notice is served must be informed about the claim of party under each head. The judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported at AIR 2001 SC 544- (Bishandayal and Sons v. State of Orissa), is also relied upon for said purpose. Learned Counsel states that addition of plea by amendment to plaint about which there was no notice under Section 80, is not valid and failure to object to it in written statement does not to constitute waiver.
54. Judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported at 2011 AIR SCW 6180 - (National Textile Corporation Ltd. vs. NareshKumar Badrikumar Jagad), is relied upon to show the relevance of pleadings and particulars. Party has to take proper pleas and prove the same by adducing sufficient evidence. No evidence can be permitted to be adduced on any issue unless factual foundation has been laid down for the same. Learned Counsel states that in its plaint, present respondent / plaintiff did not seek any relief for shrinkage deduction. He points out that only accounts were sought finally and that request Fa152.91
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was never reiterated later on. Judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported at 2006 (2) SCC 285- (K.C
.Skaria vs. Govt. of State of Kerla
and another), is also relied upon for very same purpose. He relies upon discussion in paragraph nos. 18 and 19 of this judgment to show obligation cast upon the plaintiff to maintain accounts. 2008 (12) SCC 796 - (Kashmir Singh vs. Harnam Singh and another) is also relied upon along with AIR 1963 SC 1917 (Gurubaksh Singh vs. Nikka Singh and another), AIR 1974 SC 1178(Shikharchand Jain vs. Digamber JainPraband Karini Sabha), AIR 1988 SC 703 (J.B. Sharma vs. State of M.P.), to explain what constitutes a proper finding on fact in law and when relevant material is not looked into or irrelevant material enters consideration, finding reached thereafter must be held to be vitiated.
55. AIR 1972 SC 712- (Puran Lal Shah vs. State of U.P). is relied upon to show that where the work is done under a contract according to the terms thereof, no amount can be claimed by way of quantum meruit. The remedy under section 73 of the Contract Act is available to a person who breaks the contract, even though he may have partially performed part of his obligations. Shri Kaptan, learned counsel states that perusal of paragraph nos. 2 and 5 of this judgment reveals that facts looked into by the Hon'ble Apex Court are more or less identical with the present matter. He contends that discussion by Hon'ble Apex Fa152.91
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Court in paragraph nos. 7, 9, 11 and 12 must apply even in present matter and hence importance given to Article-I by the Trial Court is liable to be ignored and set at naught. He contends that here present plaintiff was aware of rejection of Article-I by the Superintending Engineer.
56. Judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported at AIR 1988 SC 2149 (State of Punjab vs. M/s Ompraksh Baldev Krishan) is relied upon to urge that when letter of acceptance in said case was signed by the Executive Engineer, but not in the name of Governor, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that there was no valid and binding contract. According to Shri Kaptan, learned counsel under Article 299 of the Constitution of India when the revised rates at Article-I are not signed on behalf of Hon'ble Governor, the same cannot be taken recourse to. He points out that there was no case of novation of contract before the Trial Court and Trial Court therefore, has acted erroneously by granting revised rates as said per Article-I.
57. He has also relied upon judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported at 1968 Mh.L.J. 842-(Mulamchand v. State of Madhya Pradesh) to show that provisions of Article 299 of the Constitution of India are held mandatory and its contravention renders contract void. Fa152.91
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Even the principles of estoppel are not applicable in such situation.
58. Shri Parchure, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent / plaintiff has at the threshold handed over 4 maps to explain the technical concepts involved. Thereafter, he has pointed out that the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court in Special Civil SuitNo. 4/1981 cannot be viewed as single decree. According to the learned counsel, there are two decrees. By first decree money claim of respondent / plaintiff has been allowed, while the other decree dismisses counter claim of present appellant. He points out that both the decrees needed to be challenged separately and even if a common appeal against a decree in favour of the plaintiff and challenging dismissal of counterclaim by defendant/appellant is held to be maintainable, two sets of court fees are required. AIR 1953 PEPSU 129- (Sultan Singh vs. Ranchpal and others), paragraph no.5 is relied upon by him for said purpose. He points out that in paragraph no.4 there, the Division Bench of High Court has found that filing of two separate appeals was essential and separate court fee on each claim needed to be paid. He points out that here there is no such separate payment of court fee and only single set of court fee has been paid. Rs. 15000/- was the maximum court fee then required, and hence, here additional amount of Rs.15000/- needs to be paid by the appellant/ defendant. Fa152.91
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AIR 2007 Kerala 69 (Pampara Philip vs. Koorithottiyal Kinhimohommed) (para 6) is also pressed into service to show that claim in money decree against defendant and amount of counterclaim needed to be clubbed together for finding out the jurisdiction and for payment of court fee.
59. Shri Parchure, learned counsel thereafter has invited attention to contract at Exh.62 to show that it bears signature of Executive Engineer only and that of contractor. It is therefore, not entered into on behalf of the Governor of Maharashtra and hence, Article 299 of the Constitution of India has no application. Clause 2.10 which requires contractor to inform himself fully, arrangement thereunder for regulating leads and lifts, Clause 3.3.1 which uses the word "rough guide", Clause 3.3.2 which carries mention of trial pits and envisages variation in initial conditions and Clause 3.3.3 which contemplates variation in quantities are all relied upon to urge that language employed in these clauses of contract Exh.62, clearly reveals that it is provisional or rough and not final or binding on any body. Clause 4.17 is also relied upon with contention that it also presupposes modifications. Clause 4.49 is used to demonstrate that here material was already utilized for preparation of guide bund by the department before handing over the site to the contractor and measurement of that Fa152.91
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material not was recorded. The learned counsel argues that hence, emphasis on Exh. 62 as determinative is unsustainable. He also invites attention to clause 8 which deals with running bills, to urge that the running bills are always provisional and subject to adjustments at the time of preparation of final bill. Therefore, it was not necessary for the plaintiff to raise any objection to the same on each occasion, and not doing so or accepting payment without any protest till 12th running bill is therefore, inconsequential. He points out that said agreement vide its clause 38 admits and allows execution upto 25% of more work over and above the tender stipulation. He points out that here quantity of excavation of hard strata exceeded much more than said 25% ceiling and hence, department had rightly prepared the re-revised estimate Article-I. Attention is invited to Schedule-B appended to this agreement, particularly items nos. 3,7 and 8 therein to demonstrate the quantities exceeding the quantum therein.
60. He hands over government resolutions dated 14.03.1974 and 25.08.1976 across the bar and for the first time in this first appeal to contend that it has bearing on clause 37 and 38 of form "B2". Shri Kaptan, learned counsel has objected to this use as leave of this court is not sought and appellant is also not given any opportunity. He further states that as an advocate, he has no knowledge or instructions about Fa152.91
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these resolutions. However, Shri Parchure, learned counsel states that these government resolutions show the situation in which estimates can be revised. He reads out the introduction part of Article-I to show why the appellant/defendant felt revision of rates necessary. He relies upon Exh. 153 dated 06.06.1981 to show that out of total three files processed for preparation of re-revised rates, one file was claimed to be missing. According to him in this situation, use of Article-I by the Trial Court cannot be faulted with. He relies upon evidence on record to contend that only work of gorge filling was remaining or to be done when plaintiff abandoned the contract. He relies upon Ex. 156 dated 21.05.1963 to demonstrate that the Executive Engineer is the final authority, when there is no dispute. As in present matter there were no disputes, the revised rates signed by the Executive Engineer must be acted upon for evaluating the work performed by the respondent / plaintiff.
61. He has then shifted to the objection raised by Shri Kaptan, learned Counsel about notice under Section 80 of Code of Civil Procedure. He relies upon the plaint allegations particularly in paragraph nos.2, 8, 9, 10 and 13 to show that how there is full disclosure of necessary facts. Notice dated 24/25.07.1979 at Ex.90 is pleaded in paragraph no.13 and appellants/defendants had received Fa152.91
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that notice. The situation in which prayer for accounts was required to be incorporated in plaint is also explained in this background, in the light of the assertion in paragraph no.26 in the plaint. The fact that actual utilization needed to be computed at 90% and need to apply 2% shrinkage in paragraphs no.26 and 27, and that for accounts for leads and lifts, averments in paragraph no.28 are pressed into service for this purpose. Plaint paragraph no.29 is read to show that all documents required for this purpose were with the defendants. Prayer clause [e] and [f] in plaint containing the prayer for accounts, measurement and the scheme of Clause 8 of agreement Exh.62 is also relied upon for this purpose.
62. Learned Counsel states that here the contract was canceled under Sub-clause [b] of Clause 3 of Exh.62. According to him, there was no previous notice to plaintiff before taking recourse to said clause. Clause 4 of Exh.62 mandates a notice of 10 days and here notice issued is only of 6 days. Said notice Exh.124 was issued on 10.03.1980 and department claimed to have resumed the work from 16.03.1980. Apprehension expressed in paragraph no.30 of the plaint and then notice under Section 80 of Code of Civil Procedure issued on 09.04.1980 and pleadings about it, are also pointed out. Learned Counsel states that as defendant breached the contract, the plaintiff had Fa152.91
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terminated it.
63. Written statement filed by the plaintiff to oppose the counter claim of appellants/defendants is also shown to this Court with contention that in paragraph no.2 thereof, objection to court fee was already raised.
64. Judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported at AIR 1958 SC 905 (Union of India vs. Jeewan Ram), particularly paragraph no.80 is pressed into service by Shri Parchure, learned Counsel to show how claim and Section 80 notice needs to be liberally construed. AIR 1965 SC 11 (State of A.P. vs. Gundugola Venkata), paragraph no.11 is also relied upon to urge that the object of legislature is to give Government an opportunity to reconsider its legal position. He contends that understandable defects and errors are liable to be ignored if this basic purpose is satisfied. AIR 1958 SC 274 (Dhian Singh Sobha Singh vs. Union of India), paragraph no.30 is also relied upon for very same purpose. AIR 1959 Bom 134 (Pandurang Kashinath More vs. Union of India), paragraph no.22 is also relied upon to show that if allegations in the notice leave no doubt about the nature of suit contemplated, the object in issuing that notice is served, and hence, Section 80 stands complied with. AIR 1961 Cal 48 (Sudhir Ranjan Halder vs. State of Fa152.91
65
W.B.), paragraph no.43 is also relied upon for very same purpose.
65. Shri Parchure, learned Counsel states that as Article-I is a legal and valid document binding upon defendants, the use thereof for awarding higher payment for quantity of about 41000 cum. of excavation of hard rock and for 46000 cum. towards borrowing of casing material, is legal and valid. He contends that in tender document and contract, there is no provision for this borrowing. He further points out that length of Dam itself is about 1100 meters and borrow pit was about 1 km. away from the Dam. Therefore, total lead of 2 km. has been provided for in Article-I. He further states that as quantity is increased, work period also increased and hence escalation granted cannot be faulted with. Average height of Dam is 9.5 meters, while in Exh.62, lift provided for is of 1.5 meters. Hence, the Trial Court is justified in finding that 6 extra lifts are involved. Since the work was required to be stopped as defendants - appellants had no funds, the Trial Court has rightly granted idle charges to plaintiff. Though the plaintiff removed hard rock, it was paid as soft rock and therefore, there is difference in rate of payment which has been granted by the Trial Court. The last measurements were taken behind the back of plaintiff and therefore, the Trial Court has correctly accepted his claim. The rate paid by the department for getting the work completed Fa152.91
66
or quantity put in by it, are not proved and hence counterclaim has been correctly rejected. He argues that as per defendants, 10% of the work was only left and for it they have shown expenditure of Rs.18,00,000/-. By this standard, the expenditure for entire work is Rs. 1.80 Crores and proportionate value of 90% work done by the plaintiff is Rs. 1.62 Crores. Therefore, decree granted by the Trial Court to plaintiff cannot be viewed as exorbitant or arbitrary.
66. Evidence of P.W.2 Rewatkar on revised estimate, evidence of D.W.1 Gadekar on to -fro leads, and evidence of P.W.3 Ratnaparkhi on re-revised estimate, is pressed into service to support the conclusions in favour of the plaintiff by as recorded by the Trial Court. Evidence of D.W.2 Shri Kelkar, is also heavily relied upon to point out how it demonstrates the need for preparation of re-revised estimate and faulty handling of situation by the defendants which forced the plaintiff to terminate the contract. His evidence which reveals possible recovery of Rs. 2,50,000/- to Rs. 3,00,000/- from plaintiff is also heavily relied upon. According to Shri Parchure, learned Counsel answers given by this witness in paragraph no.7 of his cross examination are sufficient to show that the appellants have deliberately withheld the re-revised estimate and hence, use of Article-I by the Trial Court needs to be sustained. The Executive Engineer, being competent Authority for Fa152.91
67
finalizing the rates in re-revised estimate, the fact that Superintending Engineer did not accord sanction to it, is irrelevant. He further points out that action under Clause 15 of Exh.62 was not taken in present matter and hence grant of idle charges and damages needs to be upheld. He points out this witness accepts that while preparing 13th R.A. Bill and taking final measurements for that purpose no notice was given to the plaintiff. He further points out that in paragraph no.17, this witness has accepted that no payment has been shown on account of diversion of Nala, and though there was sanctioned provision of Rs.15,000/- and it was revised to Rs.30,000/- it was not released upto 13th R.A. Bill. The evidence of this witness in paragraph no.22 on utilization of 90% of the excavated material and deduction due to shrinkage is also pressed into service. The answer given by this witness accepting that the quantity in estimate remains rough, but in actual execution it may vary and rates given therein are basic rates and they are not weighted rates, is also relied upon by Shri Parchure, learned Counsel. According to him this evidence has been rightly looked into by the Trial Court for decreeing the suit of plaintiff.
67. He relies upon finding of Trial Court that department needed to act under Clause 15 of Exh.62 which shows that when Government suspends or stops any work, the contractor is not entitled to Fa152.91
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compensation therefor. This Clause 15 also shows that it can be resorted to when there is no default on the part of the contractor. It's sub-clause [2] reveals that if the suspension of work continues beyond 90 days, the contractor is given liberty to withdraw from the contractual obligations by giving 10 days notice within 30 days of the expiry of the said period of 90 days. After such notice is given, the contractor is deemed to have discharged his obligation to complete the remaining un-executed work and the engineer has to proceed to complete the measurement and settle accounts. The settlement of accounts does not prejudice right of the contractor to any further compensation. Under sub-clause [3] the contractor is given right to apply for payment of compensation to the extent of pecuniary loss suffered by him in respect of working machinery rendered idle and for salary or wages to labour after the work is resumed. However, total claim for compensation cannot extend the payment of 30 days whether consecutive or in aggregate of such suspension.
68. On 19.12.2011,the learned counsel for the Respondent handed over a chart (hand written) but could not effectively rely upon it and hence shifted to consideration of issueNo. 1. He pointed out that DW-2 accepted that only 10% work was left when the plaintiff abandoned (allegedly) the contract. The total work was not more than Fa152.91
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40000 cubic meters as mentioned in Exh. 138. He contends that Article I is accepted by this witness and though it is not a contract, it is still binding. Thereafter the matter was required to be adjourned to next day i.e. 20th December 2011.
69. On next day, no reference is made to handwritten notes. To us, the notes are points jotted by somebody to construct proper arguments and in absence of necessary assistance, We found it difficult to decipher it. Without touching said notes, the respondent/ plaintiff points out that total four notices to produce the documents i.e. Article I were served upon the defendant vide Exh. 19 dated 11.3.1991, Exh. 144 dated 06.10.1998, Exh. 149 dated 05.10.1988 and Exh. 147 dated 27.12.1988. The defendant gave say on Exh. 149 and stated that the original of Article I was perhaps in custody of plaintiff. Shri Parchure, learned counsel has, however, fairly pointed out that the Trial Court has not passed any orders on any of these exhibits. and no order is separately recorded in the daily order sheets. The consideration by Trial Court in this respect in para 50 is pressed into service. Section 63(2) of the Evidence Act read with Section 65(a) Part III is relied upon to show that the document has been rightly looked into by the Trial Court. It is further contended that there was no objection raised by defendants to its use.
Fa152.91
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70. Attention is invited to Cross Objection filed in present First Appeal by the respondent - plaintiff. Shri Parchure, learned counsel, states that material on record reveals entitlement of plaintiff to idle charges and it is, therefore, obvious that during said time, the plaintiff could not work elsewhere. Hence, answer to issueNo. 11 ought to have been in affirmative by the Trial Court and damages of Rs. One lac needed to be granted. Similarly, by placing reliance upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of M/s. Tarapore and Co. vs. Cochin Shipyard Ltd., Cochin reported at AIR 1984 SC 1072, the ,
learned counsel states that interest as claimed to have been awarded under Interest Act.
71. In the case of Union of India vs. M.L. Dalmiya and Co. , reported at AIR 1977 Calcutta 266(1), is relied upon to urge that it Ltd.
was also duty of the defendant to keep the records of work done and to maintain proper measurements. He contends that the work was resumed by defendant/ appellant from 16.03.1980 under clause 3(b) of Contract at Exh. 62 and hence the plaintiff worked only up to 15.03.1980. It was incumbent upon the defendants to have proper measurements before resuming work. He points out that vide Exh. 124 dated 10.03.1980, the defendants had given advance notice to the Fa152.91
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plaintiff and they could have therefore also arranged for measurements.
72. For delay in completion of work, the learned counsel blames defendants as, according to him, Monsoon was on from 29.06.1977 till August 1977 and hence no effective work could be undertaken. The strata dispute was never resolved and drawings were also supplied belatedly. He contends that extra item list was also finalized quite late. He further states that in the map (Ex.62A) supplied along with copy of Exh. 62 to plaintiff, there was no green hatching showing borrow zone for casing and, therefore, this also created problem. To and fro claim for leads for such borrowing and heavy expenditure on hard strata was not being reimbursed. In this situation, the plaintiff had no option but to put an end to contract as defendants were not co-operating. He, therefore, prays for dismissal of appeal and for allowing Plaintiff's cross-objection.
73. Shri Kaptan, learned counsel, in his reply states that in the case of Sultansingh vs. Rachhpal and Ors , reported at AIR 1953 .
PEPSU 129, relied upon by the respondent, there were two suits, two Regular Civil Appeals and one Second Appeal. Moreover, the provisions of Order 8, Rule 6A of Civil Procedure Code are added by 1976 Amendment to Civil Procedure Code. Hence, in this matter, there is Fa152.91
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only one decree, one appeal under Bombay Court Fee Act is contemplated and its Schedule I, Article I also contemplated maximum Court fee. He relies upon the judgment in the case of Barthels and Luders GmbH vs. M.V. "Dominique" reported at AIR 1988 Bom. 380, ,
particularly paras 6 and 7 and judgment in Syndicate Bank vs. M/s. S.S. Printers, reported at 1995 (2) Mh. L.J. 198, particularly paras 5 and 3 in support of his contention. He further states that a Civil Application to pay deficit Court fee, if required, is also being filed today itself. On Section 80 of CPC notice, the learned counsel states that he has relied upon a Constitutional Bench judgment in the case of Amar Nath Dogra vs. Union of India, reported at AIR 1963 SC 424 and hence other judgments relied upon by Shri Parchure, learned counsel are not relevant.
74. At this stage, Shri Parchure, learned counsel points out that the Trial Court has committed calculation error in its judgment. While taking "to and fro" lead, it should have multiplied rate of Rs.1.49 per km. By 2 (two) and not by 3 (three). He contends that because of this Trial Court erroneously used multiplier of Rs.4.92, it has resulted in grant of excess amount to the plaintiff. According to him, correct amount should be calculated by using multiplier of Rs. 3.27 per km. and hence correct figure works out to Rs.3,68,976.99/-. Fa152.91
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75. Resuming his argument, Shri Kaptan, learned counsel contends that a term to pay higher charges for Government machinery/ vehicles per km. embodied in contract between the appellant and respondent cannot be read in an independent contract at Exh. 62 and hence grant of "to and fro" charges by the Trial Court is erroneous. By inviting attention to discussion on issue Nos. 7 and 9, the learned counsel states that undue importance has been given to non-disclosure of borrow for casing material in map by Exh. 170. He points out that in map with Exh. 62, this borrow zone is clearly shown and that map has been independently given Exh. 169. The said part is also clear in original at Exh. 172. Only in copy of map given to plaintiff with copy of Ex.62(contract), there is omission, but then this omission has not materially affected the performance of the plaintiff. He was aware of this inadvertent mistake and made no grievance about it at any point about it. He had seen Exh. 132 before filling tender and also original contract and original map with it. He further points out that though in copy of map given to Plaintiff's, this borrow zone is not marked, legend about its description appears on that copy also. He further contends that said map at Exh. 170 is produced by the plaintiff to confront DW-2. He, therefore, reiterated request to allow appeal by dismissing suit of respondent - plaintiff, by dismissing its Cross Objection and to decree Fa152.91
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the counter claim filed by the appellant before the Trial Court.
76. In the light of controversy and these arguments, We find it appropriate to stick to the issues, original 23 and 8 additional , as framed by Trial Court itself as "points for determination" in this appeal to facilitate the appreciation. We therefore do not change the serial number of said issues. This also facilitates scrutiny of Cross objection of Respondent Plaintiff which is on issueNo. 11 and 12. In addition to those issues, We are also required to frame "A to E" also as points for determination. We have below mentioned all these points with our answer to the respective point and reasons therefor, thereafter :-- Points for determination in this Appeal.
A) Whether Defendant's Single
Appeal u/S. 96 C.P.C. against
money decree granted to
Plaintiff and rejection of its
Counterclaim is tenable? Ans. -Yes. B) Whether separate court fees
is required on each such
challenge to money decree and
rejection of counterclaim? Ans. -No. C) Whether notice u/S 80 CPC dated
9.4.1980 is legal?
If not, what is its effect on Suit
as filed ? Ans. -Partly Yes. Fa152.91
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D) Whether Suit for accounts
by Respondent-Contractor
is maintainable? Ans. -No. E) Whether contact at Ex. 62
or then Article-I governs the
transactions and relationship
between parties? Ans. -Ex.62. (Issues framed by Trial Court)
1. Does the plaintiff prove that it is entitled to claim Rs. 1,82,160.00 on account of hard strata work upto 31.3.1980 ?
Ans. Yes, Rs. 66,609.84/-.
2. Does the plaintiff prove that it is entitled to claim Rs. 3,48,200.00 + Rs. 62,750.00 on account of compensation for machinery ?
Ans.- No.
3. Does the plaintiff prove that it is entitled to claim Rs. 59,858.00 on account of lead for
pitching machinery and metal ? Ans.- No.
4. Does the plaintiff prove that it is entitled to claim Rs. 3,78,378.00 on account of lead for
casing about 2 km. at the rate of Rs. 1.98 for
95550 cum ? Ans.- No.
5. Does the plaintiff prove that claim Rs. 96,000.00 on account of idle charges of machinery from 10.4.1979 to 10.5.1979 and
Fa152.91
76
Rs.24,000/- for [four] 4 trucks +road
roller ? Ans.- No.
6. Does the plaintiff prove that claim Rs. 10,000.00 for work of diversion of nala and
"C" dam ? Ans. Yes, Rs. 11000/-only.
7. Does the plaintiff prove that claim Rs. 1,34,640.00 on account of difference of
hearting and casing ? Ans.- No.
8. Does the plaintiff prove that claim Rs. 37,440.00 on account of utilization of hard
strata ? Ans.- No.
9. Does the plaintiff prove that claim Rs. 2,59,960.00 on account of lead for hearting
from borrow area ? Ans.- No.
10. Does the plaintiff prove that claim Rs. 1,28,480.00 for excavation below soft strata
for 8000 cum.? Ans.- No.
11. Does the plaintiff prove that he is entitled to claim Rs. 66,689.00 as interest as per
Interest Act, on the above said amount ? Ans.- No.
12. Does the plaintiff prove that he is entitled to claim Rs. 1,00,000.00 as damages for not getting other work ? Ans.- No.
13. Whether plaintiff is entitled to claim total amount of Rs. 18,56,564.00 as prayed ?
Ans.-- Rs. 77,610/ only.
14. Does the defendant prove the counter claim
of Rs. 91,000/- on account of fine or Fa152.91
77
compensation as per 2 of the agreement ?
Ans. -Yes.
15. Does the defendant prove its counter claim
of Rs. 10,16,892.30 on account of extra expenditure incurred by it for completion of
work left by the plaintiff ? Ans.- No.
16. Does the defendant prove its counter claim of
Rs. 36,893/- for hire charges of machinery hired to plaintiff ? Ans.- No.
17. Does the defendant prove its counter claim of
Rs. 2,33,943.00 on account of establishment
of one Sub-Dn. From 1.4.80 to 31.1.81 for
completion of work ? Ans.- No.
18. Does the defendant prove its counter claim of
Rs. 35,250.00 on account of loss of irrigation
revenue for 470 hects. at the rate of Rs.75/-
per hectare, per season for 1980-81?
Ans.- No.
19. Does the defendant prove that it is entitled to claim of Rs. 100,000/- by way of general damages from plaintiff ? Ans.- No.
20. Does the defendant prove that its total counter claim of Rs. 15,13,978.30 ps. ?
Ans.- No.
21. Is the plaintiff entitled for compensatory costs, as alleged ? Ans.- No.
22. Is the defendant entitled for compensatory costs, as alleged ? Ans.- No.
23. What order and decree ?
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Additional Issues of Trial Court.
1. Does plaintiff prove that defendant had committed breach of contract and, therefore, contract was terminated ? Ans.- No.
2. Does plaintiff prove that the action taken by the department under clause 3[b] of the contract is illegal and not binding on the plaintiff and that if any amount is spent over, it, plaintiff is not liable to reimburse the same ? Ans.- No.
3. Does plaintiff prove that if any penalty is levied and recovered from him, it is also illegal and plaintiff is entitled to refund of the penalty amount ? Ans.- No.
4. Is plaintiff entitled to accounts for illegal utilization and for shrinkage etc., and for price escalation clause ? Ans.- No.
5. Is plaintiff entitled to get declaration and direction to be given to the defendant to prepare the correct final bill of the work done by the plaintiff ?
Ans.- No.
6. Is plaintiff entitled to recover Rs. 400/- for costs of notices ? Ans.- No.
7. Is plaintiff entitled to get declaration that the plaintiff will be entitled to get the refund of security deposit after three months for payment of
correct final bill ? Ans.- No.
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8. Is plaintiff entitled to get injunction against the defendant that the defendant should not recover
any amount for the suit work from amount due and payable to plaintiff from any other work carried out by the plaintiff by the State of Maharashtra even outside the State of
Maharashtra through the Executive Engineer, Superintending Engineer or any other servant of defendant ? Ans.- Does not survive.
77. Points framed along with issues accepted above as points for determination clearly show that finding on Point E by us is bound to have effect on consideration of all other issues/aspects. Answer to Additional Issues at serial nos. 1,2,3,6,7,8 as also original issues 12,13 and 21 by itself will not entitle Plaintiff's to compensation as sought or to the sums claimed as due by it under different heads. In order to prove its entitlement to particular sum as not paid to it towards the work done, it/he has to first establish that said work was done by it as per contract and still it has not been paid for the same. In that eventuality, responsibility for wrongfully putting an end to contract at Ex. 62 may by itself may not be decisive. But for answering the other issues, person or agency at fault for premature termination of agreement at Ex. 62 needs to be identified. Discussion on these issues may overlap to large extent. Arguments noted by us above show that Fa152.91
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clarification or certification of Hard Strata is the root cause. Hence, We first proceed to consider on points A to E and then on issues having bearing on hard strata. Thus we record our reasons hereafter for reaching answers already recorded above.
78. As to Point A :-- Objection raised by Shri Parchure, learned Counsel for respondent/ plaintiff about maintainability of single appeal now needs to be looked into. The appellants/defendants has filed only one appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which has been registered as First Appeal No. 156/1991. In it, challenge is to judgment and decree dated 31.12.1980 delivered by the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Yavatmal in Special Civil Suit No.4/1981 on 31.12.1990 whereby the money decree of Rs.61,41,048/- has been passed in favour of respondent / plaintiff and appellants counter claim for Rs. 15,00,000/- has been rejected. The valuation of the appeal has been by adding these two claims together i.e. at Rs. 76,41,048/-. Maximum court fee of Rs. 15,000/- is paid with it. It is not in dispute that, if separate appeals are required to be filed or claims need to treated as distinct warranting separate court fee, the appellants/defendants will be required to pay additional maximum court fee of Rs.15,000/-. The perusal of judgment in the case of Sultan Singh vs. Ranchpal and others (supra), relied upon by Shri Parchure, Fa152.91
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learned Counsel reveals that there the Second Appeal No.509/1950 was filed and it arose out of two Civil Suits i.e. Nos. 204/2000 and 299/2000 (Samvat). First suit was for possession on the allegations that mortgagers after having deposited the amount on which they had been granted redemption by the Collector, had obtained possession of the lands, but later on were wrongfully dispossessed by the mortgagees. The mortgagees suit was for declaration. They contended that since previous two applications of the mortgagers had been dismissed by the Collector, they were debarred from making third application, and consequently the Collector's order was without jurisdiction. They, therefore, sought declaration of ownership. Suits were consolidated and first suit (No.204/2000) was decreed and Second Suit (No.299/2000) was dismissed. Mortgagees preferred two appeals to the District Judge from the decrees in both the suits, but failed. Thereafter, they filed one Second Appeal in High Court. The Court has found that though no objection was taken to filing of such single Second Appeal, the procedure followed by the appellant was illegal and they could not have preferred a consolidated appeal from both the decrees. It found that the appeals to the District Judge resulted into two separate decrees. That is not the position before us. The Trial Court has passed single decree and hence, this judgment has no application in present facts. Pampara Philip vs. Koorithottiyal Fa152.91
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Kinhimohommed (supra), relied upon by Shri Parchure, learned Counsel, is the judgment of learned Single Judge. There the challenge was not in relation to filing of single proceedings, but to valuation, and its impact on pecuniary jurisdiction. The suit claim and counter claim are found single proceeding. Because of this unification, it is held that when it comes to higher forum, challenge is to such single proceedings. In case at hand before it, learned Single Judge found that plaint was for realization of Rs.19,000/- and counter claim was for realization of Rs.25,000/-. Consolidated claim was for Rs. 44,000/-. The claim of plaintiff was decreed and counter claim was disallowed. Hence, defendant was constrained to challenge both these findings. The learned Single Judge found that valuation therefore, needed to be at Rs.44,000/- in such challenge. At the relevant point of time pecuniary jurisdiction of District Court was only Rs.25,000/- and hence, the appeal was rightly held filed before the High Court. Thus, a single appeal filed as First Appeal before the High Court rejecting the counter claim and decreeing suit of the plaintiff, by defendant was held maintainable. Precisely same is the position before us. Defendants State has questioned rejection of its counter claim and grant of money decree against it. Appeal as filed is therefore maintainable. Point A is answered accordingly.
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79. As to Point B :- Other question which needs to be looked into is about the valuation. Shri Kaptan, learned Counsel has rightly pointed out that when the Pepsu High Court decided the controversy in Sultan Singh vs. Ranchpal and others (supra), Order VI Rule 6A of Civil Procedure Code did not exist in statute book. It has been added by 1976 amendment. Barthels and Luders Gmbh .vrs. M.V. Dominique (supra), is the judgment of learned Single Judge which considers somewhat similar issue in paragraph nos. 6 and 7. In it the judgment of Madras High Court reported at T.K.V.S. Vidyapoornachary Sons and others .vrs. M.R. Krishnamachary (supra), is relied upon in paragraph no.7 to note that the Court has to pronounce a single judgment on original claim as also counter claim, therefore, the suit and counter claim cannot be regarded as "things apart". The same are held to be constituting unified proceedings.
In Syndicate Bank .vrs. M/s. S.S. Printers (supra), the provisions of Section 18 and Schedule-I and Article 1 of the Bombay Court Fees Act, has been considered by the learned Single Judge of this Court. Section 18 of the Bombay Court Fees Act reads as under : "18. Multifarious suits.
Where a suit embraces two or more
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distinct subjects, the plaint or memorandum of appeal shall be chargeable with the aggregate amount of the fees to which the plaints or memorandum of appeal in suits embracing
separately each of such subjects would be liable under this Act."
Schedule-I in Article 1 specifies the amount of Court fees chargeable on plaints or memorandum of appeal not provided for elsewhere in the Act. The proviso thereto reads as under -
"Provided that the maximum fee leviable on a plaint or memorandum of appeal or of cross objection shall be fifteen thousand rupees".
The question before this Court in that matter was whether this proviso applied to limit the fee chargeable on plaint or memorandum of appeal of the nature mentioned in Section 18. In para 5 provisions of Section 18 are looked into and conclusion reached is that Section 18 by itself does not contain any provision for proper fee to be charged and lays down a general rule that aggregate amount of fees on such two or more distinct subjects should be paid. This provision, therefore, is held regulated by Schedule which prescribes amount of court fee and thus where plaint and memorandum of appeal contains one or more distinct Fa152.91
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subjects, because of this proviso, maximum court fee payable upon it is found to be Rs.15,000/-. We find this ratio clearly attracted in present facts. The provisions in Section 18 expected the appellants/defendants before us to pay court fee on aggregate amount of valuation of such two or more distinct subjects. Thus in a given case if appeal against money decree, Court fee of Rs.5000/- is payable and against rejection of counter claim court fee of Rs.5000/- is payable, than appellants will be required to pay court fee of Rs.5000/ + Rs.5000/ i.e. Rs.10,000/-. However, when single appeal is maintainable, the ceiling limit prescribed by above mentioned proviso gets attracted and court fee beyond maximum of Rs.15,000/- as prescribed therein need not be paid. The wordings of said proviso are important. Section 18 speaks of memorandum of appeal which embraces two or more distinct subjects. The proviso in Article-1 however, does not even consider such distinct subjects and straightway prescribes maximum court fee of Rs.15000/-. Thus said proviso is applicable, irrespective of the number of distinct subjects assailed in such single appeal. The single appeal filed by the appellant/defendant is already held maintainable by us. Therefore, this judgment is squarely applicable and maximum court fee of Rs.15000/- paid by the appellants/defendants must be held to be legal and valid. With the result, no orders are required to be passed on Civil Application No. [F] 3411/2011, filed by the appellants/defendants Fa152.91
86
seeking leave to pay additional court fee by way of abundant precaution. That application is accordingly disposed of as unnecessary. Point B is answered accordingly.
80. As to Point C :- The objection that suit as filed is not maintainable as there is no valid notice to the appellants/defendants as required by Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure, now needs scrutiny. Shri Kaptan, learned Counsel for the appellants has relied upon the judgment in case of Gajjan Singh .vrs. Union of India and others, (supra). The said judgment by learned Single Judge of Himachal Pradesh High Court shows a specific defence that the suit was not maintainable as valid notice under Section 80 of Code of Civil Procedure was not served. The learned Single Judge in paragraph no.20 of the judgment has observed that the question before it was, whether in absence of any demand or claim for rendition of accounts in such notice, prayer for specific amounts in suit could not have been looked into. The appellants/plaintiffs there had argued that notice needed to be construed liberally. Learned Single Judge refused to do so, and for that purpose relied upon certain precedents. In Amar Nath Dogra .vrs. Union of India (supra), the Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that such notice Fa152.91
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cannot be interpreted pedantically and substantially information recording the claim against Government should be conveyed. The Hon'ble Supreme Court found that in facts before it there was no compliance with the provisions of Section 80. Relevant observations in paragraph no.11 show that the authority on whom notice is served, has a right to be informed about the claim being made in respect of each of the several heads. Though such notice is not in the shape of "pleadings", the Hon'ble Apex Court found that keeping in mind the object for which Section 80 has been enacted, such details as are sufficient must be communicated through it. In notice before it, the Hon'ble Apex Court found that there was general complaint that the Government did not conform to the contract. If such notice had disclosed amount claimed under each of the several heads, it would have been possible for the Government to consider whether it was worthwhile to settle with the plaintiff by agreeing to pay sum demanded. Such opportunity was not extended to the government. In Bishandayal and Sons, v. State of Orissa and others (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court has considered this constitutional bench judgment and in paragraphs no.15 and 16 observed that though notice under Section 80 can be waived, mere absence of any objection in relation to such notice in amended part of written statement, cannot Fa152.91
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be construed as waiver. The Hon'ble Apex Court noted that in Trial Court itself there was an issue about validity or appropriateness of notice under Section 80 of Civil Procedure Code. Its earlier judgment reported at Gangappa .vrs. Rachawwa (supra), has been relied upon to note that, when plaint does not show service of such notice, it would be duty of Court to reject the plaint. The discussion in paragraph no.16 shows that amended plaint was on entirely new facts, based on new cause of action. No notice under Section 80 was given in relation to such amended claim. The Hon'ble Apex Court therefore, found that in absence of proper notice under Section 80, the suit on such cause of action was not maintainable.
81. Shri Parchure, learned Counsel for the respondent / plaintiff, on the other hand, has pointed out that in plaint as filed there was reference to suit notice in paragraph no.13. He further contends that in peculiar situation, as plaintiff was not having necessary details and without those details exact claim or its quantum could not have been worked out, demand of accounts was made in paragraph no.26 of the plaint. Even for price escalation and to and fro leads, such prayer was made in paragraph nos. 28 and 29. The suit was based upon notice dated 09.04.1980 at Exh.180 after withdrawal of first notice dated 24/25.07.1979. He had pointed out this statement in paragraph no.31 Fa152.91
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of the plaint. He relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported at Union of India vrs. Jeewan Ram (supra), which again is a Constitution Bench judgment and particularly paragraph no.8 thereof. Perusal of that paragraph shows that in notice under Section 80 of Code of Civil Procedure, the reinstatement was asked for with all amounts due, as if he was not discharged. The objection raised was, in plaint declaration that discharge or removal was illegal and arbitrary, was prayed for and it was contrary to the demand in notice. The Hon'ble Apex Court has not accepted this argument. This judgment is not relevant in present facts.
Perusal of The State of Andhra Pradesh .vrs. Gundugola Venkata Suryanarayana Garu (supra)- paragraph no.11 reveals that the Court has to find out whether name, description and residence of plaintiff are given in such notice so as to enable the authority receiving it to identify him. Second aspect to be noted is, whether cause of action and relief are set out with sufficient particulars; and the third aspect is whether notice was served on competent Authority and last aspect is, whether suit has been instituted after expiration of two months from such service. The court cannot ignore the object behind this exercise and if, after a reasonable reading and without making any undue estimation, it can be gathered that the plaintiff has supplied the Fa152.91
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information which statute requires him to give, other defects or errors need to be ignored.
In Dhian Singh Shobha Sing and another .vrs. Union of India (supra), in paragraph no.30 the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that notice needed liberal interpretation and approach, if purpose of Section 80 is not being defeated thereby. The appellants before the Hon'ble Apex Court had prayed for redelivery of two trucks or in the alternative Rs.3,500/- being its value, the value was as on date on which the delivery of trucks was expected by them. The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that the appellants can only have demanded that sum as on the date of that notice and sensibly enough they could not have demanded any other sum. Shri Parchure, learned Counsel has relied upon a judgment of Division Bench of this Court reported at Pandurang Kashinath More .vrs. Union of India (supra), in paragraph no.22 does not lay down any different law. Sudhir Ranjan Halder vs. State of W.B., (supra), in paragraph nos. 43 and 44 again lays down similar law. As we have already considered the judgments of Hon'ble Apex Court above, it is not necessary to delve more in these two judgments.
82. The prayer in the suit was for accounts and plaint itself shows that the respondent/plaintiff was aware of the revised estimate Fa152.91
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Exh.132, or re-revised estimate Article-I. His evidence itself shows that he had received payments for whatever work he had put in till 12 th running bill. It is not his case that the requirement of a valid notice under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure has been waived by the appellants/defendants in present matter. We find that the Trial Court has not looked into the heads of claim in notice and claim in plaint properly. Paragraphs 26 and 27 in Ex. 180 and Ex. 1 are same. In paragraph 26, claim is to treat recorded measurements of 100% quantity as 90% only and in para 27, payment for 2% more quantum over and above recorded one is sought due to "Shrinkage". In Para 28 of notice Ex. 180, inability to specify exact quantities is expresses as all measurement books and records are with defendants. In para 28 of plaint, claim of escalation, to-fro leads and damages of Rs. 1 Lac as Plaintiff's could not work elsewhere are prayed for. Thus, paragraph no.28 of plaint and of suit notice Exh.180 differ materially. Price escalation and payment for "to and fro" leads, did not figure in Section 80 notice at all. In paragraph no.31 of the plaint against item no.3 amount of Rs.59,858/- has been claimed, while in Section 80 notice it was Rs. 29,929/-. Against item no.4 for lead about 2 km. to and fro amount of Rs. 3,78,378/- has been claimed, while in suit notice it was only Rs. 1,89,189/-. Against item no.9 again dealing with lead -to and fro, amount of Rs. 2,56,960/- was claimed, while in Section 80 notice, it Fa152.91
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was only Rs. 1,28,482/-. Total claim in plaint has been valued at Rs. 18,86,564/-. The details of escalation payment due to plaintiff were placed by it in the shape of chart on record and the Executive Engineer has verified it and stated that "I certify that the amounts mentioned above is correct, as per the record value and I have been verified the same and found it to be correct." The total amount payable as per this chart is Rs.60,30,957/-. The chart also carries a remark by the plaintiff which reads "Payment due to us as per our plaint. It does not however, include the payment due to us for execution of work beyond 12th R.A. bill." The document has not been exhibited and in any case the plaintiff did not amend his plaint accordingly to bring these details on record. Had the notice contained escalation or to and fro leads, as heads in relation to which demands were being made, notice could have been read as complete in that connection. The plaintiff then could be said to have extended an effective opportunity to defendants to apply mind to find out whether amends needed to be made. Here, notice to that extent does not meet the requirement of law, and therefore, claim in plaint for escalation and for to and fro leads could not have been looked into by the Trial Court. However, the law as looked into above by us also shows that mere wrong communication of amounts due, cannot be held as sufficient to vitiate the notice. Hence in so far as item no.3, item no.4, item no.9 in paragraph no.31 of plaint are concerned, the Fa152.91
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institution of suit cannot be said to be bad. Point C stands answered accordingly.
83. As to Point D :- Objection by Shri Kaptan, learned Counsel about maintainability of a Suit for accounts by Respondent Plaintiff has not been even touched by Respondent. In K. C. Skaria v. Govt. of State of Kerala, (supra), Hon. Apex Court holds that an independent contractor engaged by employer to execute work cannot file suit for accounts against his employer in regard to payment for work done. Such a right is not created or recognized by any statute. The independent contractor is not an agent of the employer. Nor is the employer in the position of a trustee with reference to the independent contractor. The claim cannot also be supported in equity by stating that the relationship is such that rendition of the accounts is the only relief which will enable the contractor to satisfactorily assert his legal right. A contractor who is engaged to execute a work, is expected to maintain his own accounts. At all events, there is no bar for a contractor to keep an account of the work done. Even where the contract between the employer and independent contractor may provide for payment on the basis of measurements to be recorded by the employer, nothing prevents the contractor from measuring the work done by him and then suing for the value of the work done. The contractor may also demand Fa152.91
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joint measurements to determine the quantum of work done. If the employer for some reason does not co-operate or prevents the contractor from taking a physical measurements, the contractor can seek appropriate legal remedy which will enable him to take measurements or to secure the information from the measurement book in the custody of the employer. Therefore, either the fact that the measurement book is maintained by the employer, or the fact that the contractor does not possess the exact measurements, will not entitle the contractor to file a suit for rendition of accounts against the employer. We, therefore, find that Suit for accounts as filed and reliefs consequential upon such settlement of accounts like additional issue No. 5 or escalation, illegal utilization and for shrinkage etc. could not have been looked into by Trial Court as there was no computation or quantification of any such claim by Plaintiff.
Plaintiff had been aware that from 16.3.1980, the department was to introduce its force and machineries to expedite the work. It/He was not to stop his operations and hence, could have opposed that step. In any case, he could have insisted for taking measurements of existing position before the department came on site. As he had been making grievances about hard strata work, there was dissolution of State assembly and he feared victimization, insistence for Fa152.91
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joint measurement could have been most natural and expected. He could have immediately taken his own measurements and levels. Plaintiff's had sufficient time to take all necessary measures to protect itself. However, Plaintiff remained satisfied with abandoning the work. He/It did not issue any notice putting an end to contract but issued suit notice at Ex.180 on 9.4.1980. We also find that he did not notice the work of guide bund and excavation already done departmentally. His first communication dated 8.12.1977 at Ex.63 about hard strata is about 6 months after starting work and after completing about 3000 to 4000 cum. hard strata excavation. He chose not to make any claim for any specific quantity of hard strata work and relied mostly on Ex. 138 and estimates to support his case. He remains satisfied with the quantities in Ex. 138 treated as Plaintiff's work by the Trial Court which does so in violation of cardinal principle that Plaintiff has to stand on its own feet and cannot take advantage of weaknesses in the defence. We also can not accept that inadvertent absence of green hatching in map-copy with Ex.62A but presence of legend on it pointing out "omission to mark" it, had gone un-noticed. Plaintiff's could have shown their bonafides by getting it rectified or then,in any case, by not raising such frivolous claims. Clause 4.3 in Ex. 62 speaks about drawings and specifications and it puts duty on the plaintiff not to take any advantage of such errors and omissions It also conveniently chose to overlook express Fa152.91
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stipulation in Ex. 62 that all rates were inclusive of "all leads and lifts" or then did not move for removal of doubts, if any. Claims not made at Ex. 80 or 155 stage, not included in Ex. 180 or in plaint are allowed by Trial Court. Plaintiff though filed a suit for accounts, could have got it amended to specify particular amount as claimed under respective head. It is apparent that when his Suit for accounts is itself not tenable, decree therein for particular amount under an unspecified head/s in relation to which accounts were sought ought not to have been granted. All this inexplicably put Plaintiff's in tight corner in so far as law courts are concerned. We find grant of Rs. 33,69,286.00/ to Plaintiff in impugned judgment while answering additional issueNo. 5 by the Trial Court, bad. When Suit for accounts as filed is unsustainable, grant of specific amounts instead of accounts in it, is equally misconceived. Here Plaintiff did not choose to compute and quantify its entitlement under such heads in relation to which accounts were claimed, at any point of time and even during trial. He could have easily amended the plaint as maximum court fee was paid by him/it. We are recording more reasons even on merits on this additional issueNo. 5 little later as Trial Court has already embarked on merits.
We therefore find that Suit for accounts as filed was not tenable. Hence, in such a Suit, reliefs like additional issueNo. 5 or Fa152.91
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escalation, illegal utilization and for shrinkage etc. could not have been looked into by Trial Court. Point D stands answered thus.
84.
As to Point E :- Most important question to be resolved is in relation to document governing the controversy, whether it is Contract agreement at Ex. 62 or then Article- I used by Trial court as secondary evidence. We find that law on the point can be found in Ashok Dulichand v. Madahavlal Dube and Another reported at [1975(4) SCC 664] which is followed in AIR 2007 SC 1721 - 2007 [5] SCC 730 (J. Yashoda .vrs. K. Shobharani.)
In J. Yashoda .vrs. K. Shobharani (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court observes :-
"7. Secondary evidence, as a general rule is admissible only in the absence of primary evidence. If the original itself is found to be inadmissible through failure of the party, who files it to prove it to be valid, the same party is not entitled to introduce secondary evidence of its contents.
8. Essentially, secondary evidence is an evidence which may be given in the absence of that better evidence which law requires to be given first, when a proper explanation of its absence is given. The Fa152.91
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definition in Section 63 is exhaustive as the Section declares that secondary evidence "means and includes" and then follow the five kinds of secondary evidence.
9. The rule which is the most universal, namely that the best evidence the nature of the case will admit shall be produced, ----------- .............. ------------------ .............. ----------- ............... ------------------. ............. can be admitted. Secondary evidence of the contents of a document cannot be admitted without non-production of the original being first accounted for in such a manner as to bring it within one or other of the cases provided for in the Section. In Ashok Dulichand v. Madahavlal
Dube and Another [1975(4) SCC 664], it was inter
alia held as follows:
"After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, we are of the opinion that the order of the High Court in this respect calls for no interference. According to clause (a) of Section 65 of Indian Evidence Act, Secondary evidence may be given ----------- .............. ------------------ .............. ----------- ............... ------------------ ............. Prayer was also made by the appellant that in case
respondent No. 1 denied that the said manuscript had been written by him, the photostat copy might
be got examined from a handwriting expert. The appellant ----------- .............. Fa152.91
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------------------ .............. ----------- ............... ------------------ ............. the original document was in the possession of respondent No.1. The appellant further failed to explain as to what were the circumstances under which the Photostat copy was
prepared and who was in possession of the
original
document at the time its photograph was taken .
Respondent No. 1 in his affidavit denied being in possession appeared to the High Court to be not above suspicion. In view of all the circumstances, the High Court came to the conclusion that no foundation had been laid by the appellant for leading secondary evidence in the shape of the Photostat copy. We find no infirmity in the above order of the High
Court as might justify interference
by this Court."
10. The admitted facts ----------- .............. ------------------ .............. ----------- ............... ------------------. ............. satisfied. Therefore, the High Court's order does not suffer from any infirmity to warrant interference. -"
85. Section 63 of the Evidence Act reads:--
63. Secondary evidence.--
Secondary evidence means and includes--
(1) certified copies given under the provisions hereinafter contained;
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(2) copies made from the original by mechanical processes which in themselves insure the accuracy of the copy, and copies compared with such copies;
(3) copies made from or compared with the original;
(4) counterparts of documents as against the parties who did not execute them;
(5) oral accounts of the contents of a document given by some person who has himself seen it.
The document in dispute her i.e., Article- I- the re-revised estimate in present matter is neither the certified copy nor shown to be made from the original by mechanical processes which in themselves insure the accuracy of the copy or a copy compared with such copies. Plaintiff has also not proved that same is made from original or has been compared with original by him or anybody. Said document is not even uttered to be counterpart/s. Plaintiff has not even explained how he came in possession of said document and witness to whom he put it has stated that it is not re-revised estimate. Plaintiff's witness 1 has in para 6 of his chief claimed that re-revised estimate was prepared after he gave letter dated 5.3.1979 at Ex. 89. He also deposed that Ex. 90 dated 25.7.1979 was issued after it. He in para 7 claimed that signatures of Executive and Assistant Engineers as also overseer were on re-revised estimate. He deposed that he was filing its typed copy Fa152.91
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though despite notice to produce, document was nor filed. That typed copy was then given Article-I. He , therefore, does not explain either the custody or source or contents. In para 11 of his deposition, he has stated that his suit is based on re-revised estimate. He disclosed that Article- I was not given to him officially. It is sent to Government through A.G. for approval. He accepted that estimate does not get any value or legal sanctity unless government approves it. He also admitted that there was no letter form either Executive or Superintending Engineer that he would be paid as per rates in re-revised estimate. In para 18, he accepts that re-revised statement was sent back by Superintending Engineer without approval and it was never forwarded to State Government for its approval. At the end of para 11, he admits that for further work, he was paid at agreed rate as per clause 38(2) of Ex. 62. Plaintiff's witness 2 Shri Rewatkar has said that a revised estimate was prepared by him and submitted to Executive Engineer. He was not asked about re- revised estimate and not shown Article- I initially in examination in chief. He stated that he did not remember whether there was any remarkable difference in respect of "lead" in revised estimate. When Article- I was shown to him, he stated that it was revised estimate prepared before fixing tender. In cross by defendants, he stated that his signatures did not appear on Article-I. He could not vouchsafe about the contents and claimed that estimate does not remain like Article-I. He Fa152.91
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asserted that Article-I was in no way concerned with Ex. 62. Trial Court then permitted Plaintiff to cross-examine him and this witness proved Ex. 132 as original estimate on which Ex. 62 was based. He could not tell if Ex. 62 was prior to Article- I. Then some questions to show reference in Article- I to 1977-78 CSR i.e., of period later to 1974-75 CSR used in Ex. 62 were put to him and he has accepted contents as appearing in Article- I in that regard. He was not asked about truth of contents of Article-I and no effort is made to establish that Article- I is copy of or prepared from the alleged re-revised estimate. In any case, after 12.11.1979 - Ex.155, said Article- I lost all its relevance.
86. Judgment of learned Single Judge of this Court reported at Om Prakash Berlia and another .vrs. Unit Trust of India and others (supra), shows that as per Section 63, secondary evidence includes an oral account of the contents of a document given by some person who has seen it. That person does not give evidence of the truth of the contents of the document merely by reason of having seen it, but of what he saw. In Section 63, therefore, the expression "the contents of a document" has been held to mean only what the document states. Section 61 provides that the contents of documents may be proved either by primary or by secondary evidence. The expression in Section 61 must, therefore, is also found to mean what the document states, Fa152.91
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and not the truth of what the document states. This Court has noted that Sections 61 and 62 read together show that the contents of a document must, primarily, be proved by the production of the document itself for the inspection of the Court. The truth of the contents of the document, even prima facie, cannot be proved by merely producing the document for the inspection of the Court, what it states can be so established. The writer of a document is required to depose to the truth of its contents. Section 67 of the Act requires the proof of the handwriting or signature upon a document. This Court has held that if by mere production of the original document for the inspection of the Court the truth of its contents was proved prima facie, the requirement of proof of the handwriting and of the signature upon it would be almost superfluous.
87. When this law is applied in present facts, We find that document at Article-I is not secondary evidence as warranted by Section 63 above and hence, its use by the Trial Court can not be upheld. Trial Court has overlooked this material ingredient and hence, its consideration and grant of relief to Respondent Plaintiff by using it is liable to be quashed, and is set aside accordingly.
88. With Article- I- the so called re-revised estimate ceasing to be Fa152.91
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available for regulating the relationship between parties and no plea of novation or modification of contract, Ex. 62 remains the only binding contract with reference to which the grievance in Suit and mutual obligations need examination. In Delhi Development Authority v. M/s. R. S. Sharma and Co.(supra), importance of agreed terms and decisive nature of contract between parties has been highlighted as under :-- "15. It is stated by the learned counsel appearing for the claimant that since the DDA has not approved
Delhi Quartz stone which was not as per CPWD specifications and specifications mentioned in the tender document, stories were brought from Nooh,
Haryana which satisfied those specifications. As rightly pointed out by the learned ASG appearing for DDA, there is no specific clause in the terms of agreement for extra cartage for bringing stones from elsewhere. In this regard, the appellant heavily relied on clause 3.16 of the Agreement which reads
as under :
"3.16 - The collection and stacking of material shall include all leads. The rates quoted by the contractor shall hold good irrespective of the source from which the material are brought so long as they conform to the specifications. The closure of particular quarry will not entitle the contractor to any revision in the rates."
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16. The perusal of the Award of the Arbitrator as
well as the judgment of the Division Bench clearly
shows that they did not advert to the above clause
3.16. It is relevant to point out that the extra cartage has been awarded by the Arbitrator without
adverting to clause 3.16 of the Agreement, hence, the learned single Judge was wholly justified in partially setting aside the Award in respect of the claims with respect to the extra cartage We also .
perused the pleadings and evidence placed on record pertaining to Claim Nos. 1-3 and additional Claim
Nos. 1-3. As rightly observed by the learned single Judge, there was no material on record to substantiate the case of the claimant, viz., DDA had insisted upon the claimant for using the stone aggregates brought from Nooh in Haryana. In those
circumstances and of the fact that the terms and conditions of the Agreement are binding on both the parties, in the absence of specific clause with regard payment of extra cartage and in view of clause
to
3.16, the respondent-
claimant cannot claim extra
cartage @ Rs. 30/- per cubic meter on
the ground of
extra lead involved in bringing the stone aggregates from Nooh in Haryana. The Division Bench like the
Arbitrator proceeded on the sole basis that DDA had compelled the claimant-Company from bringing the
stone aggregates from Nooh in Haryana and committed an error in affirming the erroneous Fa152.91
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conclusion arrived at by the Arbitrator insofar as the additional claims are concerned. As rightly pointed out by the learned Additional Solicitor General, the Division Bench proceeded on an erroneous premise that the appellant-DDA has nowhere stipulated where the stone was to be brought from. It is true that DDA had given certain specifications required to be conformed. Further, the of the work was irrespective of the source or cost
lead from where the stone was brought. The award
is completely silent on the relevant clause viz., clause 3.16
of the Agreement which makes it clear
that the contractor is wholly responsible for all the extra leads. In fact, the Arbitrator has given no reason whatsoever so far as the rate claimed for the extra lead by the claimant and has verbatim accepted the claim without giving any justification for the same. We are satisfied that this is an error apparent on the face of the record as well as contrary to the terms of the Agreement. -"
In Ch. Ramalinga Reddy v. Superintending Engineer, (supra), Hon'ble Apex Court states :-
"15. Claim 3 was for "extra rate for excavation of rocks, i.e., FF rock, hard rock, etc.". The arbitrator awarded Rs 7,45,025 and Rs 1,38,878 in respect of
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Claim 3. Claim 7 was for "extra cost due to bailing out of water". The arbitrator awarded Rs 1,15,945
for Claim 7. It is important to note that for the extra work that was done the appellant was paid at
the contract rate. What was now sought was an increase in the rate that had been tendered by the
appellant and accepted. The arbitrator awarded an
extra rate of Rs 6.97 p. for excavation of 1 Cum HR with 10% overheads and Rs 4.36p. for excavation
of 1 Cum of FFR with 10% overheads under Claim
3. In respect of Claim 7 he made an award on the
basis of Rs 0.88 per Cum with 10% overheads. Clause 11 of Schedule E of the Special
Conditions of
Contract provides that every tenderer is expected, before quoting his rates, to inspect the site of the proposed work and to carry out such investigation
as may be necessary to enable him to correctly evaluate the work; the Government would not, after
acceptance of the contract rate, be liable to pay any extra charges in case the successful tenderer made a misjudgment. Clause 11 also states that it would be presumed that the successful tenderer had satisfied himself as to the nature and location of work, general and local conditions, including magnitude
of possible seepage, river stages, etc., before arriving at his rates and the Government would bear no responsibility for lack of such acquaintance and the consequences thereof. Clause 6 of Part VII of the Fa152.91
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General Conditions of Contract states that no extra payment would be made for bailing out water for
dewatering. Having regard to these terms of the contract between the parties, it is difficult to accept the submission that the appellant had encountered
hard rock due to a tank nearby which had not been
disclosed in the tender documents and that is why
he was entitled to the extra rates as claimed. The
High Court was right in pointing out that the contract expressly stated that no payment would be
made on account of the lack of acquaintance of the
contractor with the work site, he having been deemed to have satisfied himself in respect thereof before having quoted the rates. The arbitrator was
bound by the contract between the parties and to
decide the claims referred to him in the light thereof. His award being found to be contrary to the plain terms of the contract, it was liable to be set aside to that extent. The award in respect of Claims 3 and 7 was, therefore, rightly set aside."
89. First and foremost consideration is the terms and conditions which govern the contractual relationship between the parties. Contract at Ex. 62 initially entered into insure Article- 299 of the Constitution of India. Minutes dated 12/11/1979 at Ex, 155 recorded before the Hon. State Minister also lend support to this. What Fa152.91
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therefore is the status of Ex. 62 due to Article- 299 of Constitution of India is also an important facet. We have already found that no cognizance of Article- I is legally possible. Still by way of abundant precaution, We will attempt to find whether Article- I - the re-revised estimate has any statutory sanction in this background? At the out set it needs to be stated that Article- I is not a proved document and correctness of its contents are also not established. Moreover, it by itself, as such does not show or carry any date but then as per Plaintiff's witnessNo. 2 Shri Rewatkar re-revised estimate were prepared by him as Assistant Engineer and were signed also by Ex. Engineer Shri Ratnaparkhi. He does not accept Article- I to be said re-revised estimate. As per PW1, re-revised estimate was prepared when he had written letter at Ex. 89 dated 5.3.1979. As per DW2 Shri Kelkar he assumed charge of post held by Ratnaparkhi in October,1978 and hence, Shri Ratnaparkhi ceased to be Ex. Engineer concerned with this contract after October,1978. Plaintiff therefore ought to have shown that Shri Ratnaparkhi signed this Art I before October,1978 and his failure to prove the contents or date thereof, jeopardizes his claim for entitlement thereunder. Merely showing that his witness PW2 Rewatkar prepared some re-revised estimate or then it was signed by his other witness PW3 Ratnaparakhi, is not sufficient to enable a court of law to use document at Article- I as said re-revised estimate. But then if it is presumed that Fa152.91
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Article- I came into being in October,1978; the minutes dated 12/11/1979 at Ex. 155 certainly eclipse it. Plaintiff could have shown acceptance and implementation of Article- I by pointing out payment of any item inR.A.bills to him at said rates. He accepts that said document does not get any legal force till it is accepted by the government. Shri Kaptan has at length drawn our attention to oral evidence on record and we have made reference to it while narrating his arguments.
Page 56 of Ex. 62 shows that PW2 Shri Ratnaparkhi, Executive Engineer has on 29th June 1977 signed and accepted the tender for and on behalf of name Governor of Maharashtra. In State of Punjab v. M/s. Om Parkash Baldev Krishan (supra), cited by Shri Kaptan, learned Counsel when letter of acceptance was found signed by Executive Engineer but not in the name of Governor, Hon'ble Apex Court has held that it could not be said that there was valid binding contract in conformity with Article- 299(1) of the Constitution. The plea that once authority of the Executive Engineer to accept the tender on behalf of the Governor was established and it was made clear from the evidence that the authorities have acted on that basis, it must be presumed that the contract had been entered into in accordance with the provisions of Article- 299 of the Constitution was also held not to be Fa152.91
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tenable. Another Apex Court judgment shown by him i.e., 1968 Mah. L.J. 842=(AIR 1968 SC 1218)-- (Mulamchand v. State of Madhya Pradesh) is also relied upon to buttress very same contention. This also finds consideration in later judgment in "State of Punjab v. M/s. Om Parkash Baldev Krishan" (supra) and We find it appropriate to reproduce following paragraphs of later :-
" 11. Clause (1) of Article 299 of the Constitution provides as follows:
"(1) All contracts made in the exercise of the executive power of the Union or of a State shall be expressed to be made by the President, or by the Governor of the State, as the case may be, and all
such contracts and all assurances of property made
in the exercise of that power shall be executed on behalf of the President or the Governor by such persons and in such manner as he may direct or authorize."
12. In this case, the Executive Engineer has signed contract nowhere in the contract it was the but
offered and accepted or expressed to be made in the name of the Governor. The constitutional
requirement enjoined in Clause (1) of Article 299 of the Constitution is based on public policy. This position has been made clear by this Court in State of Bihar v. Karam Chand Thapar and Brothers Ltd.
Fa152.91
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(1962) 1 SCR 827 : (AIR 1962 SC 110). There a
dispute between the respondent and the
Government of Bihar over the bills for the amount
payable to the company in respect of the construction works carried out by it for the Government was referred to arbitration. Section 173(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935 provided as follows (at p. 111 of AIR) :
"Subject to the provisions of this Act with respect to the Federal Railway authority, all contracts made in the exercise of the executive authority of the Federation or of a province shall be expressed to be made by the Governor-General, or by the Governor
of the Province, as the case maybe, and all such contracts and all assurances of property made in the exercise of that authority shall be executed on behalf of the Governor-General or Governor by such
persons and in such manner as he may direct or authorize."
13. This Court reiterated that under that section a contract entered into by the Governor of a Province must satisfy three conditions, namely, (i) it must be expressed to be made by the Governor; (ii) it must
be executed; and (iii) the execution should be by such persons and in such manner as the Governor
might direct or authorize. These three conditions are required to be fulfilled. This position was reiterated by this Court again in Seth Bikhraj Fa152.91
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Jaipuria v. Union of India, (1962) 2 SCR 880: (AIR
1962 SC 113). This Court explained that three conditions as mentioned in State of Bihar v. Karam
Chand Thapar (AIR 1962 SC 110) (supra) had to
be fulfilled, and further reiterated that the object of enacting these provisions was that the State should not be saddled with liability for unauthorized contracts and, hence, it was provided that the contracts must show on their faces that these were made by the Governor-General and executed on his
behalf in the manner prescribed by the person authorised. It is based on public policy. No question of waiver arises in such a situation. If once that position is reached, and that position is well-settled by the authorities over a long lapse of time, no question of examining the purpose of this requirement arises. In Union of India v. A.L. Rallia Ram (1964) 3 SCR 164 : (AIR 1963 SC 1685), this
Court again reiterated that the agreement under arbitration with the Government must be in accordance with section 175(3) of the Government
of India Act, 1935. These principles were again reiterated by this Court in Timber Kashmir Pvt. Ltd. v. Conservator of Forests, Jammu, (1977) 1 SCR 937: (AIR 1977 SC 151). There, the Court was concerned with section 122(1) of the Jammu and
Kashmir Constitution which corresponded to Article
299(l) of the Constitution of India. In that case all Fa152.91
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the three applications filed by the respondent State for a reference to an arbitrator under section 20 of the Jammu and Kashmir Arbitrator Act, were dismissed by a single Judge of the Jammu and Kashmir High Court on the ground that the arbitration clause was, in each case, a part of an
agreement which was not duly executed in accordance with the provisions of section 122(1) of the Jammu and Kashmir Constitution which
corresponded to those of Article 299(l) of the Constitution of India. But the Division Bench allowed the appeals holding that if contracts were
signed by the Conservator of Forests in compliance
with an order of the Government, the provisions of
section 122(1) of the Jammu and Kashmir Constitution could not be said to have been infringed. This Court held that the contract could not be executed without the sanction. Nevertheless, if the sanction could be either expressly or impliedly given by or on behalf of the Government, as it could, and, if some acts of the Government could fasten some obligations upon the Government, the
lessee could also be estopped from questioning the terms of the grant of the sanction even where there is no written contract executed to bind the lessee. But, once there had been a valid execution of lease by duly authorised officers, the documents would be the best evidence of sanction. In that case, the Fa152.91
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contracts were executed on behalf of the Government of Jammu and Kashmir. The only question with which the Court was concerned in that case was whether the contracts executed by duly authorised officials had been proved or not. It was held that it was so proved.
14. In Bihar Eastern Gangetic Fishermen Co- operative Society Ltd. v. Sipahi Singh (1978)1 SCR375: (AIR 1977 SC 2149), where this Court relied on a previous decision in Mulamchand v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1968) 3 SCR 214: (AIR
1968 SC 1218) and reiterated that there cannot be
any question of estoppel or ratification in a case where there is contravention of the provisions of Article 299(1) of the Constitution. The reason is that the provisions of section 175(3) of the Government of India Act and the corresponding provisions of Article 299(1) of the Constitution have not been enacted for the sake of mere form but they have been enacted for safeguarding the Government against unauthorized contracts. The provisions are embodied in section 175(3) of the Government of India Act and Article 299(1) of the
Constitution on the ground of public policy on the
ground of protection of general public.... and these formalities cannot be waived or dispensed with. This Court again reiterated the three conditions mentioned herein before. The same principle was Fa152.91
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again reiterated by this Court in Union of India v. Hanuman Oil Mills Ltd., 1987 Suppl SCC 84."
90. Neither "Article- I" nor any other document satisfy these tests and hence, can not be looked into as modifying original contract. In fact, Plaintiff has not come out with any such case. Ex. 62 therefore remains a decisive document. Perusal of Ex. 75 dated 17.8.1978 sent by defendant and of reply thereto by Plaintiff vide Ex. 79 dated 24.11.1978, leave no manner of doubt that parties had reached an agreement to pay at rate accepted therein for excavation of hard strata beyond permissible excess of 25%. Ex. 155 itself shows that classification of hard strata in approach channel excavated till then was already decided and paid for. It could not have been reopened and Executive engineer had given some assurance in that regard for future. Contractor's reliance on certificate about strata issued by Shri Rewatkar , Asst. Engineer, was shown misconceived as what was disclosed by Shri Rewatkar was only an estimated quantity and Shri Rewatkar had no authority regarding such classification. Claim for longer lead for casing material was found erroneous. Claim for additional lead for rubble pitching was also found contrary to clause 3.12.2 of Ex. 62. But Contractor requested for sympathetic Fa152.91
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consideration by Government and it was agreed to. Hence, though there was no legal right in Plaintiff, a consideration was assured. This can not and does not derogate from binding obligation cast by Ex. 62. Claim towards Nala diversion was payable to the extent of 20% after he completed C.O.T. (cut of trench) in gorge and 80% after completion of whole work. It was brought to Contractor's notice that said C.O.T. was filled in by piece rated workers, he was not entitled to 20% and hence, payment could have been considered only while preparing final bill after completion of work. In present facts, Plaintiff/Contractor did not even complete the work but abandoned before that stage could be reached. In respect of his claim for idle machinery, it was demonstrated to him that for period from April 1978 to November,1978 he had employed average 60 labours per day and hence, work was never stopped. In March,1978 he was paid for 1620 CUM hard strata which was much in excess of agreed 82 CUM quantity. Hence as per Ex. 62 he was not entitled to anything. The claim for payment of Hard Strata was shown misconceived as clause 4.1 of Ex. 62 authorised only Ex. Engineer and he was placing reliance upon the certificate issued by the Asst. Engineer who denied having issued any such document. The document then produced by him was found only an estimate of quantities required for completion of work. Contractor was informed accordingly. This Rewatkar is examined by Plaintiff's as its witness PW2 Fa152.91
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before the Trial Court. Contractor insisted before the Minister for payment as per said classification and hence, Minister made further inquiry which revealed that levels were taken only for preparation of estimates and Ex. Engineer had not visited subsequently. Hon. Minister then asked Contractor whether he was willing to continue by withdrawing untenable claims. Superintending Engineer pointed out that Contractor has to withdraw Section 80 CPC notice also and pay hire charges of government machineries brought to site. Contractor accepted this but requested payment as per classification of hard strata in approach channel to keep mutual good will. Minister was informed about classification already done and acceptance of payment accordingly by the Contractor. As the re-classification was not possible, the request of Contractor was accepted for future where classification after excavation could have been done. Contractor also agreed to this proposal. Hon. Minister then directed that Contractor should be allowed to restart work on these conditions. It is not in dispute that Contractor resumed work accordingly. He withdrew his first notice under Section 80 CPC dated 25.7.1979 at Ex. 90. It is therefore clear that all disputes were redressed to Plaintiff's satisfaction and hence he could not have again raised the very same grievances. In paragraph 16 of the plaint, plaintiff has pointed out this withdrawal of Ex. 90 vide letter dated 19.11.1979. Before institution of present suit, he did issue another Fa152.91
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notice at Ex. 180 on 9/4/1980. Minutes at Exh. 155 therefore resolved the controversy between the Plaintiff and department by bringing it to notice of Plaintiff absence of any merit in its dispute. It does not bring about any change in contract at Ex. 62. We are constrained to refer to all this minutely to show that Article- I never figured in this discussion. In para 50 of its judgment, Trial Court has itself noted that Article- I is not executed document. When Article- I - the re-revised estimate has no statutory sanction, the only document available on record i.e., Ex. 62 is bound to govern everything.
Though Shri Parchure has attempted to show that contract at Ex. 62 was provisional and for that purpose relied upon clauses 3.3.1,3.3.2,3.3.3, 4.17 of Ex. 62, We can not accept it. These clauses only show that quantities specified by the department were subject to change and do not indicate that the rate quoted for such work were also liable to revision. Though clause 38 of Ex. 62 (page 88) regulates payment for quantities not exceeding 25% over and above those mentioned in contract, here Ex. 79 read with Ex. 155 clinch the situation and estopp Plaintiff from advancing any argument inconsistent therewith. G.R. dated 14.3.1974 and 25.8.76 have not been produced on record by Plaintiff as per law and We can not look into those documents as the Appellant/Defendant did not get opportunity to meet Fa152.91
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the same. Similarly, Ex. 153 dated 6.6.1981 on which learned Counsel relied on only shows loss of one file containing re-revised estimate. It also shows that re-revised estimates as proposed were not till then accepted by the Executive Engineer and it was returned to Divisional Office for some compliances. It therefore militates with theory of Plaintiff that an alternate and binding arrangement had legally come into force. Thus this document does more harm to the case of Plaintiff than assisting it. In any event, it does not establish that Article- I is the copy of said original re-revised estimate and also does not prove contents thereof or truth of contents. Cross-examination of DW2 Kelkar in para 7 shows that revises estimate was finalized by Ratnaparkhi and PW-1 Ratnaparkhi in paragraph 1 of his chief states that he had checked by him and submitted to higher authorities. However, (PW1) he did not state whether Article- I was as per revised estimate. DW2 could not answer why loss of original estimate was not pleaded in W.S. Another document at Ex. 156 dated 21.5.1963 is government decision which resolves controversy when rates for extra item are settled by Executive Engineer and contractor proceeds further accordingly but later competent superior authorities disagree to such rates and over-rule Ex. Engineer. Here that is not the contingency and there was/is no occasion to determine rate for any extra item. Clause 14 at page 69 of contract (Ex.62), requires contractor to complete additional work or work of the Fa152.91
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nature already envisaged in Ex. 62 at same rate. If that type of work is not provided for in Ex. 62, for work of such new nature, contractor is to be paid at prevailing CSR. Hence, in the light of this material on record, We find reference to to Ex. 156 misconceived. Most important is the fact that Plaintiff has not established his entitlement to be paid as per re- revised estimate. On the contrary, answers given by its witness PW-1 during cross-examination in paragraph 11 and 18, sufficiently bring on record Plaintiff's dis-entitlement to rates in Article- I or re-revised estimate. There is nothing in other evidence or material on record to militate with this position. Mere need felt by PW-2 or PW-3 to prepare re-revised estimate or availability of justification therefor, does not infuse any legal sanction in it and hence, Article- I is totally useless document. Plaintiff's entitlement is to be decided only as per Ex. 62 also in the light of Ex. 155.
In conclusion, We find that both on facts and on law, controversy needs to be resolved with reference to Ex. 62 only. Point E is answered accordingly.
91. As to Issue nos. 1, 10, 8 and Additional Issue No. 5. It is convenient to treat these issues together. Out of it, we first consider the Trial Court's issueNo. 1,10.
Fa152.91
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In plaint paragraph 2 has pleaded that "The plaintiff now learnt that the department has also prepared tentative revised estimates prepared for 2nd time in which department has taken quantity of hard strata to about 41,000 Cub.m." . Then he has given break up thereof. He has then pointed out letters written by him. In letter Ex. 68 dated 10.4.1978, he has mentioned that revised estimate hard strata was 2000 cum. Letter then states -- "but as per the site condition and the strata now thus exposed can be seen that the excavation in hard strata comes to 60,000/- cum or so." Little later in said letter plaintiff states that -- "thus the approximate quantity of 10,000 cum has been done by us so far". It also states that -- "In our opinion it is about 60,000 cum further we have to state that we have generally removed all soft strata from the area of the approach and tail channel where about 65000 cum. quantity of excavation is remaining out of which 5000 cum may commensurate to as soft strata and 60,000 cum of hard strata." Plaintiff has then mentioned quantity executed i.e, 10000 cum in hard strata is finalized, rate decided and paid, it was not ready the work below existing level. Early finalization is also sought as material from borrow pit was to be used for casing. Confirmation is sought that about 35000 cum earth work is required and preparation of extra item list is urged. In plaint paragraph 9, it is stated that on 13.12.1978 levels were Fa152.91
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taken and quantity of 19260 cum hard strata was noticed. At that time payment for 5200 cum was already received. In paragraph 10(f), said quantity till December,1978 is stated to be 9000 Cum. Thereafter, additional work of 7000 cum is also claimed. Again there is reference to further additional work of 2000 cum. It is claimed that 19260 cum work was recorded by SDO. In legal notice dated 25.7.1979 (Ex.90) payment of Rs. 2,63,120.00/- was claimed for 13000 cum. In plaint, claim is of Rs. 2,63,190.00/-. Paragraph 31(1) of plaint shows hard strata not measured upto 31.3. 1980 as 9000 cum and claims Rs. 182160.00/- for it. Rate claimed is thus Rs.20.24/- per cum for these quantities and in plaint outstanding for 9000 cum is pleaded. Another claim in which specific quantity is revealed is paragraph 25 where payment at Rs. 16.08/-cum as difference between rate due and rate paid is sought. Quantity mentioned is for 8000 cum and sum asked is Rs.128480/-. In paragraph 31, against claim 10, this amount is disclosed as towards excavation below soft strata. Prayer (e) is to direct defendants to render accounts for illegal utilization and for shrinkage etc. and price escalation clause. Prayer (f) is "it may be declared and direction be given to the defendants to prepare the correct final bill of the work done by plaintiff".
92. Judgment of Trial Court considers this aspect in paragraphs Fa152.91
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32 till 37. Trial Court finds that "admittedly" hard strata excavation in the project 40000 cum. For this deposition of DW2 is relied upon. His evidence is also found to contain a statement that Plaintiff did abandon after completing 90% of the work. Then Ex. 138 which in fact is chart of measurement by the defendant/appellant's after plaintiff abandoned the work, is relied upon. It shows 12542 cum as work in hard strata and Trial Court observes that admittedly final measurements of work done by plaintiff was recorded by the defendant without notice. Trial Court remarks that - "This was because the design of the defendant so that some of the plaintiff's work of hard strata excavation would be shown as the work done by department." In next paragraph, it relies on Ex. 85 to observe that from it 9000 cum work can be seen. Ex. 85 shows quantity of hard strata and for its correct comprehension, scrutiny of evidence of PW-2 Rewatkar is essential. He has in examination in chief itself stated that it is revised estimate dated 13.12.1978 which was placed before the Executive Engineer. Therefore, this estimate can not supersede the the actual quantities measured and reflected in running account bills. Trial Court then shifts to another estimate i.e., re-revised estimate at Article- I to note that said work in approach channel was 10020 cum and therefore work in hard strata left unpaid was (19260-10020) 9240 cum. Trial Court has thus erred in using two estimates only to arrive at this figure. Plaintiff had Fa152.91
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not shown courage to put this so called simple mathematical exercise to his own witness i.e., PW2 (Rewatkar himself) who in fact was an officer of department. DW1 Shri Gadekar to whom Trial Court refers in this paragraph, has stated that he had not seen the original estimate at Ex. 132 or the revised estimate. H stated in cross examination that he had seen contractor's bills, measurement books, field books etc. However, the Plaintiff avoided to cross examine him on the actual quantum or quantity of work done. In paragraph 3, he accepts that Contractor had done work of 26437 cum as per Ex. 138 but then he could not give the date by which said work was put in by Plaintiff. He states that said quantity of excavating hard strata mentioned in Ex. 138 is on the basis of 13thR.A.bill in the measurement book Article- 3. His cross examination shows an important piece of evidence brought on record by Contractor/Plaintiff that Contractor signs R.A.bills in token of its acceptance and 13th R.A.bill does not bear such signature. This evidence therefore does not support the mathematical exercise of subtraction. It does not mean that estimation in Ex. 85 and Article- I were of actual work then remaining in balance and could be used to find out the work completed in the meanwhile. In any case, when Article- I is held not admissible in evidence, its use for said mathematical exercise is unsustainable. Apart from this there is no other material on record to conclude that 9240 or 9000 cum of hard rock is Fa152.91
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left unpaid. As per Plaintiff' case this 9000 cum is the quantity not measured and not paid.
In paragraph 34 of the judgment Trial Court finds that Plaintiff has been paid for 23143 cum of hard strata till 12th R.A.bill. Then it reverts to Exh. 138 and uses 41000 AS cum hard rock quantity disclosed therein as total work put in by Plaintiff'. There is no basis for such presumption on record. Alleged admission of DW2 does not show that in Ex. 138, 41000 cum. is reflected as the work performed in hard strata. It then deducts quantity paid for i.e., 23000 cum from total quantity of 40000 cum to record a finding that charges for 17000 cum of hard strata are not paid. Again it finds favour with plaintiff's version that out of this 17000 cum, he received payment for 8000 cum as soft strata work and hence deduces that he is not paid anything for balance 9000 cum hard strata. Total absence of such claim of completion of 41000 or 40000 cum hard strata work in plaint is lost site of by it in the process. Total excavation in Hard Rock as per Exh. 138 is 26437 by Plaintiff and 12542 by Defendant's department i.e., total of 38979 cum only. Though Plaintiff's representative was not summoned and present when measurements for 13th R.A.bill were taken, Defendants have shown (26437 - 23143) 03291 cum hard rock excavation by plaintiff after 12th R.A.bill till he abandoned on 16.3.1980. 12th R.A.bill is duly Fa152.91
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signed by Plaintiff and hence, it is undisputed. It is paid on 23.1. 1980 and Plaintiff' had resumed the work on 26.11.1979. 11th running bill was paid to the plaintiff on 25.12.1979. He was earlier paid 10th R.A.bill on 30.12.1978. Thereafter he discontinued work on 12.2.1979 , started again in April,1979 to stop on 8.5.1979. and had resumed on 26.11. 1979 as per minutes dated 12/11/1979 at Ex, 155 recorded before the Ho. State Minister. 12th running bill was paid on 23.01.1980 and thus, it was for work put in between measurements relevant for these two bills i.e., 11th and 12th. Plaintiff accepted that the measurement of work in approach channel and tail channel till 12th running bill were taken in his presence and he had not submitted any bill for quantities claimed. PW1 further accepted that had he submitted any such bill, it would have been verified by the Engineer In-charge. Plaintiff never objected to the measurements recorded. Plaintiff has not discharged burden put upon him by law in this respect by specifically pleading and proving any levels or measurement of excavation as per his records. In cross examination, he accepts receipt of up to date payment and not raising any objection to any measurement. Not only this, he also did not produce his measurements of work done in Hard Strata. Looking to entire correspondence about this controversy which begins with Exh. 63 dated 8.12.1977 sent by Plaintiff, reply to him at Ex. 64 dated 18.1.1978, impact of proceedings at Ex. 155 recorded by Fa152.91
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the Hon. Minister and his defence that non-cooperative attitude by the defendants in this connection resulted in stoppages of work or to his "leaving" the contract, derogates from finding of completion of 17000 cum of hard strata work during said period. More findings on this conduct are recorded by us while considering claim of Plaintiff for compensatory costs. All this only indicates the heavy burden on him to come up with strong and convincing plea and evidence to support such a claim. Plaintiff's ought to have maintained proper measurement records and lodged protests with the defendants from time to time with its copies. Clause 10 and 14 of Ex. 62 assume relevance here and deny to Plaintiff any enhancement in rate rendering Article- I superfluous. That has not been done and, hence, here 03291 cum could have been only accepted as quantity of hard strata for which Plaintiff can claim payment. When as per Ex. 138 CSR of Rs. 18. 40/- + 10% is applied, Rs. 66,609.84/- is the amount due to Plaintiff for it. But then, claim of work got done by department also can not be overlooked. Reply dated 11.05.1980 at Ex. 126(B) sent by the appellants to notice under Section 80 of Code of Civil Procedure reveals that including quantum of 3394.37 cum. hard strata adjusted in 13th running bill, plaintiff was paid for 26,537.87 cum. and plaintiff had claimed excavation of only 10,000 cum. till November, 1978. For said work worth Rs. 2,30,772.80/-, had the defendants proved that they have paid Fa152.91
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Rs. 3,60,022.80/- to another agency, they could have successfully raised counterclaim for excess expenditure of Rs. 129250/-. However such excess payment to any other agency is not established by the defendants. Hence, this counterclaim needs rejection. Quantities used in paragraph 34 of its judgment by Trial Court are in fact the quantities in Article- I and reproduced by Plaintiff from it in plaint paragraph 2. He has made reference to it as "tentative revised estimates prepared for 2nd time" by the department. As such, absence of any rebuttal to it by Defendants or alleged inability of DW2 to specify exact break up thereof does not dilute the burden cast on Plaintiff's shoulder by law. On the contrary, it shows perverse approach on part of said Court. Answer to IssueNo. 1 therefore needs to be modified accordingly. Plaintiff is declared not entitled to 1,82,160.00/- but he is found eligible to recover sum of Rs. 66,609.84/- instead from defendants. We are required to consider the Appellant/Defendant's counterclaim in more details little later. However, Defendant's counterclaim on this account is liable to be rejected.
93. This now necessitates consideration of issueNo. 10 as framed by Trial Court. Plaintiff's claim Rs. 1,28,480.00/- as difference in rate. It claims that though it excavated hard strata, it/he has been paid at soft strata rate. Quantity involved is alleged to be 8000 Cum. How err Trial Fa152.91
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Court deducts quantity paid for i.e., 23000 cum from total quantity of 40000 cum to record a finding that charges for 17000 cum of hard strata are not paid, how it finds favour with plaintiff's version that out of this 17000 cum, he received payment for 8000 cum as soft strata work and hence deduces that he is not paid anything for balance 9000 cum hard strata and mistakes therein are already noticed by us while answering issue 1. We found him entitled to claim relief for 03291 cum only. As per Ex. 138, total work in Hard Strata is 38979 cum only. Assertions of Plaintiff's nowhere show that he was claiming said 17000 cum work or then at least 8000 cum work to be over and above this quantity in Ex. 138. He never disputed that quantity and put no suggestions to departmental witnesses in this connection. If this claim is to be accepted, quantities of Hard and Soft Strata work in Ex. 138 need to be matched. He has not pleaded and proved that 46328 cum soft strata work credited to him in Ex. 138 also included this 8000 cum hard strata work. There is no such suggestion by him to any department's witnesses or even attempt to show it through his own witnesses. As recorded in Ex. 155, Hon. Minister on 12.11.1979 asked Plaintiff whether he was willing to continue after withdrawing all untenable claims. Superintending Engineer pointed out that Contractor had also to withdraw Ex. 90 i.e.,Section 80 CPC notice and pay hire charges of government machineries brought to site. Contractor accepted Fa152.91
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this but requested payment as per classification of hard strata in approach channel to preserve cordial relations. Minister was informed about classification exercise already done and acceptance of payment in pursuance thereof by the Contractor. As the re-classification was not possible, the request of Contractor was accepted prospectively where classification was till then not done. Contractor consented to this arrangement. Hon. Minister then directed that Contractor should be allowed to resume on these conditions and it is not in dispute that work was resumed accordingly. We have already seen significance of these developments above. In this background this claim which definitely pertains to period prior to 12.11.1979 could not have been re- agitated before Trial Court. In any case, heavy burden lay upon Plaintiff to prove satisfactorily the exact quantum of work done in Hard strata and Soft Strata, and for said purpose, to raise appropriate plea. His chief examination in paragraph 8 shows grievance that correct measurements of his work were not taken by the defendants and no measurements of work done in February and March, 1980 were taken. This does not find any support in plaint and little later, he claims amount of Rs. 1,28,480.00/- on account of difference in rate of Hard and Soft strata towards 8000 cum. In para 13 of this chief, he claims that this work was done between 1978 to January,1980. In cross examination, in para 15, he accepts that he received payment for Fa152.91
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23042. 50 cum as Hard strata. He further accepts that he received payments for this work in January,1980 and it was payment for the work "up to date". He then stated that use of "up to date" was not correct. He however accepted that he did not record any protest regarding incorrect measurement in Measurement Book-Article- 4. He also did not produce any measurements maintained by him. Trial Court itself has paragraph 71 of its judgment accepted that work in hard strata can not start till soft strata work is complete. We therefor find that Trial Court erred in holding that this 8000 cum work was in fact in Hard Rock and further, in granting him any amount on account of alleged difference. Evidence and material clearly establishes his failure to prove any such entitlement. We have, while answering point D above found that it would have been most natural for Plaintiff's to insist for taking measurements. It would have shown his bonafides. However, Plaintiff thought it proper to abandon the work. IssueNo. 10 therefore needs answer against the Plaintiff Contractor.
94. As to Issue 8 :- Issue 8 claiming sum of Rs. 37,440/ due to utilization of hard strata is decided by Trial Court in para 54 of its judgment by relying upon its findings against issue 1. Quantity of 9000 CUM as unpaid hard strata reached by it in issue 1 is also used here. Said use is therefore unsustainable. It has then applied enhanced rate of Fa152.91
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Rs. 4.16 per CUM and rate of "to and fro" lead to it of Rs. 3.28 per CUM. Total rate used is Rs. 7.44 per CUM and accordingly decree of Rs. 66,960/- is allowed. Thus, it ignored the limited demand and granted relief in excess. There was/is no occasion to grant such relief to the Plaintiff.
95. As to additional Issue No. 5 :-- Decree on additional issue No. 5 in favour of Plaintiff for extra lifts, soft strata utilization, for soft strata excavation totaling to Rs. 33,69,286.00/- now needs consideration. Trial Court considers all this while answering issue No. 5 in paragraphs 65 to 73 of its judgment. Mention of issue No. 5 is obviously wrong and it is additional issue No. 5 which reads-- Is plaintiff entitled to get declaration and direction to be given to the defendant to prepare the correct final bill of the work done by the plaintiff ? Trial Court has answered correct issue no 5 in paragraph 45 and relevant discussion is in paragraphs 43 to 45.(There are two paragraphs with number 45.) Thus while considering the request for accounts and a direction to prepare correct final bill prayed in Suit, this relief has been given. Break up of this amount is 28,22,986/- in extra lifts, 4,68,360/- for soft strata utilization and 77,940/- for soft strata excavation. There is no such break up and plea in plaint and Plaintiff did not choose to amend it at any point of time. There is no Fa152.91
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whisper of any of these reliefs in any of the notices under Section 80 CPC i.e., Exh. 90 or Ex. 180.
Discussion above by us while rejecting Plaintiff's claim of Rs. 1,28,480.00/- on account of difference in rate of Hard and Soft strata towards 8000 cum (issue No. 10 by Trial Court) is also helpful to negate grant of Rs. 77,940/- towards 18000 cum work in soft strata. This quantity of soft strata work allegedly not paid for is worked out on the strength of deposition of DW2. Plaintiff argued that as per column 8 in in Ex. 138, defendants did embankment work (hearting + casing) of 80000 cum and it was impossible as only gorge work was left out when it left the work. Evidence of DW2 Shri Kelkar is used to find assertion of department that it completed 62000 cum earth work and therefore balance 18000 (80000-62000) is held put in by Plaintiff. Trial Court holds that as 13th R.A.bill was not a minus bill, it should have provided for payment of this 18000 cum to plaintiff. Trial Court accepts this to be un-measured work and grants rate as per Ex. 62 at Rs. 4.33 per cum for it. Evidence of DW2 Shri Kelkar utilized by Trial Court shows in para 17 total of embankment work for hearting and casing to be 79890 cum. His earlier cross contains a statement that total quantity of work in gorge portion was 89000 cum and balance work of 62000 cum was got done by the department. He also stated that quantum in Fa152.91
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gorge filling comes to 27000 cum. 79890 cum is total of work done departmentally as seen at sr. No. 7 and 8 in Ex.138-- against embankment 26968 cum. in hearting and 52922 cum. in casing. Rate for hearting Rs.6.52/- and for casing, it is Rs. 4.15/-. This document does not show that department had done only 62000 cum out of this 79890 cum. In his cross examination in paragraph 12, DW2 had deposed about work in gorge portion. Total quantity in gorge portion is deposed by him to be 89000 cum and out of it 27000 cum was done by Plaintiff and balance 62000 cum was claimed as accomplished departmentally by this witness. On next day, during further cross, he accepted the quantum disclosed as done departmentally in Ex. 138 at sr. No. 7 and 8 to be 79890 cum. and corrected his mistake. As if this is total work in gorge portion, because of his stand that department had put in only 62000 cum. work, suggestion that in addition to 27000 cum, the so called deficit in work i.e., 18000cum (79890-62000) was done by plaintiff, was given to him and he has denied it. He stated that earlier he had given figures by making calculations after verifying daily reports. But, We find apparent error in process followed by Trial Court as Plaintiff never put to him total quantity of earth work done in hearting and casing as per Ex. 138. It shows Contractor's work to be 112837 cum as per Ex. 138, column 6 against both these serial numbers. It is not the case of Plaintiff that he has not done this 112837 Fa152.91
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cum. of work and that he has not received payment therefor. Departmental work of 79890 cum. is over and above or in addition to it. This can never mean that quantum of work done by Plaintiff can be increased beyond 112837 cum . No suggestion was given to DW2 about wrong entry or wrong preparation of Ex.138 or incorrect mentioning of measurements in it. We find entire consideration of this aspect full of confusion and effort of Plaintiff to mislead Trial Court has succeeded. Said finding shows non-application of mind by Trial Court. Plaintiff's have not established any such work at all. Grant of Rs. 77.940/- on this count is therefore unsustainable and liable to be set aside. It also follows that grant of Rs. 4,68,360/- on that quantum towards rate of hearting,casing, extra lead of embankment and also extra lift is unsustainable. Consideration of this grant in paragraph 69 of its judgment again shows glaring mistakes. When quantity used in hearting and casing activities were not equal and particular proportion thereof were not proved by Plaintiff', how average of rates varying materially could have been used by Trial Court disregarding proportion thereof as shown in Ex. 138 is not explained. Average of Rs. 5.34 worked out is later brought down to 4.34. Rate of Rs. 26.02 /- used by Trial Court can not be supported. Rate of hearting in Ex. 138 is 150% of the rate of casing while quantum wise departmental work reflected Fa152.91
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therein in casing is twice the work of hearting. Extra lift rate average is worked out by adding Rs. 13.20 + Rs. 21.60 and by dividing the product 34.80 by 2 at Rs. 17.40. Ultimate rate is worked out by adding Rs. 4.34 + 3.28+ 17.40 = Rs.26.2 per cum. when actual product has to be Rs. 25.02 per cum. If 4.34 is read as 5.34, this total comes to Rs. 26,02/-. At the end of para, 18000 is multiplied by Rs.26.02 and figure of Rs. 4,68,360/- is arrived at. If it is multiplied by Rs.26.2, total works out to Rs. 471600/-. We therefore fail to note any conscious effort undertaken by Trial Court while granting this relief to Plaintiff. As 18000 cum. can not be seen as the quantity of work put in by plaintiff, grant of Rs. 77.940/- and of Rs. 4,68,360/- therefor to it, is liable to be set aside.
96. The Trial Court has also granted amount of Rs. 28,22,986.22/- towards extra lifts. Once it is held that Plaintiff has failed to prove soft strata work over and above 112837 cum., this grant also can not be sustained. We have already held that terms and conditions in Ex. 62 are determinative in so far as relationship between parties is concerned. Discussion on this tropic begins from para 65 of the impugned judgment which has heading- "Additional issue No. 5". Trial Court has committed error at the threshold when it observes that Fa152.91
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"This issue is pertaining to final bill of Plaintiff's work for extra lift. This claim also pertaining to preparation of E.I.R.L. For extra leads as it is 5 kms." E.I.R.L. means extra item rate list. Maximum height of dam is 19.10 Meters or 62.65 feet and its average height worked out to 9.55 Meters. According to Plaintiff, while arriving at tender rate of Rs. 5.93 per cum. for hearting or of Rs. 3.69 per cum. for casing, this average height was lost site of and 1.5 Meters was taken as average lift height. Plaintiff acknowledged that rates quoted were inclusive of "all leads and lifts" but urged that such leads and lifts can not be unreasonable. Plaintiff thus tried to meet the defence that Plaintiff's should have quoted higher percentage while submitting his offer as tender terms pointed out initial lift of "1.5 Meters" and there was no rate analysis. Plaintiff relied upon government circular at Ex. 172 as according to him, 600% or 6 times increase in initial lift constituted it a special circumstance. Last sentence in paragraph 65 of the judgment reads-- "We will have to relied upon 13th R.A. Bill as well as Ex. 138 column No. 6 there are respectively 48920 cum. and 63917 cum. (+25000 cum.) unpaid borrow casing is equal to 88917 cum." It is difficult to decipher its exact meaning. This "+25000" was corrected by DW2 as 27000 cum. but then Plaintiff brought it down to 18000 cum. and claimed payment therefor. We have already found that Plaintiff has failed to establish such entitlement. As per Ex. 138- column 6, embankment Fa152.91
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work done by Plaintiff in hearting is 48920 cum. and in casing, it is 63917 cum. , both works totaling to 112837 cum. In paragraph 66, Trial Court has derived average rate of extra lift and for that, relied upon deposition of DW2 Shri Kelkar to note that he frankly admitted rate of extra lift at Rs. 2.20 per cum. per slab in soil, Rs. 3 per cum. for hearting over hard murum and Rs. 4,20 per cum. for hard murum+bolder. Hard murum and bolder are used in casing zone. Trial Court has then mentioned that as per Plaintiff, average rate of extra lift in the casing zone per slab is (3/2+ 4.20/2)= Rs. 3.60 per cum. Further consideration by Trail Court in paragraph 67 of judgment shows that by dividing average dam height with average lift (i.e., 9,55/1.5), it found the total 6 slabs. For hearting, it found 4 extra lifts but then while calculating rate instead of multiplying Rs. 2.20 by 4 wrongly applied multiplier of "6" to reach answer of Rs. 13.20 per cum. Shri Parchure, learned Counsel for Respondent Contractor has himself pointed out this wrong use of multiplier by Trial Court. Hence rate of Rs. 13.20 needs to be substituted by Rs. 8.80 for hearting. For casing work, Trial Court multiplied above average rate of Rs. 3.60 by 6 to reach rate of Rs. 21.60 per cum. There are two paragraphs with number 68 in impugned judgment and in first para 68, Trial Court has multiplied hearting quality of 48920 cum. by Rs. 13.20/- to record entitlement of Plaintiff to Rs. 6,45,744/-. It has multiplied casing work of 48917cum. by Fa152.91
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Rs.21.60, to note Rs. 19,20,607.20/- as Plaintiff's entitlement. It then performed addition of both these amounts and added 10% to it, to arrive at final figure of Rs. 28.22,986.32/-. We find that when 48917 is multiplied by Rs. 21.60, correct product is Rs. 10,56,607.2/-. Figure of Rs. 19,20,607.2/- worked out and used by Trial Court is thus an apparent error. Similarly, when 48920 cum. is multiplied by Rs. 8.80/- , answer is Rs. 430496/-. Thus by adding Rs.1056607.2 and Rs. 430496, total obtained is Rs. 1487103.2. If 10% more is further added, it becomes Rs. 1635813.52/-. Thus, presuming entire exercise of Trial Court to be correct, still Plaintiff could have claimed only Rs. 1635813.52/- on account of extra lifts after deducting the payment already received from Appellants/ defendants who treated it as single lift and paid accordingly. Final figure of Rs. 28.22,986.32/- worked out by Trial Court is wrong and unsustainable. More over when separate Rate of Rs. 3/- for hard murum and Rs. 4.20/ for hard murum with bolders is prescribed, Plaintiff ought to have adduced evidence to show the respective quantities of work put distinctly and should have been made to suffer by applying lower Rate of Rs. 3/- per cum., in default. Their failure could not have been awarded by applying average rate of Rs. 3.60/-per cum. Even if it is assumed that Trial Court ought to have multiplied 63917 by Rs. 21.60/-, answer is Rs. 1380607.2/-. Thus, this consideration shows total lack of understanding on part of Trial Court Fa152.91
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about the exercise undertaken by it.
This consideration by us only shows manifest errors in application of mind by the Trial Court. However, most glaring aspect of the matter is there is no demand for such relief in Section 80 CPC notice or in Plaint. Trial Court did not frame proper issue or modify issues as framed before undertaking this exercise. Thus entire adjudication and grant by Trial Court is without jurisdiction. It is important to note that without framing any issue properly and ignoring all these defects, Trail Court has proceeded to grant decree of Rs. 33,69,286.00/- while answering issue only about direction to prepare correct final bill. Suit as filed was itself valued at Rs. 18,86,564/- only. It can not be presumed that Plaintiff, an established contractor in business with necessary paraphernalia, expertise and also knowledge of Article- I and other estimates, was not in position to plead or amend and bring on record his grievances in this respect with requisite details. Trial Court has granted decree of Rs. 33,69,286.00/- against this issue only, which is much in excess of total suit claim. Total decretal amount in Suit is 61,41,048/- while more than 50% of it stands awarded under this part of impugned judgment. This grant is therefore liable to be quashed and set aside.
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97. Evidence on record relied upon by Trial Court is of DW2 Kelkar at Ex. 150. We have very briefly looked into his evidence while considering the relief for 18000 cum. work in embankment above. Trial Court has discussed the evidence of Plaintiff on this question in para 67 where it mentions that according to PW1 rate of casing was inclusive of single or initial lift. In cross, he denied clause in contract at Ex. 62 that casing rates included all leads and lifts and it did not contain any provision for extra lift. Then it makes reference to alleged admissions by PW2 Rewatkar and DW2 Kelkar. Paragraph 23 of the deposition of Dw2 Shri Kelkar shows only reproduction of contents of Ex. 62 about rates. He, however, has also stated that lift is not shown separately in estimate. He has denied that increase in lift from 1.5/2 Meters to 19 Meters can be considered as special circumstance to attract circular dated 19.1.1989 at Ex. 172. He has also stated that said rates in estimate were not weighted rates and has deposed that same were basic rates. Shri Rewatkar has in his cross examination by defendants/ appellants, stated that rates of item No. 2,7 and 8 at page 96,97 and 98 of Ex. 62 were weighted rates. This does not improve the position for Plaintiff who has to stand on its own legs. Perusal of work of hearting at sr.no. 7 (page 98 of Ex.62) and casing at sr,no. 8 (page 98 of Ex. 62) clearly shows that rates stipulated there are inclusive "of all leads and lifts" etc. Thus, express language of Ex. 62 does not permit association Fa152.91
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of rate therein with number of slabs and that rate can not be co-related with average height of dam. There is nothing in evidence of either plaintiff, or his witness Shri Rewatkar or then in deposition of DW2 Kelkar to enable any Court to take a view to the contrary. Ex. 172 dated 19.1.1989 also shows emphasis on stipulating rates inclusive of all leads and lifts. The tender and contract satisfy these requirements of Ex.172 and there is no need to go for any special circumstance in such situation. Length and breadth of dam structure with its height were known in advance to Plaintiff and it also possessed requisite technical expertize to gather beforehand that embankment work in hearting and casing expected of it, could not be fitted in lift of 1.5 Meters. Its height circumscribed the number of lifts necessitated to complete the work. We have already found Ex. 62 decisive and determinative. Tender document and Contract, all obliged Plaintiff to gather every relevant detail by careful site inspection/study and then to offer its bid. Number of lifts was not something which could not have been discovered by any bonafide bidder after study of tender documents. Even spot visit could have helped any vigilant contractor to gather number of lifts required for achieving particular height of casing and hearting. Such grievance is not also ventilated in any letter or in Ex. 155 on 12.11.1979. Hence, on this ground also, we find grant of huge amount on account of extra lifts bad.
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Clause 2.3 of Ex.62 cast am obligation upon the tenderer [plaintiff] to examine all documents, forms, statements, special conditions, schedule drawings etc., and obliges him to get fully acquainted with physical details of sites, its location, location of quarries, labour conditions, prior to tendering for work. Clause 2.4 expressly stipulating that no increase in rate shall be granted in any circumstances is also relevant here. Clause 2.10 specifically stipulates that rates quoted by the plaintiff are inclusive of all leads and lifts involved, even if the material is required to be brought from areas other than one shown in the quarry charts with the agreement. It casts burden upon plaintiff to get his doubts clarified. The position of approach roads is disclosed in Clause 3.8 and absence of pucca roads for procurement of stones for rubble, masonry is also pointed out. Duty to construct the same and burden of its maintenance is placed upon plaintiff. Clause 3.12 regarding availability of good quality stone within 5 km. Clarifies non-availability of payment for extra leads and lifts as per said clause in that respect.
98. Here, while considering validity of notice u/S 80 CPC, We have already held that claim in plaint for escalation and for to and fro leads could not have been looked into by the Trial Court. We also found Fa152.91
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that Suit for accounts as filed was not tenable and hence, in such a Suit, reliefs like additional issue No. 5 or escalation, illegal utilization and for shrinkage etc. could not have been looked into by Trial Court. In such a suit which itself was not tenable, Trial Court could not have granted definite reliefs for extra lifts, for soft strata utilization or soft strata excavation.
We accordingly find grant of Rs. 77.940/-, of Rs. 4,68,360/-, of Rs. 28.22,986.32/- all totaling to Rs. 33,69,286.00/ while answering additional issue No. 5 by the Trial Court, unwarranted. Same is accordingly quashed and set aside.
99. As to Issue No. 6 :- Perusal of Ex. 138 reveals work of nala diversion at sr. No. 19. Its job work estimated to be completed at Rs. 11000/ in column 5 and accordingly, in column 7, said amount is stated to be paid. DW2 Shri Kelkar has in para 17 of his deposition then referred to Article- I and he only mentions contents of that document. At page 4 of said document, it is mentioned that sanction provision for nala diversion was Rs.15000/ and it was raised to Rs. 30000/-. He also accepted that till 13th R.A.bill, this payment was not shown. Ex. 155 dated 12.11.1979 reveals that 20% charges for Nala diversion were Fa152.91
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payable after completion of C.O.T. (cut of trench) in gorge and balance 80% after whole work. C.O.T. was filled in by piece rated workers and hence, he was not entitled to 20%, Remaining payment could have been considered only while preparing final bill after completion of work. Plaintiff/Contractor did not complete the work and abandoned before that. Consideration by Trial Court in para 53 of impugned judgment does not show any mention of these relevant aspects. Only because payment was not received by Plaintiff, it has proceeded to grant re- revised amount of Rs. 30000+ its 10%= Rs. 33,000/- to it. Perusal of Ex. 138 does not show payment of Rs. 11000/- to Plaintiff by adjustment. Hence, the fact that Plaintiff did not complete the work or the stage for its release had not come are not relevant. But then recourse to re-revised rate as per Article- I is unsustainable. Plaint and evidence of PW-1 is only for claim of Rs. 10,000/ as can be seen in its para 31(6). But then Plaintiff has maximum amount as court fee, decree for Rs. 11000/- can be passed. We therefore modify that grant and bring it down to Rs.11,000/- only. We hold Plaintiff's entitled to recover Rs. 11,000/- from defendant on account of Nala diversion work. Issue No. 6 framed by Trail Court is answered accordingly.
100. As to Additional Issue nos. 1 and 2 :- Before proceeding further, at this stage it is necessary to find out whether the action taken Fa152.91
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on 16.03.1980 by the defendants/appellants is erroneous. Thus additional issue 1 can also be conveniently looked into here. The Trial Court has in paragraph no.88 of its judgment noted the arguments of plaintiff that department ought to have taken recourse to Clause 3[c] of Ex. 62, instead of Clause 3[b], as it was less injurious. The Trial Court also noted admission of D.W.2-Shri Kelkar, that there was statutory lapse on his part, as he did not call for tender to complete the remainder work. The Trial Court is impressed by circular Exh.174 dated 05.04.1979 which gives right to the Executive Engineer to prepare a pre-final bill of the work done as soon as action under Clause 3[b] is taken. The Trial Court has also found that D.W.2 did not inform expenses incurred by the department to Plaintiff' and thus, the procedure prescribed by circular Exh.167 has not been followed. Because of these reasons, the action taken by the appellants under Clause 3[b] is held illegal and not binding on plaintiff. Because of this finding the Trial Court has answered the additional issue no.2 in affirmative and found the plaintiff not entitled to reimburse the same to department. These reasons at once show that conduct prior to 16.3.1980 relevant for deciding the correctness of said action has not been adverted to and events after said date have been relied upon. Some discussion in this respect also appears in paragraph no.74 of impugned judgment and onwards.
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101. Clause 2 of Ex. 62 deals with compensation for delay and prescribes time within which the plaintiff has to complete the work. It makes time essence of contract on the part of the contractor and permits department to charge compensation of an amount equal to 1% or other similar amounts, as Superintending Engineer may decide in this respect. 1/5th of contract work is to be performed in 1/6th of total contract time. Half of contract work must be finished within 3/8th of said time and 3/4th of contracted work must be completed within 3/4th time. The total amount of compensation to be paid by the contractor cannot exceed 10%. After this Clause appears Clause 3, which permits department to adopt any of these courses, as the Executive Engineer may deem best in the interest of the government. Where the contractor abandons the work, first course open to State Government is to rescind contract and to forfeit the security deposit. Sub-Clause [b] prescribes the other mode and Executive Engineer can carry out work departmentally and debit cost thereof to the account of contractor. Sub-Clause [c] enables the Executive Engineer to order the work of contractor to be measured and then to take up the un-executed part thereof and allot it to another contractor. In that event the expenses incurred in getting it completed through other contractor can be debited to the plaintiff. Clause 4 permits a peculiar course of action when Fa152.91
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progress of any particular portion of work is not satisfactory. In that event, action under Clause 3[b] can be taken after giving the contractor 10 days notice in writing. This Clause dis-entitles that contractor to any compensation for any loss sustained by him owing to such action. Clause 5 makes it clear that the contractor remains liable to pay compensation even if action is not taken under clauses 3 and 4 above. Here PW-1 has himself accepted that he left the work i.e. he abandoned it. At end of paragraph 6 of his examination in chief, witness 1 for Plaintiff claimed that state legislative assembly (ministry) was dissolved and his started again. He was not paid as agreed on 12.11.1979 and action under clause 3(b) of ex. 62 again started. He deposed that it was illegal as no notice under clause 4 was issued and penalty under clause 2 was not levied. Witness stated that he had started gorge filling but not signed the programme. He stated that he stopped the work due to said action. Reason for stoppage is obviously false as it is inconsistent with Ex. 155.
102. Here first action was taken against the plaintiff in August, 1978 during first stoppage vide communication dated 17.08.1978 at Exh.75 and he was requested to continue the work of excavation and assured payment as per Clause 38[2] of Exh.62 for quantity beyond 25% of the contracted quantum of Hard Strata. On 19.05.1979 vide Fa152.91
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Exh.114 he was informed to present himself on 28.05.1979 for taking measurements as he had discontinued the work again from 06.05.1979. He had commenced the work only on 27.04.1979 and discontinued it on 06.05.1979. Progress was very poor. On 29.08.1979 he was informed vide Exh.116 that penalty of Rs.100/- per day vide this letter dated 19.05.1979 was increased. He did not make amends and failed to complete the work in time, hence by Exh.116 penalty was increased to 1%. It is to be noted that earlier penalty of Rs.30/- per day was imposed on him and by Exh.113 dated 19.05.1979 it was increased to Rs.100/- from 06.05.1979. Exh.111 dated 07.04.1979 is the first communication by which penalty of Rs.30/- came to be imposed on him. Thus, it can be seen that all these actions were taken against him before the meeting with the Hon'ble Minister on 12.11.1979 at Exh.155. The work commenced after the said meeting on 26.11.1979. The time to complete the contract was extended upto 30.12.1979. The absence of any substance in the grievance of contractor (Plaintiff) came on record on 12.11.1979 and has been recorded in Exh.155.
103. Trial Court has in paragraph no.80 of its judgment noted the stage wise completion, in proportion with the contracted period and then found that there was not a single letter written by the defendants between 29.06.1977 till 14.08.1978 and therefore, the allegations of Fa152.91
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delay or latches on the part of the Plaintiff in written statement [Exh.30] were incorrect. The Trial Court has overlooked the mandatory language of Exh.62 and fact of time being essence of contract. It was not necessary for the defendants to write any letter to plaintiff and inform him that he was lagging behind. Progress for work done has come on record in measurement books and in running account bills--RA bills paid to him. On 18.01.1978 vide Exh.74 he was asked to start the work immediately to avoid backlog. This communication at Exh.64 is not properly looked into by the Trial Court. The communications dated 08.12.1977 at Exh.63, dated 19.01.1978 at Exh.65 all show unwillingness on the part of the plaintiff to continue further, as he was highhandedly insisting for preparation of extra item regarding the material to be brought from borrow area. On 24.01.1978 vide Exh.66 he has again made very same demand. In Exh. 65 he has informed the department that progress of work was bound to suffer. On 24.02.1978 he has again pressed for strata classification and communicated his unwillingness to continue with the job of excavation. On 10.04.1978 he reiterated his earlier stand. On 28.06.1978, vide Exh.69 Plaintiff has expressed surprise by alleging that gorge filling program appeared to have been deferred because of non settlement of its so called genuine claims. When these communications at Exh. 68 and 69 are looked into in the light of the terms and conditions of Exh.62 it becomes clear that Fa152.91
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he was making roving attempts to obtain higher rates than the tendered one, that too without any legal basis. On 13.07.1978, he has written letter at Exh.70 to create ground to claim idle charges in future. But, here again, he seeks payment as per clause 38 of Ex. 62. On 31.07.1978 vide Exh.71 when he communicated his willingness to execute the excavation of excess quantity of hard rock, he admitted that it has to be as per Clause 38[2] of the contract Exh.62. The communication dated 10.08.1978 insists for due payment to enable the plaintiff to undertake work of gorge filling. Exh.73 dated 28.08.1978 is again on same lines. Exh.75 is written on 17.08.1978 in this background and the Trial Court, therefore, has erred in concluding that till 14.08.1978 the plaintiff was never advised to speed up the work.
104. The Trial Court has in paragraph no.80 looked into only the communications sent by the plaintiff without considering the communications sent by the defendants / appellants. We also note that admissions of D.W.2 about absence of any complaint in the matter is contrary to record. In paragraph no.82 the Trial Court has considered second stage of contract. The said consideration is vitiated because of omission to note that plaintiff had discontinued the work on 01.04.1978 and resumed it only on 16.10.1978 and again discontinued it on 12.02.1979. The period of contract was from 29.05.1977 till Fa152.91
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30.12.1978 and the stage wise time table mentioned above lost its relevance due to this stoppage. The stand of D.W.2 Shri Kelkar that action under Clause 2 cannot be taken after expiry of period does not mean that action cannot be taken at all. Here admittedly the contract period was extended at the request of plaintiff and due to meeting Exh.155. The reason given by the Trial Court that all actions taken after 28.12.1978 imposing fines were bad due to alleged admission of Shri Kelkar, therefore, shows total non-application of mind. We fail to see how such stand (opinion?) of its officer can bind State Government. Fine of Rs.30/- per day on 06.04.1979, Rs.100/- per day on 19.05.1979 and penalty of 1% of the contract amount on 29.08.1979 [vide Exhs. 111, 113 and 116] are admittedly before 12.11.1979. Meeting before the Hon'ble Minister was obviously on account of contract and to sort out the alleged disputes. The Trial Court has also been influenced by the fact that 10th R.A. bill was paid on 13.11.1978 and 11th R.A. bill was then paid on 25.12.1979 i.e. almost after 1 year. The period of closure, as already mentioned above, resuming of work on 07.04.1979, discontinuing it again in May, 1979 and starting it only after meeting with the Hon'ble Minister w.e.f. 25.11.1979, all show the situation in which preparation of 11th R.A. bill till December, 1979 was not possible. The plaintiff has accepted all these stoppages of work by him. Trial Court overlooked that on 19.05.1979, vide Exh.114 he was asked Fa152.91
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to present himself on 28.05.1979 for taking measurements. Exh.94 dated 17.12.1979 shows that the plaintiff had not signed the measurement books, field books, bills recovery statements and other records and without those signatures 11th R.A. bill could not have been prepared or paid. Thus, Trial Court could not have recorded a finding in Plaintiff's favour only due to this time-gap. When unreasonableness of Plaintiff's demand has come on record on 12.11.1979, it is apparent that the Trial Court committed grave error by holding him not responsible for the same.
105. Vide Exh.93 dated 03.12.1979 the plaintiff moved the Executive Engineer to withdraw penalties imposed on him vide Exhs. 111, 113 and 116. On 17.12.1979 vide Exh.94 the action under Clause 3[a] was withdrawn and he was allowed to resume the work. He was informed that he had not made any arrangements to re-start the work and gorge filling could not have been commenced, if he did not start the work immediately. Here attention also needs to be invited to Exh.114 dated 19.05.1979 where by he was informed about the poor progress and communication dated 13.02.1980 whereby he was informed that nala cleaning needed top priority and otherwise gorge filling would not be possible. Perusal of Exh.118 reveals the note of Executive Engineer that contractor was not making any special efforts. Fa152.91
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106. Exh.94 dated 17.12.1979 shows that the plaintiff had not signed the measurement books, field books, bills recovery statements and other records and without those signatures 11th R.A. bill could not have been paid. That bill was then paid on 25.12.1979. 12th R.A. bill was paid on 23.01.1980. Exh.118 is already commented by us briefly above. This document also informs him that as gorge work was scheduled to start on 19.02.1980, immediate steps and speed was essential. He was also informed that more delay was not acceptable. It was brought to his notice that not a single truck nor roller belonging to him was on his site or was working and progress till then achieved was because of Government machinery. He was asked to accelerate the work by making special efforts and not to depend hundred percent on Government machinery. On 29.02.1980, vide Exh.119, he was informed that he had completely stopped the work of gorge filling, rock toe, excavation of drains and filling etc. which was preliminary to mean work of gorge filling and hence he was asked to engage sufficient labour and complete it before starting gorge filling. On 01.03.1980, vide Exh.120 a reminder in this respect was also issued. He was asked to submit the program of proposed work till gorge filling immediately. On 04.03.1980 vide Exh.121 his letter dated 14.02.1980 was replied. It was pointed out to him that he was engaging only 10 labour on an Fa152.91
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average per day after restart of the work i.e. after 13.02.1979 till 04.03.1980 when needed strength was about 150 to 250. Sufficient machinery was also required for starting the work of gorge filling. He was informed that in the light of the earlier letter of office dated 26.11.1979 his other claims, except the claim for extra lead towards ruble pitching cannot be referred to government. He was also informed about exact quantity of 2001 cum. and hence, of fact that large amount was not blocked. On 04.03.1980 ,vide Exh.122 he was informed that quarry for hearting was within lead of 1 km. hence there was no question of any additional lead. Vide Exh.123 also dated 04.03.1980 his letter dated 02.12.1980 was replied and he was informed that his stand about resumption of the work only because of assurance of the department that it would make Government machinery available, was afterthought and incorrect. His insistence for settlement of his alleged claims was also found unreasonable. In paragraph no.2 of this reply, his attention was invited to his assurance to complete the work in current working session and not to stop it. Vide Exh.124 dated 10.03.1980 the department wrote to him and pointed out that on 09.03.1980 he had engaged only 35 labours and it was reported that about 25 wadar majoor were working at quarry for excavation of ruble, for doing the work of ruble pitching and rock toe. Position of casing and hearting and urgent need to complete the work of rock toe and Fa152.91
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filter was pointed out to him. This was necessary to simultaneously raise down stream side casing. On 27.02.1980, he had promised to engage his 5 trucks with 200 labours so as to give output of 300 to 400 cum. per day to achieve gorge filling as directed. However, on 10.03.1980, as no steps in that directions were taken, he was directed to engage additional trucks and labours before 14.03.1980 and he was informed that otherwise department would be forced to take action under Clause 4 from 15.03.1980, as Government could not have waited more. All these undisputed letters show Plaintiff's lax attitude.
107. Communication dated 24.03.1980 at Exh.125 is in this background. He was informed that sufficient arrangements were not made by him to continue gorge filling work and hence it became necessary for the department to supplement it and to speed up the process by employing department machinery and labour. Accordingly Plaintiff' was informed that the Sub Divisional Officer was directed to carry out the works on 3 components of dam and expenditure incurred would be debited to the account of the contractor. The 3 components mentioned in this communication are - [1] Excavation and back filling of the drain with filter material near Ch.1150; [2] Filter behind rock toe in gorge, and [3]Use of departmental machinery and labour. It is not in dispute that the contractor/plaintiff had abandoned the work from Fa152.91
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16.03.1980 itself. He then issued notice under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure on 09.04.1980.
108. There is no challenge to any of these communications or it's contents in cross-examination of D.W.2 Shri Kelkar by the plaintiff. The plaintiff has made effort to bring on record the Shri Kelkar's personal ill-will, allegedly against it, but the same is totally irrelevant in the light of these facts. Non availability of funds and alleged non payment of bills could not have been a valid reason, as 12th running bill was paid to the plaintiff on 23.01.1980 and all these events have taken place thereafter. The Trial Court has not considered this sequence and developments after 12.11.1979 at all.
109. The Trial Court has also found that though penalty was imposed, the defendants had no intention to recover it from the plaintiff and hence said communications and lapses were totally irrelevant. The discussion above clearly shows that because of meeting dated 12.11.1979 and proceedings as recorded in Exh.155, a fair chance was given to the plaintiff to restart the work and therefore, penalties were withdrawn. That does not mean that its/his lapses were condoned. In any case, the mis-behaviour and wrong conduct prior to 12.11.1979 which has come on record can always be looked into and Fa152.91
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remains relevant.
110. Not giving 10 days notice, under Clause 4 cannot be fatal to the action of defendants. It is on 23.04.1980 that the plaintiff was informed about the instructions given to the Sub Divisional Officer to supplement the work on three components of Dam departmentally. The Sub Divisional Officer was also given copy of this communication dated 24.03.1980. The claim of short notice either under Clause 4 or under Clause 3[b] is, therefore, misconceived on facts. The power with defendants to supplement such work is, not in dispute. Under Clause 3, power has been given to the Executive Engineer on behalf of the Governor of Maharashtra and he has to act in best interest of the Government. Clause 3[b] does not prescribe any time limit, as such. Here the plaintiff/contractor had abandoned the work on 16.03.1980 and hence action under Clause 3[b] cannot be said to be wrongful. Under Clause 4 action is possible when progress of any particular portion of work is unsatisfactory. Here on 10.03.1980 action under Clause 4 was to be initiated from 16.03.1980 and contractor has abandoned the work completely on 16.03.1980 only because of threat. The department therefore, had no option but to complete the entire work departmentally. The plaintiff has not come up with a case that he abandoned the work on 16.03.1980, because the Sub Divisional Officer Fa152.91
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had started supplementing the work on 15/16.03.1980. Entire reasoning in this respect by the Trial Court in paragraph nos. 85 and 86 is unsustainable. If action under any term of the Contract at Ex. 62 was not possible because it had already expired on 31.12.1979, the Trial Court could not have applied double standards by declaring the steps taken by the appellants to be bad, as there was no 10 days notice to plaintiff in accordance with Clause 4 thereof.
111. In paragraph no.87 the Trial Court has attempted to find out who delayed the completion of contract. It has however, overlooked the meeting dated 12.11.1979 at Exh.155 where the hollowness of grievance made by the plaintiff came on record. After 12.11.1979, extension was sought by and sanctioned to plaintiff and he was permitted to complete the contract even after the expiry of that extension. The Trial Court has found that 13th running bill was for the work in January-February 1980 and concluded that action taken by the department under Clause 3[b] was illegal and not binding on the plaintiff. However, it has not answered the question any where as to whether the plaintiff was justified in abandoning the work on 16.03.1980. It has also not recorded any finding that the defendants started supplementing the work from 16.03.1980. Merely because defendant's Chief Engineer sent a telegram dated 14.7. 1980 at Ex. 162 Fa152.91
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to Plaintiff and invited it for discussion, inference that Plaintiff's claim were genuine has been reached by it dehors the context. Entire consideration on additional issue no.2 by the Trial Court is, therefore, unilateral and unsustainable. Plaintiff ought to have contended that he abandoned the work on 16.03.1980 because of illegal interference in his work on 16.03.1980. His only grievance in his plaint paragraph no.30 is the fear about defendants pointing out much more expenditure for completing the remaining work and forcing it's recovery upon him. He sought a declaration that appellants/defendants have committed breach of the contract and its action under Clause 3[b] was illegal. He has not stated anywhere that notice at Exh.125 dated 24.03.1980 was bad, as it was retrospective or then that notice at Exh.124 dated 10.03.1980 was not valid as it was not a notice of stipulated duration of 10 days. His plaint does not contain reference to meeting with the Hon'ble Minister dated 12.11.1979 and its outcome. Events after payment of 12th R.A. bill on 23.01.1980 also do not find any mention in his plaint. For these reasons only, Trial Court has answered additional issue no.1 also against Defendant's i.e., Appellants in paragraph 93 of its judgment. Thus, findings recorded by it on additional issue No. 1 and 2 are unsustainable. We accordingly set aside the same and answer both in favour of the Appellant. We hold Plaintiff's responsible for delay, latches and breach of Contract at Ex. 62 and uphold the Fa152.91
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departmental completion of remaining work. Additional issue No. 1 and 2 are thus decided against Plaintiff.
112. As to additional Issue No. 3:-
This issue relating to validity of recovery of penalty and entitlement of Plaintiff's to refund of amount of penalty is answered by Trial Court in favour of Plaintiff in paragraph 91 of its judgment because of its earlier discussion. This issue is itself hypothetical as it uses the word "if any penalty is levied and recovered from him" . Thus, Plaintiff was not certain of levy and recovery of penalty due to reasons which prompted it/him to claim accounts. Trial Court also has not arrived at any particular incidence in which penalty was either levied or recovered. We, for reasons recorded by us above while answering additional issue No. 2 and 3 in favour of Appellants also over-rule this finding. As Plaintiff's did not point out any such recovery and Trail Court could not have ordered refund of any specific amount, we answer additional issue No. 3 against Plaintiff in present facts and circumstances.
113. Additional Issue Nos. 7, 8 and 6 :- Trial Court has answered these issues in paragraphs 90,92 and 94 of its judgment. Due its earlier findings, it has answered all Fa152.91
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these issues in favour of Plaintiff's. Trial Court has also answered issue No. 14 pertaining to counterclaim with additional issue 7 due to its findings on additional issue No. 2. Issue No. 14 is about entitlement of defendants Appellants to Rs. 91,000/- on account of fine or compensation as per clause 2 of Contract Ex. 62. It is obvious that because of our answer to additional issue 2 above, We have to consider issue No. 14 independently. As we have found Respondent Plaintiff's responsible for breach of contract and at fault, it follows that it is not entitled to claim refund of security deposit. Additional issue No. 7 is therefore answered against Plaintiff's and in favour of defendant. Additional Issue No. 8 is about right of defendants appellants to recover the amounts to which they are entitled out of amounts payable to Plaintiff towards some other contract with State Government. Additional Issue No. 6 is also answered by holding Plaintiff's eligible to notice charges of Rs. 400/-. In the light of our discussion above, We reverse all these findings except one on additional Issue 8. As Appellant's Defendant's are not entitled to recover anything from Plaintiff, the contingency contemplated in that Issue does not arise and additional issue No. 8 therefore, calls for no answer. Accordingly, remaining issues stand answered against the Plaintiff.
114. As To Issue Nos. 12 and 13, 11 and Cross-objection :- Fa152.91
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These issues deal with claim for compensation as Plaintiff's allegedly could not undertake any other work and their total entitlement to particular amount in Suit. Trial Court has answered the same in paragraphs 60 and 109 respectively. Issue No. 12 is claim of plaintiff's for damages of Rs. 1Lac for not getting other work. Issue No. 12 is for Rs. 66,689/- as interest under Interest Act. Trial Court has rejected the damages and interest. Plaintiff's/ Respondent before us has filed a cross-objection for said purpose. As we have found Plaintiff's at fault and committing breach of Contract, it is apparent that its cross- objection is unsustainable and stands dismissed. Respondent Plaintiff is also not entitled to any damages due to said findings. Issue No. 11 about claim of interest under Interest Act,1839, fins consideration as issue No. 12 in paragraph 60 of the impugned judgment. Prayer in the plaint is for future interest on Rs. 1886564/-. In para 31(12) claim is of Rs. 66,698/- calculated at 6% on 1819866/- purportedly under Interest Act,1839 from 9.4.1980 till filing of Suit. This amount is added to reach above total of Rs. 1886564/-.Trial Court has granted rate of 12% from date of suit till realization in its operative part vide clause 20. It has not awarded any interest from 9.4.1980 till filing of Suit. It has arrived at 12% because of its observation that State had been paying interest at 12% to 14% compound rate equal to 17 to 20% of simple rate on NSC, Indira Vikas Patra and Kisan Vikas Patra. It also noted that defendants Fa152.91
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in counterclaim, had claimed 12% interest. But then reference to Interest Act or its relevance or date from which it was claimed are all lost site of by it. 1839 Act stands repealed by Interest Act,1978 which has come into force from 19.8.1981. Transaction is of prior period. As, We have found Respondent Plaintiff at fault in the matter, it is obvious that its claim for interest deserves out right rejection. We need not delve more into this aspect. Here , it needs to be noted that while considering issue of interest under issue No. 12 in paragraph 60 of its judgment, Trial Court has granted interest at 12% to Plaintiff on total decretal amount from the date of Suit. As we find Plaintiff not entitled to any such money decree, it is obvious that defendants can not be directed to pay any interest to it. Thus all these issues 11,12 and 13 are answered against the Plaintiff and its cross-objection is also dismissed.
115. As to Issue nos. 7 and 9 :- This issue is in respect of claim because of difference in hearting and casing and issue no.9 is in respect of claim on account of lead for hearting from borrow area. In the present matter there is no and there need not be an extra item rate list and hence, the Government Circular at Exh.156 has no relevance. The said Government circular dated 21.05.1963 considers situation in which the extra item rates in list agreed between the contractors and Fa152.91
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Executive Engineers were not acceptable to the higher authorities competent to sanction the rates as per final procedure of the department and the contractor had refused to accept said decision of higher authority. The circular therefore clarifies legal position, while settling rates of such extra items. It is obvious that this communication therefore, is, not relevant here. Not only this, but perusal of Exh.92 dated 26.11.1979 clearly shows misconception on the part of the plaintiff that all his claims were to be recommended to the Government for sympathetic consideration. He was expressly informed that the extra lead for ruble pitching was only to be considered by the Government that too, without any assurance of its sanction. About extra lead, he was informed that actual lead fairly tallied with its estimation. He was informed that if he was in a position to substantiate and justify his claim for additional lead, it may be reviewed and submitted to the Government for sympathetic consideration. There is nothing on record to show that the plaintiff accordingly had attempted to justify or substantiate his claim. In paragraph no.55 of its judgment, the Trial Court has restricted consideration to 47000 cum. material brought from borrow area. It has found that as per plaintiff it was paid at less rate and partly remained unpaid. It has then found that it's grant depended upon extra item rate list and for that purpose it has made reference to Article-I. This reference and reliance is Fa152.91
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misconceived. The Trial Court has found that in original estimate Exh.132 rate analysis of casing was not shown and therefore, the said rate was not weighted rate, but only basic rate in respect of available material. The Trial Court has found that in map at Exh.62-A, green hatching in borrow area was shown, while in map Exh.170 produced by the plaintiff there was no such green hatching. It has therefore, concluded that the borrow area appearing in the map Exh.62-A does not appear in map given to the plaintiff. It's discussion in this respect in paragraph no.55 is little confusing. Consideration by the Trial Court in paragraph no.56 shows that the contentions about preparation of false document. However, our verification of record show that Exh.62A is map with contract Exh.62 which is signed by both the plaintiff and defendant. Exh.169 is identical copy of Exh.62A. In contract copy provided to the plaintiff, similar map appeared and that map has been produced by the plaintiff as Exh.170. In this Exh.170 ,this borrow area is not marked, however, no grievance about absence of such borrow area was made by the plaintiff at any point of time. Identical legends appear on map Exh.62A and map at Exh.170. Borrow for casing purposes is shown in green hatching in Exh.62A. In Exh.170 though legend explaining meaning of this hatching appears, only green hatching appears to be not carried. This inadvertent omission ought to have been noticed by the plaintiff who is an expert contractor and with Fa152.91
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due diligence he could have also got it rectified from the department. It therefore can not be said that in said copy given to Plaintiff, there is no mention of this borrow and it can not be treated as extra item. Clause 4.3 in Ex. 62 prohibits Plaintiff from taking advantage of this technical or inadvertent lapse in map. This also shows that it is not an extra item requiring EIRL. Clause 10 of Ex. 62 assume relevance here and deny to Plaintiff any enhancement in rate. We are, therefore, not in a position to hold that any prejudice is caused to the plaintiff because borrow area for casing is not marked in green in Exh.170.
116. Other reason given by the Trial Court is quantity to be borrowed. The plaintiff has projected said quantity as 46,110 cum. and the Trial Court has accordingly accepted it by placing reliance upon Exh.64. As borrow area is not shown in Exh.170, the Trial Court has concluded that the tender agreement Exh.62 is silent about it and has taken recourse to Clause 14 of the suit agreement (Exh.62), with Circular Exh.156. It has found that the plaintiff was already paid at lesser rate for 22,000 cum. and for balance quantity of 24,110 cum. he was entitled to additional amount. It has in paragraph no.57 then applied the ratio of available and borrow material utilization in casing zone as 3 : 1 and by using re-revised estimate quantity, it has found plaintiff entitled to get amount of Rs. 1,34,640/- on account of Fa152.91
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difference and of Rs. 2,57,000/- on account of unpaid quantity. It has rounded of 24,110 cum. to 25,000 cum. by taking recourse to estimate Article-I.
117. The communication dated 18.01.1978 at Exh.64 is only projection and quantity of 46110 cum. is mentioned therein as approximate quantity. The document at Exh.66 dated 24.01.1978 is letter written by the plaintiff to defendant which shows that he has correctly followed the same, however, there he has attempted to take advantage of absence of borrow area in his map Exh.170. Article-I is also an estimate. The ratio of 3 : 1 is also in relation to such estimates. Plaintiff has no where brought on record the exact quantity of work performed by him. It was necessary for him to independently demonstrate that he had borrowed 46,110 cum. from said borrow area. He has failed to do so. We therefore, find answer given by the Trial Court to issue nos. 7 and 9 wrong. The same is accordingly quashed and set aside.
118. As to Issue nos. 2 and 5 :- With discussion and finding above on correspondence between the parties, issue nos. 2 and 5 about compensation for machinery or idle charges can now be taken up conveniently. The discussion on issue no.2 is from paragraph no.39 Fa152.91
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onwards of the judgment of Trial Court while that discussion on issue no.5 is from paragraph no.43. The claim against issue no.2 is for period from 01.04.1978 to 15.10.1978 and from 16.10.1978 to 15.11.1978. Claim against issue no.5 is for period from 10.04.1979 to 10.05.1979. It is already noted above that the plaintiff had stopped the work on 01.04.1978 and resumed it on 16.10.1978. He again stopped on 12.02.1979 and resumed on 07.04.1979 and again discontinued in May, 1979. Thus idle charges are for this period. It needs to be noted that on 12.11.1979 in meeting with the Hon'ble Minister and as per proceedings at Exh.155, plaintiff had withdrawn all his claims and also suit notice Exh.90 dated 25.07.1979. In this background, when his plaint is perused, in plaint, he has in paragraph no.13 spoken of the said notice and claimed compensation of Rs. 3,49,200/-. After withdrawal of that notice, he issued another notice and in that notice, he again added that demand and claimed amount of Rs. 1,20,000/- for period from 10.04.1979 to 10.05.1979 and from 10.05.1979 onwards. In earlier notice said period was described as from 10.04.1979 to 10.03.1979 and then from 06.05.1979 onwards. He has claimed these amounts, as according to him work remained stopped or suspended during this period because of fault on the part of the defendants. Evidence of plaintiff's witness no.1 Shri Krushnavatar Madan shows that he did not file any documents on record to show idleness of machinery. Fa152.91
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He also accepted that none of the Engineers had given him any letter to keep the machinery idle. He accepted that by 23.02.1979 he had done 1/3rd total work and he was made payment at agreed rate for it. He denied in his further cross examination that he himself had of his own discontinued the work. He denied that the work remained closed because of his fault.
119. While considering the correspondence between the parties, we have mentioned above that in Exh.103 dated 30.01.1978 grievance about insufficient vehicles and labour force was communicated by the Appellants to the Plaintiff. In none of its/his letters, plaintiff has made any grievance that work was not available. Even on 18.01.1978, vide Exh.64, department permitted him to continue with excavation in hard rock upto 25% in excess of agreed quantity. Till then he had received payment till 5th running account bill. Vide Exh.65 dated 19.01.1978 he insisted for payment and on 24.01.1978 vide Exh.66 he threatened of discontinuing the work, which indirectly shows that work was available. He was paid 6th running bill on 19.02.1978. Exh.67 dated 24.02.1978 shows that work continued and he was paid 7th running bill on 31.03.1978. He thereafter, discontinued work from 01.04.1978.
120. Exh.68 dated 10.04.1978 is the communication by plaintiff Fa152.91
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where he speaks about quantity of hard strata and claims that 60000 cum. was still to be excavated. Grievance made was about non payment of 10000 cum. hard strata, already excavated. Another grievance was about 35000 cum earth work required from borrow pits for which an extra item rate list was sought. Thus non payment of hard strata already excavated and extra item of earth work, were the only grievance for which work was stopped by him. We have already found above that this insistence of preparation of extra item rate list for said borrow area was arbitrary and unjustified. Grievance about hard strata did not survive after 12.11.1979 and on that date the plaintiff had agreed to resume the work. Arrangement agreed as per Ex. 155 was to classify the strata after its excavation. His grievance about earlier classification was found without any substance. The fault for stoppage by him, therefore, cannot be attributed to the department. It needs to be noted that 8th running bill was paid to him on 05.05.1978.
121. Plaintiff's communication dated 28.06.1978 at Ex. 69 contains a grievance that gorge filling was required to be deferred because of non-settlement of plaintiff's genuine claims. In view of our findings recorded above, we find this reason also unsustainable. The additional demand about actual lead involved for item no.8 i.e. embankment from soil, finds mention in this. In paragraph no.4 of this Fa152.91
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communication for the first time the plaintiff has stated vaguely that it was suffering heavily on account of machinery, labour and establishment. Vide Exh.70 dated 13.07.1978 this demand for idle charges is reiterated. He cited orders to proceed as per Clause 38 and those orders were given on 31.07.1978. On 10.08.1978 vide Exh.72, plaintiff stated that machinery was arranged for gorge filling and after payment is made, the work can be undertaken. On 28.08.1978 non- finalization of bills and issues in dispute, is given the reason. Quick settlement of claims was therefore, requested. On 17.08.1978 vide Exh.75 the Executive Engineer permitted him to continue excavation of hard rock with assurance to pay as per Clause 38[2] of the contract agreement. It was pointed out that hard rock was shown in the plan attached with that communication and work was to be restricted to that area. Vide Exh.76 dated 25.09.1978 again not taking final decision on his grievance is put forth as a reason and immediate release of payment was sought by Plaintiff.
122. Assistant Engineer Shri Rewatkar was examined by the plaintiff as its witness and he deposed that the machinery was insufficient. He was not subjected to any cross examination in this respect or about communication at Exh.104 dated 30.01.1978. No question about idle period or stoppage were put to him. In Exh.77 Fa152.91
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dated 30.10.1978, the plaintiff has stated that his 9 trucks, 1 roller, 2 water pumps were lying un-utilized for period from 01.04.1978 to 15.10.1978, he has made total demand of Rs.3,49,200/- in this communication. However, no details of these vehicles are given by him. In reply to this, Executive Engineer had pointed out that rate of excavation of excess quantity of hard strata was already settled.
123. It is also important to note that most of the period of this closure was occupied by rains. Witness 1 for plaintiff has stated in cross examination that during this period of 4 months, speed of work is quite slow and work is actually at stand still when it is raining. We find that all these i.e. material and correspondence is overlooked by the Trial Court. The Trial Court unnecessarily continued to blame the department for not classifying the hard strata, when documents on record revealed that even during this closure period two running bills i.e. 7th running bill and 8th running bill were received by the plaintiff. It is also apparent that D.W.2 Shri Kelkar joined in October, 1978 while dispute about hard strata was resolved by the earlier Executive Engineer Shri Ratnaparkhi in August, 1978 and letter at Exh.75 dated 17.08.1978 was issued before Shri Kelkar joined. The defendant no where accepted that the machineries were lying idle. We also find that use of Government rate for calculating idle charges by the Trial Court Fa152.91
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cannot be accepted. It was for the plaintiff to give details of vehicles stationed at the project site and prove his loss. Plaintiff has accepted that except for letters sent, it had no other evidence to demonstrate that it's 9 trucks, 1 roller and 2 pumps were lying idle at the site. When plaintiff is an established contractor, this state of affairs is sufficient to draw adverse inference against it/him in the matter. He had wrongfully discontinued the work and was aware that said vehicles were not required at site till work was resumed again. The Trial Court ought to have held that by raising some dispute, plaintiff himself kept the work suspended from 01.04.1978 till 15.10.1978 and hence could not have claimed any idle charges. It is also to be noted that the Trial Court has also granted idle charges for period from 16.10.1978 to 15.11.1978 by sanctioning amount of Rs. 62,750/- for said purpose. The Trial Court has overlooked the fact that the plaintiff did not place on record the registration numbers of 9 trucks and similar details of road roller and two pumps to enable him to claim the idle charges. Even if it is presumed that the work remained stopped because of some fault on the part of the appellants, that does not mean that the plaintiff becomes entitled to total amount of Rs. 4,11,950/- on that account. The Trial Court has also in Exh.42 erroneously found that only 10% of the work was left and for completing that 10% work, the Government demanded hire charges of Rs. 16,20,998.32 ps. The claim by the Government in Fa152.91
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counter claim could not have been used as a scale is without any basis and irrelevant, to award idle charges to the plaintiff.
124. The Trial Court has also found that when defendant's were facing fund crunch, it was open to it to withdraw the whole work by invoking Clause 15 of the contract Exh.62. The findings already recorded by us above, show that the plaintiff was raising unsustainable claims and was trying to exploit the situation to his advantage. He failed in it on 12.11.1979. Hence, this reason given by the Trial Court is totally irrelevant. In any case it has no bearing in so far as the demand for idle charges is concerned.
125. Discussion above also hold good for setting aside the finding of Trial Court on issue no.2 as also 5. The plaintiff claimed Rs.96,000/- on account of idle charges of machinery from 10.04.1979 to 10.05.1979. This confusion in period is already noted by us while recording arguments of Shri Kaptan, learned Counsel for the appellants, above. The delayed payment of 11th R.A. bill or time gap of about one year between payment of 10th R.A. bill and 11th R.A. bill is also looked into by us above. Sending of telegram dated 20.10.1979 by the plaintiff to stop work does not entitle it to claim idle charges. The contract was subsisting and plaintiff was, therefore, duty bound to take Fa152.91
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steps in accordance with law. The provisions in Clause 15[3] of Exh.62 may enable the Government to order stoppage and in that event, consequences provided for in it, may follow. The contractor in that event may also be entitled to claim compensation. However, facts here do not justify the stoppage by plaintiff at all. The 9th R.A. bill was paid to the plaintiff on 22.11.1978 and 10th R.A. bill was paid on 30.12.1978, therefore, the payment which could have been claimed by the plaintiff could have been in any case for a period of not more than 2 ½ months. The communication dated 29.11.1978 at Exh.107 shows demand of 6 tippers, 2 conventional trucks, 1 roller and 1 water tank from the department by plaintiff. This demand to supply so many vehicles itself militates with the demand of idle charges.
126. Vide Exh.79 dated 24.11.1978 the plaintiff acknowledged receipt of permission to continue further with excavation of hard rock. The assurance by the department to pay him as per Clause 38[2] that hard strata and letter by Executive Engineer on 09.11.1978 vide Exh.106 is also noted by us. It is apparent that in spite of this, work was not started by him. On 28.12.1978 the Executive Engineer vide Exh.108, therefore, sought unconditional consent of the plaintiff to start work of gorge filling and to implement it in time bound manner. On 04.01.1979 vide Exh.80 plaintiff replied to it and again sought release Fa152.91
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of balance payment. He also stated that preliminaries, such as stripping construction of Copper dam diversion, diversion of river flow etc., were already started by him. He, however, sought release of funds. Ultimately, he stopped work on 12.02.1979. On 26.o1.1979 vide Ex. 82 the plaintiff had suggested arrangement through Bank and defendants accepted it on 31.01.1979through Ex. 84. On 10.02.1979 the plaintiff sent telegram for instant payment and warned that work would be stopped otherwise. He discontinued the work on 12.02.1979 thereafter. On 21.02.1979 the plaintiff communicated non-receipt of payments, as the reason for stoppage. Major claims as disclosed by the plaintiff are compensation for idleness of labour and machinery from 01.04.1978 to 15.11.1978 and extra item of borrowing for casing. We have found both these claims incorrect and unsustainable. On 23.02.1979 the Executive Engineer has advised the plaintiff to do proper excavation so as to enable the office to take correct and proper measurements. This communication or its contents are also not in dispute. This communication therefore, shows that the plaintiff had done the work in haphazard manner to suit his purpose. Office informed him that progress after January 1979 was not satisfactory. Plaintiff replied to this on 05.03.1979 vide Exh.89 and reiterated his earlier stand. He claimed that he was not paid for entire hard strata work. The penalties then imposed upon him vide Exh.111 and its Fa152.91
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increase thereafter are already mentioned by us above. D.W.2 on 19.04.1979 vide Exh.112 informed him that he was already paid for upto date work and no financial aid can be provided. On 19.05.1979 vide Exh.113, as work was discontinued from 08.05.1979 ,penalty was increased to Rs.100/- per day. On 19.05.1979 vide Exh.114 he was informed about proposal to hand over the work to other agency and to remain present on 28.05.1979 for taking final measurements. On 29.05.1979 he was informed about final measurements and he was called upon to accept the same or submit his own bill after taking measurements. The plaintiff did not do so. On 04.06.1979 vide Exh.158, he was required to attend site for acceptance of measurements. It is obvious that this could have facilitated preparation of 11th R.A. bill. It is in this background, that the plaintiff issued his first notice under Section 80 of Civil Procedure Code on 25.07.1979 and withdrew it on 12.11.1979. What transpired on 12.11.1979 is again noted by us above. It is obvious that again department cannot be blamed even for this subsequent closure from 10.04.1979 and cannot be directed to pay any idle charges to the plaintiff. Finding against issue no.2 and 5 therefore, needs to be set aside.
127. As to Issue No. 3 :- Issue No. 3 is looked into by Trial Court paragraphs 45 to 50 of its judgment. Para 45 shows that Plaintiff's Fa152.91
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had sought a final decree during arguments and otherwise, it was seeking preliminary decree. We have already found suit for accounts not tenable. It is also held by us that it is Ex. 62 which is decisive and binding. Rates quoted are inclusive of "all leads" and, hence, in the light of discussion already undertaken by us above, it is clear that there is no scope for granting any amount for extra lead for pitching masonary and metal. Trial Court has disregarded it as it found that defendants otherwise would not have been required to prepare re- revised estimate Article-I. We have already found Article- I not admissible and hence, this finding on its strength is unsustainable. It has also found that due to clause 14 and Ex.156 , it is not a new contract to attract Article- 299 of the Constitution of India. In the course of our discussion and decision on point E above, We have found this reliance on clause 14 and Ex.156 wrong. It relies upon evidence of DW1 to note that defendants were charging hire charges by taking into account "to and fro" distance. Because of this only, it granted to and fro lead i.e., distance to Plaintiff. This again shows that Trial Court created a new contract and modified Ex, 62. Contract or understanding subject to which defendant's let out the government vehicles to Plaintiff was/is totally irrelevant to countermand a binding contract like Ex. 62. We can not accept that Article- 299 was not attracted in present facts. In para 50, Trial Court has noted that Article- I is not executed Fa152.91
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document but then lost its implication. It has granted amount of Rs. 94,070.00/- i.e., exceeding claim amount of Rs. 59,858.00 to Plaintiff' in the end. We find the grant bad and unsustainable. Issue No. 3 is therefore answered against Plaintiff/Respondent.
128. As to Issue No. 4 :- Plaintiff has claimed Rs. 3,78,378/- due to alleged leads for casing beyond two Km. At Rs. 1.98 per CUM for 95550 CUM. Trial Court in paragraph 51 of its judgment noted that claim was tentative as Plaintiff's did not have the measurements. It then notes that suit was for accounts and a preliminary decree, as the figures had come on record in 13th R.A.bill, re-revised estimate, measurement books etc., it has proceeded to consider the prayer further in para 52. There it finds that though actual distance of lead is more as per Article- I-page Z-4, lead was seen as 1.1 Km. i.e., the actual length of dam. It has then worked out the rate at Rs. 4.47 by using Ex. 156 and increased it by 10%. Mistake of Trial Court is accepted by Shri Parchure, learned Counsel and according to him, correct rate needed to be used was Rs. 3.27 per km. and hence correct figure works out to Rs.3,68,976.99 paisa. In Section 80 notice amount of Rs. 1,89,189/- was only claimed on this count. Trial Court has applied rate of Rs. 4.92 per CUM to 1,12,837 CUM quantity and granted decree of Rs. 5,55,158/-. The interpretation of unit price about leads and lifts is given Fa152.91
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at page 120 of Ex.62. Section 4 of Exh.62, particularly Clause 4.2 prohibits extra lead or claim for material borrowed from even area other than specified one.. Section 6 deals with rubble pitching makes similar provision to bar any claim for extra leads or lifts. Section 6.3 specifying mode of measurement of pitching work also expressly stipulates that rate is inclusive of all leads and lifts. We have already held that terms in Ex. 62 are decisive and Article- I can not be utilized for any purpose. Plaintiff has not even attempted to draw any support from Ex. 62. Thus this claim for extra lead is baseless. We have referred to this while deciding additional issue No. 5. Ex. 138 does not show that Plaintiff has not been paid for 1,12,837 CUM work. Issue No. 4 therefore needs to be answered against Plaintiff.
129. As to additional Issue No. 4 :- We have already held that the Suit for accounts as filed was not tenable and hence, in such a Suit, reliefs like escalation, illegal utilization and for shrinkage etc. could not have been looked into by Trial Court. Last line in cross examination of PW 1 shows his acceptance that in Ex. 62, there is no price escalation clause. While considering this issue in para 61, Trial Court has found that there was prayer for accounts but as all figures had come on record, it was not necessary to pass a preliminary decree. It has relied upon figures in Ex. 138 for said purpose. In clause 4.13 of Fa152.91
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Ex. 62 , we fail to see any provision which speaks of 2% shrinkage or presuming measurements recorded to be representing 90% of the actual work thereby enabling Plaintiff's to claim 10% or 2% more amount on respective payments received. On the contrary, clause 4.13{c} contemplates no deduction at final bill stage. Even otherwise, Plaintiff, though aware of the payments received, has not chosen to quantify such less payment. We also find that no such grievance has been made in any of his letters by it. Benefit of escalation is given by Trial Court on the basis of GR dated 6.6.1984 at Ex. 173. This decision is applicable to works pending on 1.4.1979 only if it is so pending as per "original terms" of contract. Here the stage wise time table and contact Ex. 62 obliged Plaintiff's to complete by 1978 end and hence, work was not pending as per original terms of contract. Trial Court has in fact given benefit of new terms as per Article- I as claimed by Plaintiff. Grant of Rs. 43,697/- for illegal utilization of hard strata, Rs. 13,773/- towards restitution of shrinkage and Rs. 7,36,354/- for price escalation against this issue, therefore, can not be upheld. Findings of Trial Court in this respect are accordingly set aside. Additional issue No. 4 is thus decided against Plaintiff.
130. As to Issue No. 21 :- As we have found Plaintiff's at fault in not completing the contract work and abandoning it, it is obvious that Fa152.91
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Plaintiff's are not entitled to any compensatory costs. Issue 21 is thus decided against Plaintiff. Trial Court has answered this issue in negative and Respondent Plaintiff's have not raised any objection to it before us. Our observations on his conduct are recorded while deciding point D and issue No. 10 above. It had earlier on 25.7.1979 served legal notice under Section 80 CPC and then withdrawn it. Thus, he already had requisite legal advise. However, at this crucial juncture, Plaintiff abandoned the work. Abandonment could never be the best solution and as a prudent business who knew that he was being victimized, he/it could have taken the most reasonable step of joint measurement or taking levels and preparation of its own measurements before 16.3.1980. If Plaintiff was certain, he ought to have issued notice well in advance to the defendants not to interfere with site till joint measurements were undertaken. Ordinary businessman/contractor who has really done any work not measured by his employer and for which such substantial payment is due to him, would follow reasonable course to get that work measured to save any loss and to avoid dispute. Mode and manner in which present Plaintiff's chose to vanish from site support only one inference and that is, he would not have gained anything had there been proper measurement. To us, it shows that he was not to loose anything by leaving the site suddenly without any measurements. His step and action therefore smack of malafides only. Fa152.91
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He or it did not issue any notice putting an end to contract but issued suit notice at Ex.180 on 9.4.1980. We therefore hold that Plaintiff's have failed to prove its entitlement to any compensatory costs under Section 35(A) of the Code of Civil Procedure. Issue 21 is thus answered.
131. As to Issue No. 14 :- All these issues framed by Trial Court arise due to counterclaim by defendant's / Appellants. Its appreciation is in para 90 and 95 onwards. Issue No. 14 is about forfeiture of contractors security deposit. Condition 3 (2) of contract at Ex. 62 permits such forfeiture when the Executive Engineer rescinds the contact. No such rescission has been pointed out to us by the appellants. In paragraph 39 of the written statement filed before the Trial Court, the Appellant's take support from events which took place prior to 12.11.1979 i.e., communications like Ex. 111,113 and 116 etc. to establish said right to forfeit. These penalties though imposed were never actually recovered and we have also found that after meeting at Ex. 155, the same were withdrawn. Those are therefore not the live and relevant insistence for exercising the power to forfeit. No other order or clause authorizing such a course is pointed out to us. But then clause 5 of Ex. 62 enables the defendants to use these instances again and it does not amount to waiver, in case Contractor defaults in future. We Fa152.91
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have noted above his wrongful conduct prior to 12.11.1979 and even thereafter. We have also found Respondent Plaintiff's responsible for breach of contract and at fault. As per clause 2, Plaintiff is responsible for the delay and for leaving work incomplete. Total tendered rate was 10% above estimate of Rs. 24,51,123/-. Clause 2 read with clause 4 permits compensation upto 10% of the tendered rate. Rs. 91000/- in custody of Appellant is less than 10% of this tendered rate. It consists of security and other deposits. The Plaintiff has not only delayed the work but left it incomplete and abandoned the contract. It follows that the Appellant/ defendant are entitled to forfeit his security deposit and also other amount as compensation. Thus amount of Rs. 91000/- can be recovered and adjusted by the defendants. Issue No. 14 is thus answered in favour of Appellant's and against Plaintiff.
132. As to Issue No. 15 :- Appellant's seek recovery of Rs.10,16,898.30/- as extra expenditure incurred on completion of work abandoned by Plaintiff. Defendant's have proved document which disclose cost of work completed by Plaintiff, funds required to complete the balance work at tendered rate, actual expenditure incurred by department for completing it and discloses excess amount spent to be Rs. 10,16,892.30/-. Break up of Rs. 20,22,344.50/- spent by defendants is given in Ex. 139 and out of it, sums spent on hire charges of Fa152.91
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machineries are 11,55,578.14 and Rs. 4,65,420.18/-. Cost of metal and cement used is Rs. 43,388./- only. Rs. 43,594/- are spent on contractor's work through NMR and through piece workers, it is Rs. 3,14,363/. This Ex. 139 is certified to be true as per records and verified by Executive Engineer. Trial Court has found correctly that thus about 80% of this expenditure is on hire charges. Ex. 140 is a statement showing hire charges of machineries of mechanical division, Akola. It has total 14 entries and each corresponds to a separate voucher. First voucher as per Ex. 140 is dated 29.2.1980 for Rs. 145064.27/- and out of it Rs. 55,341.65 /- are appropriated towards share of Plaintiff. Entries at Sr. nos.2 to 7 are for months 1/80 (January 1980), 5/80, 7/80, 10/80, 11/80 and 12/80. All these vouchers are disclosed to be dated 31.3.1980 and out of each, some portion is shown as appropriated to the account of Plaintiff. Entries at Sr. No. 13 and 14 are for months 6/80 and 3/80 with similar apportionment. Corresponding vouchers are stated to be dated 11.8.81 and 29.4.81. Entries at Sr. 8 to 11 are for months 3/80,4/80,8/80 and 9/80 with the respective vouchers dated 29.4.1981 where again part of voucher amount is debited to Plaintiff's account. Entry at Sr. 12 is for month of March,1981 (3/81) and voucher for it is shown to be dated 30.6.1981. Thus out of total hire charges of Rs. 22,79.993.60/- attempted to be proved on the basis of this chart at Ex. 140, hire charges of Fa152.91
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Rs.11,55,578.14/- are shown recoverable from Plaintiff. It is significant that as against this total hire charges of Rs. 11,55,578.14/- excess amount spent is alleged to be Rs. 10,16,892.30/- in counterclaim. More claim of Rs. 465420.18/- is shown in Ex. 141 as dues of hire charges for civil machineries for the period from 21.3.1980 to 20.7.81. In chart at Ex. 145, total amount of hire charges shown as recoverable till 20.3.1980 i.e., till abandonment is disclosed as Rs. 2,68,839. 11/- and out of it 13th R.A.bill of Rs.2,31,946.00/- is adjusted and balance of Rs. 36,893.11/- is claimed as outstanding. In counterclaim, this is shown as hire charges. Thus entire extra expenditure claimed by department appears to be on account of hire charges. If Ex. 140 figure of hire charges of Rs. 11,55,578.14/- debited to the share of Plaintiff is correct, one fails to understand why only 10,16,892.30/- is sought to be recovered. Hence, resulting excess is not on account of material consumed or wages but only due to hire charges. Material charges as per Ex. 139 are only 2.67% of the hire charges while labour charges constitute about 22% thereof. 13th R.A.bill is obviously prepared after Plaintiff's abandoned i.e., after 16th or 20th March,1980. In chart at Ex. 145, Rs. 42,000/- are stated to be due from Plaintiff towards hire charges of civil machineries for period from 15.1.1980 till 20.3.1980. Same towards C.P. Machineries are shown to be Rs. 2,21,296.46/-. In Ex. 140, first entry is of voucher No. 144 dated 29.2.1980 and it is for Fa152.91
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Rs. 1,45,064.27/- and out of it, Rs. 55,341.65/- is debited to Plaintiff. This voucher is for work prior to abandoning and hence, could have been used as part of calculations in Ex. 145. Moreover, during this period there could not have been any question of apportionment between Plaintiff and the department. If the hire charges are ignored, Rs. 401346.10/- is the only expenditure incurred for completion of work by department. Cost of said work at tendered rate as revealed in Ex. 137 is 10,05,452.20/- which still left a provision of Rs.604106.10/- towards hire charges. Moreover amount Of Rs. 11000/- payable on account of Nala diversion does not find mention anywhere. Details which can be seen in these charts have not been pleaded as facts either in written statement or in counterclaim. In view of this position, though there is not much of cross examination of DW1 Gadekar on these charts or in this respect, we are not in position to allow this part of counterclaim. Hence, we answer issue No. 15 in negative i.e., against Appellant/ Defendant.
133. As to Issue No. 16 :- Defendants claim Rs. 36,893/- as balance of hire charges towards machineries let out to Plaintiffs before abandonment of work. In para 101 of its judgment, Trial Court rejected it as it held that 13th R.A.bill was not showing any recoveries from Plaintiff. Pleadings in counterclaim in para 41 do not show details or Fa152.91
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appropriation as in Ex. 145. Paragraph 41 is of two sentences and only mentions this figure without disclosing the exercise of adjustment undertaken and shown in Ex. 145. Hence, said claim is also not substantiated by the Defendants Appellants. We, therefore, reject it.
134. As to Issue No. 17 :- Defendants claim Rs. 2,33,943/- as expenses for maintaining the establishment of subdivision from 1.4.1980 to 31.1.1981 for monitoring the completion of work. Evidence on record does not show that any extra staff was recruited or exclusively spared by the Appellants for said work. Pleadings in para 42 of the counterclaim are very cryptic to sustain this claim. We, therefore, maintain the finding of Trial Court on this and answer issue No. 17 against the Defendant/Appellant.
135. As to Issue No. 18 :- Defendants claim compensation of Rs. 35,250/- as according to it State has suffered revenue loss on 470 Hectors at rate of Rs. 75/ per hector for the year 1980-81. DW2 Shri Kelkar has in para 28 of his deposition stated that dam started collecting water in June,1980 and department started water supply for irrigation in September October,1980. Thus, had Plaintiff continued, the water could not have been collected prior to rainy season i.e., prior to June,1980. This claim is therefore liable to be rejected and is Fa152.91
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accordingly rejected. Issue No. 18 stands answered against Appellant.
136. As to Issue No. 19 :- Defendants claim Rs. 100000/- as general damages. Para 44 of Counterclaim mentions physical and mental sufferings with other losses including the notional loss. No specific instances are given and there are no details to understand this claim. It is not their grievance that there was unnecessary loss of man power or expenditure due to frivolous demands made by Plaintiff. Hence, Defendant's have failed to prove their entitlement to any such damages.
137. As to Issue No. 22 :- Defendants claim compensatory costs. We have only found them entitled to retain Rs. 91000/- as compensation under clause 2 read with clause 4 of the conditions of contract. Defendants were also aware in advance that Plaintiff was not taking up his work seriously and it, therefore, had decided to supplement his work. Why simultaneously it could not arrange for joint measurements is not understood. When it learnt that Plaintiff had abandoned the work, why it could not take steps for joint measurements. When the Plaintiff's had abandoned on 16.3.1980, Defendant's have written to him on 24.3.1980 and communicated that its sub divisional engineer was being instructed to supplement the work. Fa152.91
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In Ex. 145 hire charges are claimed from Plaintiff's till 20.3.1980. Thus, abandoning of such urgent work by agency like Plaintiff's did not reach Appellants till 20.3.1980 or then, till 24.3.1980. The way responsible officers of defendant's acted and handled the matter cast doubt also on their bonafides and does not entitle State to any such compensation. This is sufficient to deny the compensatory costs to Appellant. Issue No. 22 is thus answered in negative.
138. As to Issue nos. 20 and 23 :- Defendants thus fail to prove their counterclaim except to the extent of Rs. 91000/-. Plaintiff's have also proved their entitlement to receive amount Rs. 66,609.84/- (under issue 1) and Rs. 11,000/- (under issue 6) from defendant Appellant. Appellant Defendant to pay to Plaintiffs Rs. 77,610/- within three months from today with interest calculated at 6% from the date of judgment of Trial Court till its receipt by Plaintiff. Remaining claims of Plaintiff in Suit are dismissed. Similarly Appellant Defendant is held entitled to adjust security deposit with it towards compensation of Rs.91,000/- as per answer to issue 14. Appellant's counterclaim is decreed only to that extent.
139. ORDER.
We therefore, partly allow this First Appeal filed by the Fa152.91
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original Defendant, and dismiss the Plaintiff's cross-objection in it, with following order :-
1. Special Civil Suit 4 of 1981 filed by Plaintiff's is partly decreed.
2. Appellant Defendant to pay to Plaintiffs Rs. 77,610/- within three months from today with interest calculated at 6% from the date of judgment of Trial Court till its receipt by Plaintiff.
3. Remaining claims of Plaintiff in Suit are dismissed.
4. Appellants Defendant's counterclaim in above Suit is also partly decreed and they are permitted to retain and appropriate the security deposit and other amount totaling to Rs. 91000/ with it as compensation under clause 2 read with clause 4 of
general conditions of Contract.
5. Parties to bear their costs as incurred throughout.
6. Decree be drawn accordingly.
JUDGE JUDGE
Rgd.
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