Wednesday 28 May 2014

Whether Habeas Corpus petition is maintainable where accused is sent to judicial custody under order of Magistrate?

   In Col. Dr. B. Ramachandra Rao v. The State of Orissa  and  others AIR 1971 SC 2197
it was opined that a writ of habeas corpus is not granted where a person  is
committed to jail custody by a competent  court  by  an  order  which  prima
facie does not appear to be without jurisdiction or wholly illegal.

                 CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1572            OF 2012
             (Arising out of S.L.P. (Criminal) No. 6468 of 2012)

Manubhai Ratilal Patel Tr. Ushaben               ... Appellant
State of Gujarat & Ors.                          ... Respondents

 Citation: AIR2013SC313, 2013(1)ALD(Cri)875, 2013(1)ALT(Cri)SC11, 2013CriLJ160, (2013)2GLR1500, JT2012(9)SC394, 2013-1-LW(Crl)220, 2012(9)SCALE559, (2013)1SCC314

2.    The appellant was an accused in FIR No. I-CR No. 56/12  registered  at
Pethapur Police Station on 20th of June, 2012 for offences punishable  under
Sections 467, 468, 471, 409 and 114 of the  Indian  Penal  Code  (for  short
‘the IPC’).  Challenging the registration of the FIR and the  investigation,
the accused-appellant (hereinafter referred to as “the  accused”)  preferred
Criminal Miscellaneous Application No. 10303  of  2012  on  11.7.2012  under
Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for brevity  “the  Code”)  in
the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad for quashing of the  FIR.   A  prayer
was  also  made  for  stay  of  further  proceedings  in  respect   of   the
investigation of I-CR No. 56/12.

3.    The unfurling of factual scenario further shows that  the  matter  was
taken up on 17.7.2012 and  the  High  Court  issued  notice  and  fixed  the
returnable date on 7.8.2012 and allowed  the  interim  relief  in  terms  of
prayer No. (C) which pertained to stay of further proceedings in respect  of
the investigation.

4.    The exposition of facts reveals  that  the  accused  was  arrested  on
16.7.2012 and produced before the learned Judicial Magistrate  First  Class,
Gandhinagar at 4.00 p.m. on 17.7.2012.  The police prayed for remand of  the
accused to police custody which was granted by the learned  Magistrate  upto
2.00 p.m. on 19.7.2012.  On 18.7.2012, it was brought to the notice  of  the
concerned investigation agency about the  stay  order  passed  by  the  High
Court on 17.7.2012 and prayer was made  not  to  proceed  further  with  the
investigation in obedience to the order passed by the  High  Court.   It  is
pertinent to note that an application for regular bail under Section 439  of
the Code was filed on 19.7.2012 before the learned Magistrate.   Apart  from
other grounds, it was highlighted that when a petition  was  pending  before
the High Court for quashment of the First  Information  Report  and  a  stay
order had been passed pertaining to  further  investigation,  the  detention
was illegal and hence, the accused was entitled to be admitted to bail.

5.    The learned Magistrate dwelled upon the allegations made  against  the
accused and declined to release him on bail regard being had to  the  nature
of offences.  Dealing with the order passed by the High Court,  he  observed
that the order passed by  the  Hon’ble  High  Court  pertained  to  stay  of
further investigation although no investigation was required to  be  carried
out during judicial custody and, as the accused was involved  in  commission
of grievous offences, it would not be just to enlarge him on bail.

6.     Being  aggrieved  by  the  aforesaid  order,  the  accused  preferred
Criminal Miscellaneous Application No. 539 of 2012 in the Court  of  learned
Sessions Judge, Gandhinagar and also prayed for grant of interim bail.   The
learned Sessions Judge rejected the prayer for grant  of  interim  bail  and
fixed the main application for hearing on 24.7.2012.

7.    Dissatisfied with  the  aforesaid  orders,  the  accused  preferred  a
habeas corpus petition before the High Court of Gujarat forming the  subject
matter of Special Criminal Application No. 2207 of 2012.  It  was  contended
before the High Court that since the investigation was stayed  by  the  High
Court in exercise of power under  Section  482  of  the  Code,  the  learned
Magistrate could not have exercised power under Section 167(2) of  the  Code
remanding the  accused  either  to  police  or  judicial  custody.   It  was
submitted that the power of the Magistrate remanding the accused to  custody
during the course of investigation stood  eclipsed  by  the  order  of  stay
passed by the High  Court  and,  therefore,  the  detention  was  absolutely
illegal and non est in law.  It was also urged that as the detention of  the
accused was unlawful, a writ of habeas corpus would lie and he  deserved  to
be set at liberty forthwith as long as the stay order was operative.

8.    The aforesaid stand put forth by the learned counsel was  combated  by
the State contending, inter alia, that it could not be said that  there  had
been no investigation as arrest had already taken place and hence,  stay  of
further investigation would not nullify the order of remand, be it a  remand
to police custody or judicial custody.  Highlighting  the  said  stance,  it
was  propounded  that  the  order  of  remand  could  not  be   treated   as
impermissible warranting interference by  the  High  Court  in  exercise  of
jurisdiction of writ of habeas corpus.

9.    The High Court adverted to the chronology of events and held thus: -

           “From the chronology of events as emerging from the petition  as
           well as affidavit-in-reply, it is not in dispute that the arrest
           of the petitioner  was  effected  on  16/07/2012.   Whereas  the
           quashing petition came to be filed on 17/07/2012  and  the  stay
           order was granted on 17/07/2012 at  about  04.30  p.m.  and  the
           remand of the accused – petitioner to police custody was granted
           on 17/07/2012  till  02.00  p.m.  of  19/07/2012.   It  is  also
           required to be noted that order passed by learned JMFC  has  not
           been challenged anywhere and has attained finality.  Thereafter,
           the order passed by this Court in CRMA No.  10303  of  2012  has
           been served on the Police authority on 17/07/2012 at 09.30  p.m.
           On the next day i.e. on 18/07/2012,  the  Investigating  Officer
           seems to have informed learned JMFC about the  stay  granted  by
           the High Court and has attended High Court  in  connection  with
           anticipatory bail application preferred by the  petitioner.   It
           is also not the case of the petitioner that after the service of
           order of stay, any other investigation has been carried  by  the
           Investigating  Officer.   On  19/07/2012  itself  the  applicant
           preferred an application for bail under Section 437 of the Code,
           which came to be  rejected  and  the  accused  was  remanded  to
           judicial custody and as such the  petitioner  –  accused  is  in
           judicial custody as on now.  It is pertinent to  note  that  the
           learned JMFC  has  rightly  observed  in  his  order  upon  bail
           application that the High Court has stayed further investigation

10.   After so stating, the High Court dealt  with  the  issue  whether  the
custody of the accused could be said to be illegal.  It was  opined  by  the
High Court that it was not possible  to  accept  the  stand  that  once  the
investigation  was  stayed,  there  could  not   have   been   exercise   of
jurisdiction under Section 167(2) of the Code,  for  stay  of  investigation
would not eradicate the FIR or  the  investigation  that  had  been  already
carried out pursuant to lodging of FIR.  It was further opined that  it  was
only an ad-interim order and if the stay order would eventually  be  vacated
or the quashing petition would not be entertained, the  investigation  would
be continued.  The High Court  further  observed  that  solely  because  the
investigation was stayed, it would not be apposite to say that there was  no
investigation and the order passed by the learned Magistrate was flawed.

11.   Addressing to the issue of remand, the  High  Court  opined  that  the
order of remand of the accused to custody could not be said to be a part  of
the investigation and hence, the said order was not  in  conflict  with  the
order passed under  Section  482  of  the  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure  in
Criminal Miscellaneous Application No. 10303 of 2012.    Reference was  made
to Section 2(h) of the Code which defines ‘investigation’ and it  was  ruled
that the order passed by the learned Magistrate could not  be  termed  as  a
part of the investigation.  Eventually, the High Court opined that it  could
not be held that when the order was passed by the learned  JMFC,  there  was
no investigation and, therefore, there was no force  in  the  argument  that
the learned JMFC could not have remanded the accused in such a situation  in
exercise of powers under Section 167 of the Code, and secondly, the  act  of
the learned JMFC remanding the accused to custody is a  judicial  act  which
cannot be termed as part of the investigation and cannot  be  considered  to
have been covered under the stay granted by  the  High  Court  in  CRMA  No.
10303 of 2012.  It was further held that illegal or  unauthorised  detention
or confinement is a sine qua non for entertaining a  petition  for  writ  of
habeas corpus and the custody of the petitioner  being  in  pursuance  of  a
judicial act, it could not be termed as illegal.

12.   At this juncture, it is seemly to note that the appellant had  knocked
at the doors of the High Court in a habeas corpus  petition.   The  writ  of
habeas corpus has always  been  given  due  signification  as  an  effective
method to ensure  release  of  the  detained  person  from  prison.   In  P.
Ramanatha  Aiyar’s  Law  Lexicon  (1997  edition),  while  defining  “habeas
corpus”, apart from other aspects, the following has been stated: -

           “The ancient prerogative writ of habeas corpus  takes  its  name
           from the two mandatory words habeas. corpus, which it  contained
           at the time when it, in common with all forms of legal  process,
           was framed in Latin.  The general purpose  of  these  writs,  as
           their name  indicates,  was  to  obtain  the  production  of  an

13.   In Secretary of State for Home Affairs  v.  O’Brien[1],  it  has  been
observed  that  it  is  perhaps  the  most  important  writ  known  to   the
constitutional law of England affording as it does a  swift  and  imperative
remedy in  all  cases  of  illegal  restraint  or  confinement.   It  is  of
immemorial antiquity, an instance of its use occurring in the  thirty  third
year of Edward I.  It has through the ages been jealously maintained by  the
courts of law as a check  upon  the  illegal  usurpation  of  power  by  the
executive at the cost of liege.

14.   In  Ranjit  Singh  v.  The  State  of  Pepsu  (now  Punjab)[2],  after
referring to Greene v. Secretary of States for Home Affairs[3],  this  Court
observed that the whole object of proceedings for a writ  of  habeas  corpus
is to make them expeditious, to keep  them  as  free  from  technicality  as
possible and to keep them as simple as  possible.   The  Bench  quoted  Lord
Wright who, in Greene’s case, had stated thus:

        “The incalculable value of Habeas Corpus is  that  it  enables  the
        immediate determination of the right to the appellant’s freedom.”

      Emphasis was laid  on  the  satisfaction  of  the  court  relating  to
justifiability and legality of the custody.

15.   In Kanu Sanyal v. District Magistrate, Darjeeling  and  others[4],  it
was laid down that the writ of habeas corpus deals  with  the  machinery  of
justice, not the substantive law.  The object  of  the  writ  is  to  secure
release of a person who is illegally restrained of his liberty.

16.   Speaking about the importance of the writ of  habeas  corpus,  a  two-
Judge Bench, in Ummu Sabeena v. State of Kerala and others[5], has  observed
as follows: -

           “…the writ of habeas corpus is the oldest writ  evolved  by  the
           common law of England to protect the individual liberty  against
           its invasion in the hands of the executive or may be also at the
           instance of private persons.  This principle  of  habeas  corpus
           has been incorporated in our constitutional law and  we  are  of
           the opinion that in  a  democratic  republic  like  India  where
           Judges function under a written Constitution  and  which  has  a
           chapter on fundamental rights, to protect individual liberty the
           Judges owe a duty to safeguard  the  liberty  not  only  of  the
           citizens but also of all persons within the territory of  India.
           The most effective way of doing the same is by way  of  exercise
           of power by the Court by issuing a writ of habeas corpus.”

In the said case, a reference was made to Halsbury’s Laws  of  England,  4th
Edn. Vol. 11, para 1454 to highlight that a writ of habeas corpus is a  writ
of highest  constitutional  importance  being  a  remedy  available  to  the
lowliest citizen against the most powerful authority.

17.   Having stated about the significance of the writ of habeas  corpus  as
a weapon for protection of individual liberty through judicial  process,  it
is condign to refer to certain authorities to appreciate how this Court  has
dwelled upon and expressed its views  pertaining  to  the  legality  of  the
order of detention, especially that ensuing from  the  order  of  the  court
when an accused is produced in custody before  a  Magistrate  after  arrest.
It is also worthy to note that the opinion of this  Court  relating  to  the
relevant stage of delineation for the purpose of adjudicating  the  legality
of the order of detention is of immense importance for the present case.

18.   In Col. Dr. B. Ramachandra Rao v. The State of Orissa  and  others[6],
it was opined that a writ of habeas corpus is not granted where a person  is
committed to jail custody by a competent  court  by  an  order  which  prima
facie does not appear to be without jurisdiction or wholly illegal.

19.   In Re. Madhu Limaye and others[7], the Court referred to the  decision
in Ram Narayan Singh v. State of Delhi[8] and opined  that  the  court  must
have regard to the legality or otherwise of the detention  at  the  time  of

20.    In  Kanu  Sanyal  v.  Dist.  Magistrate,  Darjeeling  and  others[9],
contentions were raised to the effect that  the  initial  detention  of  the
petitioner in District Jail, Darjeeling was illegal because he was  detained
without being informed of the grounds  for  his  arrest  as  required  under
clause (i) of Article 22 of the Constitution  and  that  the  Sub-Divisional
Magistrate, Darjeeling had no jurisdiction to try and, therefore,  he  could
not authorise the detention of the  petitioner  under  Section  167  of  the
Code.  The two-Judge Bench adverted to the aforesaid  aspects  and  referred
to the earlier decisions in Naranjan  Singh  v.  State  of  Punjab[10],  Ram
Narain Singh (supra), B.R. Rao (Supra) and Talib Hussain v. State  of  Jammu
and Kashmir[11] and noted that three views had been taken by this  Court  at
various  times  pertaining  to  the   relevant   date   to   determine   the
justifiability of the detention and opined as follows:-
           “This Court speaking through Wanchoo, J. (as he then  was)  said
           in A.K. Gopalan v. Government of India; [(1966) 2 SCR 427 = (AIR
           1966 SC 816)].  “It is well settled that  in  dealing  with  the
           petition for habeas corpus the  Court  is  to  see  whether  the
           detention on the date on which the application is  made  to  the
           Court is legal, if nothing more has intervened between the  date
           of the application and the date of the hearing”.  In  two  early
           decisions of this Court,  however,  namely,  Naranjan  Singh  v.
           State of Punjab, [(1952 SCR 395) = AIR 1952  SC  106)]  and  Ram
           Narain Singh v. State of Delhi, [(1953 SCR 652) = (AIR  1953  SC
           277)] a slightly different view was expressed and that view  was
           reiterated by this Court in B.R. Rao v.  State  of  Orissa  (AIR
           1971 SC 2197) where it was said; “In habeas corpus the Court  is
           to have regard to the legality or otherwise of the detention  at
           the time of the return and not with reference to the institution
           of the proceedings.”  And yet in another decision of this  Court
           in Talib Husain v. State of Jammu & Kashmir (AIR 1971 SC 62) Mr.
           Justice Dua, sitting  as  a  Single  Judge,  presumably  in  the
           vacation, observed that “in habeas corpus proceedings the  Court
           has to consider the legality of the detention on the date of the
           hearing.”  Of these three views taken by the Court at  different
           times, the second appears to be more in consonance with the  law
           and practice in England and may be taken as having received  the
           largest measure of approval in India, though the third view also
           cannot be discarded as incorrect, because an inquiry whether the
           detention is legal  or  not  at  the  date  of  hearing  of  the
           application for habeas corpus would be quite relevant,  for  the
           simple reason that if on that date the detention is  legal,  the
           Court cannot order release of the person detained by  issuing  a
           writ of habeas corpus.  But, for  the  purpose  of  the  present
           case, it is immaterial which of these three views is accepted as
           correct, for it is clear that, whichever be  the  correct  view,
           the earliest date  with  reference  to  which  the  legality  of
           detention  may  be  examined  is  the  date  of  filing  of  the
           application for habeas corpus and the Court is not, to quote the
           words of Mr. Justice Dua in AIR 1971 SC 2197 “concerned  with  a
           date prior to the initiation of the proceedings for  a  writ  of
           habeas corpus”.”

                                                         (emphasis supplied)

      After so stating, the Bench opined that for adjudication in  the  said
case, it was immaterial which of the three views  was  accepted  as  correct
but eventually referred to paragraph 7 in  the  case  of  B.R.  Rao  (supra)
wherein the Court had expressed the view in the following manner: -

           “….in habeas corpus proceedings the court is to have  regard  to
           the legality or otherwise of the detention at the  time  of  the
           return  and  not  with  reference  to  the  institution  of  the

      Eventually, the Bench ruled thus: -

           “The production of the  petitioner  before  the  Special  Judge,
           Vizakhapatnam, could not, therefore, be said to be  illegal  and
           his subsequent detention in  the  Central  Jail,  Vizakhapatnam,
           pursuant to the orders made by the Special Judge, Vizakhapatnam,
           pending trial must be held to be valid.  This Court pointed  out
           in AIR 1971 SC 2197 that a  writ  of  habeas  corpus  cannot  be
           granted “where a person  is  committed  to  Jail  custody  by  a
           competent court by an order which prima facie does not appear to
           be without jurisdiction or wholly illegal”.”

21.   The principle laid down in Kanu Sanyal  (supra),  thus,  is  that  any
infirmity in the detention of the petitioner at  the  initial  stage  cannot
invalidate the subsequent detention and the same has to  be  judged  on  its
own merits.

22.   At this juncture, we may profitably refer to  the  Constitution  Bench
decision in  Sanjay Dutt v. State through C.B.I.,  Bombay  (II)[12]  wherein
it has been opined thus: -

           “It is settled by Constitution Bench decisions that  a  petition
           seeking the writ of habeas corpus on the ground of absence of  a
           valid order of remand or detention of the  accused,  has  to  be
           dismissed, if on the date of return of the rule, the custody  or
           detention is on the basis of a valid order.”

23.   Keeping in view the aforesaid concepts with  regard  to  the  writ  of
habeas corpus, especially pertaining to  an  order  passed  by  the  learned
Magistrate at the time of production of the  accused,  it  is  necessary  to
advert to the schematic  postulates  under  the  Code  relating  to  remand.
There are two provisions  in  the  Code  which  provide  for  remand,  i.e.,
Sections 167 and 309.   The  Magistrate  has  the  authority  under  Section
167(2) of the Code to direct for detention of the accused in  such  custody,
i.e., police or judicial, if he thinks that further detention is  necessary.

24.   The act of directing remand of an accused is fundamentally a  judicial
function.  The Magistrate does not act in executive capacity while  ordering
the detention of an accused.  While exercising  this  judicial  act,  it  is
obligatory on the part of the Magistrate  to  satisfy  himself  whether  the
materials  placed  before  him  justify  such  a  remand  or,  to   put   it
differently, whether there exist reasonable grounds to  commit  the  accused
to custody and extend his remand.   The  purpose  of  remand  as  postulated
under Section 167 is  that  investigation  cannot  be  completed  within  24
hours.  It  enables  the  Magistrate  to  see  that  the  remand  is  really
necessary.  This requires the investigating agency to send  the  case  diary
along with the remand report so  that  the  Magistrate  can  appreciate  the
factual scenario and apply his mind whether there is a  warrant  for  police
remand or justification for judicial remand or there  is  no  need  for  any
remand at all.  It is obligatory on the part of the Magistrate to apply  his
mind and not to pass an order of remand automatically  or  in  a  mechanical
manner.  It is apt to note that in Madhu Limaye (supra), it has been  stated
that once it is shown that the arrests made  by  the  police  officers  were
illegal, it was necessary for the State to establish that at  the  stage  of
remand, the Magistrate directed detention in  jail  custody  after  applying
his mind to all relevant matters.

25.   In Central Bureau of Investigation, Special Investigation Cell-I,  New
Delhi v. Anupam J. Kulkarni[13], it has been stated that  where  an  accused
is placed in police custody for the maximum period of fifteen  days  allowed
under law either pursuant to a single order  of  remand  or  more  than  one
order, when the remand is restricted on each occasion to a lesser number  of
days, the further  detention  of  the  accused,  if  warranted,  has  to  be
necessarily to judicial custody and not otherwise.  Thus,  the  exercise  of
jurisdiction clearly shows that the Magistrate performs a judicial act.

26.   Presently, we shall advert to the concept of investigation.  The  term
“investigation” has been defined in Section 2(h) of the Code.  It  reads  as
follows: -

           “Investigation” includes all the proceedings under this Code for
           the collection of evidence conducted by a police officer  or  by
           any person (other than a Magistrate)  who  is  authorised  by  a
           Magistrate in this behalf;”

27.    A  three-Judge  Bench  in  H.N.  Rishbud  and  another  v.  State  of
Delhi[14], while dealing with “investigation”, has  stated  that  under  the
Code,  investigation  consists  generally  of  the  following   steps:   (1)
Proceeding to the spot, (2) Ascertainment of the facts and circumstances  of
the  case,  (3)  Discovery  and  arrest  of  the  suspected  offender,   (4)
Collection of evidence relating to the commission of the offence  which  may
consist of (a) the examination of various persons  (including  the  accused)
and the reduction of their statements into writing, if  the  officer  thinks
fit, (b) the search of places or seizure of things considered necessary  for
the investigation and to be produced at the trial, and (5) Formation of  the
opinion as to whether on the material collected, there is a  case  to  place
the accused before a Magistrate for trial and, if so, taking  the  necessary
steps for the same by the filing of a charge-sheet under Section 173.

28.   In Adri Dharan Das v. State of West Bengal[15],  it  has  been  opined
that arrest is a part of the process of  investigation  intended  to  secure
several  purposes.   The  accused  may  have  to  be  questioned  in  detail
regarding  the  various  facets  of  motive,  preparation,  commission   and
aftermath of the crime and the connection of other persons, if any,  in  the

29.   In Niranjan Singh v. State of Uttar  Pradesh[16],  it  has  been  laid
down that investigation is not an inquiry or  trial  before  the  court  and
that is  why  the  legislature  did  not  contemplate  any  irregularity  in
investigation as of sufficient importance to vitiate or otherwise  form  any
infirmity in the inquiry or trial.

30.   In S.N. Sharma v. Bipen Kumar Tiwari[17], it has  been  observed  that
the power of police to investigate is independent  of  any  control  by  the

31.   In State of Bihar v. J.A.C.  Saldanha  and  others[18],  it  has  been
observed that there is a clear cut and well demarcated  sphere  of  activity
in  the  field  of  crime  detection  and  crime  punishment   and   further
investigation of an offence  is  the  field  exclusively  reserved  for  the
executive in the police department.

32.   Coming to the case at hand, it is evincible that the arrest had  taken
place a day prior to the passing of order of  stay.   It  is  also  manifest
that the order  of  remand  was  passed  by  the  learned  Magistrate  after
considering the allegations in the FIR but not in a  routine  or  mechanical
manner.  It has to be borne in mind that the effect  of  the  order  of  the
High Court regarding stay of investigation could only have  bearing  on  the
action of the  investigating  agency.   The  order  of  remand  which  is  a
judicial act, as we perceive, does not suffer from any infirmity.  The  only
ground that was highlighted before the High Court as  well  as  before  this
Court is that once there is stay of investigation, the order  of  remand  is
sensitively  susceptible  and,  therefore,  as  a  logical  corollary,   the
detention is unsustainable.  It is worthy to  note  that  the  investigation
had already commenced and  as  a  resultant  consequence,  the  accused  was
arrested.  Thus, we are disposed to think that the order  of  remand  cannot
be regarded as untenable in law.  It is well accepted principle that a  writ
of habeas corpus is not to be entertained when  a  person  is  committed  to
judicial custody or police custody by the competent court by an order  which
prima facie does not appear to be  without  jurisdiction  or  passed  in  an
absolutely mechanical manner or wholly illegal.  As has been stated  in  the
cases of B.R. Rao (supra) and Kanu Sanyal (supra), the court is required  to
scrutinize the legality or otherwise of the order  of  detention  which  has
been passed.   Unless  the  court  is  satisfied  that  a  person  has  been
committed to jail custody by virtue of an order that suffers from  the  vice
of lack of jurisdiction or absolute illegality,  a  writ  of  habeas  corpus
cannot be granted.  It is apposite to note that the  investigation,  as  has
been dealt with in various authorities of this Court, is neither an  inquiry
nor trial.  It is within the exclusive domain of the police  to  investigate
and is independent  of  any  control  by  the  Magistrate.   The  sphere  of
activity is clear cut and well demarcated.  Thus viewed, we do not  perceive
any error in the order passed by the High Court refusing to grant a writ  of
habeas corpus as the detention by virtue of the  judicial  order  passed  by
the Magistrate remanding the accused to custody is valid in law.

33.   Though we have not interfered  with  the  order  passed  by  the  High
Court, yet we would request the  High  Court  to  dispose  of  the  Criminal
Miscellaneous Application No. 10303 of 2012 within a period  of  six  weeks.
Liberty is granted to the appellant to move the appropriate court for  grant
of bail, if so advised.

34.   Consequently, with the aforesaid observations  mentioned  hereinabove,
the appeal, being sans merit, stands dismissed.

                                                       [K. S. Radhakrishnan]

                                                               [Dipak Misra]

New Delhi;
September 28, 2012.
[1]    (1923) AC 603 (609)

[2]    AIR 1959 SC 843
[3]    1942 AC 284
[4]    AIR 1973 SC 2684

[5]    (2011) 10 SCC 781
[6]    AIR 1971 SC 2197
[7]    AIR 1969 SC 1014
[8]    AIR 1953 SC 277
[9]    AIR 1974 SC 510
[10]   AIR 1952 SC 106
[11]   AIR 1971 SC 62
[12]   (1994) 5 SCC 410

[13]   AIR 1992 SC 1768

[14]   AIR 1955 SC 196

[15]   AIR 2005 SC 1057
[16]   AIR 1957 SC 142
[17]   (1970) 1 SCC 653
[18]   (1980) 1 SCC 554

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