Wednesday 17 September 2014

Leading judgment of justice Chagla on jurisdiction of bench of HC and principal seat of HC to decide particular matter



In the case of State of Maharashtra vs. Narayan, reported in AIR 
1983 SC 46 three Judges of the Apex Court in paragraph 26 relied on the ratio 
of the decision rendered by Chagla, C.J. at the Bombay High Court.  It would 
be appropriate to quote paragraph 26 in its entirety, which reads thus :

“26.As to the scope and effect of sub­s. (3) of s. 51 of the Act,  
the question came up for consideration before Chagla, C.J. and  
Badkas, J. in Seth Manji Dana v. Commissioner of Income­tax,  
Bombay, Civil Appeal No.995 of 1957(Bom),  decided on July  
22,   1958.  This  was   an  application  by which  the  validity of  
Rule 254 of the Appellate Side Rules was challenged insofar as  
it provided that all income­tax references presented at Nagpur  
should   be   heard   at   the   principal   seat   of   the   High   Court   at  
Bombay, and the contention was that the result of this rule  
was   that   it   excluded   income­tax   references   from   the  
jurisdiction   of   the   High   Court   functioning   at   Nagpur.   In 
repelling the contention, Chagla, C. J. observed : 

"Legally, the position is quite clear. Under section 51 (3) 
of the States Reorganization Act, the Judges sitting at Nagpur  
constitute a part of the High Court of Bombay. They are as  
much a part of the High Court of Bombay, and if we might say 
so distinguished part of the High Court of Bombay, as if they  
were sitting under the same roof under which Judges function 
in Bombay. All that happens is that the Chief Justice, under  
the powers given to him under the Letters Patent distributes  
the   work   to   various   Judges   and   various   Divisional   Benches,  
and acting under that power he distributes certain work to the  
Judges sitting at Nagpur."
He then continued:
"All that rule 254 does is to permit as a matter of convenience  
certain   matters   to   be   presented   at   Nagpur   to   the   Deputy 
Registrar. If rule 254 had not been enacted, all matters would  
have   to   be   presented   at   Bombay   and  then   the   Chief  Justice  
would   have   distributed   those   matters   to   different   Judges,  
whether sitting in Bombay or at Nagpur. It is out of regard and  
consideration   for   the   people   of   Vidarbha   and   for   their  
convenience that this rule is enacted, so that litigants should  
not be put to the inconvenience of going to Bombay to present  
certain   matters.   Therefore,   this   particular   rule   has   nothing 
whatever   to   do   either   with   section   51   (3)   of   the   States  
Reorganisation Act or with the Constitution." With regard to  
Rule 254, he went on to say :
"Now, having disposed of the legal aspect of the matter, we turn  
to the practical aspect, and let us consider whether this rule  
inconveniences the people at Nagpur. If it does, it would certain 
call for an amendment of that rule. Now, there is particular  
reason   why   all   Income   Tax   References   should   be   heard   in  
Bombay and that reason is this. The High Court of Bombay for  

He then concluded :
many   years,   rightly   or   wrongly,   has   followed   a   particular  
policy with regard to Income Tax References and that policy is  
that the  same   Bench  should   hear  Income   Tax References,   so  
that there should be a continuity with regard to the decisions  
given on these References. I know that other High Courts have  
referred to this policy with praise because they have realised  
that the result of this policy has been that Income Tax Law has  
been laid down in a manner which has received commendation  
from various sources. The other reason is and we hope we are  
not   mistaken   in   saying   so   that   the   number   of   Income   Tax  
References from Nagpur are very few. If the number was large,  
undoubtedly a very strong case would be made out for these  
cases to be heard at Nagpur."

"After all, Courts exist for the convenience of the litigants and  
not in order to maintain any particular system of law or any  
particular system of administration. Whenever a Court finds  
that   a   particular   rule   does   not   serve   the   convenience   of  
litigants, the Court should be always prepared to change the  
rule."
The ratio to be deduced from the decision of Chagla, C. J. is  
that the   Judges   and   Division   Courts   sitting   at  Nagpur   were  
functioning as if they were the Judges and Division Courts of 
the High Court at Bombay.”



MISC. CIVIL APPLICATION NO.341 OF 2013.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY,
NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR.
       

Mrs. Sayali wife of Swapnil Kuber,
 V
Swapnil S/o. Harischandra Kuber,

­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­
CORAM  :   A.B.CHAUDHARI, J.
DATED    :   SEPTEMBER 19, 2013.
Citation; 2014(5) ALLMR97

Taken up for final disposal by consent of the rival parties looking 
to the nature of the matter at hand. 
4.
The undisputed facts are that the applicant­wife is residing with 
her parents at Nagpur,   after having returned from matrimonial house of the 
husband.   It   is   also   not   in   dispute   that   she   has   filed   proceedings   for 
maintenance   and   the   proceedings   under   the   provisions   of   the   Domestic 
Violence Act, in the Courts at Nagpur against the respondent­husband.   The 

respondent­husband   has   filed   matrimonial   proceedings   seeking   a   decree   of 
nullity of marriage in the Court at Thane. 
5.
The present transfer application has been filed by the applicant­
wife  with a prayer to transfer Hindu Marriage Petition No.109 of 2013 from 
the   Court   of   3rd  Civil   Judge   Senior   Division,   Thane   to   the   Family  Court   at 
Nagpur before which Petition No. C­22 of 2013 is pending.
6.
Mr. B.N. Mohta, learned counsel for the respondent­husband has 
raised a preliminary objection to the territorial jurisdiction of this bench of the 
Bombay High Court to entertain the present application for transfer on the 
following grounds :
i.
The cause of action for filing Hindu Marriage Petition No. 109 of 
2013   in the  Court  at Thane  arose   at  Thane,  which  petition  is 
sought to be transferred by the present application.   That being 

so,  the   transfer   application  ought  to   be   filed   and   tried   by  the 
Principal   Seat   of   the   Bombay   High   Court   and   not   at   Nagpur 
ii. 
Bench.
Sections   22   and   24   of   the   Code   of   Civil   Procedure   read   with 
Chapter XXXI Rule 1 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side 
Rules, 1960 and further read with definition of the 'High Court' 
in Clause 3(25) of the General Clauses Act and the definition of 

'Subordinate Courts' in Section 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure 
shows that the subordination of the Courts to the High Court will 
have to be held on judicial side.  If subordination of the Court is 
held   to   be   on  the  judicial   side   then  in  that  case   the   Court   at 
Thane is not subordinate looking to the territorial jurisdiction of 
Nagpur   Bench   of   the   Bombay   High   Court.     He   relied   on   a 
decision of single Judge of the Madras High Court in the case of 
K.  Kavitha v. Subramanian,  reported  in  AIR   2007(NOC)  1841 
(MAD.)
iii)
The witnesses to be examined by the husband are the Doctors 
residing at Thane and Mumbai and it will be very difficult for the 
respondent­husband   to   produce   witnesses   in   the   event   of   the 
case being transferred to Nagpur Court.

iv)
Respondent­husband is ready to pay the required charges to the 
applicant­wife   and   her   escort,   if   any,   to   undertake   to   and   fro 
journey between Nagpur and Thane.
Per contra, Mr. Thakur, learned counsel for the applicant­wife, in 
7.
response to the preliminary objection relied on the following decisions of the 
Supreme Court and Single Judges of this Court. :
M.C.A.   No.82/2007   (Mrs.Sandhya   Rajesh   Chaturvedi/Rajesh  
    Ramkrishna Chaturvedi,
ii) 2011(1) Mh.L.J. 518 (Anita Balkrishna Barge/Balkrishna Sopan  
          Barge),
iii) MCA No.320/2011 (Mrs.Priti Chauhan/Madansingh Chouhan),
iv) 2009(1) Mh.L.J. 303 (Sangamitra Vs.Ramakant),
v) MCA No.33/2013 (Sau.Snehal Kothekar/Omprakash Kothekar)

i) 
The learned counsel also relied on the decisions of the Supreme 
Court   for   transfer   of   the   case   on   merits   thereof   in   the   cases   of   (i)  Soma  
Choudhury Vs. Gourab Choudhaury, reported in (2004) 13 SCC 462) and   (ii)  
Sumita Singh V. Kumar Sanjay, reported in AIR 2002 SC 396.
8.
Mr. Thakur argued that there is no other go for the applicant­wife 
but   to   reside   with   her   parents   at   Nagpur   since   she   was   driven   out   of   the 
matrimonial house after two months of her marriage.   The proceedings for 

domestic   violence  and   for   maintenance   have   already  been  instituted   in  the 
Courts at Nagpur and the respondent­husband has been making appearance 
either personally or through his Advocate in those proceedings.  According to 
him,   the   respondent­husband   is   a   Software   Engineer   earning   handsome 
remuneration   but   keeping   an   eye   on   the   proceedings   filed   by   the   wife   for 
maintenance etc. a defence is being raised that the respondent­husband is not 
in any employment now.   He submitted that the defence is not plausible.  He 
argued that the convenience of the wife has to be seen particularly because she 

does not have independent source of income and she would be put to hardship 
if the proceedings are not transferred from Thane to Nagpur.  On the contrary, 
according to him, no such inconvenience will be caused to the husband since 
he has already been attending the Courts at Nagpur. 
9.
I   have   heard   the   learned   counsel   for   rival   parties   for   quite 
sometime.  I have gone through the provisions of law cited by Mr. Mohta and 
also various judgments cited by the parties. As to the question about territorial 
jurisdiction between the Principal Seat of the benches the question has been 
often raised before the Courts.
10.
In the case of State of Maharashtra vs. Narayan, reported in AIR 
1983 SC 46 three Judges of the Apex Court in paragraph 26 relied on the ratio 
of the decision rendered by Chagla, C.J. at the Bombay High Court.  It would 
be appropriate to quote paragraph 26 in its entirety, which reads thus :

“26.As to the scope and effect of sub­s. (3) of s. 51 of the Act,  
the question came up for consideration before Chagla, C.J. and  
Badkas, J. in Seth Manji Dana v. Commissioner of Income­tax,  
Bombay, Civil Appeal No.995 of 1957(Bom),  decided on July  
22,   1958.  This  was   an  application  by which  the  validity of  
Rule 254 of the Appellate Side Rules was challenged insofar as  
it provided that all income­tax references presented at Nagpur  
should   be   heard   at   the   principal   seat   of   the   High   Court   at  
Bombay, and the contention was that the result of this rule  
was   that   it   excluded   income­tax   references   from   the  
jurisdiction   of   the   High   Court   functioning   at   Nagpur.   In 
repelling the contention, Chagla, C. J. observed : 
ig
"Legally, the position is quite clear. Under section 51 (3) 
of the States Reorganization Act, the Judges sitting at Nagpur  
constitute a part of the High Court of Bombay. They are as  
much a part of the High Court of Bombay, and if we might say 
so distinguished part of the High Court of Bombay, as if they  
were sitting under the same roof under which Judges function 
in Bombay. All that happens is that the Chief Justice, under  
the powers given to him under the Letters Patent distributes  
the   work   to   various   Judges   and   various   Divisional   Benches,  
and acting under that power he distributes certain work to the  
Judges sitting at Nagpur."
He then continued:
"All that rule 254 does is to permit as a matter of convenience  
certain   matters   to   be   presented   at   Nagpur   to   the   Deputy  
Registrar. If rule 254 had not been enacted, all matters would  
have   to   be   presented   at   Bombay   and  then   the   Chief  Justice  
would   have   distributed   those   matters   to   different   Judges,  
whether sitting in Bombay or at Nagpur. It is out of regard and  
consideration   for   the   people   of   Vidarbha   and   for   their  
convenience that this rule is enacted, so that litigants should  
not be put to the inconvenience of going to Bombay to present  
certain   matters.   Therefore,   this   particular   rule   has   nothing 
whatever   to   do   either   with   section   51   (3)   of   the   States  
Reorganisation Act or with the Constitution." With regard to  
Rule 254, he went on to say :
"Now, having disposed of the legal aspect of the matter, we turn  
to the practical aspect, and let us consider whether this rule  
inconveniences the people at Nagpur. If it does, it would certain 
call for an amendment of that rule. Now, there is particular  
reason   why   all   Income   Tax   References   should   be   heard   in  
Bombay and that reason is this. The High Court of Bombay for  
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Judgment
He then concluded :
many   years,   rightly   or   wrongly,   has   followed   a   particular  
policy with regard to Income Tax References and that policy is  
that the  same   Bench  should   hear  Income   Tax References,   so  
that there should be a continuity with regard to the decisions  
given on these References. I know that other High Courts have  
referred to this policy with praise because they have realised  
that the result of this policy has been that Income Tax Law has  
been laid down in a manner which has received commendation  
from various sources. The other reason is and we hope we are  
not   mistaken   in   saying   so   that   the   number   of   Income   Tax  
References from Nagpur are very few. If the number was large,  
undoubtedly a very strong case would be made out for these  
cases to be heard at Nagpur."
ig
"After all, Courts exist for the convenience of the litigants and  
not in order to maintain any particular system of law or any  
particular system of administration. Whenever a Court finds  
that   a   particular   rule   does   not   serve   the   convenience   of  
litigants, the Court should be always prepared to change the  
rule."
The ratio to be deduced from the decision of Chagla, C. J. is  
that the   Judges   and   Division   Courts   sitting   at  Nagpur   were  
functioning as if they were the Judges and Division Courts of 
the High Court at Bombay.”
11.
The decision in the case of  K.Kavitha Vs.Subramanian, cited by 
Mr. Mohta, is clearly in contrast to the decision of another single Judge of the 
Madras High Court in the case of  T. Kamatchi vs. S. Murali, reported in  AIR 
2006 Madras 159 in which the single Judge of the same Court in paragraphs 
17 and 18 held as under :
“17. True it is, that the word High Court under Section 3(25)  
of the General Classes Act is defined as, 'High Court', used with  
reference   to   Civil   proceedings   shall   mean   the   highest   Civil  
Court   of   appeal   in   the   part   of   India   in   which   the   Act   or  
regulation   containing   the   expression   operates.   Although,   it  
may appear that the Court of appeal for cases in the Districts  
lying within the Territorial jurisdiction of Permanent Bench at  
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Judgment
ig
Madurai would only be the latter, when once the proviso to  
Presidential   Order   above   mentioned   empowers   the   Chief  
Justice in the Principal Seat at Madras High Court to order for  
hearing of any case pending in the Madurai Bench at Madras,  
it would only indicate that such power of appellate authority  
of the Madurai Bench is likely to be delegated to the Principal  
Bench at Madras. This delegation as connoted to the proviso to  
the   Presidential   Order   cannot   have   any   meaningful   effect  
unless and until the Principal Seat is clothes with such power  
of   appellate   authority   over   the   Territorial   jurisdiction   of 
Permanent Bench at Madurai.

To put it in other words if only the Principal Bench at  
Madras can hear and decide the matter arising out of Districts  
lying   in   the   Territorial   jurisdiction   of   Permanent   Bench   at  
Madurai,   the   proviso   to   the   Presidential   Order   can  
meaningfully   empower  the   Chief  Justice  to   make   order  that  
any case or class of cases arising in any such Districts shall be  
heard at Madras. It is thus the Principal Seat at Madras is  
delegated   with   the   power   of   appellate   authority   over   cases  
arising   from   the   Districts   allotted   to   Permanent   Bench   at  
Madurai.   When   once   this   element   is   proved,   then   both   the  
Presiding Officers and the Courts of the Districts falling within  
the Territorial jurisdiction of the Permanent Bench at Madurai  
will be considered as subordinate also to the Principal Seat at 
Madras.
18.   Moreover,   it   cannot   be   said   that   simply   because   the  
jurisdiction   was   bifurcated   between   the   Permanent   and  
Principal   Bench,   the   Courts   and   the   offices   in   the   former's  
jurisdiction may not be subordinate to the Chief Justice, who  
wields power of administration for both Permanent Bench at  
Madurai and Principal Seat at Madras. Thus, the Courts lying  
within the jurisdiction of Permanent Bench at Madurai can be  
termed as subordinate to the Principal Seat at Madras and in  
that sense, the powers vested under Section 24(1)(b) of C.P  
.C.
can be exercised by this Court and valid transfer can be made  
upon withdrawing the case from the Court at Pattukottai and  
transferring the same to that of the Court at Salem.”
In   the   case   of  Kamatchi   v.   G.P   Jaiprakash,  1997   AIHC   364 
.
another single Judge of Kerala High Court with reference to Section 23 of the 
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Judgment
Code of Civil Procedure held in paragraph 9, relying on the decision of the 
Rajasthan High Court, as under :
ig
“9. With regard to third objection regarding Section 21A of the  
Hindu Marriage Act and earlier suit was filed in Palghat.   I  
refer   to   the   decision   of   the   Rajasthan   High   Court   in   Smt.  
Sunita Bali v. Ashok Bali, AIR 1987 Rajasthan 79   where it  
was   held   that   such   technical   objections   cannot   restrict   the 
power   of   the   High   Court   in   transferring   the   case.     Under  
Section 23(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure, it is very clear.  It  
provides that in case two petitions are pending before different  
courts   which   are   subordinate   to   different   High   Courts  
application shall be made to the High Court within the local  
limits   of   whose   jurisdiction   the   Court   in   which   the   suit   is  
brought   is   situate.     The   application   for   transfer   will   come  
under   Section   23(3)   of   the   Code   of   Civil   Procedure.     High  
Court has got power to transfer the suit pending in a Court  
subordinate to it to any other Court.   Powers of High Court  
under   Section   23(3)   are   not   restricted   by   any   of   the  
technicalities.  Objections with regard to the provisions in the  
Hindu   Marriage   Act   were   also   considered   by   the   Rajasthan  
High Court and it was held that such powers were not  subject 
to the procedure adopted by different matrimonial Courts and  
the   power   to   transfer   petition,   in   such   circumstances,  
enumerated in Section 21A cannot be withheld down, in view  
of the powers under Section 23(3).   As held by the Bombay  
High Court in M/s. S.S. Mahalakshmi R. & G. O. Mills v. M/s.  
Rajesh   Trading   Co.,   AIR   1983   Bombay   486   an   order   of 
transfer under Section 22 is based on balance of convenience.  
The fact that one suit was filed earlier is immaterial.”
With reference to the writ jurisdiction of the Bench at Nagpur 
similar question arose in the case of  Nitin Industrial Association Vs. State of  
Maharashtra, reported in 1986(3) Bom.C.R. 174 Division Bench of this Court 
held thus in paragraph 6 of the said judgment. 
“6.   Turning   to  the next limb  of the  argument namely that  
since   the   cause   of   action   had   arisen   in   Bombay   the   writ  
jurisdiction   of   the   High   Court   Bench   at   Nagpur   stands  
abridged   by   reason   of   the   provisions   of   section   41   of   the  
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Judgment
mca341.13  
Bombay Reorganisation Act, 1960 (Act. No.11 of 1960) read  
with the provisions of Chapter XXXI of the Bombay High Court  
Appellate Side Rules, 1960, we do not see how any enactment  
passed by the Parliament and/ or by the State Legislature can  
possibly   trench   upon   the   jurisdiction   conferred   on   the   High  
Court by Article 226.  In re The Kerala Education Bill, 1957,  
A.I.R.   1958   Supreme   Court   956,   it   has   been   observed   as  
follows :
ig
“No enactment of  a State   Legislature  can,  as  long  as  
that   article   (i.e.   226)   stands,   take   away   or   abridge   the  
jurisdiction and  power  conferred on the  High Court by that  
article.”
In view of this, the contention must be negatived.  But be that  
as it may, although the said two provisions cannot abridge the 
jurisdiction, the said two provisions need to be looked at in 
their   proper   perspective.   The   said   two   provisions   namely,  
section 41 of the Bombay Reorganisation Act, 1960 (Act No.11  
of 1960) and the provisions of Chapter XXXI of the Bombay  
High Court Appellate Side Rules, 1960 are designed to meet  
administrative requirements, and administrative convenience.  
Hence it is not that every petition under Article 226 which is  
presented to this Bench at Nagpur that needs to be entertained  
and regard must be had to these two provisions in the filing of  
writ  petitions  so that the   petitions  can  be  dealt with  by an  
appropriate   Bench.     However,   in   so   far   as   this   matter   is  
concerned, in view of the above discussion, it cannot be said  
that the Bench at Nagpur has no jurisdiction to try and hear  
the petition. ....”
12.
The   conspectus   of   the   above   decisions   to   my   mind   does   not 
permit making of any definition about the jurisdiction in the manner sought to 
be done between the Principal Seat at Bombay and the Benches in the State of 
Maharashtra.    The   objection   on  that   count   raised  by   Mr.  Mohta,   therefore, 
must be overruled.  
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Judgment
mca341.13  
Second   issue   is   about   the   cause   of   action.   In   the   case   of 
13.
Rajasthan High Court Advocates Association v. Union of India, reported in  AIR 
2001 SC 416 the Apex Court, as to the cause of action, held thus in paragraph 
17 :

“17. The expression cause of action has acquired a judicially  
settled meaning. In the restricted sense cause of action means  
the   circumstances   forming   the   infraction   of  the   right or   the  
immediate occasion for the action. In the wider sense it means  
the   necessary   conditions   for   the   maintenance   of   the   suit,  
including not only the infraction of the right, but the infraction  
coupled   with   the   right   itself.   Compendiously   the   expression 
means every fact which it would be necessary for the plaintiff  
to   prove,   if   traversed,   in   order   to   support   his   right   to   the  
judgment   of   the   Court.   Every   fact   which   is   necessary   to   be  
proved, as distinguished from every piece of evidence which is 
necessary to prove each fact, comprises in cause of action. It  
has to be left to be determined in each individual case as to 
where the cause of action arises. The Chief Justice of the High  
court has not been conferred with the legislative competence to  
define cause of action or to declare where it would be deemed 
to have arisen so as to lay down artificial or deeming test for  
determining territorial jurisdiction over an individual case or 
class   of   cases.   The   permanent   bench   at   Jaipur   has   been  
established by the Presidential Order issued under sub­section  
(2) of Section 51 of the Act. The territorial jurisdiction of the  
permanent bench at Jaipur is to be exercised in respect of the  
cases arising in the specified districts. Whether the case arises  
from one of the specified districts or not so as to determine the  
jurisdictional   competence   to   hear   by   reference   to   territory  
bifurcated between the principal seat and the bench seat, shall  
be an issue to be decided in an individual case by the judge or  
judges   hearing   the   matter   if   a   question   may   arise   in   that 
regard. The impugned explanation appended to the Order of  
the Chief Justice dated 23rd December, 1976 runs counter to  
the Presidential Order and in a sense it is an inroad into the  
jurisdiction of the judges hearing a particular  case or cases, 
pre­empting a decision to be given in the facts of individual  
case whether it can be said to have arisen in the territory of a  
particular district. The High Court is right in taking the view  
which it has done.” 

The submission made by the learned counsel for the respondent­
14.
husband   that   the   cause   of   action   for   filing   matrimonial   proceedings   in   the 
Court at Thane arose at Thane and that the same should be treated as cause of 
action   for   the   purposes   of   deciding   the   present   transfer   application   under 
Section   24   of   the   Code   of   Civil   Procedure,   does   not   appeal   to   me.     The 
proceedings of transfer under Section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure are 
based on an independent cause of action namely that the applicant­wife in the 
instant   case   is   praying   for   transfer   of   the   case   from   Thane   to   Nagpur   on 
various   grounds.     The   bundle   of   facts   disclosed   by   her   in   her   application 
requesting for such transfer under Section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure 
themselves constitute a cause of action and therefore, it is that cause of action 
which is relevant for exercise of powers under Section 24 of the Code.  In the 
light of cause of action accrued to the applicant­wife for transfer of the Hindu 
Marriage Petition from Thane, I find that even on the issue of cause of action 
the present application for transfer is well maintainable.  
15.
The   submission   made   by   Mr.   Mohta   about   examination   of 
witnesses, which the respondent ­husband wants to produce before the Court, 
is equally unsustainable.   In the first place, the witnesses who are said to be 
the Doctors can be produced before the Court by prior appointment of the 
Presiding Officer of the Court, so that the witnesses are not required to go back 
without   recording   effective   evidence.     Even   otherwise,   in   the   wake   of 

availability of the facility of video conferencing for recording the evidence the 
submission made by Mr. Mohta cannot be accepted.   Next submission about 
the convenience of the wife and inconvenience for the husband has been well 
taken care of by the various judgments to say and to quote the decisions in the 
case of Soma Choudhury and Sandhya Chaturvedi (supra) would be adequate. 
In addition to the fact that the respondent­husband is already appearing in the 
proceedings filed at Nagpur in some other cases would certainly answer the 

aspect of convenience or inconvenience projected before me by the learned 
16.
counsel for the respondent­husband. 
The upshot of the above discussion is that the present application 
must be allowed. In the result I pass the following order.
ORDER  
The Miscellaneous Civil Application No. 341 of 2013 is allowed. 
Hindu Marriage Petition No. 109 of 2013 pending on the file of 3rd Joint Civil 
Judge Senior Division, Thane is transferred to the Family Court at Nagpur for 
hearing along with matrimonial Petition No. C­22 of 2013 filed by the present 
applicant in the Family Court at Nagpur. 
Rule is made absolute accordingly with no order as to costs. 
  
       

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