There is a glaring omission to mention the names of the workers said to have been employed by the respondent or his agents who have allegedly painted the slogans. So also no material particulars are given as regards the vehicles on which the said slogans have been said to have been painted. There are no material particulars or facts. We are of the view that inasmuch as the material facts and particulars in regard to this alleged practice were not mentioned and the High Court was justified in taking the view that it had taken. The averments contained in regard to this charge also do not satisfy the test laid down by the various decisions of this Court adverted hereinabove. A Division Bench of this Court in Nihal Singh v. Rao Birendra Singh, [1970] 3 S.C.C. 239, speaking through Bhargava, J. has observed :-
"...The pleading was so vague that it left a wide scope to the appellant to adduce evidence in respect of a meeting at any place on any date that he found convenient or for which he could procure witnesses. The pleading, in fact, was so vague and was wanting in essential particulars that no evidence should have been permitted by the High Court on this point...... "
(see para 8) The principle laid down is that the pleading in regard to matters where there is scope for ascribing an alleged corrupt practice to a returned candidate in the context of a meeting of which dates and particulars are not given would tantamount to failure to incorporate the essential particulars and that inasmuch as there was a possibility that witnesses could be procured in the context of a meeting at a place or date convenient for adducing evidence, the High Court should not even have permitted evidence on that point. In other words, no amount of evidence could cure the basic defect in the pleading and the pleading as it stood must be construed as one disclosing no cause of action. In the light of the aforesaid principle laid down by the Supreme Court which has held the field for more than 15 years, the High Court was perfectly Justified in reaching the conclusion called into question by the appellant.
Supreme Court of India
Azhar Hussain vs Rajiv Gandhi on 25 April, 1986
Equivalent citations: 1986 AIR 1253, 1986 SCR (2) 782
Bench: Thakkar, M.P. (J)
Representation of the People Act, 1951 : Section 80 to 83, 86 & 87 - Election Petition - Mandatory requirement to furnish material facts and particulars - Non compliance - Summary dismissal of election petition - What are material particulars to be incorporated in an Election Petition. Civil Procedure Code, 1908 - Order 6 Rule 16 and Order 7 Rule 11(a) - Election Petition - Applicability of. HEADNOTE: The respondent having secured the highest votes in the 1984 general elections was declared elected as a Member of the Lok Sabha from the Amethi Constituency of Uttar Pradesh. On the last date for challenging the election, the appellant, an elector from that constituency filed an election petition challenging the election of the respondent alleging various corrupt practices. The respondent upon being served, instead of filing a written statement, raised preliminary objection to the maintainability of the petition contending that the petition was lacking in material facts and particulars and was defective on that account, and that since it did not disclose any cause of action it deserved to be dismissed. The High Court upheld the preliminary objection of the respondent and dismissed the petition. In the appeal to this Court on behalf of the appellant it was contended : (1) that where the legislature wanted to provide for summary dismissal of the election petition, the legislature has spoken on the matter and that the intention was to provide for summary dismissal only in case of failure to comply with the requirement of sections 81, 82 and 117 and not section 83; (2) that the powers to reject an election petition summarily under the provisions of the Code of Civil 783 Procedure should not be exercised at the threshold, and that the Court must proceed with the trial, record the evidence, and only after the trial of the election petition is concluded that the powers under the Code of Civil Procedure for dealing with the defective petition which does not disclose cause of action should be exercised. Dismissing the appeal, ^ HELD : 1. The results of an election are subject to judicial scrutiny and control only with an eye on two ends. First, to ascertain that the 'true' will of the people is reflected in the results and second, to secure that only the persons who are eligible and qualified under the Constitution obtain the representation. In order that the "true will" is ascertained the Courts will step in to protect and safeguard the purity of Elections, for, if corrupt practices have influenced the result, or the electorate has been a victim of fraud or deception or compulsion on any essential matter, the will of the people as recorded in their votes is not the 'free and true' will exercised intelligently by deliberate choice. It is not the will of the people in the true sense at all. And the Courts would, therefore, be justified in setting aside the election in accordance with the law if the corrupt practices are established. So also when the essential qualifications for eligibility demanded by the constitutional requirement are not fulfilled, the fact that the successful candidate is the true choice of the people is a consideration which is totally irrelevant notwithstanding the fact that it would be virtually impossible to re-enact the elections and reascertain the wishes of the people at the fresh elections, the time scenario having changed. [788 B-F] 1.1 In matters of election the will of the people must prevail and Courts would be understandably extremely slow to set at naught the will of the people truely and freely exercised. If Courts were to do otherwise, the Courts would be pitting their will against the will of the people, or countermanding the choice of the people without any object, aim or purpose. But where corrupt practices are established the result of the election does not echo the true voice of the people. The Courts would not then be deterred by the aforesaid considerations which in the corruptior-scenario lose 784 relevance. Such would be the approach of the Court in an election matter where a corrupt practice is established. [788 F-H; 789 A] 2. Undisputedly, the Code of Civil Procedure applies to the trial of an election petition by virtue of section 87 of the Representation of People Act of 1951, and so the Court trying the election petition can act in exercise of the powers of the Code including Order 6, Rules 16 and Order 7, Rule 11(a). The fact that a reference to section 83 does not find a place in section 86 of the Act does not mean that power under the Civil Procedure Code cannot be exercised. [792 D-E; 793 F] 3. An election petition can be summarily dismissed if it does not furnish cause of action in exercise of the powers under the Code of Civil Procedure. So also appropriate orders in exercise of powers under the Code of Civil Procedure can be passed if the mandatory requirement enjoined by section 83 of the Act to incorporate the material facts in the election petition are not complied with. [794 F-H] 3.1 Even in an ordinary Civil litigation the Court readily exercises the power to reject a plaint if it does not disclose any cause of action, or the power to direct the concerned party to strike out unnecessary, scandalous, frivolous or vexatious parts of the pleadings. Or such pleadings which are likely to cause embarassment or delay the fair trial of the action or which is otherwise an abuse of the process of law. An order directing a party to strike out a part of the pleading would result in the termination of the case arising in the context of said pleading. The Courts in exercise of the powers under the Code of Civil Procedure can also treat any point going to the root of the matter such as one pertaining to jurisdiction or maintainability as a preliminary point and can dismiss a suit without proceeding to record evidence and hear elaborate arguments in the context of such evidence, if the Court is satisfied that the action would terminate in view of the merits of the preliminary point of objection. Such being the position in regard to matters pertaining to ordinary Civil litigation, there is greater reason why in a democratic set-up, in regard to a matter pertaining to an elected representative of the people which is likely to inhibit him in the discharge of his duties towards the Nation, the controversy is set at rest at the earliest if the facts of the case and the law so warrant. [795 H; 796 A- C; 797 D-E] 785 3.2 Since the Court has the power to act at the threshold, the powers must be exercised at the threshold itself in case the Court is satisfied that it is a fit case for the exercise of such power and that exercise of such power is warranted under the relevant provision of law. [797 E-F] 4. All the primary facts which must be proved by a party to establish a cause of action or his defence are material facts. The omission of a single material fact would lead to an incomplete cause of action and an election petition without the material facts relating to a corrupt practice is not an election petition at all. [795 B-C; A-B] 4.1 Whether in an election petition a particular fact is material or not and as such required to be pleaded is dependent on the nature of the charges levelled and the circumstances of the case. All the facts which are essential to clothe the petition with complete cause of action must be pleaded and failure to plead even a single material fact would amount to disobedience of the mandate of s. 83(1)(a). An election petition, therefore, can be and must be dismissed if it suffers from any such vice. [795 C-D] Hardwari Lal v. kanwal Singh, [1972] 2 S.C.R. 742, Samant N. Balkrishna & Anr. v. George Fernandez & Ors., [1969] 3 S.C.C. 239, Udhav Singh v. Madhav Rao Scindia Popatlal Manilal Joshi & Ors., [1969] 3 S.C.R. 217, relied upon. 5. The pleading in regard to matters where there is scope for ascribing an alleged corrupt practice to a returned candidate in the context of a meeting of which dates and particulars are not given would tantamount to failure to incorporate the essential particulars. And inasmuch as there was a possibility that witnesses could be procured in the context of a meeting at a place or date convenient for adducing evidence, the High Court should not even have permitted evidence on that point. No amount of evidence could cure the basic defect in the pleading and the pleading as it stood must be construed as one disclosing no cause of action. [806 E-G] Nihar Singh v. Rao Birendra Singh, [1970] 3 S.C.C. 239, relied upon. 786 6. In the instant case, on a scrutiny of the averments made in the Election Petition it is evident that it is not pleaded as to who had distributed the pamphlets, when they were distributed, where they were distributed, to whom they were distributed, and in whose presence they were distributed. The pleading is ominously silent on these aspects. It has not even been pleaded that any particular person with the consent of the respondent or his election agent distributed the said pamphlets. The pleading, therefore, does not spell out a cause of action. [818 E-G] 7. The election petition, in the instant case, was filed on the last day on which the election petition could have been presented. Having regard to the rigid period of limitation prescribed by section 81 of the Act, it could not have been presented even on the next day. Such being the admitted position, it would make little difference whether the High Court used the expression 'rejected' or dismissed'. It would have had some significance if the petition was 'rejected' instead of being 'dismissed' before the expiry of the limitation inasmuch as a fresh petition which contained material facts and was in conformity with the requirements of law and which disclosed a cause of action could have been presented 'within' the period of limitation. The High Court was, therefore, perfectly justified in dismissing the petition. And it makes no difference whether the expression employed in 'dismissed' or 'rejected' for nothing turns on whether the former expression is employed or the latter. [821 H; 822 A-D] 8. The expression 'corrupt practice' employed in the Act would appear to be rather repulsive and offensive. It can perhaps be replaced by a natural and unoffensive expression such as 'disapproved practices'. [822 D-E] JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2774 (NCE) of 1985.
From the Judgment and Order dated 6th May, 1985 of the Allahabad High Court in Election Petition No. 2 of 1985.
Ravi Prakash Gupta, N.M. Popli and Ms. Kirti Gupta for the Appellant.
Dr. Y.S. Chitale, M.R. Sharma, S. C. Maheshwari, Ms. Rachna Joshi and Dalveer Bhandari for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by THAKKAR, J. An election petition having been dismissed on the ground that it did not comply with the mandatory requirement to furnish material facts and particulars enjoined by Section 83 of the Representation of People Act and that it did not disclose a cause of action, the election petitioner has appealed to this Court under Section 116-A of the Representation of the People Act of 1951 (Act).
The respondent was elected as a Member of the Lok Sabha from the Amethi Constituency of Uttar Pradesh in the general elections held on 24th December, 1984 under Section 15 of the Act. Having secured the highest votes (3,65,041) the respondent was declared as elected on December 29, 1984. On 12th February, 1985, the last date from challenging the election the appellant (who claims to be a worker of the Rashtriya Sanjay Manch), an elector from the Amethi constituency, filed the election petition giving rise to the present appeal.
The election of the returned candidate, respondent herein, was challenged on the ground of alleged corrupt practices as defined by the Act. Seventeen grounds set out in para 4(I to XVII) of the election petition were called into aid in support of the challenge. The respondent upon being served, instead of filing a written statement, raised preliminary objections to the maintainability of the petition on a number of grounds inter alia contending that the petition was lacking in material facts and particulars and was defective on that account, and that since it did not disclose any cause of action it deserved to be dismissed. The appellant on his part filed two applications for amendment of the election petition. (None of which was for supplying the material facts and particulars which were missing). All these applications were heard together and were disposed of by the Judgment under appeal upholding the preliminary objection raised on behalf of the Respondent and dismissing the election petition. Hence this appeal.
In a democratic polity 'election' is the mechanism devised to mirror the true wishes and the will of the people in the matter of choosing their political managers and their representatives who are supposed to echo their views and represent their interest in the legislature. The results of the Election are subject to judicial scrutiny and control only with an eye on two ends. First, to ascertain that the 'true' will of the people is reflected in the results and second, to secure that only the persons who are eligible and qualified under the Constitution obtain the representation. In order that the "true will" is ascertained the Courts will step in to protect and safeguard the purity of Elections, for, if corrupt practices have influenced the result, or the electorate has been a victim of fraud or deception or compulsion on any essential matter, the will of the people as recorded in their votes is not the 'free' and 'true' will exercised intelligently by deliberate choice. It is not the will of the people in the true sense at all. And the Courts would, therefore, it stands to reason, be justified in setting aside the election in accordance with law if the corrupt practices are established. So also when the essential qualifications for eligibility demanded by the constitutional requirements are not fulfilled, the fact that the successful candidate is the true choice of the people is a consideration which is totally irrelevant notwithstanding the fact that it would be virtually impossible to re-enact the elections and reascertain the wishes of the people at the fresh elections the time-scenario having changed. And also notwithstanding the fact that elections involve considerable expenditure of public revenue (not to speak of private funds) and result in loss of public time, and accordingly there would be good reason for not setting at naught the election which reflects the true will of the people lightly. In matters of election the will of the people must prevail and Courts would be understandably extremely slow to set at naught the will of the people truly and freely exercised. If Courts were to do otherwise, the Courts would be pitting their will against the will of the people, or countermanding the choice of the people without any object, aim or purpose. But where corrupt practices are established the result of the election does not echo the true voice of the people. The Courts would not then be deterred by the aforesaid considerations which in the corruption-scenario lose relevance. Such would be the approach of the Court in an election matter where corrupt practice is established. But what should happen when the material facts and particulars of the alleged corrupt practices are not furnished and the petition does not disclose a cause of action which the returned candidate can under law be called upon to answer? The High Court has given the answer that it must be summarily dismissed. The appellant has challenged the validity of the view taken by the High Court.
Learned counsel for the appellant has urged four submissions in support of this appeal viz:
A - Since the Act does not provide for dismissal of an election petition on the ground that material particulars necessary to be supplied in the election petition as enjoined by Section 83 of the Act are not incorporated in the election petition inasmuch as Section 86 of the Act which provides for summary dismissal of the petition does not advert to Section of the Act there is no power in the Court trying election petitions to dismiss the petition even in exercise of powers under the Code of Civil Procedure.
B - Even if the Court has the power to dismiss an election petition summarily otherwise than under Section 86 of the Representation of People Act, the power cannot be exercised at the threshold. C - In regard to seven grounds of challenge embodied in paragraph 4 of the election petition viz. I, II (i, ii & iii), XIII, XIV and XV the High Court was not justified in dismissing the petition.
D - Even if the powers under the Code of Civil Procedure can be exercised by the Court hearing election petitions worse comes to worse, an election petition may be rejected under Order 7, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, but in no case can it be dismissed.
GROUND A:
In order to understand the plea, a glance at Sections 83 and 86(1) in so far as material is called for :-
"83. Contents of petition:- (1) an election petition
a) shall contain a concise statement of the material facts on which the petitioner relies :
b) shall set forth full particulars of any corrupt practice that the petitioner alleges, including as full a statement as possible of the names of the parties alleged to have committed such corrupt practice and the date and place of the commission of each of such practice; and
c) shall be signed by the petitioner and verified in the manner laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) for the verification of pleadings:
(Provided that where the petitioner alleges any corrupt practice, the petition shall also be accompanied by an affidavit in the prescribed form in support of the allegation of such corrupt practice and the particulars thereof) (2) Any schedule or annexure to the petition shall also be signed by the petitioner and verified in the same manner as the petition."
"86 - Trial of election petitions -
(1) The High Court shall dismiss an election petition which does not comply with the provisions of section 82 or section 117.
Explanation - An order of the High Court dismissing an election petition under this sub- section shall be deemed to be an order made under clause (a) of section 98."
The argument is that where the legislature wanted to provide for summary dismissal of the election petition, the legislature has spoken on the matter. The intention was to provide for summary dismissal only in case of failure to comply with the requirement of Sections 81, 82 and 117 (1) and not Sec. 83.
------------------------------------------------------------ (1) 81. Presentation of petitions - (1) An election petition calling in question any election may be presented on one or more of the grounds specified in (sub-section (1)) of Section 100 and Section 101 to the High Court by any candidate at such election or any elector within forty-five days from, but not earlier than the date of election of the returned candidate or if there are more than returned candidate at the election and the dates of their election are different, the later of those two dates.
Explanation : In this sub-section `elector' means a person who was entitled to vote at the election to which the election petition relates, whether he has voted at such an election or not.
(3) Every election petition shall be accompanied by as many copies thereof as there are respondents mentioned in the petition and every such copy shall be attested by the petitioner under his own signature to be a true copy of the petition.
82. Parties of the petition - A petitioner shall join as respondents to his petition -
(a) where the petitioner, in addition to claiming declaration that the election of all or any of the returned candidate is void, claims a further declaration that he himself or any other candidate has been duly elected, all the contesting candidates other than the petitioner, and where no such further declaration is claimed, all the returned candidates; and
(b) any other candidate against whom allegations of any corrupt practice are made in the petition.
The argument is that inasmuch as Section 83(1) is not adverted to in Section 86 in the context of the provisions, non-compliance with which entails dismissal of the election petition, it follows that non-compliance with the requirements of Section 83(1), even though mandatory, do not have lethal consequence of dismissal. Now it is not disputed that the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) applies to the trial of an election petition by virtue of section 87 of the Act (2). Since CPC is applicable, the Court trying the election
------------------------------------------------------------
117. Security for costs - (1) At the time of presenting an election petition, the petitioner shall deposit in the High Court in accordance with the Rules of the High Court a sum of two thousand rupees as security for the costs of the petition. (2) During the course of the trial of an election petition, the High Court may, at any time, call upon the petitioner to give such further security for costs as it may direct.
(2) 87. Procedure before the High Court - (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act and of any rules made thereunder, every election petition shall be tried by the High Court, as nearly as may be, in accordance with the procedure applicable under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) to the trial of the suits ;
Provided that the High Court shall have the discretion to refuse, for reasons to be recorded in writing, to examine any witness or witnesses if it is of the opinion that the evidence of such witness or witnesses is not material for the decision of the petition or that the party tendering such witness or witnesses is doing so on frivolous grounds or with a view to delay the proceedings.
(2) The provisions of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, be deemed to apply in all respects to the trial of an election petition.
petition can act in exercise of the powers of the Code including Order 6 Rule 16 and Order 7 Rule 11(a) which read thus :-
Order 6, Rule 16 : "Striking out pleadings - The Court may at any stage of the proceedings order to be struck out or amend any matter in any pleading -
a) which may be unnecessary, scandalous, frivolous or vexatious, or
b) which may tend to prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial of the suit; or
c) which is otherwise an abuse of the process of the Court."
Order 7, Rule 11 : "Rejection of Plaint - The plaint shall be rejected in the following cases :-
a) where it does not disclose a cause of action ; xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx"
The fact that Section 82 does not find a place in Section 86 of the Act does not mean that powers under the CPC cannot be exercised.
There is thus no substance in this point which is already concluded against the appellant inHardwari Lal v. Kanwal Singh, [1972] 2 S.C.R. 742 wherein this Court has in terms negatived this very plea in the context of the situation that material facts and particulars relating to the corrupt practice alleged by the election petitioner were not incorporated in the election petition as will be evident from the following passage extracted from the judgment of A.N. Ray, J. who spoke for the three-judge Bench :
"The allegations in paragraph 16 of the election petition do not amount to any statement or material fact of corrupt practice. It is not stated as to which kind or form of assistance was obtained or procured or attempted to obtain or procure. It is not stated from whom the particular type of assistance was obtained or procured or attempted to obtain or procure. It is not stated in what manner the assistance was for the furtherance of the prospects of the election. The gravamen of the charge of corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123(7) of the Act is obtaining or procuring or abetting or attempting to obtain or procure any assistance other than the giving of vote. In the absence of any suggestion as to what that assistance was the election petition is lacking in the most vital and essential material fact to furnish a cause of action.
Counsel on behalf of the respondent submitted that an election petition could not be dismissed by reason of want of material facts because Section 86 of the Act conferred power on the High Court to dismiss the election petition which did not comply with the provisions of Section 81, or Section 82 or Section 117 of the Act. It was emphasized that Section 83 did not find place in section 86. Under section 87 of the Act every election petition shall be tried by the High Court as nearly as may be in accordance with the procedure applicable under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to the trial of the suits. A suit which does not furnish cause of action can be dismissed."
In view of this pronouncement there is no escape from the conclusion that an election petition can be summarily dismissed if it does not furnish cause of action in exercise of the powers under the Code of Civil Procedure. So also it emerges from the aforesaid decision that appropriate orders in exercise of powers under the Code of Civil Procedure can be passed if the mandatory requirements enjoined by Section 83 of the Act to incorporate the material facts in the election petition are not complied with. This Court in Samant N. Balkrishna & Anr. v. George Fernandez & Ors., [1969] 3 S.C.C. 239, has expressed itself in no unclear terms that the omission of a single material fact would lead to an incomplete cause of action and that an election petition without the material facts relating to a corrupt practice is not an election petition at all. So also in Udhav Singh v. Madhav Rao Scindia, [1977] 1 S.C.C. 511, the law has been enunciated that all the primary facts which must be proved by a party to establish a cause of action or his defence are material facts. In the context of a charge of corrupt practice it would mean that the basic facts which constitute the ingredients of the particular corrupt practice alleged by the petitioner must be specified in order to succeed on the charge. Whether in an election petition a particular fact is material or not and as such required to be pleaded is dependent on the nature of the charge levelled and the circumstances of the case. All the facts which are essential to clothe the petition with complete cause of action must be pleaded and failure to plead even a single material fact would amount to disobediance of the mandate of Section 83(1)(a). An election petition therefore can be and must be dismissed if it suffers from any such vice. The first ground of challenge must therefore fail.
GROUND B :
Learned counsel for the petitioner has next argued that in any event the powers to reject an election petition summarily under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure should not be exercised at the threshold. In substance, the argument is that the court must proceed with the trial, record the evidence, and only after the trial of the election petition is concluded that the powers under the Code of Civil Procedure for dealing appropriately with the defective petition which does not disclose cause of action should be exercised. With respect to the learned counsel, it is an argument which it is difficult to comprehend. The whole purpose of confernment of such powers is to ensure that a litigation which is meaningless and bound to prove abortive should not be permitted to occupy the time of the court and exercise the mind of the respondent. The sword of Damocle need not be kept hanging over his head unnecessarily without point or purpose. Even in an ordinary Civil litigation the Court readily exercises the power to reject a plaint if it does not disclose any cause of action. Or the power to direct the concerned party to strike out unnecessary, scandalous, frivolous or vexatious parts of the pleadings. Or such pleadings which are likely to cause embarrassment or delay the fair trial of the action or which is otherwise an abuse of the process of law. An order directing a party to strike out a part of the pleading would result in the termination of the case arising in the context of the said pleading. The Courts in exercise of the powers under the Code of Civil Procedure can also treat any point going to the root of the matter such as one pertaining to jurisdiction or maintainability as a preliminary point and can dismiss a suit without proceeding to record evidence and hear elaborate arguments in the context of such evidence, if the Court is satisfied that the action would terminate in view of the merits of the preliminary point of objection. The contention that even if the election petition is liable to be dismissed ultimately it should be so dismissed only after recording evidence is a thoroughly misconceived and untenable argument. The powers in this behalf are meant to be exercised to serve the purpose for which the same have been conferred on the competent Court so that the litigation comes to an end at the earliest and the concerned litigants are relieved of the psychological burden of the litigation so as to be free to follow their ordinary pursuits and discharge their duties. And so that they can adjust their affairs on the footing that the litigation will not make demands on their time or resources, will not impede their future work, and they are free to undertake and fulfil other commitments. Such being the position in regard to matters pertaining to ordinary Civil litigation, there is greater reason for taking the same view in regard to matters pertaining to elections. So long as the sword of Damocles of the election petition remains hanging an elected member of the Legislature would not feel sufficiently free to devote his whole-hearted attention to matters of public importance which clamour for his attention in his capacity as an elected representative of the concerned constituency. The time and attention demanded by his elected office will have to be diverted to matters pertaining to the contest of the election petition. Instead of being engaged in a campaign to relieve the distress of the people in general and of the residents of his constituency who voted him into office, and instead of resolving their problems, he would be engaged in a campaign to establish that he has in fact been duly elected. Instead of discharging his functions as the elected representative of the people, he will be engaged in a struggle to establish that he is indeed such a representative, notwithstanding the fact that he has in fact won the verdict and the confidence of the electorate at the polls. He will have not only to wind the vote of the people but also to win the vote of the Court in a long drawn out litigation before he can whole-heartedly engaged himself in discharging the trust reposed in him by the electorate. The pendency of the election petition would also act as a hindrance if he be entrusted with some public office in his elected capacity. He may even have occasions to deal with the representatives of foreign powers who may wonder whether he will eventually succeed and hesitate to deal with him. The fact that an election petition calling into question his election is pending may, in a given case, act as a psychological fetter and may not permit him to act with full freedom. Even if he is made of stern metal, the constraint introduced by the pendency of an election petition may have some impact on his sub-conscious mind without his ever being or becoming aware of it. Under the circumstances, there is greater reason why in a democratic set-up, in regard to a matter pertaining to an elected representative of the people which is likely to inhibit him in the discharge of his duties towards the Nation, the controversy is set at rest at the earliest, if the facts of the case and the law so warrant. Since the Court has the power to act at the threshold the power must be exercised at the threshold itself in case the Court is satisfied that it is a fit case for the exercise of such power and that exercise of such powers is warranted under the relevant provisions of law. To wind up the dialogue, to contend that the powers to dismiss or reject an election petition or pass appropriate orders should not be exercised except at the stage of final judgment after recording the evidence even if the facts of the case warrant exercise of such powers, at the threshold, is to contend that the legislature conferred these powers without point or purpose, and we must close our mental eye to the presence of the powers which should be treated as non-existent. The Court cannot accede to such a proposition. The submission urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner in this behalf must therefore be firmly repelled. GROUND C :
The learned counsel for the election pecitioner has very fairly contended that out of the 17 grounds embedded in the election petition, grounds other than the seven mentioned by him cannot be pressed into service and that he would restrict his submissions to these seven grounds. It is therefore unnecessary to advert to grounds other than the seven grounds which have been urged in support of this petition. We will accordingly proceed to consider the plea urged to the effect that in regard to the aforesaid alleged corrupt practices, the High Court was not justified in dismissing the election petition.
Before we deal with these grounds seriatim, we consider it appropriate to restate the settled position of law as it emerges from the numerous decisions of this Court which have been cited before us in regard to the question as to what exactly is the content of the expression `material facts and particulars', which the election petitioner shall incorporate in his petition by virtue of Section 83(1) of the Act.
(1) What are material facts and particulars ? Material facts are facts which if established would give the petitioner the relief asked for. The test required to be answered is whether the Court could have given a direct verdict in favour of the election petitioner in case the returned candidate had not appeared to oppose the election petition on the basis of the facts pleaded in the petition. Manubhai Nandlal Amarsey v. Popatlal Manilal Joshi & Ors., [1969] 3 S.C.R. 217. (2) In regard to the alleged corrupt practice pertaining to the assistance obtained from a Government servant, the following facts are essential to clothe the petition with a cause of action which will call for an answer from the returned candidate and must therefore be pleaded.Hardwari Lal v. Kanwal Singh, [1972] 2 S.C.R. 742:
a) mode of assistance;
b)measure of assistance; and
c) all various forms of facts pertaining to the assistance.
(3) In the context of an allegation as regards procuring, obtaining, abetting or attempting to obtain or procure the assistance of Government servants in election it is absolutely essential to plead the following :
a) kind or form of assistance obtained or procured;
b) in what manner the assistance was obtained or procured or attempted to be obtained or procured by the election-candidate for promoting the prospects of his election Hardwari Lal v. Kanwal Singh. (supra) (4) The returned candidate must be told as to what assistance he was supposed to have sought, the type of assistance, the manner of assistance, the time of assistance, the persons from whom the actual and specific assistance was procured Hardwari Lal v. Kanwal Singh (supra) (5) There must also be a statement in the election petition describing the manner in which the prospects of the election was furthered and the way in which the assistance was rendered. Hardwari Lal v. Kanwal Singh (supra).
(6) The election petitioner must state with exactness the time of assistance, the manner of assistance, the persons from whom assistance was obtained or procured, the time and date of the same, all these will have to be set out in the particulars Hardwari Lal v. Kanwal Singh (supra). And having restated the settled position in regard to the content of the expression `material facts', the time is now ripe to proceed to deal with the grounds on which the election of the returned candidate is assailed, seriatim.
GROUND I :
Alleged corrupt practice as incorporated in Ground I reads thus :-
"The election of the respondent is liable to be set declared void because the respondent was guilty of the following corrupt practice as defined under Section 123(7) of the Representation of People Act, 1951, read with Section 100(1)(b) and 100(D)(ii) of the said Act, the said corrupt practice was committed with the consent of the respondent returned candidate and of other workers of his with his consent. In any event, it was committed by the respondent's agents in the interests of the returned candidate and the said corrupt practice has materially affected the result of the election in so far as it concerns the returned candidate. One M.H. Beg who at one time was the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of India and is a close friend of the Nehru family and is personally known to and friendly with the respondent, appeared on the government controlled news media and made a speech praising the respondent and comparing his entry into politics as the birth of new Arjuna, the insinuation being that the opposition were the kauravas. His appearance on the television was relayed day after day on the government controlled media. Television sets had been installed in practically every election office of the respondent in Amethi constituency and throughout the election campaign thousands and thousands of voters were exposed to the television appearance and speech of the said Mr. Beg. Mr. Beg is a gazetted officer, being the Chairman of the Minorities Commission. His services were procured and obtained by the respondent, his agents and other persons with the consent of the respondent with a view to assist the furtherance of the prospects of the respondent's election. Mr. Beg was seen and heard on the television as later as 21st December, 1984. Propaganda about Mr. Beg's was done particularly amongst the members of the Muslim community. Apart from being gross misuse of the office of Chairman of the Minorities Commission, the same constitutes a gross corrupt practice under the election law."
Why the High Court held that material facts and particulars are absent and did not disclose a cause of action ?
The High Court observed :-
"The contention of the learned counsel for the respondent is that there is no pleading that Mr. Beg was "a person in the service of the government" as, according to the learned counsel, the Chairman of the Minorities Commission is not a person in the S service of the government. Learned counsel for the petitioner says that the petitioner had specifically pleaded that Mr. Beg was a gazetted officer which implies a pleading that he was in the service of the government. Learned counsel for the respondent says that simply because a person is a gazetted officer, it is not necessary that he must also be a government servant because the appointment of so many persons is gazetted and yet some of them may not be government servants. Be that as it may, the fact remains that the petitioner had not stated in the pleading that Mr. Beg was a person in the service of the government as specifically required by Section 123(7) of the Act. This requirement is a requirement of the statute and is, therefore, a material fact within the meaning of Sec. 83(1)(a) of the Act. Similarly, the statement that the services of Mr. Beg were procured and obtained "by the respondent, his agents and other persons with the consent of the respondent" is clearly vague as discussed above. It was incumbent upon the petitioner to specify which of the three alternatives he meant to plead; in particular it was necessary for him to indicate the names of the respondent's agents and other persons to enable the respondent to know that what was the case which he was expected to meet. Learned counsel for the respondent further contended that the petitioner has not set out the exact words used by Mr. Beg in his speech; the expression "a speech prais-
ing the respondent" and comparing his "entry into politics as the birth of new Arjuna" is not what Mr. Beg might have said. In the case of K.M. Mani v. P.J. Antony, [1979] 2 S.C. Cases 221, the speech made by a Police Officer exhorting the electors in an election meeting to support a candidate was questioned. It was held that a mere statement of the making of the speech or exhortation was not enough, and that transcript of the alleged speech or contemporaneous record of the points or atleast substance of the
No comments:
Post a Comment