Friday 13 March 2015

Whether trial court can enlarge scope of enquiry on a remand of case?


However, counsel for the respondent vehemently argues that the Controller could have extended his enquiry into re-appreciating the material on record to go into the previous conduct of the landlord to reopen the question of bona fide requirement. This with great respect to counsel cannot be done. The scope and ambit of the trial court on a remand if restricted cannot be enlarged. Reference may be had to Konappa Mudaliar Vs. Kusalaru alias Munuswami Pillai and Ors. , Balaswaraswami Varu and Anr. Vs. Mallidi Doraya and Ors. , Smt.Ramabai and Ors. Vs. Harbilas and Ors. , Mohan Lal Vs. Anandibai and Ors. and K.Veerabasappa Vs. The Court of Dist. Judge at Chitradurga and Ors. .
7.From a perusal of the above judgments, it is clear that the law stands settled that the trial court must strictly adhere to the remand order. Any enlargement of scope would not be permissible and beyond jurisdiction. I need hardly dwell on the matter any further since it is evident from the judgment under challenge that the trial court has far exceeded its mandate which required the Controller to adjudicate upon the alternative accommodation. The Controller while exceeding his authority went on to old that the previous conduct of the landlord dis-entitles him from an order of eviction under Section 14(i)(e), even though the previous order took into consideration the requirements of the landlord at the time when the petition was filed and held that the bona fide requirement did exist and stood proved. 
Delhi High Court

Om Prakash Sharma vs Raj Rani on 3 December, 2004
Equivalent citations: 116 (2005) DLT 283, 2005 (80) DRJ 380

Bench: R Sodhi



1.RC.REV. 37/2004 is directed against the judgment of the Additional Rent Controller, Delhi (for short ''the Controller'') in E 295/2003, whereby the learned Controller vide its judgment dated 28th April, 2004, has dismissed the petition of the petitioner herein under Section 14(1)(e) read with Section 25(B) of the Delhi Rent Control Act.
2. The brief facts of the case, as has been noted by the learned Controller, are as under :
''Brief facts necessary for the adjudication of aforesaid petition are that petitioner had filed a petition aforestated against the respondent on 4.12.2002. Summons were sent to the respondent as per Schedule III of D.R.C. Act. Thereafter, leave to defend application was filed. The said leave to defend application of the respondent was dismissed and an eviction order was passed against the respondent vide order dated 26.4.2003 passed by then learned Addl.Rent Controller, Ms.Nivedita Anil Sharma. Thereafter, the respondent went in appeal before the Hon'ble High Court and vide order dated 16.10.2003 Hon'ble High Court granted leave to contest the petition to the respondent and also observed that trial court shall endeavor to dispose of the matter within six months from the date of communication of the order. Accordingly, the matter was remanded back and was marked to this court by the learned Rent Controller''
3.It is contended by counsel for the petitioner that the High Court while remanding the matter vide order dated 16th October, 2003, had specifically directed the Controller that the only question requiring his attention and adjudication was regarding the extent of alternative, suitable accommodation available with the landlord and his son. The Controller is strictly bound by this direction and could not have gone behind the findings in the earlier order.
4.Counsel for the respondent on the other hand contends that to adjudicate upon this matter it was necessary for the Controller to have gone into the previous conduct of the landlord to arrive at a conclusion that the eviction sought from the premises in question was bona fide.
5.I have heard counsel for the parties and have gone through the judgment under challenge. It appears that by an earlier order dated 26th April, 2003, the learned Controller had held that the relationship of landlord and tenant stands established. The learned Controller had also held that the requirement of the landlord is bona fide and that there was no suitable, reasonable, alternative accommodation available with him. Consequently, the Controller has dismissed the application of the tenant for leave to defend on the ground that no friable issue has been raised. Feeling aggrieved thereof, the tenant preferred a revision petition being CR 640/2003 before the High Court contending therein that the son of the landlord had accommodation which was not taken into consideration by the Controller, though the eviction was sought on the ground that the premises are bonafidely required by the landlord and his son dependent upon him. The High Court vide its order dated 16th October, 2003, has partly allowed the petition in the following terms :
''The petitioner-tenant is granted leave to contest the eviction petition only on the question of the extent of alternate suitable accommodation available to the landlord and his son and whether the requirement of the petitioner-landlord could not be met even if the entire accommodation available to them is taken into consideration''
6.The ambit and scope of the enquiry by the Controller was therefore limited to the alternative accommodation. It is the admitted case of the parties before me that on the date of filing of the eviction petition the case of the landlord stood proved. In other words, the relationship of landlord and tenant was admitted, premises let out for residential purposes was admitted, premises required bonafidely for residence of the landlord and his son dependent on him was admitted and it was also admitted that n that day there was no alternative accommodation available with the son of the landlord which could be taken into consideration as being the suitable alternative accommodation for the purposes of the Delhi Rent Control Act. However, counsel for the respondent vehemently argues that the Controller could have extended his enquiry into re-appreciating the material on record to go into the previous conduct of the landlord to reopen the question of bona fide requirement. This with great respect to counsel cannot be done. The scope and ambit of the trial court on a remand if restricted cannot be enlarged. Reference may be had to Konappa Mudaliar Vs. Kusalaru alias Munuswami Pillai and Ors. , Balaswaraswami Varu and Anr. Vs. Mallidi Doraya and Ors. , Smt.Ramabai and Ors. Vs. Harbilas and Ors. , Mohan Lal Vs. Anandibai and Ors. and K.Veerabasappa Vs. The Court of Dist. Judge at Chitradurga and Ors. .
7.From a perusal of the above judgments, it is clear that the law stands settled that the trial court must strictly adhere to the remand order. Any enlargement of scope would not be permissible and beyond jurisdiction. I need hardly dwell on the matter any further since it is evident from the judgment under challenge that the trial court has far exceeded its mandate which required the Controller to adjudicate upon the alternative accommodation. The Controller while exceeding his authority went on to old that the previous conduct of the landlord dis-entitles him from an order of eviction under Section 14(i)(e), even though the previous order took into consideration the requirements of the landlord at the time when the petition was filed and held that the bona fide requirement did exist and stood proved. The crucial date for deciding the bona fides of the landlord is the date on which his application for eviction has been filed. Reference may be had to Gaya Prasad Vs. Pradeep Srivastava [(2001) 2 SCC 604], G.C.Kapoor Vs. Nand Kumar Bhasin and Ors. [2002(1) RCJ 53 SC], Kamleshwar Prasad Vs. Pradumanju Agarwal and N.R.Narayan Swamy Vs. B.Francis Jagan . In the result, admittedly there is no suitable alternative accmmodation available to the landlord and member of his family dependent on him. The judgment under challenge is set aside and the petition under Section 14(i)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act read with Section 25(B) of the Delhi Rent Control Act is allowe. RC.REV.37/2004 is accordingly allowed and disposed of. A decree of eviction from the premises in question is passed. Six months' time is granted to the tenant to vacate the premises in question.

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