The appellate authority however placed unnecessary emphasis on
the fact that the landlord had not filed any document to show the education
of his sons. It further held that there were no documents filed to show that
the landlord's sons wanted to start business and further that said business
did not have direct match with the acquired qualifications. When the tenant
was not aware about the family members of the landlord or about his two
sons, it could not be said that the tenant had placed on record any material to
doubt the bonafides of the landlord. As held by the Supreme Court in Sarla
Ahuja Vs. United India Insurance Company Ltd. (1998) 8 Supreme
Court Cases 119, there is always a presumption that the requirement of the
landlord is bonafide and it is for the tenant to displace said presumption. In
the present case, except for general denial there was no material placed on
record by the tenant to doubt the landlord's bonafides.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY NAGPUR BENCH
NAGPUR.
WRIT PETITION NO. 1847 OF 2007
Purushottam Ramlal Shukla Vs Atul Narayanprasad Pande
CORAM: A. S. CHANDURKAR J.
Dated; 8-1-2015
Citation; 2015(3)ALLMR32,2015(2)ABR18,2015(1)BomCR719, 2015(3)MhLj402
This Writ Petition filed under Article 226 read with Article 227 of
the Constitution of India by the landlord, challenges the order dated
24.11.2006 passed by the Additional Collector, Nagpur whereby the appeal
preferred by the respondentstenants under Clause 21 of the C. P. and Berar
Letting of Premises and Rent Control Order, 1949 (for short the Rent Control
Order) has been allowed. As a result of said order, the proceedings initiated
by the landlord have been remanded to the Rent Controller for fresh inquiry
with regard to grant of permission under Clause 13(3)(i), (ii) and (v) of the
Rent Control Order. The landlord has been held ineligible for grant of
permission under Clause 13(3)(vi) of the Rent Control Order.
2]
The present litigation is long drawn and reference is being made
to the relevant facts which are required to be considered while adjudicating
the Writ Petition. The petitioner is the owner of premises that are situated at
Dharampeth, Nagpur being Municipal Corporation House No. 194. The
respondents are the tenants who have been let out two rooms admeasuring
22 ft. X 33 ft. for business purposes. There is also a frontage of 22 ft. On
18.01.1991 the petitioner had initiated proceedings under Rent Control
Order by approaching Rent Controller under the provisions of Clause 13(3)
(i), (ii) and (v) thereof. On 29.03.1993 the Rent Controller granted
permission to issue quit notice to the respondents. The tenants filed appeal
under Clause 21 of the Rent Control Order. Along with said appeal an
application for condonation of delay was also filed. By order dated
28.05.2001 the application for condonation of delay came to be rejected.
The review application filed by the respondents was also dismissed on
30.08.2004. Both the aforesaid orders were challenged in Writ Petition No.
5941 of 2004. This Court on 17.01.2005 dismissed the Writ Petition.
Thereafter the respondents preferred Letters Parent Appeal No. 21 of 2005
which came to be allowed on 28.06.2005. After setting aside the orders
passed by the appellate authority as well as by the learned Single Judge, the
application for condonation of delay came to be allowed. This order in turn
came to be challenged by the landlord before the Supreme Court of India.
On 20.02.2006 the Supreme Court of India permitted the landlord to amend
the proceedings for eviction and to seek permission to issue quit notice on the
ground of bonafide need. The appellate authority was also permitted to
record evidence and thereafter decide the appeal.
3]
Pursuant to aforesaid liberty as granted, the petitioner amended
the original application and sought eviction of the respondents on the ground
of bonafide need. It was pleaded that the landlord had two sons who were
on the verge of completing their education. It was stated that in part of the
premises the landlord's wife was running a lodge and hence the elder son
decided to start a general store in part of the premises. The younger son
wanted to start restaurantcummess in part of the premises. The
respondents amended their written statement and opposed the claim of the
landlord. It was denied that there was any bonafide need on the part of the
landlord. It was further stated that a large portion of the premises was lying
vacant and was not being used. Similarly, it was stated that the landlord did
not have need of the entire premises. It was then stated that if the
permission as prayed was granted, then hardship would be caused to the
tenants.
The landlord examined himself in support of aforesaid grounds.
The respondents in turn examined respondent no. 5 on their behalf. The
appellate authority thereafter on 24.11.2006 decided said appeal by holding
that as the tenants did not have proper opportunity to contest the original
proceedings. Hence, as regards grounds under Clause 13(3)(i), (ii) and (v)
the proceedings came to be remanded to the Rent Controller. It further held
that the landlord had failed to prove that he was in bonafide need of
aforesaid premises. Hence, permission under Clause 13(3)(vi) of the Rent
Control Order came to be denied. This order passed by the appellate
authority has been challenged in the present Writ Petition. It is to be noted
that on 19th and 20th November 2008 the Writ Petition had been partly
allowed and the landlord was granted permission under Clause 13(3)(vi) of
the Rent Control Order. The tenants being aggrieved by aforesaid judgment
filed Letters Patent Appeal No. 410 of 2008. The Division Bench dismissed
said Letters Patent Appeal while holding that the Writ Petition filed by the
landlord under Article 226 of the Constitution of India was not maintainable.
The tenants thereafter filed Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court
of India. On 14.07.2014 the Supreme Court of India set aside the order
dated 20.10.2010 passed by the Division Bench and remanded the
proceedings to this Court. In the order dated 14.07.2014 it was observed
thus:
“In the present case, we find that the High Court on
the one hand while held that the writ petition was not
maintainable, on the other hand dismissed the LPA.
We are of the view that instead of dismissed the LPA ,
Division Bench should have referred the matter back to
the Single Judge to decide whether the writ petition
was maintainable and whether it was a fit case for
interference under Article 227 of the Constitution of
India.”
It is in this background that the present Writ Petition has been
heard.
4]
Shri J. T. Gilda, learned counsel appearing for the landlord after
referring to the earlier orders passed in the proceedings, submitted that in
view of the order dated 14.07.2014 the writ petition would have to be
decided in the light of observations made by the Supreme Court of India. He
submitted that under the provisions of Article 227 of the Constitution of India
this Court could exercise jurisdiction if it is found that the order passed by the
subordinate authority has resulted in grave injustice or failure of justice.
Relying upon the observations made in Surya Dev Rai Vs. Ram Chander Rai
and others (2003) 6 Supreme Court Cases 675, it was urged that if the
impugned order is shown to have been passed in clear ignorance or utter
disregard of the provisions of law, then even errors of fact or of law could be
corrected. In that regard he also placed reliance on the judgment of learned
Single Judge in Shankar Bhairoba Vadangekar since deceased through
L.Rs. Dattatraya Shankar Vadangekar and others Vs. Ganpati Appa
Gatare since deceased through L. Rs. Smt. Sushilabai Ganpat Gatare and
others 2001(4) Maharashtra Law Journal 131, Norman Joseph Ferreira
and another Vs. Arjandas Newandram by his L.Rs. Newandram
Shivalomal and others 2001(2) Maharashtra Law Journal 810 as well as
Ganpat Ragho Dhangar and others Vs. Ninaji Raoji Dhangar and
another 1980 Maharashtra Law Journal 263. He then submitted that
there was sufficient material on record to hold that the landlord had proved
his bonafide need. The permission had been sought on the ground that both
his sons were on the verge of completing their education and hence it was
necessary for him to settle them in life. As the landlord's wife was running a
lodge, the purpose for which the tenanted premises were required would
have supplemented the aforesaid activity. He further submitted that the
landlord being the best judge of his needs, he was entitled to seek eviction of
the tenant so as to settle his sons. He, therefore, submitted that the appellate
authority was not justified in refusing permission to the landlord on the
ground of bonafide need. In this regard he placed reliance on the decision in
Shamshad Ahmad and others Vs. Tilak Raj Bajaj (Deceased) through
LRs. And others (2008) 9 Supreme Court Cases 1. He urged that the tenant
in his written statement had merely denied the case of the landlord as
regards bonafide need. In the reply it was merely pleaded that greater
hardship would be caused to the tenant if said permission is granted. He,
therefore, submitted that the bonafide need of the landlord had been clearly
established. On the aspect of hardship to the tenants, he urged that merely
on the ground of length of tenancy relief could not be denied to the landlord.
In this regard he placed reliance on Mohd. Ayub and another Vs. Mukesh
Chand AIR 2012 Supreme Court 881. He, thus submitted that the appellate
authority having failed to take into account the relevant evidence that was
available on record as well as the settled law as regards the matters to be
considered while adjudicating the bonafide need of the landlord having been
ignored, a case for interference under Article 227 of the Constitution of India
had been made out.
On the other hand Shri C. S. Kaptan, learned Senior Counsel with
5]
Shri R. V. Shah, learned counsel appearing for the respondents opposed the
writ petition. It was submitted that in view of the order dated 14.07.2014
passed by the Supreme Court of India, the scope for interference was quite
limited. The learned senior counsel submitted that while exercising
jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court
could not act like a Court of appeal. Such jurisdiction could not be exercised
to upset erroneous conclusion of facts. He placed reliance upon the judgment
of learned Single Judge in Prabhudas Narayan Gedam & others Vs.
Municipal Council, Bhadrawati 2003 (1) Mh. L.J. 275 to urge that in
absence of any jurisdictional error, there was no scope to interfere under
Article 227 of the Constitution. Relying upon the decision in Delhi
Administration Vs. Gurdip Singh Uban and others (2000) 7 Supreme
Court Cases 296, it was urged that merely because a party has lost before
lower authority, the same could not lead to be presumption that injustice had
been done to him. The same would depend upon the facts of each case. He
further submitted that the view expressed in Surya Deo Rai (supra) had not
been accepted by the Supreme Court in its subsequent decision in Radhey
Shyam and another Vs. Chhabi Nath and others (2009) 5 Supreme Court
ig
Cases 616.
On merits it was submitted that the appellate authority had on
the basis of evidence before it come to the conclusion that landlord had failed
to prove his bonafide need. The conclusion as drawn was after taking into
account all the material that was available on record. This Court could not
exercise jurisdiction merely because another view of the matter was possible.
It was further urged that the landlord had not led any documentary evidence
in support of his claim and therefore his case was rightly disbelieved by the
appellate authority. Relying upon the decision in Municipal Committee,
Hoshiarpur Vs. Punjab State Electricity Board and others (2010) 13
Supreme Court Cases 216, it was submitted that only if the findings as
recorded were either perverse or the conclusion as arrived at was such that
no reasonable person could have arrived at the same, only then a case for
interference would be made out. Such was not the position in the present
case. He also placed reliance on the decision of learned Single Judge in
Janba Daulatrao Borkar Vs. Rajeshkumar Ramjiwan Agrawal AIR 1976
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Bombay 70. He further submitted that it could not be expected that the
landlord's son who was pursuing his engineering course was interested in
running restaurantcummess. It was also submitted that the provisions of
Clause 13(8) of the Rent Control Order had not been taken into
consideration by the appellate authority. The aspect of partial eviction
which could satisfy the need of the landlord was not examined. He
submitted that the plea regarding partial eviction had been raised in the reply
ig
and was also referred to in the tenants deposition. He, therefore, submitted
that as aforesaid aspect had not been taken into account, findings based on
such adjudication were not available in the present case. He, thus, submitted
that the appellate authority had rightly found that the landlord had failed to
prove his case of bonafide need.
6]
The learned counsel for the petitioner in reply submitted that the
High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution could interfere with
findings as recorded if the same are not supported by evidence on record. He
submitted that said view taken by learned Single Judge in
Madhusudansingh Laxmansingh Chouhan and another Vs. Bhaskar
Govind Deshpande 1987 Mh. L. J. 487 had been affirmed by the Division
Bench in Bhaskar Govind Deshpande since deceased by Legal
Representatives Wasundharabai and others Vs. Madhusudansingh
Laxmansingh Chouhan and another 1988 Mh. L. J. 409. He further urged
that it was for the tenant to factually place on record relevant material if
benefit of provisions of Clause 13(8) of the Rent Control Order was sought to
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be taken. Reliance in this regard was also placed on the decision in
Gopalsing Rajput Vs. Mumtaz Hussain 1996(1) Mh. L. J. 742. He further
submitted that as the appellate authority had found that the bonafide need of
the landlord had not been proved, there was no question of recording any
findings under Clause 13(8) of the Rent Control Order. He also urged that it
was not necessary for the landlord to have dire necessity to prove his
bonafide need. In this regard he relied upon the decision of learned Single
ig
Judge in Mandakini Radhakrishna Damkondawar Vs. Nirmaladevi
Chandrakant Pandit 1995(2) Maharashtra Law Journal 864. He also
submitted that there was shift in the approach of the Supreme Court as well
as of this Court while considering bonafide need of a landlord. Said shift in
approach was in favour of the landlord. In this regard he placed reliance on
the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra and Anr. Vs.
Super Max International Pvt. Ltd. and Ors. (2009) 9 SCC 772. He,
therefore, urged that in aforesaid background the order passed by the
appellate authority could not be sustained and interference was called for in
writ jurisdiction.
7]
Before considering aforesaid submissions, it may be noted that
the learned Counsel for the petitioner urged for considering the case of the
landlord on the ground of bonafide need. No submissions were made with
regard to grounds under Clause 13(3)(i), (ii) and (v) of the Rent Control
Order.
It would therefore be necessary to consider the aspect of
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tenability of the writ petition as well as the scope for interference available
under Article 227 of the Constitution of India while considering challenge to
the impugned order. In the order of remand passed by the Supreme Court of
India, this Court has been directed to decide whether the writ petition was
maintainable and whether it was a fit case for interference under Article 227
of the Constitution of India. With regard to the first issue regarding
maintainability of the writ petition, the learned counsel for the petitioner
ig
relied upon decision of the Supreme Court in Surya Dev Rai (supra). In
paragraphs 37 and 38 of aforesaid decision the Supreme Court has observed
that a writ of certiorari is directed against the acts, or proceedings of the
subordinate Court and it can issue even if the lis is between two private
parties. For holding so, the Supreme Court referred to earlier larger Bench decisions
in T. C. Basappa Vs. T. Nagappa AIR 1954 Supreme Court 440 and Province of
Bombay Vs. Khushaldas S. Advani AIR 1950 Supreme Court 222. In reply to
aforesaid submission, the learned Senior Counsel for the respondent
submitted that the proposition laid down in Surya Dev Rai (supra) that
judicial orders passed by civil Court could be examined and then corrected by
the writ Court in exercise of its power under a writ of certiorari has been referred to
a larger Bench. In the present case the order impugned is passed by the authority
empowered to adjudicate the proceedings under the Rent Control Order. Though
the view as taken in Surya Dev Rai (supra) as referred to above has been referred
to a larger Bench, till such adjudication is made said view continues to operate.
Moreover, in view of subsequent decisions of the Full Bench of this Court in
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Advani Oerlikon Ltd. (supra) and Ramchandra Dagoji Rangari through
LRs. (supra) it is clear that the Writ Petition as filed under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India is tenable.
8]
It would now be necessary to consider whether any case has been
made out for interfering under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. While
doing so it would be necessary to refer to the law laid down by the Supreme
Court in that regard:
ig
a] In State of Gujarat etc. Vs. Vakhatsinghji Vajesinghji Vaghela (dead)
his legal representatives and others AIR 1968 Supreme Court 1481, while
considering the scope of interference under Article 227 of the Constitution of
India it was held in paragraph 14 as under:
“Article 227 of the Constitution gives the
High Court the power of superintendence over all
Courts and tribunals throughout the territories in
relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. This
jurisdiction cannot be limited or referred by any Act of
the State Legislature. The supervisory jurisdiction
extends to keeping the subordinate tribunals within
the limits of their authority and to seeing that they
obey the law.”
b] In Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao Vs. Ashalata S. Guram (1986) 4
Supreme Court Cases 447 in the context of proceedings under the Bombay
Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, in paragraphs 16
and 20 it has been observed as under:
“16. It is well settled that the High Court can set aside
or ignore the findings of fact of an appropriate court if
there was no evidence to justify such a conclusion and
if no reasonable person could possibly have come to
the conclusion which the Courts below have come or
in other words a finding which was perverse in law.
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c]
This principle is well settled.
20. It is true that in exercise of jurisdiction under
Article 227 of the Constitution the High Court could
go into the question of facts or look into the evidence
if justice so requires it, if there is any misdirection in
law or a view of fact taken in the teeth of
preponderance of evidence.”
In Achutananda Baidya Vs. Prafullya Kumar Gayen And
Others (1997) 5 Supreme Court Cases 76, in paragraph 10 thereof it was
observed as under:
ig
“10. The power of superintendence of the High Court
under Article 227 of the Constitution is not confined to
administrative superintendence only but such power
includes within its sweep the power of judicial review.
The power and duty of the High Court under Article
227 is essentially to ensure that the courts and
tribunals, inferior to High Court, have done what they
were required to do. Law is sell settled by various
decisions of this Court that the High Court can
interfere under Article 227 of the Constitution in cases
of erroneous assumption or acting beyond its
jurisdiction , refusal to exercise jurisdiction, error of
law apparent on record as distinguished from a mere
mistake of law, arbitrary or capricious exercise of
authority or discretion, a patent error in procedure,
arriving at a finding which is perverse or based on no
material, or resulting in manifest injustice. As regards
finding of fact of the inferior court, the High Court
should not quash the judgment of the subordinate
court merely on the ground that its finding of fact was
erroneous but it will be open to the High Court in
exercise of the powers under Article 227 to interfere
with the finding of fact if the subordinate court came
to the conclusion without any evidence or upon
manifest misreading of the evidence thereby indulging
in improper exercise of jurisdiction or if its conclusions
are perverse.”
d] Thereafter in Koyilerian Janaki And Others Vs. Rent Controller
(Munsiff), Cannanore And Others (2000) 9 Supreme Court Cases 406,
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while considering the provisions of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent
Control) Act, in the backdrop of the position that the order of the appellate
authority was made final, in paragraph 4 of said judgment it was observed as
under:
9]
ig
“The proceedings in the present case arose under a
special Act governing the landlord and tenant
relationship and disputes. The Act does not provide
any second appeal or revision to the High Court. The
purpose behind for not providing such remedy is to
give finality to the order passed under the Act. The
power under Article 227 is exercisable where it is
found by the High Court that due to a certain grave
error an injustice has been caused to a party.”
From the aforesaid it is, therefore, clear that interference under
Article 227 of the Constitution of India is called for to keep the subordinate
authority within the limits of its authority and to see that the law of the land
is obeyed. In case there is any misdirection in law or if a conclusion is
arrived at without there being any evidence on record, then even a finding of
fact arrived at on said basis can be interfered with. The decision in
Raghunath B. Panhale (Dead) by Lrs. (supra) also lays down the same law.
It is not in dispute that conclusions of fact even if erroneous
cannot be upset unless such conclusions are found to be perverse or against
the weight of evidence on record. As held in M/s India Pipe Fitting Co.
(supra) relied upon by the learned Senior Counsel for the respondent, the
High Court cannot act as a Court of appeal in exercise of jurisdiction under
Article 227 of the Constitution. However, in the very same decision it has
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been observed in paragraph 6 that interference could be justified in an
appropriate case if it is found that the conclusion arrived at by the
subordinate authority is either perverse or against the weight of evidence.
Considering the aforesaid position of law, it is not necessary to
refer to other decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner
as regards the scope for interference under Article 227 of the Constitution of
Keeping aforesaid legal position in mind, the respective cases of
ig
10]
India.
the parties would have to be examined on the basis of material placed on
record. In the application seeking permission to issue quite notice on the
ground of bonafide need, the landlord came up with a specific case that both
his sons who were taking education intended to start some business in the
tenanted premises. While the elder son wanted to start a general store, the
younger son wanted to start restaurantcummess. It was further stated that
there were several hotels and lodges in the area and the landlord's wife was
already running a lodge. In his deposition the landlord referred to aforesaid
need. In his cross examination it was suggested to the landlord that he had
not filed any documents to indicate that he had two sons aged 27 years and
22 years respectively. He stated that he had sold two blocks about 4 to 5
years ago which blocks were admeasuring 8 X 10 ft. each.
11]
So far as tenant is concerned, in his written statement he stated
that he did not know whether the landlord had two sons. Besides general
denial, it was stated that the need of the landlord was not bonafide and
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genuine. It was stated that tenant had spent an amount of Rs.4,00,000/ in
renovating the tenanted premises. It was further stated that the landlord was
owning various other buildings that could be used for his bonafide
requirement. It was then stated that if such permission was granted, greater
hardship would be caused to the tenant.
The tenant examined himself and in his cross examination he
admitted that he had no knowledge about the family members of the
ig
landlord or about occupation of said family members. He further stated that
he was not aware whether any family members of the landlord were running
lodging and boarding house. He specifically stated that he did not know
anything about the landlord's sons. He referred to other business premises
from where his business was being run.
12]
In view of the order of remand, aforesaid evidence was examined
only by the appellate authority. The consideration of aforesaid evidence and
appreciation thereof has been done by the appellate authority in a cryptic
manner. The appellate authority held that:
a] The landlord had not filed any documents to show the education of his
sons;
b] The landlord had not filed any document to show that both sons wanted
to start their respective business;
c] one son wanting to start general stores and the other son wanting to start
restaurantcummess did not have direct match with their acquired
qualifications.
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Thereafter, in a cryptic manner, the appellate authority concluded that the
landlord had failed to prove his bonafide need. It, therefore, allowed the
appeal and held the landlord ineligible for grant of permission under Clause
13(3)(vi) of the Rent Control Order.
13]
If the evidence and cross examination of the respective parties is
considered, it is clear that while the landlord came up with a specific case
regarding need of his sons, the tenant remained content by taking the stand
ig
of denial. In his cross examination he stated that he had no knowledge either
about the landlord's family, their occupation or even about his two sons. The
bonafides of the landlord were not specifically challenged. Though a plea
was raised that the landlord had various other premises where business could
be started, there was no evidence what so ever led by the tenant in that
regard. The tenant was also not aware about the proceedings initiated
against the other tenant for seeking possession of the other tenanted
premises. This is the nature of evidence that was available on record.
14]
The appellate authority however placed unnecessary emphasis on
the fact that the landlord had not filed any document to show the education
of his sons. It further held that there were no documents filed to show that
the landlord's sons wanted to start business and further that said business
did not have direct match with the acquired qualifications. When the tenant
was not aware about the family members of the landlord or about his two
sons, it could not be said that the tenant had placed on record any material to
doubt the bonafides of the landlord. As held by the Supreme Court in Sarla
Ahuja Vs. United India Insurance Company Ltd. (1998) 8 Supreme
Court Cases 119, there is always a presumption that the requirement of the
landlord is bonafide and it is for the tenant to displace said presumption. In
the present case, except for general denial there was no material placed on
record by the tenant to doubt the landlord's bonafides.
15]
As regards absence of documents to show that the sons wanted to
start business, it is well settled that it is not necessary to have prior
experience for starting any business and the same is not relevant while
examining the bonafide need of the landlord. The learned counsel for the
petitioner has rightly relied upon the decision of the learned Single Judge in
Dinesh s/o Balkrishna Dande (supra). As regards the third reason for
rejecting the application namely that in view of the qualifications of the sons
the same did not have match with the business proposed to be started, it is to
be noted that such was not even the case of the tenant. It was not the stand
of the tenant that because both the sons were taking education they were not
entitled to run the business. The appellate authority has come to said
conclusion without there being any factual foundation for the same in the
pleadings. Moreover, as observed in Sarla Ahuja (supra), the tenant cannot
dictate the manner in which the landlord should undertake his
business/livelihood.
16]
Hence, when aforesaid conclusions recorded by the appellate
authority on the evidence available on record are examined in the light of the
law laid down by the Supreme Court that has been referred to above, it is
clear that:
a] requiring the landlord to file documents to show his sons education is a
perverse conclusion resulting from misdirection in law;
b] requiring the landlord to file documents that his sons wanted to start
business is in breach of settled legal position;
c] observations that the sons qualifications did not have direct match with the
evidence what so ever.
business proposed to be started is again a perverse finding not based on any
Thus it is clear that the appellate authority while arriving at aforesaid
conclusions disregarded the settled position of law. Findings have been
recorded without there being any evidence on record and the landlord's
bonafides have been doubted in absence of any contrary evidence in that
regard. By coming to said conclusion the appellate authority has committed
grave error thereby causing injustice to the landlord. There being manifest
misreading of evidence resulting in improper exercise of jurisdiction, a clear
case for interference under Article 227 of the Constitution of India has been
made out. Considering the evidence on record, it is clear that the landlord
had made out a case for grant of permission to issue quit notice under Clause
13(3)(vi) of the Rent Control Order. The landlord desired to settle his two
sons for doing independent business and proceedings for eviction of another
tenant had also been commenced. The business that was intended to be
started was to supplement the lodging business being done by the landlord's
wife. In absence of any contrary evidence to doubt the bonafides of the
landlord, it would be difficult to maintain the findings recorded by the
17]
appellate authority that the landlord had failed to prove his bonafide need.
The other submission made by the learned Senior Counsel as
regards examination of the matter in the light of provisions of Clause 13(8)
of the Rent Control Order is required to be examined. In the application
moved by the landlord it was specifically stated that the landlord required the
entire premises for his sons bonafide occupation. In the written statement
besides denial, there was no plea raised that the need of the landlord could
be satisfied by granting him portion of the tenanted premises. In some what
similar situation, this Court in Gopalsing Rajput (supra) had observed that in
absence of any pleadings or evidence in support thereof, it would not be
possible to permit the tenant to raise a plea regarding necessity of inquiry
under Clause 13(8) of the Rent Control Order. As found above, there was no
evidence led by the tenant even in that regard. Moreover, the premises in
question are two rooms admeasuring 22 X 33 ft. along with frontage. It is,
therefore obvious that if both the sons are to be settled in separate business
for each of them, there would hardly be any scope even otherwise to consider
whether the need of the landlord could be satisfied by being granted part of
the tenanted premises. Hence, aforesaid submission cannot be accepted.
As a result of aforesaid discussion, the petitioner is entitled to
succeed. Hence the following order is passed:
1]
The order dated 24.11.2006 passed by the Additional Collector
Nagpur, in Rent Control Appeal No. 58/A71(2)/199394 refusing to grant
2]
set aside.
permission under Clause 13(3)(vi) of the Rent Control Order is quashed and
The petitioner is granted permission to issue quit notice to the
respondents under provisions of Clause 13(3)(vi) of the Rent Control Order.
Rule is made absolute in aforesaid terms with no order as to
costs.
3]
JUDGE
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