Saturday 4 July 2015

Whether decree for specific performance of contract can be granted to plaintiff if he fails to plead and prove readiness and willingness to perform contract?



 The Apex court in the case of Raj Kishore (supra) 
has   held   that   it   is   mandatory   for   the   plaintiff   in   a   suit   for   specific 

performance to plead and prove that he was always ready and willing to 
perform his part of contract. In the facts and circumstances of the present 
case, I am more than satisfied that the Plaintiff has failed to plead and 
prove   his   continuous   readiness   and   willingness   to   perform   his   part   of 
contract. IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
           CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
SECOND APPEAL NO.296 OF 1989     

Parshram Tanaji Aher, age 30 years

versus
Dattu Kadu Aher;

  
CORAM:­ R. G. KETKAR, J

PRONOUNCED ON: 24th September, 2013


Heard Mr. S. M. Gorwadkar, learned counsel for the Appellants and 
Mr. S. K. Shinde, learned counsel for the Respondents, at length.
2
By this Appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 
1908,     (for   short   C.P
.C.),   the   original   Defendants   No.1­A   to   1­H   have 
challenged   the   judgment   and   decree   dated   5­10­1985   passed   by   the 
Learned Civil Judge Junior Division, Chandwad in Regular Civil Suit No.96 

of 1975 as also the Judgment and Decree dated 12­9­1988 passed by the 
Learned   III   Additional   District   Judge,   Nashik   in   Civil   Appeal   No.46   of 
1986.   By   these   orders,   the   courts   below   decreed   the   suit   instituted   by 
Respondent No.1­ Plaintiff for specific performance of contract dated 30­
12­1968. The parties shall, herein after be referred as per their status in 
the trial court. The facts and circumstances, giving rise to the filing of the 
Respondent No.1 (original Plaintiff) instituted the suit initially for 

present Second Appeal briefly stated, are as under:
redemption of mortgage. The controversy in this Appeal is in respect of 
land which previously was bearing CTS No.96/5 measuring 32 Gunthas 
assessed at Rs.1.69 ps. and subsequently merged in the lands of Appellants 
(Defendants   No.1A   to   1H)   and   formed   block   No.294   which   together 
measures at 1 Acre and 37 gunthas (for short 'suit land'). It was the case of 
the Plaintiff that on 21­8­1968   (exhibit 46) he had mortgaged the suit 
land to  defendant No.2  i.e. Pundalik. The document was however styled 
as a sale deed and consideration of Rs.2000/­ was shown. It is the case of 
the   Plaintiff   that   he   had   received   Rs.1500/­.   The   said   document   was 
executed by way of security for repayment of the loan. The Plaintiff needed 
Rs.1000/­   more,   so   he   demanded   Rs.1000/­   from   Defendant   No.2. 
Defendant No.2 did not have that much amount and on the contrary he 

demanded Rs.1500/­ paid to the Plaintiff under Exhibit 46. The Plaintiff 
approached   Defendant   No.1,   since   deceased   who   paid   Rs.2500/­   and 
document   dated   30­12­1968   Exhibit   45   was   executed.   Though   this 
document was styled as sale deed, the said document was executed by way 
of   security   only.   Under   that   document   possession   was   delivered   to 
Defendant No.1. At that time Defendant No.1 agreed to execute a separate 
document about re­conveyance of the suit land to the Plaintiff. Accordingly 

Defendant   No.1   executed   a   receipt   on   30­12­1968   (exhibit   40).   The 
Plaintiff issued notice on 14­11­1975 to Defendant No.1 for redemption of 
mortgage. It was alleged that defendant No.1 had executed a receipt on 
30­12­1968 and agreed to sell the suit land to the Plaintiff upon paying 
Rs.2500/­.  Defendant  No.1  gave   reply  on  2­12­1975.  On  8­12­1975  the 
Plaintiff instituted the suit for redemption of mortgage. It was alleged by 
him   that   the   sale   deed   dated   30­12­1968   was   in   fact   a   mortgage   with 
conditional   sale.   It   was   further   alleged   that   the   document   even   though 
styled as a sale deed, in reality, it was agreed between the parties that the 
Defendant   No.1  would   take  agricultural   produce   in   lieu  of  interest   and 
after return of  Rs.2500/­,  would convey the suit land to the Plaintiff.
4
The Plaintiff filed application on 17­8­1982 for amendment of the 
plaint. By that amendment the plaintiff sought specific performance of the 

contract dated 30­12­1968. By judgment and order dated 20­9­1982 the 
Trial   Court   rejected   that   application.   Aggrieved   by   that   decision,   the 
plaintiff instituted Civil Revision Application No. 714 of 1982 in this court. 
By judgment and order dated 2­2­1984 this court allowed the civil revision 
application thereby permitting the plaintiff to amend the plaint.
5
Original   Defendant   No.1   Tanaji   filed   Written   Statement   on   24­8­
1976   and   additional   written   statement   on   31­8­1984.   It   was   interalia 

contended that the transaction dated 21­8­1968 (Exhibit 46) between the 
Plaintiff and Defendant No.2 was an out and out sale and not a transaction 
of mortgage as alleged by the Plaintiff. Defendant No.1 further contended 
that   one   Babulal   had   obtained   his   blank   signatures   and   taking   undue 
advantage   of   signatures   on   blank   papers,   the   plaintiff   has   alleged   that 
Defendant   no.1   had   executed   receipt   dated   31­12­1968   (exhibit   40) 
allegedly agreeing to reconvey the suit land.
The learned Trial Court framed the necessary issues. The parties led 

oral as well as documentary evidence before the Trial Court. By Judgment 
and decree dated 5­10­1985 the Learned Trial Judge decreed the suit for 
specific performance of contract dated 30­12­198 (Exhibit 40). The Trial 
Judge held that the Plaintiff had failed to prove that the suit property was 
mortgaged with defendant no.2. He further held that the suit instituted by 

the   Plaintiff   was   within   limitation   and   was   not   barred   by   provisions   of 
Bombay Prevention of  Fragmentation and Consolidation of Holdings Act, 
1947. He further held that the Plaintiff had proved receipt dated 30­12­
1968 (exhibit 40 executed by Defendant no.1. During the pendency of the 
suit, defendant No.1­Tanaji died and Defendant Nos.1A to 1H being his 
heirs and legal representative were brought on record. Aggrieved by the 
decision of the Trial Court, Defendant Nos.1A to 1H preferred appeal no.46 

of 1986. By Judgment and decree dated 12­9­1988, the Learned District 
Judge dismissed the appeal and confirmed the decree of the Trial Court. It 
is   against   these   decisions   Defendant   Nos.1A   to   1H   have   instituted   the 
present second appeal. The second appeal was admitted on 1­8­1989 as 
involved substantial questions of law mentioned in ground nos.(a) to (e). 
The ground nos.(a) to (e) read as under:
“(a)   Whether   the   alleged   agreement   dated   30 th 
December   1968   between   the   defendant   and   the 
plaintiff is void as without consideration in view of the 
findings of the lower appellate court that the title in 
the   suit   land   had   already   passed   in   favour   of   the 
defendant   under   sale   deed   dated   21 st  August   1968 
(Exhibit 46).

December,   1968   in   respect   of   CTS   No.96/5 
admeasuring  32  gunthas  was  liable  to   be  specifically 
(b)   Whether   the   alleged   agreement   dated   30 th 
performed when on the date of the suit it had merged 
with   other   lands   and   has   become   part   of   the   Gat 
No.294 admeasuring 1 Acre and 37 gunthas and has 
lost its original identity.
ig
(c)   Whether   in   view   of   the   findings   of   the   lower 
appellate court that exhibit 46 dated 21 st August 1968 
and   Exhibit   45   dated   30th  December   1968   are 
simplicitors sale deeds and not mortgage transactions 
as   contended   by   the   plaintiff.   The   suit   filed   by   the 
plaintiff was maintainable in the present form.
(d)   Whether   the   plaintiff   was   ready   and   willing   to 
perform   his   part   of   contract   in   view   of   the   specific 
findings of the courts below that he had not deposited 
Rs.2,500/­ in the court till the date of the judgment by 
the   trial   court   on   5th  October   1985   though   he   had 
stated so in his plaint and the said statement was found 
to be false.

limitation   when   the   plea   and   relief   of   specific 
performance   was   sought   by   an   amendment   to   the 
(e) Whether the suit filed by the plaintiff was barred by 
plaint beyond the period of limitation and whether the 
amendment related back to the date of the suit.”  

In support of this appeal, Mr. Gorwadkar submitted that the courts 
below   committed   serious   error   in   decreeing   the   suit   instituted   by   the 

Plaintiff   for   specific   performance   of   contract   dated   30­12­1968   (Exhibit 
40).   In   the   first   place,   he   submitted   that   the   plaintiff   had   misused   the 
signatures of defendant no.1 that were taken on blank papers and further 
he   alleged   that   defendant   no.1   had   executed   receipt   on   30­12­1968 
(exhibit   40)   thereby   purportedly   agreed   to   reconvey   the   suit   land. 
Secondly,   he   submitted   that   in   any   case   the   courts   below   committed 
serious error in holding that suit for specific performance of contract was 
within   limitation.  He   submitted  that  initially  the   plaintiff   had  instituted 
suit only for redemption of the mortgage. The suit was instituted on 8­12­
1975 at that time, the plaintiff did not pray for specific performance of 
contract. He further filed application for amendment of plaint which was 
rejected by the trial court on 20­9­1982. By judgment and order dated 2­2­
1994 in civil revision application no.714 of 1982, this court allowed the 

civil   revision   application   thereby   permitting   the   plaintiff   to   amend   the 
plaint. He submitted that basically when the plaintiff filed application for 
amendment of plaint on 17­8­1982, the relief of specific performance itself 
was barred by limitation. He submitted that though this court permitted 
the plaintiff to amend the plaint on 2­2­1994, the amendment so allowed 
does not relate back to the date of institution of the suit namely 8­12­1975. 
In support of this submission, he relied upon the following decisions:

(i) Tarlok Singh Vs. Vijay Kumar Sabharwal, (1996) 8 SCC 367
(2001) 6 SCC 163
(ii)   Vishwambhar   &   Ors.   Vs.   Laxminarayan   (dead)   through   LRS   &   Anr, 
(iii) South Konkan Distilleries & Anr. Vs. Prabhakar Gajanan Naik & Ors.,
(2008) 14 SCC 632 
(iv) Sampath Kumar Vs. Ayyakannu & Anr., (2002) 7 SCC 559
(v) RAgu Thilak D. John Vs. S. Rayappan & Ors., (2001) 2 SCC 472
(vi) Southern Ancillaries Pvt Ltd., Vs. Southern Alloy Foundaries Pvt. Ltd., 
AIR 2003 MADRAS 416
(vii)   Sri   Gobina   Ghosh   &   Ors.   Vs.   Biswanath   Ghosh   &   Ors.,   AIR   2005 
Calcutta 359        
8
In   any   case,   Mr.   Gorwadkar   submitted   that   the   courts   below 
committed serious error in decreeing the suit instituted by the Plaintiff for 

specific performance of contract dated 30­12­1968 (Exhibit 40), when the 
plaintiff was not all along ready and willing to perform his part of contract. 
He submitted that plaintiff had neither pleaded nor proved his readiness 
and willingness to perform his part of contract as required under Section 
16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 and as per form Nos.47 and 48 of the 
1st Schedule of CPC. Though the plaintiff had issued notice on 14­11­1975 
(exhibit   86),   he   did   not   offer   to   pay   the   amount   as   per   the   alleged 

agreement dated 30­12­1968 (exhibit 40). He did not deposit any amount 
at the time of instituting the suit on 8­12­1975 nor during the pendency of 
the   suit.   The   plaintiff   also   did   not   comply   the   specific   direction   issued 
while   passing   the   decree   by   the   trial   court   for   depositing   the   balance 
consideration   on   or   before   2­12­1985.   Thus   the   plaintiff   has   not 
established   his   continuous   readiness   and   willingness   as   required   under 
section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. In support of this submission, 
he relied upon the following decisions:
(i)  Abdul Khader Rowther Vs. P
. K. Sara Bai, AIR 1990 SC 682
(ii) N.P
. Thirugnanam Vs. R. Jag Mohan Rao, AIR 1996 SC 116,
(iii) Rajkishore (dead) by LRS. Vs. Prem Singh & Ors., (2011) 1 SCC 657
9
On the other hand, Mr. Shinde supported the impugned orders.  He 
submitted   that   the   courts   below   have   concurrently   held   that   the   suit 

instituted by the plaintiff was within limitation and that the plaintiff was 
all along ready and willing to perform his part of contract. He submitted 
that since the Plaintiff has deposited the amount as per the directions of 
the   trial   court,   it   cannot   be   said   that   he   was   not   ready   and   willing   to 
perform   his   part   of   the   contract.   He   further   submitted   that   the   courts 
below   have   rightly   held   that   the   suit   for   specific   performance   was   not 
barred by limitation. In any case when this court allowed the civil revision 
application   on   2­2­1984,   this  court   did   not  keep  the   issue  of  limitation 
open. This court also did not direct that the amendment permitted by it 
shall not relate back to the date of the suit and to the extent permitted by 
it, shall be deemed to have been brought before the court on the date of  
which the application seeking amendment was filed. In other words, he 
submitted that the issue of limitation was not left open for being agitated 
by the parties. Once this court had allowed the amendment though on 2­2­
1984, it relates back to the date of the institution of the suit namely 8­12­
1975.   He   further   submitted   that   the   trial   court   decreed   the   suit.   The 
Appellate   Court   confirmed   the   decree.   The   discretion   exercised   by   the 
Appellate Court cannot be termed as arbitrary or capricious. He, therefore, 
submitted that since the appeal does not raise any question of law much 
less any substantial question of law, the same is liable to be dismissed.

I have considered the rival submissions made by the parties. I have 
also   perused   the   material   on   record.   From   the   material   on   record,   the 
(i)
following facts are emerged. 
The Plaintiff had executed sale deed in favour defendant no.2 on 21­
8­1968 (exhibit 46). Though the plaintiff alleged that it was a transaction 
of mortgage, the courts below have concurrently held that it was an out 
and out sale

(ii) Defendant no.1 purchased the suit land from defendant no.2 on 30­12­
1968 (exhibit 45). It is the case of the plaintiff that on the same day i.e. 
30­12­1968 defendant no.1 executed receipt (exhibit 40) where under he 
agreed to reconvey the suit land to the plaintiff. Defendant no.1 contended 
that   his   signatures   on   blank   papers   were   misused.   The   courts   below 
concurrently found  that  defendant no.1  had  executed receipt on   30­12­
1968 in favour of the plaintiff.
(iii)   on   14­11­1975,   the   plaintiff   issued   notice   to   defendant   no.1   for 
redemption of mortgage. It was alleged that defendant no.1 had executed 
a receipt on 30­12­1968 where under he agreed to reconvey the suit land 
to the plaintiff when he returns Rs.2500/­. Defendant no.1 gave reply on 2­
12­1975 and refused to convey the land to the plaintiff.
(iv) on 8­12­1975, the plaintiff instituted suit for redemption of mortgage. 
At that time, the plaintiff did not pray for specific performance of contract 
dated 30­12­1968.
(v) on 17­8­1982 the plaintiff filed application for amendment of the plaint 
thereby   praying   for   specific   performance   of   contract   dated   30­12­1968. 
The trial court rejected that application on 20­9­1982.
(vi)   Aggrieved   by   this   decision,   the   plaintiff   instituted   civil   revision 
The question that requires to be considered is whether the relief of 

11
application no.714 of 1982 in this Court which was allowed on 2­2­1984. 
specific   performance   of   contract   was   barred   by   limitation   or   not.   Mr. 
Gorwadkar submitted that on the date of filing application on 17­8­1982, 
the   claim   for   specific   performance   of   contract   dated   30­12­1968   was 
obviously  time  barred, as in  reply dated 2­12­1975  defendant  no.1  had 
refused to convey the suit land to the plaintiff. The time will start running 
from date of refusal on the part of defendant no.1 to perform his part of 
contract.   The   relief   for   specific   performance   ought   to   have   been   made 
within 3 years from the date of refusal by defendant no.1 i.e. to say on or 
before 1­12­1978.
As   against   this   Mr.   Shinde   submitted   that   while   allowing   civil 
revision   application   on   2­2­1984,   this   court   did   not   keep   the   issue   of 
limitation   open.     He   submitted   that   this   Court   while   permitting   the 

amendment did not direct that the amendment permitted by it shall not 
relate back to the date of the suit and to the extent permitted by it shall be 
deemed   to   have   been   brought   before   the   court   on   the   date   on   which 
application   seeking   the   amendment   was   filed.   I   find   merit   in   the 
submission of Mr. Shinde in the case of Sampath Kumar, (supra) the Apex 
Court observed in paragraph 10 as under :
“10. An amendment once incorporated relates back to 

the date of the suit. However, the doctrine of relation 
back in the context of amendment of pleadings is not 
one of universal application and in appropriate cases 
the   court   is   competent   while   permitting   an 
amendment to direct that the amendment permitted 
by it shall not relate back to the date of the suit and to 
the   extent   permitted   by   it   shall   be   deemed   to   have 
13
been brought before the court on the date on which 
the application seeking the amendment was filed.”
In the light of the above judgment, amendment once incorporated 
relates back to the date of the suit. However, the doctrine of relation back 
in   the   context   of   amendment   of   pleadings   is   not   one   of   universal 
application   and   in   appropriate   cases   the   court   is   competent,   while 

permitting an amendment to direct that the amendment permitted by it 
shall not relate back to the date of the suit and to the extent permitted by 
it shall be deemed to have been brought before the court on the date on 
which the application seeking the amendment was filed. 
13
In case of Ragu Thilak D. John Vs. S. Rayappan & Ors, (2001) 2 
Supreme   Court   Cases   472,   the   Apex   Court   observed   that   whether   the 
amendment was barred by time or not was a disputed question of fact and 

therefore that prayer for amendment could not be rejected and in such 
circumstance the issue of limitation can be made an issue in the suit itself. 
In other words, the court while allowing the application for amendment 
can permit the parties to agitate issue of limitation by keeping that issue 
open  as observed  in  the  case  of  Ragu Thilak (supra) or  as observed  in 
Sampath Kumar's case (supra) in case while permitting the amendment, 
the court directs that the amendment permitted by it shall not relate back 
to the date of the suit and shall be deemed to have been brought before the 
court on the date on which the application seeking amendment was filed, 
in such circumstance only the question of limitation can be agitated. 
14
Perusal  of  the   order  dated  2­2­1984 passed by  this Court  in  CRA 
No.714 of 1982 shows that this court neither kept the issue of limitation 
open nor directed that the amendment so allowed shall not relate back to 

the date of institution of the suit but shall be deemed to have been brought 
before the Court on the date of which application seeking the amendment 
was filed. In view thereof it is not possible to accept the submissions of Mr. 
Gorwadkar that the amendment allowed by this court will not relate back 
to the date of the suit. The reliance placed on the Judgments   (i) Tarlok 
Singh   (supra),  (ii)   Vishwambhar   (supra),   (iii)   South   Konkan   Distilleries 
(supra), (iv) Sampath Kumar (supra), (v) Ragu Thilak D. John (supra), 
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(vi) Southern Ancillaries Pvt Ltd. (supra), (vii) Sri Gobinda Ghosh (supra), 
does not advance the case of Defendant Nos.1A to 1H.
The next question that is required to be considered is whether the 
courts below were justified in holding that the plaintiff was all along ready 
and willing to perform his part of contract. Mr. Gorwadkar relied upon the 
decision of Abdul Khader Rowther (Supra) and in particular paragraphs 
10,   11   and   12   thereof.   In   that   case   the   Apex   court   held   that   even   by 
putting a liberal construction on the various statement contained in the 
plaint, it is difficult to hold that there has been even a faint attempt to 
make it to conform to the requirements prescribed in Forms 47 and 48 of 
the   First   schedule   in   the   CPC,   that   the   plaintiff   had   applied   to   the 
defendants specifically to perform the agreement and that he had been and 
is still ready and willing to specifically perform his part of the agreement. 

In   such   circumstance   equitable   relief   of   specific   performance   cannot   be 
granted. He also relied upon decision of the apex court in the case of N.P

Thirugananam (supra). In that case, the apex Court held that evidence did 
not show that the plaintiff was ever ready to perform his part of contract. 
To adjudge whether the plaintiff is ready and willing to perform his part of 
the  contract,  the  court  must  take   into  consideration   the  conduct  of  the 
plaintiff  prior  and  subsequent  to  the  filing  of   the   suit  along  with   other 

attending circumstances. He also relied upon the decision of Raj Kishore 
(Supra) and in particular paragraph 27. In this case the apex court held 
that it is mandatory for the plaintiff to assert that he/she was always ready 
and  willing  to perform  the  essential terms  of  the  contract sought to be 
enforced against the defendant. In the absence of such an averment, relief 
of specific performance cannot be granted. 

In the light of this, if the record of the present case is perused, it 
would be evident that the Plaintiff did not aver specifically that he was and 
is ready and willing to perform his part of contract namely payment of 
consideration   of   Rs.2500/­.   In   fact   perusal   of   the   averments   made   in 
paragraph 3 of the plaint, shows that it was asserted that an amount of 
Rs.2500/­ is being deposited in the Court. The appellate court in paragraph 
10 of the impugned order observed that Rs.2500/­ were not deposited in 

the court though there is a   recital about such deposit being made in the 
Court. The Plaintiff in fact did not deposit the amount in the Court. Perusal 
of the operative part of the trial court order and in particular clauses (1) 
and (3) thereof clearly shows that the plaintiff did not deposit the amount 
even during the pendency of the suit and in fact the plaintiff was directed 
to   deposit   the   amount   in   the   trial   court   on   or   before   2­12­1985.   In 
paragraph   11,   the   appellate   court   observed   that   since   the   plaintiff   has 
already deposited the amount as per the directions of the trial court, he is 
entitled to specific performance of contract.
In the light of the aforesaid discussions, I am more than satisfied that 
17
the plaintiff  was not all along ready and willing to perform  his  part of 
contract.   As   noted   earlier,   all   that   was   asserted   in   the   plaint   was   that 
amount of Rs.2500/­is being deposited in the court. Factually the plaintiff 
did not deposit the amount in the trial court. Apart from that even during 
the   pendency   of   the   suit,   the   plaintiff   did   not   deposit   the   amount   of 
Rs.2500/­ in the trial court. Perusal of clauses (1) and (3) of the operative 
part of the trial court clearly shows that the plaintiff did not deposit any 
amount in the trial court and was therefore, directed to deposit the amount 
on or before 2­12­1985. The Apex court in the case of Raj Kishore (supra) 
has   held   that   it   is   mandatory   for   the   plaintiff   in   a   suit   for   specific 

performance to plead and prove that he was always ready and willing to 
perform his part of contract. In the facts and circumstances of the present 
case, I am more than satisfied that the Plaintiff has failed to plead and 
prove   his   continuous   readiness   and   willingness   to   perform   his   part   of 
contract. 
18
Mr. Shinde, submitted that the trial court decreed the suit. Against 
that order, Defendants No.1A to 1H preferred Appeal. The Appellate Court 

dismissed the appeal. He submitted that it cannot be said that discretion 
exercised by the Appellate Court under Section 20 of the Specific Relief 
Act,   1963,   was   either   arbitrary   or   capricious.   The   Appellate   Court   has 
exercised   sound   discretion   while   confirming   the   trial   court's   decree.   He 
therefore   submitted   that   no   case   is   made   out   for   exercising   discretion 
under Section 20 of the said Act. In any case, he submitted that the courts 
below have concurrently decreed the suit and even otherwise no case is 
made out under Section 100 of CPC.
19
In case of   N.P
. Thirugnanam (supra), the Apex Court observed in 
paragraph 5 as under:
5.   It   is   settled   law   that   remedy   for   specific 
performance is an equitable remedy and is in the 
discretion of the court, which discretion requires 
to be exercised according to settled principles of 
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law and not arbitrarily as adumbrated under S.20 
Act'). Under S.20, the court is not bound to grant 
the relief just because there was valid agreement 
of   the   Specific   Relief   Act   1963   (for   short,   'the 
of  sale. Section  16(c) of  the  Act envisages that 
plaintiff   must   plead   and   prove   that   he   had 
performed or has always been ready and willing 
to   perform   the   essential   terms   of   the   contract 
which   are   to   be   performed   by   him,   other   than 
those terms the performance of which has been 
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prevented   or   waived   by   the   defendant.   The 
continuous readiness and willingness on the part 
of the plaintiff is a condition precedent to grant 
the   relief   of   specific   performance.   This 
circumstance   is   material   and   relevant   and   is 
required to be be considered by the court while 
granting   or   refusing   to   grant   the   relief.   If   the 
plaintiff fails to either aver or prove the same, he 
must   fail.   To   adjudge   whether   the   plaintiff   is 
ready   and   willing   to   perform   his   part   of   the 
contract, the court must take into consideration 
the conduct of the plaintiff prior and subsequent 
to the filing of the suit alongwith other attending 
circumstances.   
20
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Perusal   of   paragraph   5   extracted   herein   above   shows   that   the 
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remedy   for   specific   performance   is   an   equitable   remedy   and   is   in   the 
discretion   of   the   court,   which   discretion   is   required   to   be   exercised 
according to settled principles of law and not arbitrarily. Under Section 20, 
the   court   is   not   bound   to   grant   the   relief   just   because   there   was   valid 
agreement of sale. Section 16(c) of the Act envisages that plaintiff must 
plead   and   prove   that   he   had   performed   or   has   always   been   ready   and 
willing   to   perform   the   essential   terms   of   the   contract   which   are   to   be 
ig
performed by him, other than those terms the performance of which has 
been prevented or waived by the defendant. The continuous readiness and 
willingness on the part of the plaintiff is a condition precedent to grant the 
relief of specific performance.  
I have already held that the plaintiff was not all along ready and 
21
willing to perform his part of contract. In view of the Judgment of the Apex 
Court   in   the   case   of   N.P   Thirugnanam   (supra),   the   Appellate   Court 
.
committed serious error in exercising discretion under Section 20 of the 
Act. In the case of Abdul Khader Rowther (Supra) the Apex Court has held 
that a suit for specific performance has to conform to the  requirements 
prescribed in  form Nos.47 and 48 of the 1st Schedule of CPC. The Plaintiff 
must   further   plead   that   he   has   been   and   is   still   ready   and   willing   to 
specifically perform his part of the agreement. I am, therefore, satisfied 
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that   the   courts   below   could   not   have   decreed   the   suit   for   specific 
Coming to the submissions of Mr. Shinde based upon Section 100 of 
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performance of contract.
CPC, I do not find any merit in the submission of Mr. Shinde. In the case of 
Union   of   India   Vs.   Ibrahim   Uddin,   (2012)   8   SCC   148,   the   Apex   Court 
considered various Judgments. In paragraphs 68 and 70 it was observed as 
under:
ig
“68. In Jai Singh Vs. Shakuntala, this Court held that 
it is  permissible to interfere even on question of fact 
but it may be only in  “very exceptional cases and on 
extreme perversity that the authority to examine the 
same in extenso stands permissible­ it is a rarity rather 
than   a   regularity   and   thus   in   fine   it   can   be   safely 
concluded that while there is no prohibition as such, 
but   the   power   to  scrutiny   can   only   be   had   in   very 
exceptional   circumstances   and   upon   proper 
circumspection 
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70.   There   may   be  exceptional   circumstances   where 
the   High  Court   is   compelled   to   interfere, 
notwithstanding   the   limitation   imposed   by   the 
wording of Section 100 CPC. It may be necessary to 
do so for the reason that after all  the purpose of the 
establishment of courts  of justice is to render justice 
between the parties, though the High Court is bound 
to   act   with   circumspection   while   exercising   such 
jurisdiction.   In   second   appeal,   the   Court   frames   the 
substantial question of law at the time of admission of 
the appeal and the Court is required to answer all the 
said questions unless the appeal is finally decided on 
one or two of those questions or the Court comes to 
the conclusion that the questions(s) framed could not 
be   the   substantial   question(s)   of   law.   There   is   no 
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prohibition in law to frame the additional substantial 
question of law if the need so arises at the time of the 
final hearing of the appeal.”  
In   my   opinion,   the   present   case   squarely   falls   in   the   criteria   laid 
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down by the Apex Court. Though the Plaintiff was not all along ready and 
willing to perform his part of the contract, still the courts below decreed 
the suit. It is held by the Apex Court that the requirement of pleading and 
ig
mandatory requirement. 
proof of readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract is 
In   the   light   of   this   discussions,   I   am   satisfied   that   the   courts   below 
committed serious error in decreeing the suit instituted by the plaintiff for 
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specific performance of the contract.
In   the   result   Appeal   succeeds   and   the   same   is   allowed.   The 
impugned Judgment and decree dated 5­10­1985 passed by the trial court 
in Regular Civil Suit No.96 of 1975 as also the impugned Judgment and 
decree   dated   12­9­1988   passed   by   the   Learned   District   Judge,   Nasik   in 
Civil Appeal No.46 of 1986 are quashed and set aside. The suit instituted 
by the plaintiff for specific performance of contract stands dismissed with 
no order as to costs.             
     
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(R. G. KETKAR, J)
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