Remitting the matter for de novo trial
should be exercised as a last resort and should be
used sparingly when there is grave miscarriage of
justice in the light of illegality, irregularity,
incompetence or any other defect which cannot be
cured at an appellate stage. The appellate Court
should be very cautious and exercise the discretion
judiciously while remanding the matter for de novo
trial.
60.6. While examining the nature of the trial
conducted by the Trial Court for the purpose of
determining whether it was summary trial or
summons trial, the primary and predominant test
to be adopted by the appellate Court should be
whether it was only the substance of the evidence
that was recorded or whether the complete record
of the deposition of the witness in their chief
examination, cross examination and reexamination
in verbatim was faithfully placed on
record. The appellate Court has to go through each
and every minute detail of the Trial Court record
and then examine the same independently and
thoroughly to reach at a just and reasonable
conclusion.”
5. Now, let me examine the present matter in the light of
the aforesaid observations of the apex Court.
I have seen the evidence that was adduced before the
court in respect of two witnesses examined by complainant and
their crossexamination. The proceedings were completed in four
days and perusal of the crossexamination of both these witnesses
shows that the detailed crossexamination was made by counsel
for the respondent, so also affidavit on evidence was also in detail
and in fact tenor of the evidence adduced by the complainant and
the crossexamination clearly shows that the case was tried as
summons trial. In my opinion, merely because summary form was
used for explaining the particulars and evidence was recorded only
in English and not in Marathi, one cannot come to the conclusion
that the format used in recording of the evidence in English could
decide whether a case was summary trial or summons trial. The
substance of the evidence must be seen. The evidence of two
witnesses for the complainant was recorded so also crossexamination
was also done on four various dates. Perusal of the
crossexamination shows that full dress trial was held and it is
with that understanding, both the parties joined the trial even till
statement under section 313 of Cr. P. C. also recorded.
6. I have perused the record and I find that the evidence
was recorded, crossexamination was conducted and complete trial
was held. Perusal of the record nowhere shows that, in fact,
summary trial was held.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
NAGPUR BENCH AT NAGPUR
CRIMINAL WRIT PETITION NO.170/2015
Shri Sukhdeo Ganeshram Tardeja, V Shri Rajesh Dayaram S adhwani,
CORAM: A. B. CHAUDHARI, J.
DATED : 09.07.2015
Citation: 2016 ALLMR(CRI)2534
2. By the present petition, the petitioner has put to
challenge the revisional order dated 13.02.2014 passed by
Sessions Judge, Amravati by which he confirmed the order dated
20.12.2011 passed by Judicial Magistrate First Class, Court No.1,
Amravati ordering de novo trial for an offence punishable under
Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. In support of the
petition, learned counsel for the petitioner invited my attention to
the evidence, that was recorded before the trial Judge so also the
judgment that, in fact, the trial that was held was a summons trial
and not a summary trial. He submitted that complaint under
Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act was filed in the
Court on 24.06.2009. Thereafter, the evidence commenced in
July2010 and the crossexamination was conducted by counsel for
the respondent on 13.08.2010 and 15.10.2010. Another witness
was examined as CW2Satyanarayan Mohanlal Chhangani on
29.11.2010, who was crossexamined and on the same day, the
complainant closed his case. Thereafter, statement of accused was
recorded and the case was posted further. Learned counsel
submitted that the trial as well as the appellate court committed
error in not finding distinguishing features in the case at hand
while considering the judgment in Nitinbhai Shah ..vs..
Manubhai Manjibhai Panchal (2011) 9 SCC 638 and invited my
attention to another judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of
J. V. Baharuni and another ..vs.. State of Gujarat and another;
(2014) 10 SCC 494. He then submitted that the detailed crossexamination
was made and the evidence was adduced like
summons case and not as a summary trial. The courts below erred
in ordering de novo trial by applying judgment in the case of
Nitinbhai (supra).
3. Per contra, Mr. Shukla, learned counsel for respondent
no.1, submitted that the case of Nitinbhai is squarely applicable in
the instant case at hand since the Magistrate has used summary
form for explaining the particulars and evidence was recorded
only in English and not in Marathi, which shows that it was
summary trial and not summons trial. He, therefore, prayed for
dismissal of the writ petition.
4. I have heard learned counsel for the rival parties.
Perused the judgment in the case of Nitinbhai (supra) as well as
J.V.Baharuni (supra). Here, it is necessary to consider the
observations of the apex Court in J. V. Baharuni (supra) wherein
judgment in the case of Nitinbhai (supra) has also been
considered. The relevant observations are as under:
“30. In Nitinbhai we find that the entire
case was tried 'summarily' and the Magistrate who
issued process, was transferred after recording the
evidence. The succeeding Magistrate delivered the
judgment basing upon the memo filed by the
parties declaring that they had no objection to
proceed with the matter on the basis of evidence
recorded by his predecessor. Ultimately, this Court
remanded the matter to the Trial Court for de novo
trial opining that no amount of consent by the
parties can confer jurisdiction on a Court of law,
where there exists none, nor can they divest a Court
of jurisdiction which it possesses under the law.
31. Coming to the facts of the present cases,
on scrutiny of record available in SLP (Crl) No.
5623 of 2012, we found that there has been in
total 82 hearings spread over five years. Out of 82
hearings, 67 hearings were done by Jt. C.J.(J.D.)
and J.M.F.C., Veraval. The Magistrate was
transferred on 24.02.2005 and was replaced by
J.M.F.C., Veraval who heard the case for 14 more
times and delivered judgment on 15th hearing i.e.
on 12.09.2005. Thus by any stretch of
imagination, the trial which extended over five
years and was decided in over 82 hearings with
elaborate cross examination, deposition and all
trappings of regular trial cannot simply be termed
as "summary trial".
32. On perusal of record of other two cases
(SLP (Crl.) Nos. 3332 of 2012 and 734 of 2013),
we found the similar situation. The Complaint was
taken up on 20th August, 2001 and the Trial Court
decided the criminal case on 30th May, 2009
declaring the accused Appellants as innocent, after
conducting about 132 hearings. It is also evident
from the record that in SLP(Crl) No. 734 of 2013,
the criminal proceedings under the N.I. Act were
initiated in December, 1998 before the Trial Court
which came to be concluded by the judgment of the
Metropolitan Magistrate on 7th August, 2009.
Thus, during the period of about 11 years a total of
103 hearings took place and a detailed trial
procedure had been followed. Going thereby, prima
facie, it is difficult for us to accept that the case was
tried summarily.
33. Moreover, these cases were decided by
the same judge in the High Court and there seems
to be a mechanical application of Nitinbhai
without discerning the difference on facts of
Nithinbhai and the present cases. In Nitinbhai,
the case was established as being decided
'summarily' whereas in the present cases, no such
independent inquiry has been undertaken by the
High Court to arrive at a just conclusion whether
the cases were tried "summarily" or in a "regular
way".
34. Be that as it may, to satisfy ourselves
we have carefully gone through the records of the
Trial Court as well as the High Court in each
matter before us. There is no doubt, as per the
record, learned Magistrate has not specifically
mentioned that the trial was conducted as
summons case or summary case. Though in the
record of SLP(Crl) No. 734 of 2013, at some places
the word 'summary' was mentioned as regards to
the nature of proceedings of the case, having given
our anxious and thorough consideration, we found
that the word 'summary' used therein was with
reference to Chapter XXII of Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1882 and it does not relate to the
'summary trial' envisaged Under Section 143, of the
N.I. Act. Pertinently, before the Trial Court the Suit
No. 4457 of 2001 has been referred at some places
as 'Summary Suit' and at some other places it has
been referred as 'Civil Suit'. Similarly, the case
number 5294 of 1998 has been shown at some
places as Summary Case and at some other places
it was shown as Criminal Case. After a careful
examination of the record, we came to the
conclusion that the word 'summary' used at some
places was with reference to summary trials
prescribed under Code of Criminal Procedure
Needless to say that the summary trial as preferred
mode of trial in the matters related to negotiable
instruments was inserted by the Amendment Act,
2002 only w.e.f. 6th February, 2003.
35 & 36 ...
37. But where even in a case that can be
tried summarily, the Court records the evidence
elaborately and in verbatim and defence was given
full scope to crossexamine, such procedure adopted
is indicative that it was not summary procedure
and therefore, succeeding Magistrate can rely upon
the evidence on record and de novo enquiry need
not be conducted [See A. Krishna Reddy.v.State
and Anr. 1999(6) ALD 279].
38 to 56. …..
57. A de novo trial should be the last resort
and that too only when such a course becomes so
desperately indispensable. It should be limited to
the extreme exigency to avert "a failure of justice".
Any omission or even the illegality in the procedure
which does not affect the core of the case is not a
ground for ordering a de novo trial. This is because
the appellate Court has got the plenary powers to
revaluate and reappraise the evidence and to take
additional evidence on record or to direct such
additional evidence to be collected by the Trial
Court. But to replay the whole laborious exercise
after erasing the bulky records relating to the
earlier proceedings by bringing down all the
persons to the Court once again for repeating the
whole depositions would be a sheer waste of time,
energy and costs unless there is miscarriage of
justice otherwise. Hence the said course can be
resorted to when it becomes imperative for the
purpose of averting "failure of justice". The superior
Court which orders a de novo trial cannot afford to
overlook the realities and the serious impact on the
pending cases in trial courts which are crammed
with dockets, and how much that order would
inflict hardship on many innocent persons who
once took all the trouble to reach the Court and
deposed their versions in the very same case. The
reenactment of the whole labour might give the
impression to the litigant and the common man
that law is more pedantic than pragmatic. Law is
not an instrument to be used for inflicting
sufferings on the people but for the process of
justice dispensation [See State of M.P. v. Bhooraji
(2001) 7 SCC 679].
58. Thus, in summation, we are of the considered
opinion that the exercise of remitting the matter to
Trial Court for de novo trial should be done only
when the appellate Court is satisfied after thorough
scrutiny of records and then recording reason for
the same that the trial is not summons trial but
summary trial. The nonexhaustive list which may
indicate the difference between both modes of trial
is framing of charges, recording of statement Under
Section 313 of the Code, whether trial has been
done in the manner prescribed Under Sections 262
265 of Code of Criminal Procedure, how
elaborately evidence has been adduced and taken
on record, the length of trial etc. In summary trial,
the accused is summoned, his plea is recorded
Under Section 263(g) of Code of Criminal
Procedure and finding thereof is given by the
Magistrate Under Section 263(h) of Code of
Criminal Procedure of his examination.
59. ….
60 to 60.4.….
60.5 Remitting the matter for de novo trial
should be exercised as a last resort and should be
used sparingly when there is grave miscarriage of
justice in the light of illegality, irregularity,
incompetence or any other defect which cannot be
cured at an appellate stage. The appellate Court
should be very cautious and exercise the discretion
judiciously while remanding the matter for de novo
trial.
60.6. While examining the nature of the trial
conducted by the Trial Court for the purpose of
determining whether it was summary trial or
summons trial, the primary and predominant test
to be adopted by the appellate Court should be
whether it was only the substance of the evidence
that was recorded or whether the complete record
of the deposition of the witness in their chief
examination, cross examination and reexamination
in verbatim was faithfully placed on
record. The appellate Court has to go through each
and every minute detail of the Trial Court record
and then examine the same independently and
thoroughly to reach at a just and reasonable
conclusion.”
5. Now, let me examine the present matter in the light of
the aforesaid observations of the apex Court.
I have seen the evidence that was adduced before the
court in respect of two witnesses examined by complainant and
their crossexamination. The proceedings were completed in four
days and perusal of the crossexamination of both these witnesses
shows that the detailed crossexamination was made by counsel
for the respondent, so also affidavit on evidence was also in detail
and in fact tenor of the evidence adduced by the complainant and
the crossexamination clearly shows that the case was tried as
summons trial. In my opinion, merely because summary form was
used for explaining the particulars and evidence was recorded only
in English and not in Marathi, one cannot come to the conclusion
that the format used in recording of the evidence in English could
decide whether a case was summary trial or summons trial. The
substance of the evidence must be seen. The evidence of two
witnesses for the complainant was recorded so also crossexamination
was also done on four various dates. Perusal of the
crossexamination shows that full dress trial was held and it is
with that understanding, both the parties joined the trial even till
statement under section 313 of Cr. P. C. also recorded.
6. I have perused the record and I find that the evidence
was recorded, crossexamination was conducted and complete trial
was held. Perusal of the record nowhere shows that, in fact,
summary trial was held. In view of above, following order is
passed.
ORDER
(i) Criminal Writ Petition No. 170/2015 is allowed.
(ii) Rule is made absolute in terms of prayer clause (2) of
the order.
Print Page
should be exercised as a last resort and should be
used sparingly when there is grave miscarriage of
justice in the light of illegality, irregularity,
incompetence or any other defect which cannot be
cured at an appellate stage. The appellate Court
should be very cautious and exercise the discretion
judiciously while remanding the matter for de novo
trial.
60.6. While examining the nature of the trial
conducted by the Trial Court for the purpose of
determining whether it was summary trial or
summons trial, the primary and predominant test
to be adopted by the appellate Court should be
whether it was only the substance of the evidence
that was recorded or whether the complete record
of the deposition of the witness in their chief
examination, cross examination and reexamination
in verbatim was faithfully placed on
record. The appellate Court has to go through each
and every minute detail of the Trial Court record
and then examine the same independently and
thoroughly to reach at a just and reasonable
conclusion.”
5. Now, let me examine the present matter in the light of
the aforesaid observations of the apex Court.
I have seen the evidence that was adduced before the
court in respect of two witnesses examined by complainant and
their crossexamination. The proceedings were completed in four
days and perusal of the crossexamination of both these witnesses
shows that the detailed crossexamination was made by counsel
for the respondent, so also affidavit on evidence was also in detail
and in fact tenor of the evidence adduced by the complainant and
the crossexamination clearly shows that the case was tried as
summons trial. In my opinion, merely because summary form was
used for explaining the particulars and evidence was recorded only
in English and not in Marathi, one cannot come to the conclusion
that the format used in recording of the evidence in English could
decide whether a case was summary trial or summons trial. The
substance of the evidence must be seen. The evidence of two
witnesses for the complainant was recorded so also crossexamination
was also done on four various dates. Perusal of the
crossexamination shows that full dress trial was held and it is
with that understanding, both the parties joined the trial even till
statement under section 313 of Cr. P. C. also recorded.
6. I have perused the record and I find that the evidence
was recorded, crossexamination was conducted and complete trial
was held. Perusal of the record nowhere shows that, in fact,
summary trial was held.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
NAGPUR BENCH AT NAGPUR
CRIMINAL WRIT PETITION NO.170/2015
Shri Sukhdeo Ganeshram Tardeja, V Shri Rajesh Dayaram S adhwani,
CORAM: A. B. CHAUDHARI, J.
DATED : 09.07.2015
Citation: 2016 ALLMR(CRI)2534
challenge the revisional order dated 13.02.2014 passed by
Sessions Judge, Amravati by which he confirmed the order dated
20.12.2011 passed by Judicial Magistrate First Class, Court No.1,
Amravati ordering de novo trial for an offence punishable under
Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. In support of the
petition, learned counsel for the petitioner invited my attention to
the evidence, that was recorded before the trial Judge so also the
judgment that, in fact, the trial that was held was a summons trial
and not a summary trial. He submitted that complaint under
Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act was filed in the
Court on 24.06.2009. Thereafter, the evidence commenced in
July2010 and the crossexamination was conducted by counsel for
the respondent on 13.08.2010 and 15.10.2010. Another witness
was examined as CW2Satyanarayan Mohanlal Chhangani on
29.11.2010, who was crossexamined and on the same day, the
complainant closed his case. Thereafter, statement of accused was
recorded and the case was posted further. Learned counsel
submitted that the trial as well as the appellate court committed
error in not finding distinguishing features in the case at hand
while considering the judgment in Nitinbhai Shah ..vs..
Manubhai Manjibhai Panchal (2011) 9 SCC 638 and invited my
attention to another judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of
J. V. Baharuni and another ..vs.. State of Gujarat and another;
(2014) 10 SCC 494. He then submitted that the detailed crossexamination
was made and the evidence was adduced like
summons case and not as a summary trial. The courts below erred
in ordering de novo trial by applying judgment in the case of
Nitinbhai (supra).
3. Per contra, Mr. Shukla, learned counsel for respondent
no.1, submitted that the case of Nitinbhai is squarely applicable in
the instant case at hand since the Magistrate has used summary
form for explaining the particulars and evidence was recorded
only in English and not in Marathi, which shows that it was
summary trial and not summons trial. He, therefore, prayed for
dismissal of the writ petition.
4. I have heard learned counsel for the rival parties.
Perused the judgment in the case of Nitinbhai (supra) as well as
J.V.Baharuni (supra). Here, it is necessary to consider the
observations of the apex Court in J. V. Baharuni (supra) wherein
judgment in the case of Nitinbhai (supra) has also been
considered. The relevant observations are as under:
“30. In Nitinbhai we find that the entire
case was tried 'summarily' and the Magistrate who
issued process, was transferred after recording the
evidence. The succeeding Magistrate delivered the
judgment basing upon the memo filed by the
parties declaring that they had no objection to
proceed with the matter on the basis of evidence
recorded by his predecessor. Ultimately, this Court
remanded the matter to the Trial Court for de novo
trial opining that no amount of consent by the
parties can confer jurisdiction on a Court of law,
where there exists none, nor can they divest a Court
of jurisdiction which it possesses under the law.
31. Coming to the facts of the present cases,
on scrutiny of record available in SLP (Crl) No.
5623 of 2012, we found that there has been in
total 82 hearings spread over five years. Out of 82
hearings, 67 hearings were done by Jt. C.J.(J.D.)
and J.M.F.C., Veraval. The Magistrate was
transferred on 24.02.2005 and was replaced by
J.M.F.C., Veraval who heard the case for 14 more
times and delivered judgment on 15th hearing i.e.
on 12.09.2005. Thus by any stretch of
imagination, the trial which extended over five
years and was decided in over 82 hearings with
elaborate cross examination, deposition and all
trappings of regular trial cannot simply be termed
as "summary trial".
32. On perusal of record of other two cases
(SLP (Crl.) Nos. 3332 of 2012 and 734 of 2013),
we found the similar situation. The Complaint was
taken up on 20th August, 2001 and the Trial Court
decided the criminal case on 30th May, 2009
declaring the accused Appellants as innocent, after
conducting about 132 hearings. It is also evident
from the record that in SLP(Crl) No. 734 of 2013,
the criminal proceedings under the N.I. Act were
initiated in December, 1998 before the Trial Court
which came to be concluded by the judgment of the
Metropolitan Magistrate on 7th August, 2009.
Thus, during the period of about 11 years a total of
103 hearings took place and a detailed trial
procedure had been followed. Going thereby, prima
facie, it is difficult for us to accept that the case was
tried summarily.
33. Moreover, these cases were decided by
the same judge in the High Court and there seems
to be a mechanical application of Nitinbhai
without discerning the difference on facts of
Nithinbhai and the present cases. In Nitinbhai,
the case was established as being decided
'summarily' whereas in the present cases, no such
independent inquiry has been undertaken by the
High Court to arrive at a just conclusion whether
the cases were tried "summarily" or in a "regular
way".
34. Be that as it may, to satisfy ourselves
we have carefully gone through the records of the
Trial Court as well as the High Court in each
matter before us. There is no doubt, as per the
record, learned Magistrate has not specifically
mentioned that the trial was conducted as
summons case or summary case. Though in the
record of SLP(Crl) No. 734 of 2013, at some places
the word 'summary' was mentioned as regards to
the nature of proceedings of the case, having given
our anxious and thorough consideration, we found
that the word 'summary' used therein was with
reference to Chapter XXII of Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1882 and it does not relate to the
'summary trial' envisaged Under Section 143, of the
N.I. Act. Pertinently, before the Trial Court the Suit
No. 4457 of 2001 has been referred at some places
as 'Summary Suit' and at some other places it has
been referred as 'Civil Suit'. Similarly, the case
number 5294 of 1998 has been shown at some
places as Summary Case and at some other places
it was shown as Criminal Case. After a careful
examination of the record, we came to the
conclusion that the word 'summary' used at some
places was with reference to summary trials
prescribed under Code of Criminal Procedure
Needless to say that the summary trial as preferred
mode of trial in the matters related to negotiable
instruments was inserted by the Amendment Act,
2002 only w.e.f. 6th February, 2003.
35 & 36 ...
37. But where even in a case that can be
tried summarily, the Court records the evidence
elaborately and in verbatim and defence was given
full scope to crossexamine, such procedure adopted
is indicative that it was not summary procedure
and therefore, succeeding Magistrate can rely upon
the evidence on record and de novo enquiry need
not be conducted [See A. Krishna Reddy.v.State
and Anr. 1999(6) ALD 279].
38 to 56. …..
57. A de novo trial should be the last resort
and that too only when such a course becomes so
desperately indispensable. It should be limited to
the extreme exigency to avert "a failure of justice".
Any omission or even the illegality in the procedure
which does not affect the core of the case is not a
ground for ordering a de novo trial. This is because
the appellate Court has got the plenary powers to
revaluate and reappraise the evidence and to take
additional evidence on record or to direct such
additional evidence to be collected by the Trial
Court. But to replay the whole laborious exercise
after erasing the bulky records relating to the
earlier proceedings by bringing down all the
persons to the Court once again for repeating the
whole depositions would be a sheer waste of time,
energy and costs unless there is miscarriage of
justice otherwise. Hence the said course can be
resorted to when it becomes imperative for the
purpose of averting "failure of justice". The superior
Court which orders a de novo trial cannot afford to
overlook the realities and the serious impact on the
pending cases in trial courts which are crammed
with dockets, and how much that order would
inflict hardship on many innocent persons who
once took all the trouble to reach the Court and
deposed their versions in the very same case. The
reenactment of the whole labour might give the
impression to the litigant and the common man
that law is more pedantic than pragmatic. Law is
not an instrument to be used for inflicting
sufferings on the people but for the process of
justice dispensation [See State of M.P. v. Bhooraji
(2001) 7 SCC 679].
58. Thus, in summation, we are of the considered
opinion that the exercise of remitting the matter to
Trial Court for de novo trial should be done only
when the appellate Court is satisfied after thorough
scrutiny of records and then recording reason for
the same that the trial is not summons trial but
summary trial. The nonexhaustive list which may
indicate the difference between both modes of trial
is framing of charges, recording of statement Under
Section 313 of the Code, whether trial has been
done in the manner prescribed Under Sections 262
265 of Code of Criminal Procedure, how
elaborately evidence has been adduced and taken
on record, the length of trial etc. In summary trial,
the accused is summoned, his plea is recorded
Under Section 263(g) of Code of Criminal
Procedure and finding thereof is given by the
Magistrate Under Section 263(h) of Code of
Criminal Procedure of his examination.
59. ….
60 to 60.4.….
60.5 Remitting the matter for de novo trial
should be exercised as a last resort and should be
used sparingly when there is grave miscarriage of
justice in the light of illegality, irregularity,
incompetence or any other defect which cannot be
cured at an appellate stage. The appellate Court
should be very cautious and exercise the discretion
judiciously while remanding the matter for de novo
trial.
60.6. While examining the nature of the trial
conducted by the Trial Court for the purpose of
determining whether it was summary trial or
summons trial, the primary and predominant test
to be adopted by the appellate Court should be
whether it was only the substance of the evidence
that was recorded or whether the complete record
of the deposition of the witness in their chief
examination, cross examination and reexamination
in verbatim was faithfully placed on
record. The appellate Court has to go through each
and every minute detail of the Trial Court record
and then examine the same independently and
thoroughly to reach at a just and reasonable
conclusion.”
5. Now, let me examine the present matter in the light of
the aforesaid observations of the apex Court.
I have seen the evidence that was adduced before the
court in respect of two witnesses examined by complainant and
their crossexamination. The proceedings were completed in four
days and perusal of the crossexamination of both these witnesses
shows that the detailed crossexamination was made by counsel
for the respondent, so also affidavit on evidence was also in detail
and in fact tenor of the evidence adduced by the complainant and
the crossexamination clearly shows that the case was tried as
summons trial. In my opinion, merely because summary form was
used for explaining the particulars and evidence was recorded only
in English and not in Marathi, one cannot come to the conclusion
that the format used in recording of the evidence in English could
decide whether a case was summary trial or summons trial. The
substance of the evidence must be seen. The evidence of two
witnesses for the complainant was recorded so also crossexamination
was also done on four various dates. Perusal of the
crossexamination shows that full dress trial was held and it is
with that understanding, both the parties joined the trial even till
statement under section 313 of Cr. P. C. also recorded.
6. I have perused the record and I find that the evidence
was recorded, crossexamination was conducted and complete trial
was held. Perusal of the record nowhere shows that, in fact,
summary trial was held. In view of above, following order is
passed.
ORDER
(i) Criminal Writ Petition No. 170/2015 is allowed.
(ii) Rule is made absolute in terms of prayer clause (2) of
the order.
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