13. Thus, to conclude on the legal issue:
“whether the appellant herein, being the father
of the deceased, has statutory right to prefer an
appeal to the High Court against the order of
acquittal under proviso to Section 372 of Cr.P.C.
without obtaining the leave of the High Court as
required under sub-Section (3) to Section 378 of
Cr.P.C.”, this Court is of the view that the right of
questioning the correctness of the judgment and order
of acquittal by preferring an appeal to the High
Court is conferred upon the victim including the
legal heir and others, as defined under Section 2(wa)
of Cr.P.C., under proviso to Section 372, but only
after obtaining the leave of the High Court as
required under sub-Section (3) to Section 378 of
Cr.P.C. The High Court of M.P. has failed to deal
with this important legal aspect of the matter while
passing the impugned judgment and order.
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1315 OF 2015
(Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl) NO. 7954 of 2014)
SATYA PAL SINGH
VERSUS
STATE OF M.P. AND ORS.
V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.
DATED:October 6, 2015
Citation: 2015 SCCONLINE 906
2. This criminal appeal by special leave is directed
against the impugned judgment and order dated
04.03.2014 passed in Criminal Appeal No.547 of 2013
by the High Court of M.P. at Gwalior whereby the High
Court has upheld the decision of the Sessions Court,
Bhind, M.P. (the trial court) in Sessions Case No.
293/2010 by acquitting all the accused i.e.
respondent nos. 2 to 6 herein.
3. The appellant herein made a written complaint
dated 19.07.2010 regarding the death of his daughter,
Ranjana (hereinafter referred to as “the deceased”)
to the Addl. Superintendent of Police, Bhind, M.P.
The FIR was registered on 27.07.2010. The trial court
after the examination of evidence on record passed
the judgment and order dated 13.06.2013 acquitting
all the accused of the charges levelled against them
for the offences punishable under Sections 498A and
304B of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short “IPC”) and
Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 and
alternatively for the offence punishable under
Section 302 of IPC. Being aggrieved of the decision
of the trial court, the appellant approached the High
Court against the order of acquittal of respondent
nos. 2 to 6. The High Court vide its judgment and
order dated 04.03.2014 has upheld the trial court’s
decision of acquittal of all the accused persons.
The impugned judgment and order of the High Court is
challenged in this appeal before this Court
questioning its correctness.
4. Being aggrieved of the impugned judgment and
order the appellant being the legal heir of the
deceased filed an appeal before the High Court under
proviso to Section 372 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (for short “the Cr.P.C.”). The High
Court, however, has mechanically disposed of the
appeal by passing a cryptic order without examining
as to whether the leave to file an appeal filed by
the appellant as provided under sub-Section (3) to
Section 378 of Cr.P.C. can be granted or not. The
correctness of the same is questioned by the
appellant in this appeal inter alia urging various
grounds.
5. Mr. Prashant Shukla, the learned counsel on
behalf of the appellant placed strong reliance upon
the judgment rendered by Delhi High Court in Ram Phal
v. State & Ors. 221 (2015) DLT 1 wherein the Full Bench, after
interpreting the proviso to Section 372 read with
Section 2(wa) of the Cr.P.C., has held that the
father of the victim has locus standi to prefer an
appeal, being a private party coming under the
definition of victim under Section 2(wa) of the
Cr.P.C. It was contended by him that in the instant
case, the appellant, being father of the deceased,
has locus standi to file an appeal before the High
Court against the order of acquittal under proviso to
Section 372 without seeking the leave of the High
Court as required under sub-Section (3) of Section
378 of Cr.P.C. Thus, the appeal filed by the
appellant was maintainable before the High Court of
M.P. under the abovesaid provisions of Cr.P.C. He
further urged that undoubtedly, the said legal aspect
of the matter has not been dealt with by the High
Court and the appeal was decided on merits but
without examining as to whether the leave to file an
appeal by the appellant is required to be granted or
not under the above provisions of Cr.P.C.
6. The learned counsel for the appellant drew the
attention of this Court towards the decision rendered
by Delhi High Court in the case referred to supra,
wherein it has elaborately adverted to the definition
of victim as defined under Section 2(wa) of Cr.P.C.
and proviso to Section 372 of Cr.P.C. and has
examined them in the light of their legislative
history. It has also adverted to 154th Law Commission
Report of 1996 in connection with the said legal
provision of Cr.P.C. and has succinctly held that
where the victim is unable to prefer an appeal then
the appeal can be preferred by persons - such as
relatives, foster children, guardians, fiancé or
live-in partners, etc. of the victim, who are in a
position to do so in his/her behalf. He urged that in
the instant case, there is no need for the appellant,
being the father of the deceased, to seek leave of
the High Court as provided under sub-Section (3) to
Section 378 of Cr.P.C. to maintain the appeal before
it as it is his statutory right to prefer an appeal
against the order of acquittal of all accused persons
in view of proviso to Section 372 of Cr.P.C.
7. It was further urged by him that the High Court
ought to have granted the leave to the appellant to
file an appeal by the appellant as required under
sub-Section (3) of Section 378 of Cr.P.C. and
thereafter it ought to have examined and disposed of
the appeal on merits.
8. He further vehemently contended that the appeal
before the High Court was filed by the appellant
challenging the acquittal order passed by the trial
court but the High Court has concurred with the
decision of the trial court mechanically without reappreciating
the evidence on record. He further
submitted that the decision of the High Court suffers
from error in law as the High Court, being the
Appellate Court, was required to re-appreciate the
evidence on record to exercise its appellate
jurisdiction in the appeal filed by the appellant
with reference to the legal contentions urged in the
memorandum of appeal but it has failed to do so. The
High Court in a very cursory and casual manner has
held that after a perusal of evidence on record it
found no reason to interfere with the decision of the
trial court as the prosecution has failed to
establish beyond reasonable doubt that the charges
levelled against all the accused are proved and it
has dismissed the appeal by passing a cryptic order,
which amounts to non-exercise of appellate
jurisdiction properly by the High Court. Thus, thePage 7
7
impugned judgment and order of the High Court is
vitiated in law and therefore, the same is required
to be set aside by this Court. He further requested
this Court to remand the matter to the High Court for
re-appreciation of the evidence on record and pass
appropriate order on merits of the case after hearing
both the parties.
9. We have carefully examined the above mentioned
provisions of Cr.P.C. and the Full Bench decision of
Delhi High Court referred to supra upon which strong
reliance is placed by the learned counsel for the
appellant. There is no doubt that the appellant,
being the father of the deceased, has locus standi to
prefer an appeal before the High Court under proviso
to Section 372 of Cr.P.C. as he falls within the
definition of victim as defined under Section 2(wa)
of Cr.P.C. to question the correctness of the
judgment and order of acquittal passed by the trial
court in favour of respondent nos. 2 to 6 in Sessions
Case No. 293/2010.
10. The proviso to Section 372 of Cr.P.C. was amended
by Act No.5 of 2009. The said proviso confers aPage 8
8
statutory right upon the victim, as defined under
Section 2(wa) of Cr.P.C. to prefer an appeal against
an order passed by the trial court either acquitting
the accused or convicting him/her for a lesser
offence or imposing inadequate compensation. In this
regard, the Full Bench of Delhi High Court in the
case referred to supra has elaborately dealt with the
legislative history of insertion of the proviso to
Section 372 of Cr.P.C. by Act No. 5 of 2009 with
effect from 31.12.2009. The relevant provision of
Section 372 of Cr.P.C. reads thus:
“372. No appeal shall lie from any judgment or
order of a Criminal Court except as provided
for by this Code or by any other law for the
time being in force:
Provided that the victim shall have a right to
prefer an appeal against any order passed by
the Court acquitting the accused or convicting
for a lesser offence or imposing inadequate
compensation, and such appeal shall lie to the
Court to which an appeal ordinarily lies
against the order of conviction of such
Court.”
The said amendment to the provision of Section 372 of
Cr.P.C. was prompted by 154th Law Commission Report.
The said Law Commission Report has undertaken a
comprehensive review of Cr.P.C. and itsPage 9
9
recommendations were found to be very appropriate in
amending the Cr.P.C. particularly in relation to
provisions concerning arrest, custody and remand,
procedure to be followed in summons and warrantcases,
compounding of offences and special protection
in respect of women and inquiry and trial of persons
of unsound mind. Further, the Law Commission in its
report has noted the relevant aspect of the matter
namely that the victims are the worst sufferers in a
crime and they do not have much role in the Court
proceedings. They need to be given certain rights and
compensation so that there is no distortion of the
criminal justice system. The said report of the Law
Commission has also taken note of the views of the
criminologist, penologist and reformers of criminal
justice system at length and has focused on
victimology, control of victimization and protection
of the victims of crimes and the issues of
compensation to be awarded in favour of them.
Therefore, the Parliament on the basis of the
aforesaid Report of the Law Commission, which is
victim oriented in approach, has amended certain
provisions of the Cr.P.C. and in that amendment thePage 10
10
proviso to Section 372 of Cr.P.C. was added to confer
the statutory right upon the victim to prefer an
appeal before the High Court against acquittal order,
or an order convicting the accused for the lesser
offence or against the order imposing inadequate
compensation.
11. The Full Bench of the High Court of Delhi after
examining the relevant provisions under Section 2(wa)
and proviso to Section 372 of Cr.P.C., in the light
of their legislative history has held that the right
to prefer an appeal conferred upon the victim or
relatives of the victim by virtue of proviso to
Section 372 is an independent statutory right.
Therefore, it has held that there is no need for the
victim in terms of definition under Section 2(wa) of
Cr.P.C. to seek the leave of the High Court as
required under sub-Section (3) of Section 378 of
Cr.P.C. to prefer an appeal under proviso to Section
372 of Cr.P.C. The said view of the High Court is not
legally correct for the reason that the substantive
provision of Section 372 of Cr.P.C. clearly provides
that no appeal shall lie from any judgment and orderPage 11
11
of a Criminal Court except as provided for by Cr.P.C.
Further, sub-Section (3) to Section 378 of Cr.P.C.
provides that for preferring an appeal to the High
Court against an order of acquittal it is necessary
to obtain its leave. We have to refer to the rules of
interpretation of statutes to find out what is the
effect of the proviso to Section 372 of Cr.P.C., it
is well established that the proviso of a statute
must be given an interpretation limited to the
subject-matter of the enacting provision. Reliance is
placed on the decision of this Court rendered by four
Judge Bench in Dwarka Prasad v. Dwarka Das Saraf2, the
relevant para 18 of which reads thus:
“18. … A proviso must be limited to the
subject-matter of the enacting clause. It is a
settled rule of construction that a proviso
must prima facie be read and considered in
relation to the principal matter to which it is
a proviso. It is not a separate or independent
enactment. “Words are dependent on the
principal enacting words to which they are
tacked as a proviso. They cannot be read as
divorced from their context” (Thompson v.
Dibdin, 1912 AC 533). If the rule of
construction is that prima facie a proviso
should be limited in its operation to the
subject-matter of the enacting clause, the
stand we have taken is sound. To expand the
enacting clause, inflated by the proviso, sins
against the fundamental rule of construction
2
(1976) 1 SCC 128Page 12
12
that a proviso must be considered in relation
to the principal matter to which it stands as a
proviso. A proviso ordinarily is but a proviso,
although the golden rule is to read the whole
section, inclusive of the proviso, in such
manner that they mutually throw light on each
other and result in a harmonious construction.”
(emphasis laid by this Court)
12. Further, a three Judge Bench of this Court by
majority of 2:1 in the case of S. Sundaram Pillai v.
V.R. Pattabiraman3 has elaborately examined the scope
of proviso to the substantive provision of the
Section and rules of its interpretation. The relevant
paras are reproduced hereunder:
“30. Sarathi in Interpretation of Statutes at
pages 294-295 has collected the following
principles in regard to a proviso:
(a)When one finds a proviso to a section
the natural presumption is that, but
for the proviso, the enacting part of
the section would have included the
subject-matter of the proviso.
(b)A proviso must be construed with
reference to the preceding parts of the
clause to which it is appended.
(c)Where the proviso is directly
repugnant to a section, the proviso
shall stand and be held a repeal of the
section as the proviso speaks the
latter intention of the makers.
(d)Where the section is doubtful, a
proviso may be used as a guide to its
3
(1985) 1 SCC 591Page 13
13
interpretation: but when it is clear, a
proviso cannot imply the existence of
words of which there is no trace in the
section.
(e)The proviso is subordinate to the main
section.
(f)A proviso does not enlarge an
enactment except for compelling
reasons.
(g)Sometimes an unnecessary proviso is
inserted by way of abundant caution.
(h)A construction placed upon a proviso
which brings it into general harmony
with the terms of section should
prevail.
(i)When a proviso is repugnant to the
enacting part, the proviso will not
prevail over the absolute terms of a
later Act directed to be read as
supplemental to the earlier one.
(j)A proviso may sometimes contain a
substantive provision.
XXX XXX XXX
32. In Ishverlal Thakorelal Almaula v.
Motibhai Nagjibhai it was held that the main
object of a proviso is merely to qualify the
main enactment. In Madras and Southern
Mahrata Railway Co. Ltd. v. Bezwada
Municipality Lord Macmillan observed thus:
“The proper function of a proviso
is to except and deal with a case
which would otherwise fall within
the general language of the main
enactment, and its effect isPage 14
14
confined to that case.”
33. The above case was approved by this Court
in CIT v. Indo Mercantile Bank Ltd. where
Kapur, J. held that the proper function of a
proviso was merely to qualify the generality
of the main enactment by providing an
exception and taking out, as it were, from
the main enactment a portion which, but for
the proviso, would fall within the main
enactment. In Shah Bhojraj Kuverji Oil Mills
and Ginning Factory v. Subbash Chandra Yograj
Sinha Hidayatullah, J., as he then was, very
aptly and succinctly indicated the parameters
of a proviso thus:
“As a general rule, a proviso is
added to an enactment to qualify
or create an exception to what is
in the enactment, and ordinarily,
a proviso is not interpreted as
stating a general rule.”
XXX XXX XXX
36. While interpreting a proviso care must be
taken that it is used to remove special cases
from the general enactment and provide for
them separately.
37. In short, generally speaking, a proviso
is intended to limit the enacted provision so
as to except something which would have
otherwise been within it or in some measure
to modify the enacting clause. Sometimes a
proviso may be embedded in the main provision
and becomes an integral part of it so as to
amount to a substantive provision itself.”
(emphasis supplied)
Thus, from a reading of the abovesaid legal position
laid down by this Court in the cases referred to
supra, it is abundantly clear that the proviso to
Section 372 of Cr.P.C. must be read along with its
main enactment i.e., Section 372 itself and together
with sub-Section (3) to Section 378 of Cr.P.C.
otherwise the substantive provision of Section 372 of
Cr.P.C. will be rendered nugatory, as it clearly
states that no appeal shall lie from any judgment or
order of a Criminal Court except as provided by
Cr.P.C.
13. Thus, to conclude on the legal issue:
“whether the appellant herein, being the father
of the deceased, has statutory right to prefer an
appeal to the High Court against the order of
acquittal under proviso to Section 372 of Cr.P.C.
without obtaining the leave of the High Court as
required under sub-Section (3) to Section 378 of
Cr.P.C.”, this Court is of the view that the right of
questioning the correctness of the judgment and order
of acquittal by preferring an appeal to the High
Court is conferred upon the victim including the
legal heir and others, as defined under Section 2(wa)
of Cr.P.C., under proviso to Section 372, but only
after obtaining the leave of the High Court as
required under sub-Section (3) to Section 378 of
Cr.P.C. The High Court of M.P. has failed to deal
with this important legal aspect of the matter while
passing the impugned judgment and order.
14. Adverting to another contention of the learned
counsel on behalf of the appellant regarding the
failure on the part of the High Court to reappreciate
the evidence it is clear from a perusal of
the impugned judgment and order passed by the High
Court that it has dealt with the appeal in a very
cursory and casual manner, without adverting to the
legal contentions and evidence on record. The High
Court in a very mechanical way has stated that after
a perusal of the evidence on record it found no
reason to interfere with the decision of the trial
court as the prosecution has failed to establish the
charges levelled against the accused beyond
reasonable doubt and it has dismissed the appeal by
passing a cryptic order. This Court is of the view
that the High Court, being the Appellate Court, has
to exercise its appellate jurisdiction keeping in
view the serious nature of the charges levelled
against the accused. The High Court has failed to
exercise its appellate jurisdiction properly in the
appeal filed by the appellant against the judgment
and order of acquittal passed by the trial court.
15. Hence, the impugned judgment and order of the
High Court is not sustainable in law and the same is
liable to be set aside by this Court and the case is
required to be remanded to the High Court to consider
for grant of leave to file an appeal by the appellant
as required under sub-Section (3) to Section 378 of
Cr.P.C. and thereafter proceed in the matter
16. For the reasons stated supra, this appeal is
allowed by setting aside the impugned judgment and
order of the High Court. The case is remanded to the
High Court to hear the appellant with regard to grant
of leave to file an appeal as the appellant is legal
heir of the victim as defined under Section 2(wa) of
Cr.P.C. and dispose of the appeal in accordance with
law in the light of observations made in this order
as expeditiously as possible.
…………………………………………………………J.
[T.S. THAKUR]
…………………………………………………………J.
[V. GOPALA GOWDA]
New Delhi,
October 6, 2015
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