Saturday 12 November 2016

Basic principles when court should permit impleadment of transferee pendents lite in suit for specific performance of contract

 Taking upon  the conspectus of the  view  taken by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the earlier judgments, in the   case of
Vidur Impex  & Traders Pvt.Ltd.  vs.   Tosh  Apartments Pvt.Ltd.
And others : (2012) 8 SCC 384 finally in paragraph 41, the Apex
Court  laid down the following principles:
“41. Though there is   apparent   conflict   in
the   observations   made   in   some   of   the
aforementioned   judgments,   the   broad   principles
which should  govern disposal of an application for
impleadment  are :

41.1 The   court   can,     at   any   stage   of   the
proceedings, either on an application made by the
parties or otherwise, direct   impleadment of any
person as party,  who ought to have been joined   as
plaintiff  or defendant or whose presence before the
court   is     necessary   for   effective       and   complete
adjudication  of the issues involved in the suit.
41.2 A   necessary  party  is  the person  who
ought to be joined as party to the suit and in whose
absence   an effective decree   cannot be passed by
the court.
41.3 A   proper   party   is     a   person   whose
presence   would   enable   the   court   to   completely,
effectively and properly adjudicate upon all matters
and   issues,   though   he   may     not   be   a   person   in
favour  of or against whom a decree is to be made.
41.4 If a person is not found to be  a proper
or   necessary   party,   the   court   does   not   have   the
jurisdiction to order his impleadment   against the
wishes  of the plaintiff.

41.5 In a  suit  for   specific performance,
the court can order impleadment   of a purchaser
whose   conduct   is   above   board,   and   who   files
application   for   being joined   as   party within
reasonable time of his acquiring knowledge about
the pending litigation. (emphasis supplied)
41.6 However,   if the applicant is guilty of
contumacious     conduct     or is     beneficiary   of a
clandestine   transaction or a transaction made   by
the owner   of the suit property   in violation of the
restraint   order   passed   by   the   court   or   the
application is unduly  delayed    then the court will
be   fully     justified   in   declining   the   prayer   for
impleadment.”
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
 BENCH AT NAGPUR 

WRIT PETITION NO: 5541 /2013 
 Shrikrushna   Narayan  Tupkari Mahadeo   s/o Bansilal  Dahale

CORAM:   A.B.CHAUDHARI, J.
DATED  :   27th February,  2014 
Citation:2014 (4) MHLJ 393

1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith, with the consent
of the rival parties.
2. By means of  present petition, the  petitioner has put to
challenge  the order  dated 19.5.2013 passed by learned District
Judge­2,   Akola     (below   Exh.   23)   in   Regular   Civil   Appeal   No.
31/2013,   by which the   said Application (Exh.23)   filed by the
present petitioner,  was  rejected.
3. In support of the Writ Petition Mr.A.S.Mehadia, learned
counsel for the petitioner challenged the impugned order on the
ground   that   the   petitioner   is   a  bona   fide  purchaser   for   value
without notice to the suit  property  and he came to know  about
pendency   of   the   Appeal   against   the   judgment   and   decree   for
specific performance of contract that  was passed by the  learned
trial Judge in RCS No. 388/2012 and, therefore, in order to save
his interest, filed   Application (Exh.23)   in the pending Appeal.
The   lower   Appellate   Court   rejected   the   Application   (Exh.23)

only on the  ground that the petitioner is  a  subsequent purchaser
and is a stranger to the litigation and in view of Section 52 of the
Transfer of  Property Act (henceforth referred to  as “ the T.P. Act”),
as per the doctrine of lis pendens,  the  decree is binding on him.
As such, he cannot be allowed to participate in the proceedings in
Appeal since he is neither  a necessary party nor  a proper party.
According   to   Mr.Mehadia,   the   petitioner     was   cheated   by
respondent no.2  and  he would be losing his hard­earned income
with   which   he   purchased   the     suit   property,   he   having     no
knowledge  about the  suit or the decree that  was passed, which is
ultimately   challenged   before   the   lower   Appellate   Court.   He
submitted   that   the   petitioner   being   a   person   who   has   been
deceived,   cannot be denied the entry from the doors of the Court
in order that the  petitioner can put up his case before the lower
Appellate Court and  show his bona fides  and the manner in which
he was deceived  and also  may get some relief  if the Court finds
accordingly.     But then, according to him, closing the doors of
justice to him would be  doing  severe injustice to him and also
will   give   rise   of   multifariousness   of   litigation.     He,   therefore,

prayed for allowing Application  (Exh. 23).
4. Per contra,   Mr.U.J. Deshpande, learned counsel for the
respondent no.1   argued that his client holds a   decree in his
favour for specific performance of contract in respect of the  earlier
contract with the respondent no.2   that   was eventually   passed
without contest  from the respondent  no.2  and he is entitled to
take advantage   of the decree passed by the competent court of
law in his favour.  The petitioner,  according to  Mr.Deshpande, is
a mere  stranger.      His transaction, if any,  is hit by  doctrine of lis
pendens  contemplated under Section 52 of the T.P. Act  He relied
on the decisions reported in 2013 (2) Civil L.J. 503 (Vidur Impex
vs.  Tosh  Apartmentrs   & others);    AIR 2005   SC 2813 (1)
Kasturi   vs. Iyyamperumal and others;  and argued that it is
consistently held that  such a person is not  a necessary party to
the suit or in the Appeal. He,therefore, prayed for dismissal of the
Petition. 
5. Mr. B.N.Mohta, learned counsel appearing on behalf of
respondent no.2 supported the impugned order.

6. Upon hearing  the learned counsel for  the rival parties
and upon perusal of the impugned order, so also   the various
judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court,  I think  it will be proper
to state  few relevant  facts  in this  case.
7. The     respondent   no.1­Mahadeo     filed   the   Suit     for
specific   performance   of   contract     against   the   respondent   no.2
­Smt. Priyawanda   in respect of the suit property namely,  a house
at Emerald Colony,  Geetanagar,   Akola  vide Special Civil Suit No.
170/2010  (new RCS No. 388/2012).  The suit was filed on the
ground that  the respondent no.2 had entered into an agreement
of   sale   with   respondent   no.1   on   16.02.2010   for   a   total
consideration  of Rs. 4,25,000/­ and that the sale deed would be
completed by 16.05.2010.  The said suit proceeded and ultimately
a decree came to be passed on 11.2.2013  in faovur of  respondent
no.1     and against the respondent no.2. It appears that the suit
was   not   contested   by   respondent     no.2.   The   respondent   no.2
approached   the   petitioner   and     agreed   to   sell   the   same   suit
property   to the petitioner for   a   total sum of Rs.   9,00,000/­

with a condition that  the petitioner should clear the outstanding
loan amount from Vidarbha Premier  Housing Cooperative Society.
The petitioner agreed   and   accordingly   he cleared all the dues
and obtained sale  deed  from the  respondent no.2  on 26.2.2013.
The   Respondent no.2   preferred   an Appeal before the lower
Appellate Court  vide R.C.A. No.31/2013.   In the  said  Appeal,
the present petitioner filed Application (Exh.23)     for  addition of
party under Order  1 Rule 10  of the Civil Procedure Code on the
ground that he  was not aware about the suit  that   was filed and
decree that  was passed and he  almost paid the double the  price
than that of  respondent no.1  and  got the sale  deed in his favour,
while  there was  no sale  deed in favour of the respondent no.1
though there  was decree passed on 11.02.2013 in his  favour.  The
petitioner,   therefore,   submitted   that   he   was   deceived     by   the
respondent   no.2 and he being a  bona fide  purchaser for value
without any notice, was entitled to be added   as  a party to the
Appeal so that his  grievance can also be  taken into consideration
while  deciding the Appeal.

8. The   lower Appellate Court   considered   plethora of
judgments   and   eventually     found   that   the   petitioner   was   a
stranger and in view of the doctrine of  lis pendens,   he  was not
required to be  added  as a party to the Suit since as per Section 52
of the T.P. Act, the  decree would be binding on him. The petitioner
approached the Court at a very belated stage  i.e. after passing of
the judgment and decree and the right of the original plaintiff/
respondent   no.1 has been confirmed by passing a decree in his
favour.   According   to   the   Court,   the   petitioner   is     neither     a
necessary party nor  a proper party.
9. In my opinion, the above facts will have to be taken
into consideration to find out whether the petitioner is a necessary
or property party or not.  In  Ramesh Kundanmal  vs.   Municipal
Corporation   of   Greater   Bombay   :   (1992)   2   SCC   524    in
Paragraph 6,   the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed thus,
“6.......................A necessary party is one without
whom no order can be  made effectively. A proper
party is one in whose absence an effective  order
can be made but  whose presence is necessary for

a   complete   and   final   decision   on   the   question
involved in the proceeding. The addition of parties
is generally not a question of initial jurisdiction of
the Court but  of  a judicial discretion which has to
be   exercised     in   view   of     all   the   facts   and
circumstances of  a particular  case.”
In   Anilkumar  Singh vs. Shivnath Mishra (1995) 3
SCC 147,    in paragraph 7 the Hon’ble  Supreme Court observed
thus,
“7.  By  operation of  above  quoted rule  though
the Court may  have power to  strike out the name
of a party improperly joined  or add  a party either
on   application   or   without   application   of   either
party, but the condition precedent is that the Court
must be satisfied that the presence of the party to
be added, would be necessary in order to enable
the Court to effectually  and completely  adjudicate
upon and settle all questions involved in the suit.
To bring   a person   as party­defendant is not     a
substantive   right but one of procedure and the
Court has discretion in its proper   exercise. The
object   of the rule is   to bring on record and the
persons who are parties to the dispute relating to

the   subject­matter   so   that     the   dispute   may   be
determined   in their presence   at the same time
without any protection, inconvenience and to avoid
multiplicity of proceedings.”
In  Mumbai   International   Airport   (P)   Ltd.       vs.
Regency  Convention Centre: (2010) 7 SCC 417,   in paragraph
15,  the  Hon’ble Supreme Court observed thus, 
“15....................A   ‘proper   party’     is   a   party   who,
though   not a necessary party, is a person whose
presence  would    enable  the  Court  to   completely,
effectively   and   adequately     adjudicate   upon   all
matter sin dispute in the suit, though he need not
be   a person in favour of   or   against whom the
decree is made.”
It also observed in paragraph 22  as under :­
“ 22.......................The said sub­rule   is not about
the  right    of a non­party to   be impleaded   as a
party, but  about the judicial discretion of the Court

to   strike   out   or   add   parties   at   any   stage   of   a
proceeding. The discretion  under the sub­rule  can
be exercised either suo motu or on the application of
the plaintiff or the defendant, or on an application
of a person who is not a party to the suit.”
The   three Judges’ judgment in the  case of   Kasturi
vs. Iyyamperumal, (2005) 6   SCC 733,     the Apex Court in
paragraph 7 has observed thus;
“7. In our view, a   bare reading   of this
provision, namely, second part of Order  1 Rule  10
sub­rule (2) CPC     would clearly show that the
necessary parties in  a suit for specific performance
of a contract for sale are the parties to the contract
or if they are dead, their legal representatives  as
also a person who had purchased the contracted
property from the vendor. In equity as well as  in
law,   the   contract   constitutes   rights   and   also
regulates the liabilities of the parties. A purchaser
is a necessary party as he would be affected if he
had     purchased     with   or   without   notice   of   the
contract, but a person who claims adversely  to the

claim of   a vendor is, however, not a necessary
party.   From the above, it is now clear   that two
tests     are   to   be   satisfied     for   determining   the
question who is  a necessary party.  Tests  are – (1)
there must be a right to  some relief against such
party in  respect of the controversies  involved in
the   proceedings; (2)   no effective decree can be
passed in the absence of such party.”
In Amit Kumar   Shaw vs.  Farida Khatoon :(2005)
11 SCC 403,  two judges  of the  Hon’ble Surpeme Court in para
16  observed thus,
“16. The doctrine of lis pendense applies     only
where the lis is pending before   a Court. Further
pending the suit,  the transferee   is not entitled  as
of right to be made a party to the suit, though the
Court has   a discretion to make him   a party. But
the   transferee pendente lite can be added   as a
proper party if his interest in the subject­matter of
the suit is substantial and not just peripheral.   A
transferee   pendente   lite       to   the   extent   he   has
acquired   interest   from   the   defendant   is     vitally
interested in the litigation, where the transfer is of
the   entire   interest   of   the     defendant;   the   latter
::: Downloaded on - 12/11/2016 12:32:53 :::Bombay High Court
wp.5541.13
12
having no  more interest in the property may  not
properly defend the suit. He may  collude  with the
plaintiff. Hence, though the plaintiff is under no
obligation to make a lis pendens  transferee a party,
under Order XXII, Rule   10   an alienee   pendente
lite may be joined  as  party.   As already noticed,
the Court has discretion in the matter which must
be   judicially     exercised   and   an   alienee   would
ordinarily   be joined   as a party to enable him to
protect his interests.”
10. Taking upon  the conspectus of the  view  taken by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the earlier judgments, in the   case of
Vidur Impex  & Traders Pvt.Ltd.  vs.   Tosh  Apartments Pvt.Ltd.
And others : (2012) 8 SCC 384 finally in paragraph 41, the Apex
Court  laid down the following principles:
“41. Though there is   apparent   conflict   in
the   observations   made   in   some   of   the
aforementioned   judgments,   the   broad   principles
which should  govern disposal of an application for
impleadment  are :

41.1 The   court   can,     at   any   stage   of   the
proceedings, either on an application made by the
parties or otherwise, direct   impleadment of any
person as party,  who ought to have been joined   as
plaintiff  or defendant or whose presence before the
court   is     necessary   for   effective       and   complete
adjudication  of the issues involved in the suit.
41.2 A   necessary  party  is  the person  who
ought to be joined as party to the suit and in whose
absence   an effective decree   cannot be passed by
the court.
41.3 A   proper   party   is     a   person   whose
presence   would   enable   the   court   to   completely,
effectively and properly adjudicate upon all matters
and   issues,   though   he   may     not   be   a   person   in
favour  of or against whom a decree is to be made.
41.4 If a person is not found to be  a proper
or   necessary   party,   the   court   does   not   have   the
jurisdiction to order his impleadment   against the
wishes  of the plaintiff.

41.5 In a  suit  for   specific performance,
the court can order impleadment   of a purchaser
whose   conduct   is   above   board,   and   who   files
application   for   being joined   as   party within
reasonable time of his acquiring knowledge about
the pending litigation. (emphasis supplied)
41.6 However,   if the applicant is guilty of
contumacious     conduct     or is     beneficiary   of a
clandestine   transaction or a transaction made   by
the owner   of the suit property   in violation of the
restraint   order   passed   by   the   court   or   the
application is unduly  delayed    then the court will
be   fully     justified   in   declining   the   prayer   for
impleadment.”
11. Upon   perusal     of   paragraph     41   of   the     aforesaid
judgment   of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in my  view, there is  no
straight­jacket formula   in respect of such cases  whether to allow
or disallow a subsequent purchaser on   record of the suit     or
appeal as necessary  or proper party to the suit.   In the light of the
dictum   laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the suit for

specific performance of  contract  for which  I have  supplied the
emphasis  above,  and in the light of the  facts of the present  case,
in my  opinion, the petitioner is a person who was clearly deceived
by respondent   no.2 by   contracting   with him   merely because
the  respondent no.2  was getting   double the price   that  was
agreed   with the original plaintiff or   respondent no.1 hereinMahadeo.
The petitioner  prima facie  did not   have     knowledge
when the sale deed   was   executed in his favour, either of the
pendency  of the suit in the trial Court or of passing of the decree
in favour of  respondent no.1 but  was  caught  in a  trap  laid by
the  respondent  no. 2 who accepted the total consideration and
executed   sale   deed   in   his   favour   on   26.02.2013.     As   per   the
doctrine of  lis pendense  under Section 52 of the T.P. Act the sale
deed in favour of the petitioner  does not automatically  become
void  or illegal but the decree passed in the lis may be binding on
the petitioner.   But then the rights of the person like the petitioner
who stood deceived,   can  certainly be worked out  by the Court
ultimately by passing the decree instead of asking such person to
go  and  to file another suit.     In my opinion,   that  would also

save     the   multiplicity     of   litigation   or   an   avoidable     second
litigation. As a matter of fact, such a person like the petitioner in
that  event, would be able to   put up his  case for  a bona fide
purchaser for value   without any notice or knowledge     and of
deception practised  on him.    It is not that Section 52 of the T.P.
Act closes  the doors  of justice to such a person in the litigation
merely   because   he   came   to   know     late   about   passing   of   the
decree,  of  pendency of the suit or the Appeal, as the  case may
be. In the  backdrop of the  above­referred facts   in the instant
case and   in the light of the observations made by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court  as  quoted by me above,  I think  the petitioner
should   have   been   allowed   by   the   lower   Appellate   Court   to
participate in the proceedings of Appeal which is pending before it
instead of  driving him out of the Court.
12. There is a  serious omission in the relevant legislation
for the last several years due to which  persons like the petitioner
have been suffering hardship and misery and   high risks in the
property  transactions in the country.   It is   a matter of anxiety

that   no   corrective   step   has   yet   been   taken   by   the   legislature
though the issue   very much concerns the people in the entire
country.    A little care was taken by  Bombay Act No.14/1939 by
providing  for  Bombay Amendment to Section 52,   but then the
said amendment of the  requirement by amended provision  has
not been made applicable to the areas other than only the Greater
Bombay in the State of Maharashtra. It is, therefore, strange   that
in the State of Maharashtra itself, the said amendment of   1939
which is beneficial of the people   at large in the State,   has not
been made  applicable in the entire State, except  Greater Bombay
till the next date. It is in the above background,  the Apex Court in
the year 2010   while rendering   decision in the   case of   T.G.
Ashok Kumar  vs. Govindammal and another  : (2010) 14 SCC
370,   made a  very significant suggestion to the law­makers  but
even then no corrective steps have been yet  taken   by either of
the Legislature. It would be   appropriate to quote the relevant
paragraphs  from the said judgment :
“ A  related  suggestion to the law­makers:
19. It is necessary  to refer to  the hardship,
loss, anxiety and unnecessary  litigation caused  on

account   of   the   absence   of     a   mechanism     for
prospective   purchasers   to   verify   whether   a
property is subject to any pending suit or  a decree
or   attachment.   At   present,   a   prospective
purchaser can easily find out   about any  existing
encumbrance over a propertty either by inspection
of   the   registration   registers   or   by   securing   a
certificate     relating   to   encumbrances   (that   is,
copies of entries in  the registration registers) from
the jurisdictional   Sub­Registrar  under Section 57
of the Registration Act, 1908. But  a   prospective
purchaser   has   no   way   of   ascertaining   whether
there is any suit  or  proceeding  pending in respect
of the property, if  the person offering the  property
for   sale   does   not   disclose   it   or   deliberately
suppresses   the   information.   As   a   result,       after
parting with  the consideration (which is many  a
time the lifetime savings),  the purchaser gets   the
shock  of his life  when he  comes to know that the
property purchased by him  is subject to litigation,
and     that   it   may   drag     on   for   decades     and
ultimately   deny him title to the property.     The
pendente lite purchaser will have to wait for the
litigation to come to an   end or he may have to
take   over   the   responsibility   of   conducting   the

litigation if the transferor  loses  interest after the
sale.   The purchaser may also face   objections to
his   being   impleaded   as   a   party   to   the   pending
litigation on the ground   that being  a lis pendense
purchaser,  he is not a necessary a party.   All  these
inconveniences, risks, hardships and misery could
be avoided and the  property litigations could  be
reduced    to a considerable extent, if there is some
satisfactory   and   reliable   method   by   which   a
prospective purchaser can   ascertain whether any
suit is pending (or whether  the property is subject
to   any decree    or attachment) before  he decides
to purchase the property.
20. It is   of some interest that a solution
has been found   to this problem in the State of
Maharashtra by  an appropriate  local amendment
to Section 52  of the Act, by Bombay Act  14  of
1939. Section 52, as applicable   in Maharashtra
and Gujarat, reads thus ( the amendment is shown
in Italics):
52.  Transfer   of   property     pending   suit
relating thereto: (1) During   the pendency
in any   court having authority     within the
limits of India excluding  the State of Jammu

and Kashmir   or established   beyond such
limits by the Central Government  of any suit
or proceeding which is not   collusive   and
in which any right  to immovable property is
directly and   specifically in question,  if   a
notice   of     the   pendency     of   such   suit     or
proceeding is registered  under Section 18  of
the   Indian   Registration   Act,   1908,   the
property     after   the   notice   is     so   registered
cannot   be   transferred   or   otherwise   dealt
with by any party to the suit or proceeding
so as to affect the  rights  of any other party
thereto   under any decree   or order which
may   be   made   therein,   except   under   the
authority   of the court  and on such terms as
it may impose.
(2) Every   notice of pendency   of a suit or
proceeding referred to in sub­section (1) shall
contain the following particulars, namely;
(a) the name  and  address of the owner of
immovable property or   other person   whose
right     to   the   immovable   property     is   in
question;
(b) the   description   of   the   immovable
property,the right to  which is in question;

(c) the   court     in   which   the   suit   or
proceeding is pending;
(d) the nature   and title   of the suit   or
proceeding; and 
(e) the date on which the suit or proceeding
was instituted.”
(emphasis supplied)
21. We  hope that the Law Commission and
Parliament considers such     amendment or other
suitable amendment to cover the existing  void in
title     verification   or   due   diligence     procedures.
Provision   can     also   be   made   for     compulsory
registration of such   notice sin respect of decrees
and   in   regard   to   attachments     of   immovable
properties.
22. We may also  refer  to another related
area   where   registration   should   be   made
compulsory   to   reduce   property   litigation.   At
present in most of the States, agreements to sell
are   not compulsorily  registrable as they do not
involve transfer of any right, title  or interest in an
immovable   property.   Unscrupulous     property
owners   enter into agreements of sale and take

huge  earnest money  deposits/ advances, and then
sell the property  to others thereby  plunging   the
original   agreement­holder   and   the   subsequent
purchaser   into   litigation.   Registration   of
agreements   of sale will reduce such litigation. It
will also  assist in putting  an end to the prevalent
practice   of   entering   into     agreements   of   sale
showing     the   real   consideration   and   then
registering the sale deed for only  a part of the real
consideration.
23. If   all     agreements     of   sale     are
compulsorily   registered, that will go  a  long way
to discourage   generation and circulation of black
money   in   real   estate   matters,   as   also
undervaluation   of   documents   for   purposes   of
stamp duty.  It  will also discourage   the growth of
land mafia     and musclemen   who dominate the
real estate scene in various parts of the country.
Prevention   of     a   malaise,   is   always   better   than
allowing  a malaise to develop  and then trying to
cure it.”
CONCLUSION:

13. In the above circumstances, the anxiety  expressed by
the Apex Court   as above,   ought to be taken care of   by the
Parliament   as   well   as   State   Legislature.   The   State   Legislature
ought to extend the said amendment  of  Bombay Act No.14/1939
to the entire State of Maharashtra rather  than  resting it only to
Greater   Bombay.   Except   saying   this,   this   Court     cannot     say
anything more.
14. Turning back to the  present litigation having  recorded
the conclusions by me  as above, the following order will have to
be  passed:­
ORDER
i) Writ Petition No.5541/2013 is allowed.
ii) The impugned  order    dated    19.05.2013 (below Exh.23)
passed by learned District Judge­2, Akola  in  R.C.A. No.31/2013
is set aside.
iii) The  Application (Exh. 23)  filed by the petitioner is allowed.
The petitioner be  added  as a party to the Appeal in R.C.A. No.
31/2013.   The amendment shall be carried out within four weeks.

The Appeal shall be heard thereafter. 
iv) No order as to costs.
v) The Registrar  of this Court   to send copy of this judgment to
the Ministry of   Law & Justice, Shastri Bhawan, New Delhi and
Chief Secretary, Maharashtra State,  Mantralaya, Mumbai­32,  for
information and  necessary action.

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