On a complete evaluation of the Workmen's
Compensation Act, since re-christened as "Employees
Compensation Act, 1923", we see that the liability to pay
compensation is statutory. Section 3 onwards in Chapter II of
that Act would show that the liability that arises is fixed
statutorily. It runs from the sufferance of the incident that
generates the right in the employee or workman to
compensation. Hence, the employer has a statutory liability to
deposit amounts which he admits as compensation. Similarly,
even if there is any settlement of claims to the extent
permitted under that Act, such agreements can work only with
the seal of approval of the Commissioner. The liability to pay
interest would start to run from the non-performance and
non-discharge of the obligation to pay the compensation. That
liability being a statutory one under Section 3, it would run
from the date of the incident. May be, in exceptionally
exceptional cases where there is grave and enormous delay in
making a demand for compensation, the Courts may take a
different view; of course, without ignoring the fact that the
legislation is meant to provide support to a socially and
economically challenged and marginalized sector of the
society. With this, we follow the judgment in M.F.A.No.59 of
2011 and hold that the Commissioner was justified in granting
interest from the date of the incident.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT:
MR.JUSTICE THOTTATHIL B.RADHAKRISHNAN
&
MR.JUSTICE K.VINOD CHANDRAN
12TH DAY OF JUNE 2012
M.F.A.(W.C.Act) No.56 of 2008 (F)
THE MANAGER, LETCHMI ESTATE,
Vs
M.MURUGAN 12159,
This appeal is by the employer. Under challenge is
an order of the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner.
2. The workman, Murugan, sustained injury to his
left index finger while operating a vibrating machine. The
Chief Medical Officer of the employer assessed the disability
at 3%. The Medical Board of the Idukki District issued Exhibit
A1 certificate, assessing the permanent physical disability
due to the injury at 10%. The workman gave evidence as
A.W.1. His testimony was corroborated by A.W.2. There is no
contra evidence by the management. The monthly earnings
of the workman was proved. The Commissioner took it as
Rs.1,700/- per month.
3. The first aspect of the argument advanced by the
learned counsel for the appellant is that the Commissioner
acted contrary to law in adopting 10% as the loss of earning
capacity. It is pithily pointed out that the determination of
10% as the permanent physical disability by the Medical Board
cannot, by itself, suffice to say that the workman suffered
10% loss of earning capacity. The learned counsel also argued
that the doctor of the Medical Board, who issued Exhibit A1
Certificate, had not tendered oral evidence.
4. It is not necessary to examine the doctor to
corroborate the Medical Board's certificate, more particularly
when there is no challenge to its contents by any contra
evidence by the employer. We see that the loss of earning
capacity has not been mentioned in the Medical Certificate.
The Chief Medical Officer of the employer had also assessed
only the percentage of physical disability. The variation
between CMO's certificate and the Medical Board's certificate
is 3% to 10%. Loss of the left index finger or injury to it, was
taken, along with Exhibit A1 certificate, to hold that the
workman suffered 10% loss of earning capacity. On the
totality of the facts and circumstances, we do not find any
perversity in the appreciation of evidence by the
Commissioner. So much so, we do not find any substantial
question of law arising for decision in favour of the employer
regarding that aspect.
5. The Commissioner ordered that interest would
run from the date of accident, that is, 10.05.2000. Relying on
the decision of the apex Court in National Insurance Co.
Ltd. v. Mubasir Ahmed [2007 (3) KLT 26 (SC)], the learned
counsel for the appellant argued that the starting point of the
liability to pay interest is only from the date of the order of the
Commissioner. We may note that this issue had obtained
focused attention of the Division Bench of this Court.
Analysing the various precedents, including the one referred
to above, and the different aspects of the matter, it was held
in M.F.A.No.59 of 2011 that the precedent law as available
from the law laid down by the Apex Court categorically shows
that the liability to pay interest runs from the date of accident.
6. On a complete evaluation of the Workmen's
Compensation Act, since re-christened as "Employees
Compensation Act, 1923", we see that the liability to pay
compensation is statutory. Section 3 onwards in Chapter II of
that Act would show that the liability that arises is fixed
statutorily. It runs from the sufferance of the incident that
generates the right in the employee or workman to
compensation. Hence, the employer has a statutory liability to
deposit amounts which he admits as compensation. Similarly,
even if there is any settlement of claims to the extent
permitted under that Act, such agreements can work only with
the seal of approval of the Commissioner. The liability to pay
interest would start to run from the non-performance and
non-discharge of the obligation to pay the compensation. That
liability being a statutory one under Section 3, it would run
from the date of the incident. May be, in exceptionally
exceptional cases where there is grave and enormous delay in
making a demand for compensation, the Courts may take a
different view; of course, without ignoring the fact that the
legislation is meant to provide support to a socially and
economically challenged and marginalized sector of the
society. With this, we follow the judgment in M.F.A.No.59 of
2011 and hold that the Commissioner was justified in granting
interest from the date of the incident.
7. In the above circumstances, we do not find any
substantial questions of law arising for decision in favour of
the appellant. The appeal fails.
In the result, the appeal is dismissed. No costs.
Print Page
Compensation Act, since re-christened as "Employees
Compensation Act, 1923", we see that the liability to pay
compensation is statutory. Section 3 onwards in Chapter II of
that Act would show that the liability that arises is fixed
statutorily. It runs from the sufferance of the incident that
generates the right in the employee or workman to
compensation. Hence, the employer has a statutory liability to
deposit amounts which he admits as compensation. Similarly,
even if there is any settlement of claims to the extent
permitted under that Act, such agreements can work only with
the seal of approval of the Commissioner. The liability to pay
interest would start to run from the non-performance and
non-discharge of the obligation to pay the compensation. That
liability being a statutory one under Section 3, it would run
from the date of the incident. May be, in exceptionally
exceptional cases where there is grave and enormous delay in
making a demand for compensation, the Courts may take a
different view; of course, without ignoring the fact that the
legislation is meant to provide support to a socially and
economically challenged and marginalized sector of the
society. With this, we follow the judgment in M.F.A.No.59 of
2011 and hold that the Commissioner was justified in granting
interest from the date of the incident.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT:
MR.JUSTICE THOTTATHIL B.RADHAKRISHNAN
&
MR.JUSTICE K.VINOD CHANDRAN
12TH DAY OF JUNE 2012
M.F.A.(W.C.Act) No.56 of 2008 (F)
THE MANAGER, LETCHMI ESTATE,
Vs
M.MURUGAN 12159,
This appeal is by the employer. Under challenge is
an order of the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner.
2. The workman, Murugan, sustained injury to his
left index finger while operating a vibrating machine. The
Chief Medical Officer of the employer assessed the disability
at 3%. The Medical Board of the Idukki District issued Exhibit
A1 certificate, assessing the permanent physical disability
due to the injury at 10%. The workman gave evidence as
A.W.1. His testimony was corroborated by A.W.2. There is no
contra evidence by the management. The monthly earnings
of the workman was proved. The Commissioner took it as
Rs.1,700/- per month.
3. The first aspect of the argument advanced by the
learned counsel for the appellant is that the Commissioner
acted contrary to law in adopting 10% as the loss of earning
capacity. It is pithily pointed out that the determination of
10% as the permanent physical disability by the Medical Board
cannot, by itself, suffice to say that the workman suffered
10% loss of earning capacity. The learned counsel also argued
that the doctor of the Medical Board, who issued Exhibit A1
Certificate, had not tendered oral evidence.
4. It is not necessary to examine the doctor to
corroborate the Medical Board's certificate, more particularly
when there is no challenge to its contents by any contra
evidence by the employer. We see that the loss of earning
capacity has not been mentioned in the Medical Certificate.
The Chief Medical Officer of the employer had also assessed
only the percentage of physical disability. The variation
between CMO's certificate and the Medical Board's certificate
is 3% to 10%. Loss of the left index finger or injury to it, was
taken, along with Exhibit A1 certificate, to hold that the
workman suffered 10% loss of earning capacity. On the
totality of the facts and circumstances, we do not find any
perversity in the appreciation of evidence by the
Commissioner. So much so, we do not find any substantial
question of law arising for decision in favour of the employer
regarding that aspect.
5. The Commissioner ordered that interest would
run from the date of accident, that is, 10.05.2000. Relying on
the decision of the apex Court in National Insurance Co.
Ltd. v. Mubasir Ahmed [2007 (3) KLT 26 (SC)], the learned
counsel for the appellant argued that the starting point of the
liability to pay interest is only from the date of the order of the
Commissioner. We may note that this issue had obtained
focused attention of the Division Bench of this Court.
Analysing the various precedents, including the one referred
to above, and the different aspects of the matter, it was held
in M.F.A.No.59 of 2011 that the precedent law as available
from the law laid down by the Apex Court categorically shows
that the liability to pay interest runs from the date of accident.
6. On a complete evaluation of the Workmen's
Compensation Act, since re-christened as "Employees
Compensation Act, 1923", we see that the liability to pay
compensation is statutory. Section 3 onwards in Chapter II of
that Act would show that the liability that arises is fixed
statutorily. It runs from the sufferance of the incident that
generates the right in the employee or workman to
compensation. Hence, the employer has a statutory liability to
deposit amounts which he admits as compensation. Similarly,
even if there is any settlement of claims to the extent
permitted under that Act, such agreements can work only with
the seal of approval of the Commissioner. The liability to pay
interest would start to run from the non-performance and
non-discharge of the obligation to pay the compensation. That
liability being a statutory one under Section 3, it would run
from the date of the incident. May be, in exceptionally
exceptional cases where there is grave and enormous delay in
making a demand for compensation, the Courts may take a
different view; of course, without ignoring the fact that the
legislation is meant to provide support to a socially and
economically challenged and marginalized sector of the
society. With this, we follow the judgment in M.F.A.No.59 of
2011 and hold that the Commissioner was justified in granting
interest from the date of the incident.
7. In the above circumstances, we do not find any
substantial questions of law arising for decision in favour of
the appellant. The appeal fails.
In the result, the appeal is dismissed. No costs.
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