Thursday, 8 November 2018

Whether father can file application under domestic violence Act to seek visitation rights to child?

It is contended that since Section 21 does
not provide any right to the husband to prefer such application, and
since the legislature has not provided such right to the husband,
except as stipulated in Section 21 of DV Act, the Court ought not to
have entertained the application and granted relief as prayed by
respondent no.1. If the interpretation advanced by the applicant is
accepted, it would defeat the whole purpose of the statute. It is well
settled principle of interpretation that Court must start with the
presumption that legislature did not make a mistake and it must
interpret so as to carry out the obvious intention of legislature and

that it must not correct or make up a deficiency nor the Court read
into a provision any word which is not there particularly when literal
reading does not lead to an intelligible result. 
Where however, the words used
are capable of bearing two or more constructions, it is necessary to
adopt purposive construction, to identify the construction to be
preferred by posing the following questions. (i) what is the purpose
for which the provision is made; (ii) what was the position before
making the provision; (iii) whether any of the constructions
proposed would lead to an absurd result or would render any part of
the provisions redundant; (iv) which of the interpretations will
advance the object of the provision. The answer to these questions
will enable the Court to identify the purposive interpretation to be
preferred while excluding others. Such an exercise is involving
ascertainment of the object of the provision and choosing the
interpretation that will advance the object of the provision can be
undertaken only where the language of the provision is capable of
more than one construction. It is further observed that Section 21 is
amenable to two interpretations as is being highlighted by the

parties, in such event only that interpretation which advanced the
object of the provision can be accepted. It is worthwhile to note that
the Act enacted to prevent the occurrence of domestic violence in the
society and keeping in view that several protection orders including
the safety of the aggrieved person and the child have been
contemplated to be passed. Therefore, the cause of the safety of the
aggrieved person or the child is always warrants to be taken into
account in interpreting the provision. In such situation if the
interpretation given on behalf of the wife aggrieved parties accepted
it will render the provision incomplete as in case where wife –
aggrieved party seeks custody of the child, if the child is in custody of
the husband and an order of custody is passed in favour of the
aggrieved party, visitation right can be granted to the husband. But if
custody lies with the wife – aggrieved party, than the husband will
have no remedy of visitation right if the interpretation as
contemplated by the wife – aggrieved party is given effect to and
thereby it can easily be said that interpretation given by the
aggrieved party – wife will never advance the cause of the child. On
the other hand, if it is held that the husband, in absence of any
application for grant of custody can maintain his application for
visitation right will advance the object of the provision as in case of
child being in custody of the husband, application for custody can be
filed by the wife wherein the husband can have visitation right if
order is of custody of child passed in favour of the aggrieved party.
In other situation, when the custody of the child lies with the wife,
there would be no occasion for the wife for filing an application for
custody. In that situation, husband will have remedy to have
visitation right by filing application to that effect. The said
interpretation and observations can be applied in the present case.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO.186 OF 2018

Mrs.Payal Sudeep Laad @ Payal Sharma, Vs  Sudeep Govind Laad,

CORAM : PRAKASH D. NAIK, J.

Dated : 2nd November 2018



1. By this application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973, the applicant seeks to challenge the order dated 3rd
February 2018 passed by the Sessions Court, Mumbai rejecting the
applicant's appeal filed under Section 29 of the Protection of Women
from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (`D.V.Act') which was filed
challenging order dated 5th January 2018 passed by Metropolitan
Magistrate, 31st Court, Vikroli, Mumbai.

2. The relevant facts for determining the issues raised in this
application are as follows :
a) The marriage between the applicant and respondent
no.1 was solemnized on 7th May 2008. Out of the wedlock child
Vihan was born on 14th September 2012;
b) On 17th July 2017 the applicant filed an application
before the learned Metropolitan Magistrate under Section 12 of DV
Act seeking relief under Sections 18, 19, 20, 21 and 22 of the DV Act.
The said application was filed against respondent no.1 and his
mother. The proceedings were numbered as CC.122/DV/2017;
c) The applicant left her matrimonial home on 2nd
December 2017 with child Vihan and made separate residential
arrangement along with her parents;
d) The applicant addressed a letter dated 6th December
2017 to the school authorities of Vihan. The respondent no.1
preferred application vide Exhibit9
dated 20th December 2017
seeking access of Vihan;
e) The applicant filed her affidavitinreply
before the
learned Magistrate opposing the said application on the ground of
maintainability;
f) By order dated 5th January 2018, learned Metropolitan
Magistrate, 31st Court, Vikroli, allowed the application filed by
respondent no.1 and he was allowed to exercise his visitation rights

and keep custody of his child for 48 hours for twice in a month i.e.
on every second and fourth Friday from 6 pm to Sunday 6 pm i.e. on
alternate week ends;
g) The applicant challenged the aforesaid order by
preferring appeal before the Sessions Court. The applicant also
preferred an application for stay of the order passed by the learned
Magistrate. The Sessions Court by order dated 12th January 2018
granted interim stay to the order of the learned Magistrate pending
hearing of the appeal. The respondent no.1 filed his affidavitinreply
on 18th January 2018. The Sessions Judge by order dated 3rd
February 2018 dismissed Appeal No.30 of 2018 filed by applicant
and upheld the order dated 5th January 2018 passed by learned
Magistrate.
3. Learned counsel for applicant submitted that the impugned
orders are contrary to the provisions of law. The applicant was
constrained to prefer an application under the DV Act seeking reliefs
u/s 18 19, 20, 21 and 22 of the DV Act on 17th July 2017. The said
application was preferred on account of immense verbal, emotional,
physical, economical violence at the hands of respondents. The
respondent no.1 did not file his written statement denying any
charges against him on several dates and had threatened the
applicant to withdraw the complaint. The applicant was constrained
to lodge the NC complaints with police. Due to severe apprehension
and scary atmosphere at the matrimonial house, the applicant had no
alternative but to leave her matrimonial home on 2nd December 2017
with child Vihan and made separate residential arrangement along
with her parents. It is further submitted that the applicant had to

address letter dated 6th December 2017 to the school authorities of
Vihan as the respondent no.1 had threatened kidnapping of child,
which is reflected in the NC dated 28th November 2017. Without
filing written statement and after a period of about five months of
filing the complaint under DV Act, the respondent no.1 had preferred
an application for urgent interim relief vide Exhibit9
on 20th
December 2017. The applicant filed her affidavitinreply
opposing
the application on the ground of maintainability. It is submitted that
the learned Magistrate vide order dated 5th January 2018
erroneously allowed the application preferred by respondent no.1
and granted relief to respondent no.1. The Sessions Court has also
committed an error in rejecting the appeal preferred by the
applicant. The learned Sessions Judge has passed the order in
violation of principles of natural justice. The applicant was not given
an opportunity to represent her by advocate and compelled to argue
in person. The Sessions Court also refused to permit the applicant to
file the rejoinder. The learned Sessions Judge failed to appreciate
that Section 21 applies only when granting custody order during the
hearing. The Courts below failed to appreciate that Section 21 does
not permit the husband to move for relief under the DV Act
independent of the application of the aggrieved person. The learned
Sessions Judge failed to appreciate that the DV Act does not
contemplate any person besides wife filing an application for
custody. The learned Judge failed to appreciate that as per Section
2(a) of DV Act aggrieved person means any woman who is or who
has been in a domestic relationship with the respondent and who
alleges to have been subjected to any act of domestic violence by the
respondent and the provision under Section 21 is not applicable for
any person other than the aggrieved person. The Courts below have

failed to appreciate the scope of Section 21 of DV Act and the scope
of visitation rights. The visitation rights can only be for some hours
in the Court premises or at some convenient place in presence of
mother of the child, who is aggrieved person, as defined in the DV
Act. The Sessions Judge has failed to take into consideration the
judgments relied upon by the applicant. The child was disturbed
after learning about the impugned orders passed by the Courts
below. The preliminary objection with regards to the maintainability
of the application preferred by respondent no.1 has not been
considered in proper perspective by the subordinate Courts. The
application was preferred without showing the provision under
which respondent no.1 is entitled to file the application. Section 21
clearly expresses that the temporary custody of a child or children
can be given to the aggrieved person or the person making an
application on her behalf by making necessary arrangement for visit
of such child or children by the respondent. The application
preferred by respondent no.1 suffers from grave error. The husband
cannot file such an application seeking interim custody of the child
and the said right is given under the special enactment to the
aggrieved person. The aggrieved person as contemplated under the
DV Act would mean any woman who is or has been in a domestic
relationship with the respondent and who alleges to have been
subjected to any act of domestic violence of the respondent and
hence the said application was not maintainable in law. It is only
when the aggrieved person prefers application for custody and the
same is being adjudicated, the Court can consider grant of visitation
right of husband. Applicant has filed additional affidavit dated 3rd
May 2018 and brought on record certain subsequent facts. It is
stated that applicant had never tried to keep vihan away from

respondent no.1 and made efforts to give access even during
pendency of application. However, Vihan is not willing to go
overnight with the respondent no.1.
4. Learned counsel for the applicant relied upon several decisions
which are as follows :
(i) Board of Trustees of Port of Bombay Vs. Dilipkumar
Raghvendranath Nadkarni and others 19831SCC124;
(ii) Prakashkumar @ Prakash Bhutto Vs. State of Gujarat 20052SCC409;
(iii) Pallavi Resources Limited Vs. Protos Engineering Co. Pvt.Ltd.
20105SCC196;
(iv) Judgment passed by Kerala High Court in the case of
M.J.Shibin v/s K.C.Diji and others in MAT Appeal No.60/2015;
(v) Cotton Corporation of India Ltd. Vs.United Industrial Bank Ltd.
And others (AIR 1983 SC 1272);
(vi) Payal Agarwal Vs. Kunal Agarwal, the decision of the High
Court of Rajasthan 2014Cr.
L.J.4281;
(vii) Decision of the Karnataka High Court in the case of Mrs.Girija
Patel Vs. Vijay Rao delivered in Criminal Revision Petition No.1062
of 2014;
(viii) Prakash Kumar Singhee Vs Amrapali Singhee delivered by this
Court in Writ Petition No.3553 of 2018 dtd.4.5.2018;
(ix) Dennision Paulraj and others Vs. Union of India 2009DJLS
(Madras)818;
(x) Director, CBI and another Vs. D.P.Singh (2010)1SCC647;
(xi) Bharat Alumium Company vs. Kaisar Aluminium Technical
Service Inc. (2012)9SCC552;

(xii) Roxana Sharma Vs Arun Sharma AIR2015SC2232;
(xiii) Firm Amarnath Bashshwar Dass Vs Tekchand AIR1972SC1548.
5. Learned counsel for respondent no.1 submitted that the
complaint under the DV Act was filed by the applicant as a means to
pressurize the respondent no.1. During pendency of the said
complaint the parties were referred to mediation on 18th September
2017. On 5th October 2017 mediation proceedings took place.
Apprehensive of the fact that the applicant may act on the threat to
leave the house with Vihan, the respondent no.1 had addressed the
letter to the Senior Inspector of Park Site Police Station narrating the
state of events. On 23rd October 2017 mediation proceedings took
place. On 3rd November 2017 mediation proceedings were
conducted again and the mediator filed a failure report stating that
mediation between both the parties had failed and the matter was
adjourned to 2nd December 2017. On 1st December 2017 brothers
of applicant had arrived at their house and began packing certain
belongings. On 2nd December 2017 the matter was listed before the
Court of learned Magistrate. However, the Court was not presiding.
The respondent no.1 noticed that the applicant is loading her
belongings in to a car. Being aggrieved by the development, the
respondent no.1 went to Park Site Police Station to report the
incident. The applicant was present at the police station along with
her mother and filed NC complaint against respondent no.1. Police
refused to entertain the complaint of respondent no.1 and hence he
was constrained to file a written complaint with the Assistant Police
Inspector and the DCP. The applicant left the matrimonial home on
2nd December 2017 with Vihan. The respondent no.1 made repeated

attempts to reach out to applicant and Vihan through phone and emails
asking her whereabouts and where she has taken Vihan and
why she was not responding. The respondent no.1 visited school
where he was informed that Vihan had not attended school. The
respondent no.1 then addressed an email
to the school authorities
informing them that applicant and Vihan have left the house without
informing him. On 6th December 2017 applicant had addressed a
letter to the school that due to marital discord the applicant and
respondent no.1 do not live together and that the respondent no.1
should not be granted access of Vihan without her permission. She
also forwarded a letter to school bus authorities on 12th December
2017 informing them that Vihan should not be dropped at any
location other than the one provided by applicant. She also stated
that the respondent no.1 should not be allowed to take Vihan any
where from the school directly without her prior permission. The
respondent no.1 met the school authorities and expressed his
concerns. The school assured that they will cooperate
and all
communications regarding Vihan will also be sent to him. As the
applicant was not responding and also the police were not
supportive, the respondent no.1 filed an application for child access
u/s 21 of DV Act on 20th December 2017. The matter was heard by
the Trial Court and by order dated 5th January 2018, the learned
Magistrate partly allowed the application allowing access of Vihan to
respondent no.1.
6. It is further submitted that the applicant then preferred an
appeal before the Sessions Court which was heard at length. Both
the sides were heard and case laws were tendered by both the
parties. The Sessions Court was pleased to dismiss the appeal and

upheld the legality and validity of order dated 5th January 2018
passed by the learned Magistrate. It is further submitted that in spite
of the aforesaid orders, the attempts to contact applicant to avail the
access were futile. The respondent no.1 then visited Park Site Police
Station and requested the Protection Officer to facilitate the access.
On 15th February 2018, the police report was filed by the Protection
Officer stating that applicant had refused to grant access as she has
filed quashing petition in the High Court challenging the orders
passed by the Courts below. It is submitted that there is no reason to
interfere in the orders passed by the learned Magistrate and the
Sessions Court.
7. It is submitted that the respondent no.1 is deeply concerned
about his son's well being and safety. He had never stayed away
from him or the house till 2nd December 2017. The applicant had
forcibly and willfully kept Vihan away from him. The applicant is
acting against Vihan's interest. It is in the interest of child's welfare
that he received company of both the parents. However, the
applicant has taken unilateral decision of removing him from the
company of his father. The respondent no.1 being the natural
guardian cannot be denied the access to his child and the said fact
has been considered by the Courts below. The child needs the
company and influence of both his parents. However, the applicant
is not considering child's needs and is misusing her position as
mother to forcibly keep him away from the respondent no.1. The
impugned order passed by the learned Magistrate grants him over
night visitation rights for 48 hours i.e. twice in a month as provided
for in the said order. It is submitted that the respondent no.1 had
specifically prayed for an equal and fair access of his child and has

also prayed for an over night week end access for his child. The
respondent no.1 denies the allegations that the applicant had
suffered any verbal, emotional, physical or economical violence or
immense cruelty at his hands or his mother's hands. Since the child
was forcefully and illegally removed from the company of respondent
no.1, he was constrained to prefer an application u/s 21 of the DV
Act which provides powers to Court to grant visitation rights to the
father. It is submitted that the welfare of the child is paramount. It
is established by Child Rights Foundation that equal and substantial
access should be granted to both the parents. The applicant is trying
to deprive over night access of the child and to the father which
clearly shows that she is using the child as a tool and thus
compromising the growth and well being of the child. As per Section
21 of DV Act, learned Magistrate has exercised his power to grant
visitation rights to the respondent no.1 as per the prayer made in the
application. The applicant is confusing the two concepts of custody
and visitation rights. The Trial Court had allowed over night access
to respondent no.1 to exercise his visitation rights. Hence, the order
is proper and legal. Learned counsel for applicant relied upon the
guidelines circulated by Child Right Foundation which has been
accepted by the Government of Maharashtra and circulated to all the
Courts across the State of Maharashtra. He placed reliance on
clauses 28 and 31 of the said guidelines which are relevant for
deciding access and visitation rights. It is submitted that the child
was in exclusive custody of the applicant from 2nd December 2017
and in these circumstances the application preferred by the
respondent no.1 u/s 21 of DV Act was maintainable. It is further
submitted that applicant had appeared in person before the Sessions
Court and has argued the matter. She has also relied upon the

decisions in support of her arguments and therefore in the
circumstances it cannot be said that the principle of natural justice
has been violated by not giving opportunity to her advocate to
advance submissions before the Sessions Court. It is submitted that
if the interpretation given by the applicant about maintainability of
the application preferred by the respondent no.1 is accepted, it
would defeat the whole purpose of the statute. The intent of the
legislature and the aim and object of the act has to be taken into
consideration. Thus, even if the applicant (wife) had not preferred
any application u/s 21 of DV Act, the husband can prefer such an
application seeking access to the child. It is submitted that the
applicant had taken the child in her custody and in the circumstances
she would not have preferred any application u/s 21 of DV Act and
the respondent no.1 in such a situation would be rendered without
any remedy. It is further submitted that apart from the aforesaid
interpretation of law, it has to be noted that the applicant in her
application u/s 12 of DV Act had prayed for the custody of the child
i.e. sought reliefs u/s 21 of DV Act. Even in such circumstances the
applicant was empowered to prefer the application for access.
8. Learned counsel for the respondent no.1 relied upon the
following decisions :
(i) Decision in the case of Smt.Huidrom Ningol Ongbi Vs
Mr.Inaobi Singh Maibam delivered by High Court of Manipur at
Imphal in Cri.Revn.Petition No.16/2015;
(ii) Sandeep Kumar Thakur Vs Madhubala decided by High Court
of Himachal Pradesh at Shimla 2016SCC
OnlineHP3354;
(iii) Deepti Bhandari Vs Nitin Bhandari and another decided by
Supreme Court in Special Leave Petition (Cri) No.5213 of 2010;

(iv) Mrs.Mary Pinto Vs Cedric Pinto and another decided by this
Court in Criminal Writ Petition No.353 of 2008;
(v) Ruchi Majoo Vs Sanjiv Majoo delivered in Civil Appeal
No.4435 of 2011;
(vi) Decision of Supreme Court delivered in Civil Appeal No.4983
of 2016;
(vii) Dr.Parijat Kanetkar Vs Mallika Kanetkar 2017(2)Mh.
L.J.218
9. The primary issue in these proceedings is whether an
application preferred by respondent no.1 u/s 21 of DV Act was
maintainable. The learned Magistrate has entertained the said
application and allowed the access of the child to respondent no.1.
The said order was upheld by the Sessions Court. The learned
Magistrate has adverted to the child access and custody guidelines
along with parenting plan placed before the Court by the respondent
no.1. The factual matrix indicate that the applicant and the
respondent no.1 are highly educated persons. The marriage was
registered between them on 7th May 2008. It was a love marriage.
Child Vihan was born on 14th September 2012. The applicant had
preferred the complaint under the DV Act on 17th July 2017. In the
said complaint she has narrated the purported acts amounting to
domestic violence. During the pendency of said complaint, the
applicant had left the matrimonial home on 2nd December 2017 with
Vihan. According to applicant, on account of the atmosphere she
was constrained to leave the matrimonial home along with the child
and had to make residential arrangement with her parents. The
respondent no.1 had preferred the application u/s 21 of DV Act on
20th December 2017. According to him, since the applicant had left
the matrimonial home along with Vihan and the whereabouts were

not known and in spite of attempts being made to contract the
applicant and his son, he was constrained to prefer such an
application before the Court. The application was opposed by
applicant (wife) by filing reply. The learned Magistrate by order
dated 5th January 2018 partly allowed the said application by
granting visitation rights to respondent no.1. It was directed that the
respondent no.1 is allowed to exercise his visitation rights and keep
custody of his child Vihan for 48 hours for twice in a month i.e. on
every second and fourth Friday from 6 pm to Sunday 6 pm i.e. on the
alternate week ends. It was further directed that the applicant shall
arrange the talk between Vihan and respondent no.1 on video call on
each Thursday between 7 pm to 8 pm. The applicant was also
directed to disclose her residential address and submit copy of said
address to Senior Police Inspector, Park Site Police Station and
Protection Officer. Any change in the address be intimated. She
shall not change admission of Vihan from the school without consent
of respondent no.1. The respondent no.1 shall not approach the
child while he travels in school bus. Senior PI Park Site Police
Station shall appoint Police Station Officer as Protection Officer, who
shall keep the record of visitation by maintaining separate diary and
to submit a report to the Court once in two months. Apparently the
said order was challenged by preferring appeal before the Sessions
Court. The respondent no.1 had opposed the reliefs prayed in the
said appeal by filing reply. The learned Sessions Judge by order
dated 12th January 2018 granted interim stay to the operation of the
order dated 5th January 2018 passed by the Trial Court. The appeal
was finally heard. The applicant had appeared in person and
advanced her arguments. She also relied upon the decisions of the
Court in support of her submissions. The learned Sessions Judge has

observed that the proceedings under the Act were filed in July2017.
The mother and father were residing together till 1st December 2017.
Their son Vihan was living with them till that time. The mother
along with son left the house. The father had only occasion to see
his son once on 27th December 2017 in the Court of learned
Magistrate. The Court also referred to the guidelines in respect of
child access and custody along with parenting plan. In clause31
it is
provided that the Courts are under obligation to consider that the
child shall spend equal and substantial time with each parent. In
making the parenting order, the Court must consider that the child
must spend equal time or if not substantial and significant time with
each parent. The substantial and significant time means essential,
week days and over night week ends and holidays which allow the
parents to be involved in the child's daily routine as well as occasions
and events that are of particular significance to the child or the
parents to maintain or consolidate a secure attachment with the
parent whose behaviour is oriented only to visiting rather than care
giving. The Court further observed that the said guidelines further
provides that the child has a right to spend time on regular basis
with both parents and other people significant to their care, well fare
and development. The over night access at home of non custodial
parent should be encouraged at an early stage so that the children
have a close and continuing relationship and get love and affection
of not only the parents but also of grandparents and other family
members. On the strength of the guidelines, the visitation rights of
either of the parties to mean father or the mother to have access to
their child cannot be denied. The application made therefore is thus
tenable. It manifest that mother has excluded father from enjoying
access to son. It transpires that attendance of the child in school has

decreased. Obviously it would affect on smooth and well
development of the child. It can be against the interest of the child.
The Court thereafter observed that in the instant case, the custody of
the child is already with his mother. The father has merely sought
visitation rights to see his son which right has been granted for
limited days and limited period as apparent from the impugned
order. In case the visitation right is not given to the father, the
minor child would be deprived of father's love and affection. The
paramount consideration is welfare of child. Irrespective of the facts
for the well being and smooth development of the child, the father is
entitled for visitation rights. The father made an application for
grant of permission to have an equal and fair access to him. The
prayer made by the father is just and proper and the same cannot be
interfered with. It was further observed that the learned Magistrate
has rightly done so. While passing the impugned order, learned
Magistrate took all precaution. The order is reasoned and well
thought. Thus, no flaw can be found in the impugned order. For the
said reasons and discussion, the learned Sessions Judge was pleased
to dismiss the appeal preferred by the applicant.
10. It would be relevant to extract Section 21 of DV Act. The said
provision reads as follows :
“21. Custody orders.Notwithstanding
anything
contained in any other law for the time being in force, the
Magistrate may, at any stage of hearing of the
application for protection order or for any other relief
under this Act grant temporary custody of any child or
children to the aggrieved person or the person making an
application on her behalf and specify, if necessary, the
arrangement for visit of such child or children by the
respondent :

Provided that if the Magistrate is of the opinion
that any visit of the respondents may be harmful to the
interests of the child or children, the Magistrate shall
refuse to allow such visit.”
According to learned counsel for applicant on reading the said
provision it is apparent that the Magistrate at any stage of hearing of
the application for protection order or for any other relief under this
Act grant temporary custody of any child or children to the aggrieved
person or the person making an application on her behalf and specify
if necessary, the arrangements for visit of such child or children by
the respondent, provided that if the Magistrate is of the opinion that
any visit of the respondent may be harmful to the interest of the
child or children, the Magistrate shall refuse to allow such visit. It is
contended that the husband has no right to independently prefer an
application for custody orders as contemplated u/s 21 of DV Act.
The application can be preferred by the aggrieved person or any
person on her behalf during the pendency of her application under
for any reliefs under the DV Act. The respondent no.1 was therefore
not empowered to prefer such an application. It is submitted that for
seeking custody of the child, the respondent no.1 had other remedies
available in law under the provisions of the DV Act. It is submitted
that the respondent no.1 could have approached the Court under
Section 26 of the Hindu Marriage Act seeking custody of the child.
The remedy lies before other forum and the application before the
Trial Court in the present case was not maintainable. The Trial
Court had passed the order without jurisdiction. On perusal of the
orders passed by the Courts below and child access and custody
guidelines which were referred to by the said Courts, and for the
reasons to be stated herein, I do not find any reason to interfere in
the orders under challenge. The learned Magistrate and the learned

Sessions Judge has passed the well reasoned order which do not
require any interference.
11. The factual matrix of the present case indicate that the child
was in custody of mother (applicant) from 2nd December 2017. In
the complaint under the DV Act preferred on 17th July 2017, the
same indicate that the applicant had preferred the said complaint u/s
18, 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23 of DV Act. The form/complaint reflects
that the applicant had sought relief under the various provisions
including Section 21 which relates to custody orders. It is the
contention of the applicant that unless the applicant prefers any
application under Section 21 for custody order, the access cannot be
granted to the husband on an independent application preferred by
him. In the present case according to the applicant, she had not
preferred such application and therefore the respondent no.1 ought
not to have preferred the application seeking access and the same
was not maintainable in law. When there is no provision under the
law, the Court cannot infer existence of such provision and entertain
the application. The scope and object of the DV Act is required to be
taken into consideration. It is contended that since Section 21 does
not provide any right to the husband to prefer such application, and
since the legislature has not provided such right to the husband,
except as stipulated in Section 21 of DV Act, the Court ought not to
have entertained the application and granted relief as prayed by
respondent no.1. If the interpretation advanced by the applicant is
accepted, it would defeat the whole purpose of the statute. It is well
settled principle of interpretation that Court must start with the
presumption that legislature did not make a mistake and it must
interpret so as to carry out the obvious intention of legislature and

that it must not correct or make up a deficiency nor the Court read
into a provision any word which is not there particularly when literal
reading does not lead to an intelligible result. The said proposition
of law has been laid down in the case of Rajender Prashad Vs.
Darshana Devi (2001)7SCC69.
In the case of Nathidevi Vs.
Radhadevi Gupta (2005)2SCC271,
it was observed that in
interpreting a statute, Court must, if the words are clear, plain,
unambiguous and reasonable insusceptible to only one meaning, give
to the words that meaning irrespective of the consequences.
12. In the present case, it is the grievance of the applicant that on
2nd December, 2017, on account of the circumstances referred to by
her, the applicant had left the matrimonial home along with the
child. The reliefs sought in the application enumerates the reliefs
under Sections 18, 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23 of the said Act. The
complaint also mentions that requisite orders under Section 21 with
regards to the custody of the child are also sought. The said aspect is
apparent from paragraph 5 of the complaint. The intent of the
legislature as expressed under the proviso has to be taken into
account keeping in view the aim and object of the Act. The
application under Section 21 of the Act by the respondent could be
made in the factual matrix of the present case. In the case of Smt.
Hudidrom Ningol Ongbi (supra) relied upon by the counsel for the
respondent the High Court of Manipur has observed that where there
is no obscurity or ambiguity and intention of legislature is clearly
conveyed, there is no scope for the Court to innovate or to take upon
its task of amending or altering a statutory provisions which
proposition of law has been laid down in several cases including in a
case of Institute of Chartered Accounts of India Vs. Price Water

House and another – (1997)6SCC312.
In that case it has been
observed that the judges should not proclaim that they are playing
the role of law makers merely for an exhibition of judicial valour.
They should remember that there is a line though thin which
separates adjudication from legislation. That line should not be
crossed. This can be vouchsafed by an alert recognition of the
necessity not to cross it and instinctive as well as trained reluctance
to do so. However, where there appears to be obscurity, ambiguity,
what the Court is supposed to do has been dealt with in the case of
Grid Corporation of Orissa Limited Vs. And others. Eastern
Matters Ferros Allous and others reported in (2011)11SCC334
wherein it has been observed that the golden rule of interpretation is
that the words of the statute have to be read and understood in their
natural, ordinary and popular sense. Where however, the words used
are capable of bearing two or more constructions, it is necessary to
adopt purposive construction, to identify the construction to be
preferred by posing the following questions. (i) what is the purpose
for which the provision is made; (ii) what was the position before
making the provision; (iii) whether any of the constructions
proposed would lead to an absurd result or would render any part of
the provisions redundant; (iv) which of the interpretations will
advance the object of the provision. The answer to these questions
will enable the Court to identify the purposive interpretation to be
preferred while excluding others. Such an exercise is involving
ascertainment of the object of the provision and choosing the
interpretation that will advance the object of the provision can be
undertaken only where the language of the provision is capable of
more than one construction. It is further observed that Section 21 is
amenable to two interpretations as is being highlighted by the

parties, in such event only that interpretation which advanced the
object of the provision can be accepted. It is worthwhile to note that
the Act enacted to prevent the occurrence of domestic violence in the
society and keeping in view that several protection orders including
the safety of the aggrieved person and the child have been
contemplated to be passed. Therefore, the cause of the safety of the
aggrieved person or the child is always warrants to be taken into
account in interpreting the provision. In such situation if the
interpretation given on behalf of the wife aggrieved parties accepted
it will render the provision incomplete as in case where wife –
aggrieved party seeks custody of the child, if the child is in custody of
the husband and an order of custody is passed in favour of the
aggrieved party, visitation right can be granted to the husband. But if
custody lies with the wife – aggrieved party, than the husband will
have no remedy of visitation right if the interpretation as
contemplated by the wife – aggrieved party is given effect to and
thereby it can easily be said that interpretation given by the
aggrieved party – wife will never advance the cause of the child. On
the other hand, if it is held that the husband, in absence of any
application for grant of custody can maintain his application for
visitation right will advance the object of the provision as in case of
child being in custody of the husband, application for custody can be
filed by the wife wherein the husband can have visitation right if
order is of custody of child passed in favour of the aggrieved party.
In other situation, when the custody of the child lies with the wife,
there would be no occasion for the wife for filing an application for
custody. In that situation, husband will have remedy to have
visitation right by filing application to that effect. The said
interpretation and observations can be applied in the present case.

As indicated above, the child was in custody of the applicant from 2nd
December 2017. In these circumstances, there was no occasion for
the applicant to prefer any application seeking relief under Section
21 of the Act.
13. Child access and custody guidelines along with parenting plan
were accepted by the various High Courts and communication was
sent to the subordinates Courts to enforce the recommendations in
their respective divisions. The guardian judges of the family Courts in
the State of Maharashtra have been pleased to approve the parenting
plan as the best document to be modified as per the facts and
circumstances of the case, the Hon'ble Chief Justice was pleased to
direct circulation of the child access and custody guidelines among
all the Hon'ble Judges of the Bombay High Court. The Hon'ble
guardian judges of the Family Courts in the State of Maharashtra
have been pleased to direct the circulation of the guidelines among
the Family Court judges and the marriage councilors in the Family
Courts across the State of Maharashtra. The interim child visitation
guidelines indicates that the basic principles of the Court are to
ensure that the child/children yet to spent equal or substantial
significant time to be showered with love and affection from both the
parents irrespective of parents conflict. Efforts should be made by
parties and if necessary, Court should direct parties to mutually
agree upon a visitation schedule to be drawn up along with the
marriage councilor within a maximum period of 60 days pending
finalization of mutual final overnight visitation agreement and
interim access has to be worked out immediately. The guidelines
assume that each parent has continuous presence in the children's
life. In the event that a parent has at limited or no contact with his or

her children and wishes to be reintroduce into the children's life, it is
upto the parents to agree on the means by which this is to be
accomplished if the parents are unable to agree the first alternative
shall be to mediate the conflict. If mediation is unsuccessful, it shall
be the responsibility of the Court to adopt a schedule. In the present
case, the applicant has not asked for custody of child since the child
is already in her custody. The paramount consideration shall be
welfare of the child. The endeavor of the Court should be to ensure
that child gets love and affection of both the parents. The smooth
and proper development of the child requires affection of both
parents. Clause31
of the guidelines deals with overnight access. It is
provided that the Courts shall consider that the child shall spend
equal and substantive time with each parents. In while making
parenting order the Court has to consider that the child must spend
equal time or if not equal then substantial and significant time with
each parent. Substantial and significant time has been defined to
mean essentially, weekdays and overnight weekends and holidays
which allow the parent to be involved in the child's daily routine as
well as occasions and events that are of particular significance to the
child or the parents to maintain or consolidated a secure attachment
with a parent whose behavior is oriented only to visiting rather than
care giving. It further provides that the children have right to know
and be cared for by both their parents regardless of whether their
parents are married, separated, divorced, have never married or have
never leave together and children have a right to spend time on a
regular basis with both parents and other people significant to their
case, welfare and development including grandparents and family
members. It is further provided that overnight access at home of the
non custodial parents should be encouraged at an early stage, so that

the children have a closed and continuing relationships and get love
and affection of not only parents but also a grandparents and other
immediate family members like uncles, aunts, cousins etc. Both the
Courts below had taken into consideration the aforesaid aspects. The
Trial Court has also observed that the applicant has not disclosed her
residential address where she resides along with the child. In reply,
filed vide Exhibit10,
the address has been given that she had resided
in rental flat at Nahar Complex. By issuing various letters to school it
has been confirmed that the applicant has excluded the father of the
child from enjoying access and company of the child. The absence of
child in school has been increased. Obviously the behavior of
petitioner would affect a smooth and well development of child. The
Respondent No.1 is therefore entitled for visitation right and it is
appropriate to 48 hours visitation rights on second and fourth
Saturday and half of longer holidays be availed by the respondent
No.1. The Trial Court has therefore taken into consideration the
factual aspects and has passed the impugned order taking the broad
view of the matter. During pendency of this application this Court by
consent of both parties as interim measure had passed an order on
3rd May 2018 stating that every Sunday between 9 am to 9 pm,
custody of child shall remain with respondent no.1.
14. Learned counsel for the applicant had relied upon the decision
in the case of Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay (supra), in
support of his submission that there is violation of principle of
natural justice. It was contended that the applicant was required to
argue the appeal in person and the appellate Court deprive the
applicant to contest her appeal with the help of the advocate. The
applicant was compelled to argue the matter in person. The

application involved several legal issues and thus the applicant has
to proceed with hearing of appeal without the assistance of the
advocate which has resulted in violation of principle of nature
justice. In the said decision the Government employee requested the
Inquiry Officer to permit him to appear through a legal practitioner
and even though trained public prosecutor was appointed as
presenting officer, the request was turned down. When the matter
had reached the Court, it was held that the inquiry was in breach of
the principle of natural justice. The order of the Domestic Tribunal
was to be sustained on the submission that SubRule
5 of Rule 15 of
the Central Civil Services Rules that the Government servant may
present his case with the assistance of any Government servant
approved by the disciplinary authority may not engage legal
practitioner for the purpose of unless the person nominated by the
disciplinary authority as aforesaid is a legal practitioner or unless
disciplinary authority having regard to the circumstance of the case
so permits. The ratio in the said decision is not applicable in the
present case. On perusal of the order passed by the Appellate Court,
it is apparent that the applicant had argued the matter in person. It
can also be seen that the applicant was able to put forth her case and
has even relied upon the judicial pronouncement in support of her
submission advanced before the said Court. By referring to decision
in the case of Prakash Kumar @ Prakash Bhutto (supra) learned
counsel drew my attention to the observations made in paragraphs
20, 21, 22, 30 31 and 32 of the said decision. It was observed that it
is trite law that the jurisdiction of the Court to interpret a statute can
be invoked only in case of ambiguity. The Court cannot enlarge
scope of legislation or intention when the language of the statute is
plain and unambiguous. Narrow and padentic constructions may not

always be given effect to. Court should avoid a construction which
would reduce the legislation to futility. It is well settled that the
every statute is to be interpreted without any violence to its
language. It is also trite that when an expression is capable of more
than one meaning, the Court would attempt to resolve ambiguity in
the manner consistent with the purpose of the provision having
regard to the consequence of the alternative constructions. The Apex
Court had made reference to several other decisions wherein it was
observed that the Court's jurisdiction to interpret the statute can be
invoked when the same is ambigious. It cannot be revived and recast
legislation. It is also necessary to determine that there exist a
presumption that the legislature has not used any superfluous words.
It is well settled that the real intention of the legislation must be
gathered from the language used. It may be true that use of
expression shall or may is not decisive for arriving at a finding as to
whether the statute is directory or mandatory. But the intention of
the legislature must be found out from the scheme of the Act. It is
also equally well settled that when negative words are used the
Court will presume that the intention of legislature was that the
provisions are mandatory in character. Even in relation to the penal
statute any narrow and pedantic, literal and lexical construction may
not be always given effect to. The law would have to be interpreted
having regard subject matter of the offence and object of the law it
seeks to achieve. The purpose of the law is not to allow the offender
to sneak out the message of law. It is also observed that no part of
the statute and no word of statute can be construed in isolation. It is
trite that the Statute or Rules made thereunder should be read as a
whole and one provision should be construed with reference to the
other provisions to make the provision consistent with the object

sought to be achieved. The statute is best interpreted when we know
why it was enacted. Reference was also made to the decision in the
case of Anwar Hassan Khan Vs. Mohd. Saffi (2001)8SCC540
wherein it was observed that it is cardinal principal of construction of
a statute that the effort should be made in construing its provisions
in avoiding conflict and adopting a harmonious construction. The
statute and rules made thereunder should be read as a whole and
one provision should be construed with reference to other provisions
to make the provision consistent with the object sought to be
achieved. While applying the said principles enunciated in the
aforesaid decision, I do not find that both the Courts have committed
any patent error of law in passing the impugned orders. The reasons
stipulated in the said orders are in accordance with the aforesaid
principles. It would be relevant to note that in the same decision in
paragraph 14 it has been observed that more stringent the law, the
less is discretion of the Court. Stringent laws are made for the
purpose of achieving its objective. This being the intentment of the
legislature the duty of the Court is to see that the intention of the
legislature is not frustrated. If there is any doubt or ambiguity in the
statute, the rule of purposive construction should be taken recourse
to achieve to its objectives. Similar view was expressed in the
decision of Pallavi Resources Ltd., (supra). In paragraph 17 to 19
and 24 of the said decision, it was observed that principle of
statutory interpretation that the legislature is precise and careful in
its choice of language. If the statutory provision is enacted in a
certain manner, the only reasonable interpretation which can be
resorted to by the Courts is that such was intention of the legislature
and that the provision was consciously enacted in that manner. In
the order passed by the Kerala High Court placed for consideration

by the learned counsel for the applicant, it was observed that after
evaluating the facts and circumstances in the case the child is of
tender age of four years and all of a sudden if fortnight custody is
granted to the father who is not having much acquaintance with the
child there are chances that welfare of the child will be affected. The
said decision cannot be applied in the present case. In the case of
Cotton Corporation of India Limited (supra) it was observed that
interim relief can be granted only if the Court is empowered to grant
final relief. In the case of Payal Agrawal (supra), the High Court of
Rajasthan has dealt with the provisions of Section 21 of the said Act.
In the said decision, it was observed that Section 21 does not provide
independent remedy to seek custody of the minor child and the
jurisdiction has been conferred.
15. In the above decision it was held that the Court had no
jurisdiction to entertain such an application. On perusal of the
factual matrix of the said decision, it can be seen that the wife had
preferred an application under the Domestic Violence Act of 2005 for
various reliefs against her husband and his family members. During
the pendency of the aforesaid application, the husband filed an
application under section 21 of the said Act praying that permanent
custody of the minor child of the parties may be given to him and in
the alternative it was prayed that visitation right may be granted to
him to meet the minor child of the parties. A petition for grant of
decree of divorce was also filed by the husband under Section 13 of
the Hindu Marriage Act and the Family Court Jaipur with the
consent of the parties passed an order regarding visiting rights of the
Respondents to the effect that the petitioner will remain present
along with the child on Second Saturday of every month and

Respondent will be entitled to meet the child during that period. For
the reasons stated herein above, I do not agree with the said decision
and it was dealt in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the said
case. The learned counsel for the applicant has relied upon several
other decisions which are stated herein above. The said decisions
are on broad principles of interpretation which are referred to herein
above and it is not necessary to analyze the ratio laid down in the
said decisions.
16. Learned counsel for the respondent had relied upon the
decision of High Court of Manipur at Imphal which has been referred
to hereinabove. It was also submitted that the said decision was
confirmed by the Apex Court. However, learned counsel for
applicant had disputed the said fact and submitted that what was
challenged before the Apex Court is a different order in relation to
the same proceedings. In the case of Sandeep Kumar Thakur Vs.
Madhubala (supra), the High Court of Himachal Pradesh has dealt
with the provision of Section 21 of the said Act. In paragraph 6 of
the said decision it was observed that Section 2(d) of DV Act defines
the custody order as an order granted in terms of Section 21.
Section 2(a) defines aggrieved person to mean any woman who is or
has been in a domestic relationship with the respondent and who
alleges to have been subjected to any act of domestic violence by
respondent. Section 2(q) defines respondent to mean any adult male
person who is or has been in a domestic relationship with the
aggrieved person and against whom the aggrieved person has sought
any relief under this Act. Section 21 is referred to in the said
paragraph and it is observed that Section 21 starts with nonobstante
clause. On plain reading of the said provision and the language

employed therein it can be said that Court may at any stage of
hearing of the application for protection order or for any other relief
under this Act grant temporary custody of child or children to the
aggrieved person i.e. mother or the person making an application on
her behalf and specify if necessary the arrangements for visit of such
child or children by the father. The proviso attached to Section 21
stipulates that if the Magistrate is of the opinion that any visit of the
respondent may be harmful to the interest of child or children, the
Magistrate shall refuse to allow such visit. It was further observed
that the child in the said case was already in custody of his mother.
The respondent had not asked for custody of the child for the simple
reason that the child is already in her custody. It is the respondent
i.e. father who has sought merely visitation right to his son which
right was granted to him by the Trial Court that too for limited days.
In case the visitation right is not given to the petitioner, minor child
would be deprived of father's love and affection. The paramount
consideration is welfare of child. The petitioner could not be faced
to seek remedy either under the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 and
Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956, as observed by the
Sessions Court as it would lead to multiplicity of litigation. The Act
is a self contained code. The endeavour of the code should be to cut
short the litigation and to ensure that the child gets love and
affection of both parents i.e. mother and father. The approach of the
Court should be practicable to work out the modalities in practical
manner in evolving the process whereby the child suffers minimum
trauma. The interpretation of the statute should be purposive. I find
that the aforesaid observations of the Court deserves to be accepted
and the impugned orders passed by the Courts below are within the
aforesaid parameters which do no require interferance. The

respondent shall not be refused the visitation rights on the ground
that remedies are available in the provisions of the other enactments.
It would be pertinent to note that the respondent no.1 has not been
granted permanent custody by the Court and the relief which was
granted is visitation rights. In the case of Purvi Gada (supra), the
Supreme Court has dealt with the issue of custody of minor child and
elaborated the considerations for appointment of guardians/welfare
of child etc. The Court has dealt with the relevant considerations in
the interest of the welfare of the child. It was observed that custody
battles are always regrettable not only for the spouses to resort to the
kind of litigation, which is the offshoot of matrimonial discord and
results in their separation from each other, but also for their child/
children who become the subject matter of this kind of dispute.
Failure of marriage generally leads to disputes of varied nature,
either in the form of divorce or enforcement of conjugal rights or
maintenance etc and even criminal cases in the form of proceedings
u/s 498A of IPC and so on. However, in those cases where their
togetherness as spouses has resulted in procreation of children, the
war is extended by laying respective claims on the custody of those
children as well. These minor children for their proper upbringing,
need the company of both the parents, mother as well as father, for
financial reasons, security reasons, psychological reasons etc. The
love of both their parents. Not only separation of their parents from
each other deprives the children the company of both the parents
when it results in legal battle of custody in the Courts, the situation
becomes more traumatic for these children because of various
obvious reasons. That is why such cases which seriously impact the
children are most unfortunate. In the said decision it was further
observed that it was incumbent upon High Court to find out the

welfare of the children as on that time when it was passing the order.
Apart from discussing the welfare principle, the High Court has not
done any exercise in weighing the pros and cons for determining as
to which of the two alternatives namely giving custody to the
appellants or to the respondent is better and more feasable.
17. In the case of Dipti Bhandari (supra), the apex Court has dealt
with a situation wherein the complaint under the DV Act was filed by
wife. The husband preferred an application u/s 21 of DV Act for
visitation rights which was dismissed by the Family Court. The
husband filed an appeal against the said order before the District
Judge, which was also dismissed. The husband then preferred an
application u/s 482 of Cr.P.C for quashing the charge sheet in FIR
u/s 498A of IPC. The High Court stayed the said proceedings. The
husband also preferred petition challenging the proceedings under
the DV Act. The same was also stayed by the High Court. The Court
requested both the parties to consider settlement of the matter. The
High Court also passed orders allowing visitation rights to
respondent no.1 husband in respect of minor child. The order
dismissing application for visitation right was challenged before the
appropriate Court. The application for visitation rights was allowed
and the petitioner therein was directed to arrange for the meeting of
the respondent no.1 with the petitioner and their minor daughter.
The Apex Court in the said decision modified the said order and
disposed off the petition. The contention of the counsel for the
respondent is that while deciding the said petition, the Apex Court
did not observe that the application preferred by the husband u/s 21
of DV Act is not maintainable.

18. In the case of Mrs.Merry Pinto decided by this Court, it was
observed in paragraph 8 of the said decision that it is well settled law
that while deciding an application for custody of minor child, the
only paramount consideration is welfare of minor child and the legal
rights of the parties or the parents are not relevant.
In the case of Ruchi Majoo (supra), the Apex Court has dealt
with the basic rules with regards interpretation of statutes and liberal
interpretation. It was observed that the first and foremost rule of
interpretation is the literal meaning of the words has to be taken into
consideration. In the case of Manoj Reberro the father of the minor
child had sought visitation rights. The High Court had declined to
grant the relief to the father. The Apex Court observed that
whatever may be the background of the case, it cannot be so
acrimonious so as to deny the right of the father to see his daughter.
In the case of Dr.Kanetkar (supra), this Court has observed that the
welfare of the child is paramount consideration It was observed that
jurisdiction of the Family Court under the both the parts of Section 7
do not cover the jurisdiction exercisable by Judicial Magistrate, First
Class in respect of grant of interim custody u/s 21 of the DV Act and
therefore there is no question of jurisdiction of the Magistrate u/s 21
of DV Act, 2005 being inconsistent with the provisions conferring
jurisdiction upon the Family Court and as such the DV Act of 1984
will not have any overriding effect upon 2005 Act. Reliefs available
u/s 18, 19, 20, 21 and 22 of DV Act, 2005 are in the nature of help,
which is extended to an aggrieved person in addition to the assistant
that the aggrieved person may have under any other law for the time
being in force whether civil or criminal. This is clear from the
provision of Section 26 of 2005 Act which lays down that any relief

available u/s 18, 19, 20, 21 and 22 of DV Act may also be sought in
any legal proceedings before the Civil Court, Family Court or a
Criminal Court. In other words, the relief available under the 2005
Act are supplementary in nature and do not exclude similar reliefs
available under the other laws. This is further reaffirmed
by the
provisions of Section 36 of 2005 Act prescribing that the provisions
of this Act shall be in addition to and not in derogation of provisions
of any other law for the time being in force.
19. It was also observed that the application filed under Section 21
of the Domestic Violence Act seeking interim custody is maintainable
before a Magistrate exercising jurisdiction in relation to area where
family Court is established and the Magistrate has jurisdiction to
decide such an application in accordance with law. Irresistible
conclusion further would be that the application filed under Section
21 before the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class Amravati in the
instant case is tenable and impugned order cannot be assailed on the
ground of want of jurisdiction.
20. For the reasons stated herein above, I do not find that the
order passed by the Courts below suffers from any legal infirmity and
petition is therefore devoid of merits and same deserves to be
dismissed. Hence, I pass the following order.
ORDER
(i) Criminal Application No.186 of 2016 stands dismissed;
(ii) the impugned orders are confirmed;
(iii) Parties to comply the order dated 5th January 2018 passed by
learned Metropolitan Magistrate, 31st Court, Vikroli, Mumbai.
(PRAKASH D. NAIK, J.)

21. At this stage learned Counsel for the applicant submits that the
applicant would take a decision whether to challenge the order
passed by this Court before the Apex Court. It is prayed that the
operation of the Trial Court's order be stayed and the interim
arrangement made vide order dated 3rd May, 2018 by this Court be
continued for a period of six weeks. It is also submitted that the
applicant had given access to the respondent No.1. The applicant had
complied the interim order dated 3rd May, 2018 and in the vacation
the access was given for two days every week. Learned counsel for
the respondent No.1 vehemently opposed the prayer of the applicant.
It is submitted that the respondent No. 1 is entitled for access of the
child. Although the order was passed by the trial Court on 5th
January, 2018 the said order is not complied. It is submitted that on
account of the vacation and Diwali festival, the respondent No.1 is
entitled for overnight custody of the child. Considering submissions
advanced by both the parties, interim arrangement in accordance
with order dated 3rd May, 2018, shall continue for a period of two
weeks from today.
(PRAKASH D. NAIK, J.)

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