Saturday 25 September 2021

Whether Accused Has Fundamental/Statutory Right To Appeal Against Conviction Eo Instanti?

 Mr. Ojha, the learned counsel for the petitioner

submitted that the constitutional right of the petitioner to have a

copy of the judgment of conviction and challenge the order of

conviction is infringed. An endeavor was made to impress upon the

Court that there are two distinct parts in the judgment of conviction

and sentence. The judgment of conviction precedes the proceedings

which are conducted by trial Court to impose the sentence. At the

stage of delivery of judgment itself, a right to prefer an appeal

there against arises to the accused. The denial of the opportunity to

prefer an appeal against the order of conviction causes grave

prejudice to the right of the accused, urged Mr. Ojha.


Sub Section (1) of Section 363 envisages that the copy of the judgment shall immediately after the pronouncement of judgment be given to the accused free of cost, when the accused is sentenced to imprisonment. Had it been the intention of the legislature that a copy of the judgment be made available to the accused the moment the judgment of conviction, meaning thereby holding the accused guilty of a particular offence, is pronounced, the legislature would not have used in Sub Section (4) of Section 353 of the Code the expression that ‘the copy thereof shall be made available for the perusal of the parties or their pleaders free of costs.’

25. In view of the aforesaid provisions contained in the Code,

we are afraid to accede to the submission on behalf of the petitioner that there is either a constitutional or statutory right to prefer an appeal against the order holding the person guilty of offence. The provisions contained in Section 235 of the Code cannot be stretched to hold that there is an independent right to assail the findings recorded by the learned Sessions Judge, apart from right to prefer an appeal against the order of conviction and sentence.

27. The matter can be looked at from a slightly different

perspective. If we accept the submission on behalf of the petitioner that in every matter, where the accused is held guilty of a particular offence, he has a right to prefer an appeal against the said finding of holding him guilty, then there is a clear and present risk of destroying the integrity of trial. It would entail a two stage consideration by the appellate Court. First, after the accused is held guilty of the offence. Second, consequent to imposition of sentence on the accused. Such proposition cannot be countenanced, especially in the absence of a statutory prescription.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL WRIT PETITION NO. 3214 OF 2021

Pankaj Arjunbhai Koli Vs  The State of Maharashtra 

CORAM : S. S. SHINDE &

N. J. JAMADAR, JJ.

DATE : 17th SEPTEMBER, 2021.


1. The Petitioner who is convicted for the offences

punishable under Section 376 (1), 376(2)(n) and 506(II) of the Indian

Penal Code, 1860 (‘Penal Code’) has preferred this petition for the

following relief:-

(a) this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to

direct the Ld. Sessions Judge to pronounce and

upload the judgment of conviction dated

18.08.2021 and permit the petitioner/accused

to avail the remedy of appeal fle of Ld.

Additional Sessions (Special Judge POCSO Act),

Mumbai, Court Room No. 39, arising out of C.R.

No. 128/2015 registered with the J.J. Marg

Police Station, Mumbai.


2. The background facts which are necessary for

determining the limited controversy raised in this petition can be

stated as under:-

The petitioner was sent for trial in a proceedings arising

out of C.R. No. 128/2015 registered with J.J. Marg Police Station,

Mumbai, for the offences punishable under Section 376(1), 376(2)

(n), 506(II), 354 of the Penal Code and Section 4 and 6 of Protection

of Children From Sexual Offences Act, 2012. Post conclusion of trail,

the learned Sessions Judge by an order dated 18th August, 2021,

held the petitioner guilty of offence punishable under Section 376(2)

(n) and 506 (II) of the Penal Code. It is the contention of the

petitioner that the petitioner has applied for a copy of judgment of

conviction. However, the learned Sessions Judge was persuaded to

reject the application without assigning any reason. The petitioner

was taken in custody. Bail application preferred by the petitioner

came to be rejected. Sentence has yet not been pronounced.

The substance of the claim of the petitioner is that the

petitioner must have been provided with a copy of judgment

whereby the petitioner was held guilty for the offences punishable

under Section 376(2)(n) and 506 (II) of the Penal Code as the

petitioner has a fundamental right to prefer an appeal against the

very order of conviction, as distinct from the judgment of conviction

and sentence.

3. In the light of submissions which were canvased

yesterday to the effect that the judgment of conviction has not yet

been pronounced and it was noted in the ordersheet only that the

petitioner was held guilty of aforesaid offences, we thought it

appropriate to call a report from the learned Sessions Judge to

ascertain the true state of affairs.

4. The learned Sessions Judge has submitted a report

dated 16th September, 2021 and informed that the entire judgment

was already typed and made ready in all respects on 18th August,

2021 itself. The learned Sessions Judge has also adverted to the

developments which took place in the intervening period. We do not

propose to delve into those details except recording that in the

intervening period six applications were filed on behalf of the

accused and the matter was required to be adjourned on twelve

occasions. Mr. Ojha did not dispute that six applications were filed

on behalf of the petitioner.

5. Mr. Ojha, the learned counsel for the petitioner

submitted that the constitutional right of the petitioner to have a

copy of the judgment of conviction and challenge the order of

conviction is infringed. An endeavor was made to impress upon the

Court that there are two distinct parts in the judgment of conviction

and sentence. The judgment of conviction precedes the proceedings

which are conducted by trial Court to impose the sentence. At the

stage of delivery of judgment itself, a right to prefer an appeal

there against arises to the accused. The denial of the opportunity to

prefer an appeal against the order of conviction causes grave

prejudice to the right of the accused, urged Mr. Ojha.

6. In order to lend support to the aforesaid submissions,

Mr. Ojha invited our attention to the provisions contained in Section

235 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (‘the Code’) and

interpretation put thereon by the Supreme Court in the case of

Santa Singh Vs. The State of Punjab1, and the subsequent

judgments which followed the proposition in the case of Santa Singh

(supra). Mr. Ojha laid special emphasis on the following

observations of Supreme Court in Para 2 of the judgment in the

case of Santa Singh (supra):

2. The appeal is limited to the

question of sentence and the principal

argument advanced on behalf of the

appellant is that I no not giving an

1 (1976) 4 SCC 190

opportunity to the appellant to be

heard in regard to the sentence to be

imposed on him after the judgment was

pronounced convicting him, the

learned Sessions Judge committed a

breach of Section 235(2) of the Code of

Criminal Procedure, 1973 and that

vitiated the sentence of death imposed

on the appellant. This argument is a

substantial one and it rests on the true

interpretation of Section 235(2). This

is a new provision and it occurs in

Section 235 of the Code of Criminal

Proceudre, 1973 which reads as

follows:

235. (1) After hearing arguments and

points of law (if any), the Judge shall

give a judgment in the case.

(2) If the accused is convicted, the

Judge shall, unless he proceeds in

accordance with the provisions of

Section 360, hear the accused on the

question of sentence, and then pass

sentence on him according to law.

This provision is clear and explicit and

does not admit of any doubt. It requires

that in very trial before a court of

sessions, there must be a decision as

to the guilt of the accused. The court

must, in the fst instance, deliver a

judgment convicting or acquitting the

accused. If the accused is acquitted, no

further question arises. But if he is

convicted, then the court has to “hear

the accused on the question of

sentence, and then pass sentence on

him according to law”. When a

judgment is rendered convicting the

accused, he is, at at that state, to be

given an opportunity to be heard in

regard to the sentence and it is only

after hearing him that the court can

proceed to pass the sentence.

7. Laying stress on the observations that “The Court, must,

in the frst instance deliver a judgment convicting or acquitting the

accused. --------. But if he is convicted, then the court has to hear

the accused on the question of sentence, and then pass sentence on

him according to law”, Mr. Ojha strenuously urged that the delivery

of a judgment of conviction is the requirement law fowing from

Section 235 of the Code.

8. Mr. Ojha, placed reliance on the judgment of Hon’ble

Supreme Court in the case of Modi Telefbers Ltd. & Others Vs.

Sujit Kumar Choudhary and Others2, wherein in the context of an

order passed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court, holding

the appellant therein guilty of contempt of Court, the Supreme

Court held that the fndings recorded by the learned Single Judge

could not have been treated to be an interlocutory order and the

appellant could not have been denied the right to challenge the said

order by preferring an appeal. Reliance was placed on the

observations contained in para 4 and 5 of the said judgment.

4. After hearing the learned counsel

for the parties and perusing the

impugned order, we fnd that the

Division Bench has committed gross

error in overlooking the contents of the

order of the learned Single Judge in

2 (2005) 7 SCC 40


which the fnding has been recorded

that the employer has committed

contempt by not paying full dues of the

workmen under the award.

5. Such an order of the learned

Single Judge could not have been

treated to be an interlocutory order and

the right of appeal denied to the

appellant employer merely because the

learned Single Judge had adjourned the

contempt proceedings to enable the

alleged contemnor to purge the

contempt or else for deciding the

quantum of punishment.

9. Our attention was also invited to the observations of

learned Single Judge of Chattisgarh High Court in the case of Kiran

Singh Vs. State of Chattisgarh and Another3, wherein, in the context

of the allegations that the learned trial Judge had merely recorded

in the order sheet that the judgment is written, signed and dated

separately, but the enquiry revealed that the said judgments were

not forthcoming on the record of the Court, the learned Single

Judge held that the order sheets cannot be construed as judgment.

Reliance was placed on para 26 to 29 of the said judgment.

26. The Division Bench of Patna High

Court in Ramautar Thakur V. State of

Bihar, held thus:

18. The Criminal Procedure Code,

unlike the Civil Procedure Code does not

defne ‘Judgment’ A judgment means the

expression of the opinion of the Court

arrived at after, a due consideration of the

3 2016 SCC OnLine Chh 2123

evidence and all the arguments. The above

meaning of the word ‘Judgment’, as is to

be found in Full Bench decisions of the

Madras High Court in Re Chinna Kaliappa

Goundan, of the Bombay High Court in

Emperor V. Nan-dial Chunt Lal and of the

Calcutta High Court in Damu Senapati V.

Shridhar Rajwar, was approved by their

Lordships Bhagwati and Imam JJ., in the

Supreme Court case just mentioned.

Their Lordships mentioned that the

observations of the Madras High Court in

its Full Bench decision, just referred to,

were quoted with approval by Sulaiman, J.,

in Dr. Hori Ram Singh v. Emperor: AIR

1939 FC 43 (T). in which his Lordships

Sulaiman, J., observed that the Criminal

Procedure Code did not defne a

‘judgment’, but various sections of the

Code suggested what it meant His

Lordships then discussed those sections

and concluded that ‘judgment’ in the Code

meant a judgment of conviction or

acquittal.

19. The question, therefore, for our

consideration is, is the order of dismissal

for default a ‘judgment’?

20. In the case of AIR 1928 Rang 238 (G),

it has been held that an order of dismissal

for default is not a ‘judgment’ within the

meaning of section 369, Criminal P.C.

21. In this connection the observation of

Sulaiman, J., in ‘Dr. Hori Ram Singh (T)’,

above mentioned, which was held by the

Supreme Court to be sound, may be

reproduced below:

“It will be seen that an order under section

435 can with diffculty be called a

‘judgment’. All that a judge does at his

preliminary stage is either to send for the

records of the lower Court with it a view to

examining them under section 439(1), or

to refuse to do so it is difficult to see how

the later can possibly be called, a

judgment of conviction. When such an

order consists of the one word “Dismissed”

can it necessarily be taken as a judicial

pronouncement that in the opinion of the

Judge the respondent was rightly

convicted upon the evidence? It seems to

me that all that it means is that the Judge

sees no adequate ground disclosed in the

petition or on the face of the judgment for

proceeding further.”

22. His Lordship Bhagwati, J. in the

Supreme Court case in delivering his own

‘judgment and that of His Lordship Imam,

J. observed thus:

“The “order dismissing the appeal or

criminal revision summarily or in limine

would no doubt be a fnal order of the High

Court not subject to review or revision even

by the High Court itself but would not

tantamount to a judgment replacing that

of the lower Court.”

(Emphasis supplied)

27.Thus, by now it is fairly settled that to

constitute a judgment rendered by a

Criminal Court, it is not the operative part

written in the order sheet which would

constitute the judgment but it is the

discussion on the merits of the

prosecution evidence, the arguments of

both the sides and the fndings based on

reasons to conclude the trial in conviction

or acquittal, which would constitute a

judgment.

28. If the orders in the order sheet

pasised in the present case would

constitute a judgment, then there is

nothing to be appealed against because

there is no discussion at all of the

prosecution case and the reasons for

recording of such fnding which entitles

the accused to be acquitted.

29. In view of the authoritative

pronouncements by the Supreme Court in

Jagdev Singh Talwandi (supra) and Yakub

Abdul Razak Memon (supra), the order

passed in order sheet in favour of each of

the petitioner acquitting them of the

charges by a two line order would not

constitute judgment, therefore, the trial

has not come to an end on the basis of

such order. Moreover, the trial Judge has

mentioned in the order sheet that the

judgment is signed and dated in the open

Court, however, there is no judgment

available in the record of the Court,

therefore, the Judge himself had construed

that there is a separate document which

he has referred as judgment, which is

distinct and separate than the order in the

order sheet wherein the acquittal is

recorded.

10. Lastly, Mr. Ojha, invited our attention to the observations

of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Balaji Baliram Mupade

and Another Vs. State of Maharashtra and Others4, wherein the

Supreme Court did not approve the practice of pronouncing the

fnal orders without a reasoned judgment. Emphasis was laid on the

observations of the Supreme Court in Para 11 and 12 of the said

judgment, which read as under:-

11. We must note with regret

that the counsel extended through

various judicial pronouncements

including the one referred to aforesaid

appear to have been ignored, more

importantly where oral orders are

pronounced. In case of such orders, it

is expected that they are either

4 2020 SCC OnLine SC 893

dictated in the Court or at least must

follow immediately thereafter, to

facilitate any aggrieved party to seek

redressal from the higher Court. The

delay in delivery of judgments has

been observed to be a violation of

Article 21 of the Constitution of India

in Anil Rai’s case (supra) and as

stated aforesaid, the problem gets

aggravated when the operative portion

is made available early and the

reasons follow much later.

12.It cannot be countenanced that

between the date of the operative

portion of the order and the reasons

disclosed, there is a hiatus period of

nine months! This is much more than

what has been observed to be the

maximum time period for even

pronouncement of reserved judgment

as per Anil Rai’s case (supra).

11. In opposition to this, Mrs. Shinde, the learned APP

would urge that there is no material irregularity in the proceedings

of the learned Sessions Judge. Mrs. Shinde, invited our attention to

the provisions contained in Section 354 and Section 363 of the

Code to buttress the submission that the right of the accused to

have a copy of the judgment crystallizes only upon the

pronouncement of the sentence. The thrust of submission of Mrs.

Shinde was that the sentence forms an integral part of the

judgment and till the sentence is pronounced there is no right of

appeal against the order holding the accused guilty of the offences

charged.

12. We have given our careful consideration to the

submissions canvased across the bar. We have also perused the

material on record including the copies of ordersheets, which are

annexed to the petition. We have carefully perused the judgments

cited across the bar by Mr. Ojha.

13. The moot question, which is sought to be urged on behalf

of the petitioner, is whether the accused has a right to have the copy

of the judgment the moment the judgment of conviction is

pronounced and a further right to assail the judgment of conviction

eo instanti. The edifce of the challenge is sought to be built around

the provisions contained in Section 235 of the Code. Section 235 of

the Code reads as under:-

235. Judgment of acquittal or

conviction.- (1) After hearing

arguments and point of law (if any),

the Judge shall give a judgment in the

cae.

(2) If the accused is convicted, the

Judge shall, unless he proceeds in

accordance with the provisions of

section 360, hear the accused on the

question of sentence, and then pass

sentence on him according to law.

14. In our view the reliance sought to be placed on the

aforesaid provisions does not advance the cause of the petitioner.

On a proper construction of the said provision, especially sub

section (2)of Section 235 of the Code, it becomes abundantly clear that an important and, in a sense, inviolable right of the accused to be heard on the point of sentence is secured thereby. The said provision, in our view, cannot be construed in such a fashion as to provide right to the accused to prefer an appeal against the order of conviction only. The observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Santa Singh (supra) especially the portion extracted above that ‘the Court must, in the first instance, deliver the judgment convicting or acquitting the accused’, do not imply that there is a distinct judgment of conviction followed by the judgment of sentence.

15. The aforesaid position becomes abundantly clear, if we

consider the relevant provisions in the Code. Section 353 of the

Code prescribes the manner in which the judgment shall be

pronounced. Section 354 of the Code deals with the language and

contents of the judgment. The relevant part of Section 354 reads as

under:-

354. Language and contents of

judgment.-(1) Except as otherwise

expressly provided by this Code, every

judgment referred to in section 353,-

(a) -------

b) -------

c) shall specify the offence (if any) of

which, and the section of the Indian

Penal Code (45 of 1860) of other law

under which, the accused is

convicted and the punishment to which

he is sentenced;

(d) -----

Section 372 of the Code declares that there is no right of

appeal unless expressly provided by the Code or any other law.

Section 372 of the Code reads as under:

372. No appeal to lie unless otherwise

provided.- No appeal shall lie from any

judgment or order of Criminal Court

except as provided for by this Code or by

any other law for the time being in force:

1 [Provided that the victim shall have a

right to prefer an appeal against any

order passed by the Court acquitting the

accused or convicting for a lesser offence

or imposing inadequate compensation,

and such appeal shall lie to the Court to

which an appeal ordinarily lies against

the order of conviction of such Court].

16. Section 374 of the Code provides for appeal from

conviction. Sub Section (2) and (3) of Section 374 are material,

which read as under:-

374. Appeals from convictions.

(1) --------

(2) Any person convicted on a trial held by

a Sessions Judge or an Additional

Sessions Judge or on a trial held by any

other Court in which a sentence of

imprisonment for more than seven years

has been passed against him or against

any other person convicted at the same

trial], may appeal to the High Court.

(3) Save as otherwise provided in subsection

(2), any person,-

(a) convicted on a trial held by a

Metropolitan Magistrate or Assistant

Sessions Judge or Magistrate of the frst

class, or of the second class, or

(b) sentenced under section 325, or

(c) in respect of whom an order has been

made or a sentence has been passed

under section 360 by any Magistrate, may

appeal to the Court of Session.

17. Section 386 of the Code describes the power of appellate

Court. Clause (b) of Section 386 of the Code is relevant for

determining the controversy at hand. It reads as under:-

386. Powers of the Appellate Court.-

After perusing such record and hearing

the appellant or his pleader, if he appears

and the Public Prosecutor, if he appears,

and in case of an appeal under section

377 or section 378, the accused, if he

appears, the Appellate Court may, if it

considers that there is no suffcient

ground for interfering, dismiss the appeal,

of may-

(a) xxxx

(b) in an appeal from a conviction-

(i) reverse the fnding and sentence and

acquit or discharge the accused, or order

him to be re-tried by a Court of contempt

jurisdiction subordinate to such Appellate

Court or committed for trial, or

(ii) alter the fnding, maintaining the

sentence, or

(iii) with or without altering the fnding,

alter the nature or the extent, or the

nature and extent, of the sentence, but

not so as to enhance the same;

18. A bare perusal of aforesaid provisions would indicate

that the clause ‘c’ of Sub Section (1) of Section 354 indicates that

the Court should specify the offence of which and Section of the

particular enactment under which the accused is convicted and the

punishment to which he is sentenced. The legislature has taken

care to provide that the conviction and sentence or consequential

orders form an integral part of the judgment whereby a person is

convicted. A judgment cannot be said to be complete unless the

punishment to which the accused is sentenced is set out therein.

This position is further clarifed by Sub Section (2) and (3) of

Section 374 of the Code. The forum before which the appeal may lie

is made dependent upon the quantum of sentence imposed by the

trial Court. Thus, what is appealable under Section 374 is a complete

judgment of conviction and not a mere finding of holding an

accused guilty of a particular offence. Section 386 of the Code,

extracted above, indicates that in a appeal from conviction the

appellate Court may (i) reverse the finding and sentence and acquit

or discharge the accused, or order him to be re-tried by a Court of

competent jurisdiction subordinate to such appellate Court or (ii)

alter the finding, maintaining the sentence, or (iii) with or without

altering the finding alter the nature or the extent, or the nature and

extent, of the sentence, but not so as to enhance the same. The

aforesaid text of Section 386 makes it crystal clear that the finding

and sentence form an inseparable part of judgment of conviction.

19. A useful reference, in this context, can be made to the a

3 judge bench decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Rama

Narang Vs. Ramesh Narang5. Para No. 13 and 15 are instructive.

They read as under:-

13. Chapter XXVII deals with

judgment. Section 35 sets out the

contends of judgment. It says that every

judgment referred to in Section 353

shall, inter alia, specify the offence (if

any) of which and the Section of the

Indian Penal Code or other law under

which, the accused is con- victed and

the punishment to which he is

5 (1995) 2 SCC 513

sentenced. Thus a judgment is not

complete unless the punishment to

which the accused person is sentenced

is set out therein. Section 356 refers to

the making of an order for notifying

address of previously convicted offender.

Section 357 refers to an order in regard

to the payment of compensation. Section

359 provides for an order in regard to

the payment of costs in non-cognizable

cases and Section 360 refers to release

on probation of good conduct. It will

thus be seen from the above provisions

that after the court records a conviction,

the accused has to be heard on the

question of sentence and it is only after

the sentence is awarded that the

judgment becomes complete and can be

appealed against under Section 374 of

the Code.

14. -----------

15. Under the provisions of the Code to

which we have already referred there are

two stages in a criminal trial before a

Sessions Court, the stage upto the

recording of a conviction and the stage

post conviction upto the imposition of

sentence. A judgment becomes complete

after both these stages are covered.

[emphasis supplied]

20. The aforesaid pronouncement settles the controversy

sought to be raised on behalf of the petitioner.

21. This leads us to the grievance of the petitioner that the

copy of the judgment of conviction ought to have been made

available to the petitioner immediately after the order of conviction

was pronounced.

22. The provisions contained in Section 353 of the Code

provide an answer to the controversy sought to be raised on behalf

of the petitioner. Sub Section (1) of Section 353 provides three

modes of pronouncement of judgment: (a) by delivering the whole of

the judgment; or (b) by reading out the whole of the judgment; or (c)

by reading out the operative part of the judgment and explaining

the substance of the judgment in a language which is understood by

the accused or his pleader.

23. Section 353 (4) of the Code reads as under:-

353. Judgment.-

(1) ------

(2)------

(3)------

(4) Where the judgment is pronounced in

the manner specifed in clause (c) of

sub-section (1), the whole judgment or a

copy thereof shall be immediately made

available for the perusal of the parties or

their pleaders free of cost.


24. Evidently, Sub Section (4) of Section 353 enjoins the

Court to immediately make available for the perusal of the parties or

the pleader free of cost the whole judgment or copy thereof where

the judgment is pronounced in the manner specified in clause (c) to

sub section (1). If this provision is compared and contrasted with

Section 363 of the Code which provides for furnishing a copy of the

judgment to the accused, the position becomes clear. Sub Section

(1) of Section 363 envisages that the copy of the judgment shall

immediately after the pronouncement of judgment be given to the

accused free of cost, when the accused is sentenced to

imprisonment. Had it been the intention of the legislature that a

copy of the judgment be made available to the accused the moment

the judgment of conviction, meaning thereby holding the accused

guilty of a particular offence, is pronounced, the legislature would

not have used in Sub Section (4) of Section 353 of the Code the

expression that ‘the copy thereof shall be made available for the

perusal of the parties or their pleaders free of costs.’

25. In view of the aforesaid provisions contained in the Code,

we are afraid to accede to the submission on behalf of the petitioner that there is either a constitutional or statutory right to prefer an appeal against the order holding the person guilty of offence. The provisions contained in Section 235 of the Code cannot be stretched to hold that there is an independent right to assail the findingsrecorded by the learned Sessions Judge, apart from right to prefer an appeal against the order of conviction and sentence.

26. Reliance sought to be placed on the judgment of Hon’ble

Supreme Court in the case of Modi Telefbers Ltd. & Ors.(surpa),

does not seem to be well founded, as the said decision was rendered

in the peculiar facts of the case where the Division Bench had held

that the order holding the person guilty of contempt was an

interlocutory order.

27. The matter can be looked at from a slightly different

perspective. If we accept the submission on behalf of the petitioner that in every matter, where the accused is held guilty of a particular offence, he has a right to prefer an appeal against the said finding of holding him guilty, then there is a clear and present risk of destroying the integrity of trial. It would entail a two stage consideration by the appellate Court. First, after the accused is held guilty of the offence. Second, consequent to imposition of sentence on the accused. Such proposition cannot be countenanced, especially in the absence of a statutory prescription.

28. For the foregoing reasons we do not find any merit in the

petition. The petition, therefore, deserves to be dismissed.

29. The petition thus stands dismissed.

30. The learned Sessions Judge shall proceed to pass an

appropriate sentence in accordance with law.

31. All concerned to act on an authenticated copy of this

order.

32. Registry to send an authenticated copy of this order to

the Court of learned Sessions Judge.

( N. J. JAMADAR, J.) (S. S. SHINDE, J.)


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