Further, for an offence to be made out under
Section 3(1)(s), merely abusing a member of a
Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe would not be
enough. At the same time, saying caste name would also
not constitute an offence. {Para 15}
16. In other words, to constitute an offence under
Section 3(1)(s) it would be necessary that the accused
abuses a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled
Tribe “by the caste name” in any place within public
view. Thus, the allegations must reveal that abuses
were laced with caste name, or the caste name had been
hurled as an abuse.
Ratio: The Supreme Court held that abusive language alone is not an offence under the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, unless it is used with the intent to humiliate a person by their caste, and mere insult, even with knowledge of caste, is not punishable without such specific intent.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. ______ OF 2026
KESHAW MAHTO @ KESHAW KUMAR MAHTO Vs STATE OF BIHAR & ANR.
1. Leave granted.
2. This appeal arises from the order passed by the
High Court of Judicature at Patna dated 15.02.2025 in
Criminal Appeal (SJ) No. 112 of 2023, by which the
appeal preferred by the appellant herein seeking to
challenge the legality and validity of the cognizance
and summoning order dated 09.10.2020 passed by the
trial court came to be dismissed.
3. It appears from the materials on record that the
appellant herein went before the High Court praying
for the following relief:-
“quashing the order dated 09.10.2020
passed by the learned III Additional
Sessions Judge-cum-Special Judge SC/ST,
Bhagalpur passed in Shivnarayanpur,
Kahalgao, P.S.Case No. 451/2019 (G.R.No.
108/2019) offences alleged u/s 341, 323,
504, 506 and 34 of the I.P.C. and 3(i)(2)
(s) SC/ST Act pending in the Court of III
Additional District and Sessions cum
2
Special Judge, SC/ST, Bhagalpur.“
4. The case of the prosecution in brief is that on
the date of the incident, the original First Informant
was sitting alongwith his friend at the Aanganwadi
Center situated at Santhali Tola. At that point of
time, the accused persons came over there and started
abusing the First Informant. It is alleged that some
abuses relating to the caste of the First Informant
were hurled.
5. In such circumstances referred to above, the
original First Informant lodged an FIR. The FIR was
investigated and ultimately chargesheet came to be
filed against the appellant herein and other coaccused.
On 09.10.2020, IIIrd Additional District and
Sessions Judge-cum-Special Judge, SC/ST, Bhagalpur,
took cognizance of the offence under Sections 341,
323, 379, 504 and 34 of the IPC respectively and
Sections 3(i)(r)(s) of the SC/ST (Prevention of
Atrocities) Act, 1989, respectively against all the
accused persons.
6. The appellant, being dissatisfied with the
cognizance and summoning order passed by the Sessions
Court, went in appeal before the High Court under
Section 14A of the SC/ST Act. The High Court declined
to quash the prosecution insofar as the appellant is
concerned. In such circumstances, the appellant is
3
here before this Court with the present appeal.
7. We have heard Ms. Preetika Dwivedi, learned
counsel appearing for the appellant and Mr. Samir Ali
Khan, learned counsel appearing for the respondent –
State. Respondent No. 2 – original First Informant,
although served with the notice issued by this Court,
has chosen not to remain present before this Court,
either in person or through an Advocate to oppose this
appeal.
8. We enquired with the learned counsel appearing
for the State to show us some material insofar as the
present appellant is concerned, sufficient enough to
frame charge and put him into trial. The learned
counsel appearing for the State, with all fairness,
submitted that except the fact that the appellant was
also present at the relevant point of time with the
co-accused, there is no specific overt act attributed
to him.
ANALYSIS
9. We have looked into the allegations levelled in
the FIR. We tried to understand the nature of the
allegations, more particularly, so far as the present
appellant is concerned. It does not seem to be the
case of the prosecution that the appellant herein
uttered any word from his own mouth.
10. We shall fist proceed to examine whether the
necessary ingredients to constitute the offence under
Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act
respectively are disclosed on a plain reading of the
FIR and the chargesheet. The sections read as under:-
“3. Punishments for offences atrocities.—
[(1) Whoever, not being a member of a
Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe,—
xxx
(r) intentionally insults or intimidates
with intent to humiliate a member of a
Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in
any place within public view;
(s) abuses any member of a Scheduled Caste
or a Scheduled Tribe by caste name in any
place within public view;”
11. This Court in Shajan Skaria v. The State of
Kerala & Anr., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2249, laid down the
ingredients to constitute an offence under Section
3(1)(r) of the SC/ST Act. It reads thus:-
“55. The basic ingredients to constitute
the offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the
Act, 1989 are:
a. Accused person must not be a member of
the Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe;
b. Accused must intentionally insult or
intimidate a member of a Scheduled Caste
or Scheduled Tribe;
c. Accused must do so with the intent to
humiliate such a person; and
d. Accused must do so at any place within
public view.”
(Emphasis supplied)
12. Section 3(1)(r) is attracted where the reason
for the intentional insult or intimidation by the
accused is that the person who is subjected to is a
member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe. In
other words, the offence under Section 3(1)(r) cannot
stand merely on the fact that the
informant/complainant is a member of a Scheduled Caste
or a Scheduled Tribe, unless the insult or
intimidation is with the intention to humiliate such a
member of the community.
13. To put it briefly - first, the fact that the
complainant belonged to a Scheduled Caste or a
Scheduled Tribe would not be enough. Secondly, any
insult or intimidation towards the complainant must be
on the account of such person being a member of a
Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe.
14. With a view to dispel any doubt and lend clarity,
we deem it appropriate to mention that even mere
knowledge of the fact that the complainant is a member
of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe is not
sufficient to attract Section 3(1)(r).
15. Further, for an offence to be made out under
Section 3(1)(s), merely abusing a member of a
Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe would not be
enough. At the same time, saying caste name would also
not constitute an offence.
16. In other words, to constitute an offence under
Section 3(1)(s) it would be necessary that the accused
abuses a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled
Tribe “by the caste name” in any place within public
view. Thus, the allegations must reveal that abuses
were laced with caste name, or the caste name had been
hurled as an abuse.
17. What appears from the aforesaid is the element of
humiliation is present in Section 3(1)(s) as well. It
has to be gathered from the intentional insult towards
the caste, and the content. The content under Section
3(1)(s) are the abuses hurled at a person belonging to
a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe. However, the
intent with which the abuses were hurled must be found
to be denigrating towards the caste, resulting into a
feeling of caste-based humiliation.
18. In the case at hand, we find that there is
nothing on record to indicate that the alleged acts of
the appellant were motivated for the reason that the
complainant is a member of a Scheduled Caste or a
Scheduled Tribe. Neither the FIR nor the chargesheet
contains any whisper of an allegation of insult or
intimidation by the appellant herein, let alone one
made with the intention to humiliate the complainant.
19. The allegations levelled in the FIR, even if
taken at their face value and accepted in their
entirety, do not prima facie, constitute an offence
under either Section 3(1)(r) or under Section 3(1)(s)
of the SC/ST Act.
20. Insofar as the offences under the IPC, the
allegations do not inspire confidence. We find that
the allegations levelled against the appellant in the
FIR do not meet the essential ingredients of any of
the offences and are rather general in nature. Mere
presence of the appellant does not establish his
participation in the alleged offence.
21. In such circumstances referred to above, we are
of the view that putting the appellant into trial,
along with other co-accused, will be travesty of
justice.
22. In view of the above, this appeal succeeds and is
hereby allowed. The impugned order passed by the High
Court is set aside and the criminal prosecution
against the appellant herein is hereby quashed.
23. Pending interlocutory application(s), if any,
is/are disposed of.
……………………………………………………………………….J.
[J.B. PARDIWALA]
…………………………………………………………………...J.
[ALOK ARADHE]
NEW DELHI;
JANUARY 12, 2026.
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