Coming back to Laxmi Narayan (supra), this Court has
held that mere mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the
charge-sheet should not be the basis for adopting a hands-off
approach. It has further held that it would be open for the court
to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is
there for the sake of it or whether there is evidence to back it. It
has been held that the courts may go by the nature of injuries
sustained; as to whether the injuries are inflicted on the vital/
delicate parts of the body and the nature of weapon used. It has
also been clarified that such an exercise would be permissible
after investigation and filing of chargesheet/framing of charges
or during the trial. {Para 12}
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 660 OF 2025
(@ SLP Criminal No. 3432 of 2023)
Naushey Ali & Ors. Vs State of U.P. & Anr.
K.V. Viswanathan, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. The present appeal calls in question the correctness of
the order dated 19.01.2023 in Application under Section 482
Cr.P.C. No. 1315 of 2023 on the file of the High Court of
Judicature at Allahabad. By the said order, the High Court, by
holding that a case involving allegation of Commission of
offence under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for
short ‘IPC’) cannot be compounded, dismissed the application
2
under Section 482 Cr.P.C., seeking quashment of proceedings.
Five of the eight appellants before the High Court – Naushey
Ali, Khushboo Ali, Khursheed, Raza Ali and Nanhe – are
before this Court in Appeal. The other three have passed away.
3. The facts of the case lie in a very narrow compass.
i) The appellants and respondent No.2 Mahmood S/o late
Abdul Lateef are residents of the same village - Barwara Khas,
District Moradabad, U.P.
ii) With respect to an occurrence on 11.08.1991, it was the
appellants’ party which first lodged Case Crime No. 248/91 on
the said day itself against the respondent No.2, his father and
others for offences punishable under Sections 147, 148, 149,
307, 325, 506, 323 and 504 of IPC.
iii) On 27.08.1991, Case Crime No. 248-A/91 was
registered by Abdul Lateef, on behalf of respondent No.2, in
FIR No. 141 of 1991. The sections, violations of which were
alleged were, 147, 148, 149, 307, 325, 506, 323 and 504 IPC.
3
This FIR was registered against all eight persons, including the
appellants.
iv) The gravamen of the allegation was that the appellants’
party wanted to pass the irrigation water through the field of the
complainant by forcibly digging the land. When it was resisted
by the complainant party, the appellants’ party abused them in
filthy language and assaulted Mahmood S/o Abdul Lateef with
lathi and iron bars. When Mahmood ran to save his life, Abdul
Waris (since deceased) opened fire from his rifle.
v) According to the complainant, on hearing the sound,
Munnan S/o Mangu and Vilayat S/o Inayat came and saved
them. Thereafter, they reached the Police Station to lodge a
report, when they found that the appellants’ party was already
present at the Police Station. A complaint was lodged by
Mahmood but the thumb impression on his behalf was put by
his father Abdul Lateef.
vi) On 07.09.1991, after investigation, the police filed a
final report No. 50/91 stating that the complaint was a false
4
complaint. It was recorded that during the course of
investigation, from the statements of witnesses, it was found
that the case has been falsely registered by the complainant as a
counter blast to FIR No. 248/91 lodged by the appellants’ party.
vii) However, on 05.09.1992, the police report was rejected
by the VIth Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Moradabad,
who summoned the appellants and the three others - Abdul
Waris, Rasheed and Maseeta (all since deceased), for trial, for
offences punishable under Sections 147, 148, 149, 307, 324,
325 and 323 of IPC and issued warrants.
viii) Aggrieved, the appellants challenged the order dated
05.09.1992 of the trial Court before the High Court in Criminal
Revision No. 1318 of 1992, wherein an interim order was
passed staying the order of 05.09.1992.
ix) The criminal revision was ultimately dismissed on
03.04.2015 after it remained pending for nearly twenty-three
years. It is the case of the appellants’ party that the dismissal of
5
the criminal revision was not known to them till October, 2022,
when they received summons from the trial Court.
x) It appears that, in the meantime, due to the intervention
of the elderly persons in the village, on 19.12.2022, a
compromise was entered into between the injured Mahmood
and the appellants.
xi) Based on the compromise and affidavit of the injured
Mahmood, the appellant and three others filed application under
Section 482 CrPC numbered as Criminal Misc. Application No.
1315 of 2023 before the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
praying for quashment of the entire proceedings in view of the
compromise entered into between the parties on 19.12.2022.
xii) It has also come on record that Case No. 248 of 1991
lodged on 11.08.1991 by the appellants’ party was settled
during the lifetime of Abdul Waris. There is no dispute that the
said case is not pending.
xiii) However, vide the impugned order, on the ground that
the matter related to an offence under Section 307 IPC in which
6
there are injuries and a fracture of the head of distal phalanx of
left ring finger received by R-2 Mahmood, the High Court held
that the matter cannot be compounded. The relevant part of the
judgment of the High Court is set out herein below:-
“Although it is a common ground between both the
learned counsels that parties have entered into
compromise and have settled their dispute outside the
Court. The said compromise has been filed by
separate affidavits and has also been filed by the
injured. Copy of which is Annexure-8 to the affidavit
but since the matter relates to offence under Section
307 IPC in which there are injuries and even fracture
of head of distal phalanx of left ring finger received
by Mehboob Ali and looking to the settled law with
regard to compounding of offence, the matter cannot
be compounded”
(Emphasis supplied)
xiv) Aggrieved, five of the eight petitioners before the High
Court are in appeal before us. Three others have passed away.
4. We have heard Mr. Anupam Mishra, learned counsel for
the appellants, Ms. Garima Prashad, learned Senior Advocate
and AAG for the respondent No.1-State of U.P. and Mr.
Harikumar V., learned counsel for respondent No.2- Mahmood.
7
We have also perused the records of the case as well as the
written submissions filed by the appellants.
5. The only question that arises for consideration is: Is the
present case a fit case where proceeding could be quashed,
particularly when Section 307 IPC has inter alia been invoked
in the summons?
6. At the outset, we want to set right the error that occurs in
the short order of the High Court. The High Court has not
appreciated the difference between compounding of an offence
and quashment of proceedings. As explained in Gian Singh vs.
State of Punjab and Another, (2012) 10 SCC 303, quashing of
offence or criminal proceedings on the ground of settlement
between an offender and victim is not the same thing as
compounding of offence. This Court, highlighting the
difference, had the following to say:-
“57. Quashing of offence or criminal proceedings on
the ground of settlement between an offender and
victim is not the same thing as compounding of
offence. They are different and not interchangeable.
Strictly speaking, the power of compounding of
8
offences given to a court under Section 320 is
materially different from the quashing of criminal
proceedings by the High Court in exercise of its
inherent jurisdiction. In compounding of offences,
power of a criminal court is circumscribed by the
provisions contained in Section 320 and the court is
guided solely and squarely thereby while, on the
other hand, the formation of opinion by the High
Court for quashing a criminal offence or criminal
proceeding or criminal complaint is guided by the
material on record as to whether the ends of justice
would justify such exercise of power although the
ultimate consequence may be acquittal or dismissal
of indictment.
58. Where the High Court quashes a criminal
proceeding having regard to the fact that the dispute
between the offender and the victim has been settled
although the offences are not compoundable, it does
so as in its opinion, continuation of criminal
proceedings will be an exercise in futility and justice
in the case demands that the dispute between the
parties is put to an end and peace is restored;
securing the ends of justice being the ultimate
guiding factor. No doubt, crimes are acts which have
harmful effect on the public and consist in
wrongdoing that seriously endangers and threatens
the well-being of the society and it is not safe to
leave the crime-doer only because he and the victim
have settled the dispute amicably or that the victim
has been paid compensation, yet certain crimes have
been made compoundable in law, with or without
the permission of the court. In respect of serious
offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc., or other
offences of mental depravity under IPC or offences
of moral turpitude under special statutes, like the
Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences
9
committed by public servants while working in that
capacity, the settlement between the offender and
the victim can have no legal sanction at all.
However, certain offences which overwhelmingly
and predominantly bear civil flavour having arisen
out of civil, mercantile, commercial, financial,
partnership or such like transactions or the offences
arising out of matrimony, particularly relating to
dowry, etc. or the family dispute, where the wrong is
basically to the victim and the offender and the
victim have settled all disputes between them
amicably, irrespective of the fact that such offences
have not been made compoundable, the High Court
may within the framework of its inherent power,
quash the criminal proceeding or criminal complaint
or FIR if it is satisfied that on the face of such
settlement, there is hardly any likelihood of the
offender being convicted and by not quashing the
criminal proceedings, justice shall be casualty and
ends of justice shall be defeated. The above list is
illustrative and not exhaustive. Each case will
depend on its own facts and no hard-and-fast
category can be prescribed.”
(Emphasis supplied)
7. As would be additionally clear from a close reading of
the above two paragraphs, even though compounding and
quashing are conceptually different, this Court was careful in
pointing out that merely because there is a settlement, for
certain categories of offences proceedings will not be quashed.
This is on the premise that crimes that have harmful effects on
10
the public and consist of wrongdoing that seriously endangers
and threatens the well-being of the society cannot be quashed,
only because the accused and the victim have amicably settled
the matter.
8. Coming to the facts, notwithstanding the fact that the
High Court has mixed up the concepts of compounding and
powers of quashment, still the case needs to be considered from
the point of view of Section 482.
9. Will the mere mention of Section 307 IPC in the
criminal proceedings force the court to adopt a hands-off
approach, when parties come forward with a settlement? In that
event, what should be the duty of the court and what are the
tests to be applied to decide in which cases settlements would
be accepted and in which cases it would not be?
10. In State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Laxmi Narayan and
Others, (2019) 5 SCC 688, after discussing the ratio in
Narinder Singh and Others vs. State of Punjab and Another,
(2014) 6 SCC 466 and other judgments, this Court held:-
11
“15. Considering the law on the point and the other
decisions of this Court on the point, referred to
hereinabove, it is observed and held as under:
15.1. That the power conferred under Section 482 of
the Code to quash the criminal proceedings for the
non-compoundable offences under Section 320 of the
Code can be exercised having overwhelmingly and
predominantly the civil character, particularly those
arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of
matrimonial relationship or family disputes and when
the parties have resolved the entire dispute amongst
themselves;
15.2. Such power is not to be exercised in those
prosecutions which involved heinous and serious
offences of mental depravity or offences like murder,
rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in
nature and have a serious impact on society;
15.3. Similarly, such power is not to be exercised for
the offences under the special statutes like the
Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences
committed by public servants while working in that
capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of
compromise between the victim and the offender;
15.4. Offences under Section 307 IPC and the Arms
Act, etc. would fall in the category of heinous and
serious offences and therefore are to be treated as
crime against the society and not against the individual
alone, and therefore, the criminal proceedings for the
offence under Section 307 IPC and/or the Arms Act,
etc. which have a serious impact on the society cannot
be quashed in exercise of powers under Section 482 of
the Code, on the ground that the parties have resolved
their entire dispute amongst themselves. However, the
High Court would not rest its decision merely because
there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the
charge is framed under this provision. It would be open
to the High Court to examine as to whether
incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake
of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient
evidence, which if proved, would lead to framing the
charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it
would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of
injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the
vital/delicate parts of the body, nature of weapons
used, etc. However, such an exercise by the High
Court would be permissible only after the evidence is
collected after investigation and the charge-sheet is
filed/charge is framed and/or during the trial. Such
exercise is not permissible when the matter is still
under investigation. Therefore, the ultimate conclusion
in paras 29.6 and 29.7 of the decision of this Court in
Narinder Singh should be read harmoniously and to be
read as a whole and in the circumstances stated
hereinabove;
15.5. While exercising the power under Section 482 of
the Code to quash the criminal proceedings in respect
of non-compoundable offences, which are private in
nature and do not have a serious impact on society, on
the ground that there is a settlement/compromise
between the victim and the offender, the High Court is
required to consider the antecedents of the accused; the
conduct of the accused, namely, whether the accused
was absconding and why he was absconding, how he
had managed with the complainant to enter into a
compromise, etc.”
(Emphasis supplied)
13
11. Before we apply this judgment to the facts, it will be
worthwhile to recall the observations of Sikri, J. in Narinder
Singh (supra):-
“26. Having said so, we would hasten to add that
though it is a serious offence as the accused person(s)
attempted to take the life of another person/victim, at
the same time the court cannot be oblivious to hard
realities that many times whenever there is a quarrel
between the parties leading to physical commotion
and sustaining of injury by either or both the parties,
there is a tendency to give it a slant of an offence
under Section 307 IPC as well. …”
(Emphasis supplied)
12. Coming back to Laxmi Narayan (supra), this Court has
held that mere mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the
charge-sheet should not be the basis for adopting a hands-off
approach. It has further held that it would be open for the court
to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is
there for the sake of it or whether there is evidence to back it. It
has been held that the courts may go by the nature of injuries
sustained; as to whether the injuries are inflicted on the vital/
delicate parts of the body and the nature of weapon used. It has
also been clarified that such an exercise would be permissible
after investigation and filing of chargesheet/framing of charges
or during the trial. [See 15.4 of Laxmi Narayan (supra)].
13. Coming to the facts of the case, admittedly, there is a
settlement between the parties. The case filed by the
appellants’ party which was prior in point of time and that too
on the same day of occurrence, has been settled.
14. It should be recalled that, at the outset, after
investigation, the police actually closed the case in its final
report of 07.09.1991. It was the trial Court, which by its order
of 05.09.1992, refused to accept the same and summoned the
appellants. The incident is of 11.08.1991, i.e. about 33½ years
back. No doubt, there is a reference to the firing in the FIR but
admittedly there was no injury. The allegation is that firing was
done by Abdul Waris. He is since deceased. The facts,
assuming to be true, also do not make out a case of common
object for the appellants under Section 149 IPC insofar as the
offence of Section 307 is concerned.
15. The role attributed to the seven members, including the
five appellants is not specific. General allegation was that they
abused in filthy language and assaulted Mahmood with lathi
and iron bars. The specific individual role was only attributed to
Adbul Waris, who is since deceased.
16. In any event, the police who investigated disbelieved the
entire story. No recoveries have been made of any pellets.
What engaged the attention of the High Court was only the
fracture of the head of the distal phalanx of left finger of
respondent No.2.
17. We have seen the injuries sustained by Mahmood (R-2)
from the medical evidence collected. From the injury report, it
is clear that while the first four injuries were contusions and
abrasions, injury Nos. 5, 6 and 7 pertained to incised lacerated
wound and swelling on the middle finger of the left hand. We
have also seen the x-ray report which shows that in the left
hand there was a fracture of the head of distal phalanx of left
ring finger. Assuming that this was the result of injury with
lathis or iron bar, applying the test in Laxmi Narayan (supra),
considering the injury and the nature of the weapon used,
certainly no offence under Section 307 IPC is made out.
18. Section 307 of IPC reads as under:-
“307. Attempt to murder.—
Whoever does any act with such intention or knowledge,
and under such circumstances that, if he by that act
caused death, he would be guilty of murder, shall be
punished with imprisonment of either description for a
term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be
liable to fine; and if hurt is caused to any person by such
act, the offender shall be liable either to imprisonment for
life, or to such punishment as is hereinbefore mentioned.
Attempts by life convicts.— When any person offending
under this section is under sentence of imprisonment for
life, he may, if hurt is caused, be punished with death.”
19. Keeping in mind the surrounding circumstances, the
nature of the weapon and the nature of the injury, on facts, we
are inclined to conclude that the overt act attributed to the
appellants does not bring the case within the four corners of the
Section 307 of IPC, either on a stand-alone basis or as held
above with the aid of Section 149 of IPC.
20. We are also inclined to conclude that considering the
overall circumstances, the nature of the weapon and the nature
of the injury (fracture of the head of distal phalanx of left ring
finger), the offence alleged, on facts, does not fall in that
category of cases where the court should deny relief in the
event of a settlement. At the highest, the offence alleged could
be one under Section 326 of IPC. It could not be said, on facts,
considering all the circumstances that this is a crime which has
such an harmful effect on the public and that it has the effect of
seriously threatening the well-being of the society. We make it
clear that we are saying so on the facts of the present case. We
are also firmly of the opinion that proceeding with the trial,
when parties have amicably resolved the dispute in the present
case, would be futile and the ends of justice require that the
settlement be given effect to by quashing the proceedings. It
would be a grave abuse of process to let this trial remain
pending under the above circumstances, particularly when the
dispute is settled and resolved.
18
21. It should also be borne in mind that this was a case
which resulted in a closure report from the side of the police.
The State has also before us, after placing the law, fairly left it
to the court to take a decision.
22. In Ramgopal v. State of M.P, (2022) 14 SCC 531, Surya
Kant, J. speaking for this court, in a case involving a charge
under Section 326 IPC, while annulling the proceedings,
felicitously set out the statement of law and applied it to the
facts of the said case as under:
“19. We thus sum up and hold that as opposed to
Section 320 CrPC where the Court is squarely guided
by the compromise between the parties in respect of
offences “compoundable” within the statutory
framework, the extraordinary power enjoined upon a
High Court under Section 482 CrPC or vested in this
Court under Article 142 of the Constitution, can be
invoked beyond the metes and bounds of Section 320
CrPC. Nonetheless, we reiterate that such powers of
wide amplitude ought to be exercised carefully in the
context of quashing criminal proceedings, bearing in
mind:
19.1. Nature and effect of the offence on the
conscience of the society;
19.2. Seriousness of the injury, if any;
19
19.3 Voluntary nature of compromise between the
accused and the victim; and
19.4 Conduct of the accused persons, prior to and
after the occurrence of the purported offence and/or
other relevant considerations.
20. Having appraised the aforestated parameters and
weighing upon the peculiar facts and circumstances of
the two appeals before us, we are inclined to invoke
powers under Article 142 and quash the criminal
proceedings and consequently set aside the conviction
in both the appeals. We say so for the reasons that:
20.1. Firstly, the occurrence(s) involved in these
appeals can be categorised as purely personal or
having overtones of criminal proceedings of private
nature.
20.2. Secondly, the nature of injuries incurred, for
which the appellants have been convicted, do not
appear to exhibit their mental depravity or
commission of an offence of such a serious nature
that quashing of which would override public
interest.
20.3. Thirdly, given the nature of the offence and
injuries, it is immaterial that the trial against the
appellants had been concluded or their appeal(s)
against conviction stand dismissed.
20.4. Fourthly, the parties on their own volition,
without any coercion or compulsion, willingly and
voluntarily have buried their differences and wish to
accord a quietus to their dispute(s).
20.5. Fifthly, the occurrence(s) in both the cases
took place way back in the years 2000 and 1995,
20
respectively. There is nothing on record to evince
that either before or after the purported compromise,
any untoward incident transpired between the
parties.
20.6. Sixthly, since the appellants and the
complainant(s) are residents of the same village(s)
and/or work in close vicinity, the quashing of
criminal proceedings will advance peace, harmony,
and fellowship amongst the parties who have
decided to forget and forgive any ill will and have
no vengeance against each other.
20.7. Seventhly, the cause of administration of
criminal justice system would remain un-effected on
acceptance of the amicable settlement between the
parties and/or resultant acquittal of the appellants;
more so looking at their present age.”
23. Considering the special features of the case and taking
the settlement on record and applying the law, we find that this
is a fit case where proceedings in complaint case No. 8023 of
2015 arising out of Case Crime No. 248 of 1991 pending in the
Court of Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Court No.5,
Moradabad should be quashed.
24. In view of the above, we allow the Appeal. The order of
the High Court in application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. No.
21
1315 of 2023 dated 19.01.2023 shall stand set aside and
proceeding in Complaint Case No. 8023 of 2015 arising out of
Case Crime No. 248 of 1991 pending in the Court of Additional
Chief Judicial Magistrate, Court No. 5, Moradabad shall stand
quashed.
…....…………………J.
(K.V. Viswanathan)
.…...…………………J.
(S.V. N. Bhatti)
New Delhi;
11th February, 2025.
Print Page
No comments:
Post a Comment