Union of India & Ors. v. Maheshkumar Gordhandas Garodia, Civil Revision Application (ST.) No. 23914 of 2023, decided on 17 March 2026
The Bombay High Court has reaffirmed a basic but often ignored procedural principle: when the very cause of action in a suit disappears because of subsequent events, the court should not keep the suit alive merely because an interim order is operating. In Union of India & Ors. v. Maheshkumar Gordhandas Garodia, Justice Sandeep V. Marne held that a lease suit seeking declaration of subsistence of a 99-year lease became infructuous once the lease itself expired on 14 October 2016, and therefore the suit deserved dismissal under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
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Case details
The case was decided by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in Civil Revision Application (ST.) No. 23914 of 2023. The judgment was reserved on 5 March 2026 and pronounced on 17 March 2026.
The applicants were Union of India, Deputy Salt Commissioner, and Joint Secretary, while the respondent was Maheshkumar Gordhandas Garodia. The revision challenged the City Civil Court’s order dated 11 November 2022 refusing to dismiss the pending suit as infructuous.
Facts in brief
The dispute concerned salt-pan lands at Kanjur, namely Arthur Salt Works and Jenkins Salt Works, which had been leased for 99 years commencing from 15 October 1917 for the purpose of salt manufacture. The Union of India terminated the leases on 2 November 2004.
The lessee filed a suit in 2005 seeking a declaration that the termination orders were illegal and that the lease agreements were valid, subsisting, and binding. During pendency of the suit, however, the lease period expired by efflux of time on 14 October 2016.
After the lease expired, the Union of India moved Notice of Motion No. 3788 of 2016 seeking dismissal of the suit on the ground that its cause of action had come to an end. The City Civil Court rejected that request, which led to the present revision.
Issue before the Court
The main issue was whether a suit that was maintainable when filed can later be dismissed as infructuous because of supervening events. The further question was whether the court could use its inherent power under Section 151 CPC for this purpose when Order VII Rule 11 CPC was not attracted.
The respondent argued that Section 151 could not be invoked where the Code contained specific provisions and also claimed that the suit should survive because he intended to amend the plaint to seek renewal of lease. The High Court was therefore required to examine both the scope of Section 151 CPC and the effect of future or proposed pleadings
What the Court held
The High Court held that the suit had indeed become infructuous. The plaint only challenged the 2 November 2004 termination orders and sought a declaration that the lease remained valid and subsisting; it contained no prayer for renewal of lease.
Since the lease was admittedly for 99 years from 15 October 1917 and expired on 14 October 2016, the core declaratory relief had become ineffective and unnecessary. The court therefore concluded that there was no need to continue adjudication on the earlier termination once the plaintiff’s right to occupy the land had otherwise come to an end.
Why Section 151 CPC was used
The court clarified that Order VII Rule 11 CPC was not applicable because the plaint did disclose a valid cause of action at the time of institution. The real problem arose later, when the cause of action ceased to exist due to expiry of the lease during pendency of the suit.
In such a situation, the court held that dismissal can be traced to Section 151 CPC, which preserves the court’s inherent power to make orders necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of process. The judgment states that where no specific provision of the Code covers dismissal of a suit rendered useless by a supervening event, inherent powers can be exercised.
Reliance on Supreme Court precedent
Justice Marne relied heavily on Shipping Corporation of India Ltd. v. Machado Brothers, where the Supreme Court held that if subsequent events render a proceeding infructuous, it becomes the duty of the court to dispose of such dead litigation. The Bombay High Court treated that decision as directly governing the issue before it
The judgment also adopted the Supreme Court’s important procedural observation that interlocutory orders are made in aid of final orders and not vice versa. Therefore, a suit cannot be kept pending just to preserve an interim injunction.
Amendment plea rejected
One of the respondent’s key arguments was that he had moved, or intended to move, for amendment of the plaint to incorporate a prayer for renewal of lease. The High Court rejected this line of defence
The court noted that as on the date of the impugned order, namely 11 November 2022, no amendment application was before the trial court. It further recorded that the chamber summons for amendment was filed only on 30 June 2025, almost three years later, and till date the plaint did not contain any prayer for renewal.
The court held that whether a suit has become infructuous must be decided on the basis of the cause of action actually pleaded, not on the basis of a party’s future plans. A dead suit, the court said in substance, cannot be kept alive indefinitely in the hope that a new cause of action may later be introduced by amendment.
Ratio of the judgment
The ratio of the decision is that a civil suit whose pleaded cause of action has disappeared because of a supervening event may be dismissed as infructuous under Section 151 CPC, provided no specific provision of the Code covers the situation. A court cannot retain such a suit merely because dismissal would bring an interim order to an end.
The decision also reinforces that future or proposed amendments cannot justify retaining an otherwise infructuous suit on the file. The court must examine the reliefs actually claimed and the cause of action actually pleaded as on the relevant date.
Final order
The High Court held that the trial court had committed a jurisdictional error in refusing to dismiss the suit. It set aside the order dated 11 November 2022, made Notice of Motion No. 3788 of 2016 absolute to the extent of dismissal of Civil Suit No. 6256 of 2005, and dismissed the suit.
The revision application was accordingly allowed, with no order as to costs. The respondent’s oral request for stay of the judgment for four weeks was also rejected.
Why this ruling matters
This judgment is a valuable authority on the distinction between a plaint that never disclosed a cause of action and a suit whose cause of action disappears later. The former may attract Order VII Rule 11 CPC, but the latter can justify dismissal under Section 151 CPC where supervening events make the relief otiose.
For property, lease, and declaratory litigation, the ruling sends a clear message that courts should not allow stale proceedings to continue only because interim protection once existed. Procedural law is meant to aid justice, not to preserve litigation after its legal life has already ended.
Suggested excerpt
“A suit cannot be kept pending merely to ensure continuation of an interim order. Once the pleaded cause of action disappears due to a supervening event, the court must use its inherent powers under Section 151 CPC to terminate infructuous litigation.”
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