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Sunday, 19 April 2026

Supreme Court: Whether an appellate court can dismiss an appeal solely on the basis of an unrebutted affidavit of the respondent without considering the entire material on record, including the trial court record?

Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and having

perused the documentary material on record, we are of the view

that the writ petition did not warrant dismissal solely on the

ground that the original plaintiffs failed to file any rejoinder to the defendants’ affidavit in reply dated 12th April 2023. In our view, all relevant material that was brought on record by both the parties ought to have been examined while deciding the writ petition. The affidavit in reply dated 12th April 2023 could have been considered as additional material in opposing the claim for eviction on theground of bonafide need. Dismissal of the writ petition solely on the ground of non-traverse has, in our view, vitiated the impugned judgment. {Para 6}.

18. In the case of Gaya Prasad v. Pradeep Srivastava [(2001)

2 SCC 604], this Court held that the landlord should not be

penalised for the slowness of the legal system and the crucial

date for deciding the facts of the requirement of the landlord is

the date of his application for eviction. It is also observed that

the process of litigation cannot be made the basis for denying

the landlord relief unless the litigation at least reaches the final

stages. However, it is further added that subsequent events

may, in some situations, be considered to have overshadowed

the genuineness of the landlords’ needs but only if they are of

such nature and dimension as to completely eclipse such need

and make it lose the significance altogether.”

In the light of above discussion, the High Court failed to consider whether the subsequent event as urged by the defendants had material bearing on the right claimed by the plaintiffs. It has to be borne in mind that the Trial Court had passed a decree for eviction on the basis of the evidence on record which was reversed by the Appellate Court. It was, therefore, necessary for the High Court to have taken into consideration the entire material available on record including the affidavit dated 12th April 2023. Thus, by failing to do so, the High Court failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in it while deciding the challenge to the reversal of the decree for eviction. We, therefore, find that the order passed by the High Court deserves interference.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2026

MARIA MARTINS  Vs NOEL ZUZARTE AND OTHERS 

Author: ATUL S. CHANDURKAR, J.
Citation: 2026 INSC 376

1. Leave granted.

2. The appellant is aggrieved by the order dated 04th February

2025 passed by a learned Single Judge of the Bombay High Court1

in Writ Petition No.1458 of 2003. By the said order, the writ

petition preferred by the appellant challenging the reversal of the

decree for eviction by the first Appellate Court came to be

dismissed.

3. The appellant is one of the legal heirs of Mr. Francis Paul

Martins. According to the legal heirs of Mr. Martins, he was a

1 For short, “the High Court”

Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No.11349 of 2025 Page 2 of 9

monthly tenant of Room Nos.59 and 63 situated at Iqbal Manzil,

Dr. Ambedkar Road, Parel, Mumbai-400 012. Room No.59 had

been let out to Mr. Diego Zuzarte, the predecessor of the

respondents. He was paying rent to Mr. Martins and was treated

as his sub-tenant. On 5th December, 1994, suit for eviction came

to be filed under Section 28 of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and

Lodging House Rates Control Act, 19472 by the legal heirs of Mr.

Martins. The eviction of the sub-tenant was sought on the ground

of bonafide need of the family of the principal tenant. It was

specifically pleaded that the plaintiffs required the suit premises

for their bonafide need so as to occupy the same. In the written

statement filed on behalf of the defendants, the case as pleaded

was denied.

4. Before the Trial Court, the parties led evidence. By judgment

dated 18th July 2001, the learned Judge of the Trial Court recorded

a finding that the plaintiffs had proved their bonafide need in

respect of Room No.59 that was occupied by the defendants as the

said premises was required for privacy of the widow of Mr. Martins,

who was an old lady having 87 years of age and there were six

2 For short, the Act


daughters who used to visit her place. It was further held that

greater hardship would be caused to the plaintiffs if the decree for

eviction was not passed. The suit was, accordingly, decreed.

The defendants being aggrieved by the decree of eviction

challenged the same by filing an appeal. The Appellate Court

reversed the said decree on the reasoning that the plaintiff No.1,

who was the widow of Mr. Martins had expired and, therefore, the

bonafide need of the plaintiffs did not survive. Accordingly, the

decree for eviction was set aside and the suit for eviction was

dismissed.

5. The original plaintiffs being aggrieved by the reversal of the

decree for eviction approached the High Court and challenged the

aforesaid judgment in a writ petition filed under Article 227 of the

Constitution of India. During pendency of the writ petition, the

original defendants placed on record an affidavit in reply dated 12th

April 2023, wherein it was stated that Room No.63 that was in

occupation of the original plaintiffs was not being utilised by them

and that the said room was occupied by some other persons. When

the writ petition was taken up for hearing, it was noticed that the

original plaintiffs had not filed any rejoinder to the defendants’

affidavit. The High Court, thus, held that the plaintiffs had let out

Room No.63 despite the same being available to them which

indicated that they did not bonafide require the suit premises.

Accordingly, the writ petition was dismissed. Being aggrieved, one

of the original plaintiffs has filed the present appeal.

6. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and having

perused the documentary material on record, we are of the view

that the writ petition did not warrant dismissal solely on the

ground that the original plaintiffs failed to file any rejoinder to the defendants’ affidavit in reply dated 12th April 2023. In our view, all relevant material that was brought on record by both the parties ought to have been examined while deciding the writ petition. The affidavit in reply dated 12th April 2023 could have been considered as additional material in opposing the claim for eviction on theground of bonafide need. Dismissal of the writ petition solely on the ground of non-traverse has, in our view, vitiated the impugned judgment.

7. Suffice it to observe that it was the specific case of the

plaintiffs that they had bonafide need of Room No.59 occupied by

the defendants as the same was required by the family for their

own use and occupation. By leading evidence before the Trial

Court, the plaintiffs were successful in securing the decree for

eviction. The Appellate Court reversed the said decree principally

on the ground that the suit premises was primarily required for

the widow of Mr. Martins, who was alive when the suit was filed

but had subsequently expired. This adjudication was the subject

matter of challenge at the instance of plaintiffs before the High

Court. The defendants sought to support the reversal of the decree

for eviction by stating in their affidavit dated 12th April 2023 that

Room No.63 that was in occupation of the plaintiffs had been let

out to some other persons. This factor was required to be taken

into consideration along with all other evidence that was available

on record while considering the challenge to the decree of the

Appellate Court. The affidavit by itself could not have been the sole

basis for coming to a conclusion that the plaintiffs did not bonafide

need the suit premises, without examining the material on record.

In this regard, we may refer to the decision in Atma S. Berar Vs.

Mukhtiar Singh 2002 INSC 533 wherein it was held as under:

“The power of the Court to take note of subsequent events is

well-settled and undoubted. However, it is accompanied by

three riders : firstly, the subsequent event should be brought

promptly to the notice of the Court; secondly, it should be

brought to the notice of the Court consistently with rules of

procedure enabling Court to take note of such events and

affording the opposite party an opportunity of meeting or

explaining such events; and thirdly, the subsequent event must

have a material bearing on right to relief of any party.”

8. In this context, we are also guided by the principle laid down

by this Court in Maganlal son of Kishanlal Godha Vs.

Nanasaheb son of Udhaorao Gadewar4. While dealing with a

landlord-tenant dispute, it was held that the adjudication of

bonafide need should be done as on the date when the suit for

eviction was filed, unless some subsequent event materially

changes the ground of relief. It was further held that subsequent

events may be considered to have overshadowed the genuineness

of the landlord’s requirement only if they are of such nature and

dimension as to make it lose its significance altogether. This Court

observed as under:

“17. In Pratap Rai Tanwani v. Uttam Chand [(2004) 8 SCC

490], it was held that the bona fide requirement of the landlord

has to be seen on the date of the petition and the subsequent

events intervening due to protracted litigation will not be

relevant. It was held that the crucial date is the date of petition;

therefore, the normal rule is that the rights and obligations of

the parties are to be determined on the date of petition and that

subsequent events can be taken into consideration for moulding

the reliefs, provided such events had a material impact on those

rights and obligations. It was further observed that it is stark

reality that the longer is the life of the litigation the more would

be the number of developments sprouting up during the long

interregnum. Therefore, the courts have to take a very

pragmatic approach of the matter. It is common experience in

4 CA No.6125/2008 decided on 16.10.2008


our country that especially landlord-tenant litigations prolong

for a long time. It is true that neither can the person who has

started the litigation sit idle nor can the development of the

event be stopped by him. Therefore, the crucial event should be

taken as on the date when the suit for eviction was filed, unless

the subsequent events materially change the ground of relief.

18. In the case of Gaya Prasad v. Pradeep Srivastava [(2001)

2 SCC 604], this Court held that the landlord should not be

penalised for the slowness of the legal system and the crucial

date for deciding the facts of the requirement of the landlord is

the date of his application for eviction. It is also observed that

the process of litigation cannot be made the basis for denying

the landlord relief unless the litigation at least reaches the final

stages. However, it is further added that subsequent events

may, in some situations, be considered to have overshadowed

the genuineness of the landlords’ needs but only if they are of

such nature and dimension as to completely eclipse such need

and make it lose the significance altogether.”

In the light of above discussion, the High Court failed to consider whether the subsequent event as urged by the defendants had material bearing on the right claimed by the plaintiffs. It has to be borne in mind that the Trial Court had passed a decree for eviction on the basis of the evidence on record which was reversed by the Appellate Court. It was, therefore, necessary for the High Court to have taken into consideration the entire material available on record including the affidavit dated 12th April 2023. Thus, by failing to do so, the High Court failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in it while deciding the challenge to the reversal of the decree for eviction. We, therefore, find that the order passed by the High Court deserves interference.


9. The contention of the appellant that the contents of the

affidavit did not warrant acceptance is an aspect that requires

consideration. Since we are inclined to remand the proceedings to

the Trial Court for re-consideration of the matter in the light of

subsequent events, we do not intend to delve at length on this

aspect or as regards the material placed on record by either party,

since any observations made could prejudice the Courts. In our

view, the interests of justice would be served if the proceedings are

re-considered by the Trial Court in the light of material brought on

record and the subsequent events that have since occurred during

pendency of the proceedings. To enable the parties to buttress

their respective stands, they are granted liberty to amend their

pleadings in accordance with law. The Trial Court would thereafter

consider the entire material on record and decide the proceedings

on their own merits, uninfluenced by any observations made either

by the Trial Court or by the Appellate Court.

10. Accordingly, it is held as under:

(a) The order dated 4th February 2025 passed in Writ Petition

No.1458 of 2003 is set aside.

(b) The proceedings in R.A.E. Suit No.70 of 1995 are remanded to

the Small Causes Court, Mumbai for being decided afresh in

Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No.11349 of 2025 Page 9 of 9

accordance with law. The parties are at liberty to amend their

pleadings and thereafter lead further evidence in accordance with

law.

(c) Since the plaintiffs seek eviction on the ground of their bonafide

need, the Trial Court shall endeavor to decide the suit within a

period of one year from the date the parties appear before it,

subject to co-operation by the parties.

(d) The parties shall appear before the Small Causes Court,

Mumbai on 22nd April 2026.

It is clarified that we have not expressed any opinion on the

merits of the case and all issues are kept open for consideration by

the Trial Court in accordance with law.

11. The Civil Appeal is allowed in aforesaid terms with no order

as to costs. Pending application(s), if any, are also disposed of.

……..………………………..J.

[ J.K.MAHESHWARI ]

.…..……..…………………..J.

[ ATUL S. CHANDURKAR ]

NEW DELHI,

APRIL 16, 2026.


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