The High Court has, in our considered opinion, rightly
doubted the prosecution case insofar as the alleged recovery of
the dead body at the instance of accused Balraj @ Tiloo is
concerned. The reasons assigned by the High Court are cogent
and borne out from the record. Firstly, because at the time of
arrest of accused Balraj @ Tiloo police was not aware that the
deceased had been killed as PW1 merely filed a missing report,
then how come on the arrest memo filed on the very same date it
was mentioned that the accused was arrested for offence under
Sections 302, 394 and 201 of IPC. Secondly, the testimony of
P.W.5 Basant Singh, an independent witness, materially
undermines the prosecution case. PW5 in his testimony stated
that police had already visited and examined well from where the
dead body was discovered on 28.04.2007 itself, however since the
boring machine was not available, the dead body was recovered
on 29.04.2007. Further P.W.5 stated that none of the accused
people were present on the spot when the recovery was being
made. High Court observed that the Trial Court has totally
ignored the testimony of PW5, which is a crucial piece of evidence as the said testimony challenges the position of the prosecution. Thirdly, the requirement of independent witnesses, more particularly, as per Section 100(4) of Cr.P.C. is to provide
credibility to the investigation. In the present case, admittedly,
the dead body was recovered in the presence of one witness i.e.
P.W. 2 who happens to be uncle of deceased and another person
namely, Ramawtar who has not been produced by the
prosecution for his examination before the Court. {Para 29}
NON-REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 1353-1355 OF 2017
PAWAN KUMAR SHARMA Vs MANOJ KUMAR & ORS.
Author: PRASANNA B. VARALE, J.
Citation: 2026 INSC 539.
Dated: MAY 25, 2026.
1. The present criminal appeals arise out of the judgment and
order dated 30th January 2015 passed by the High Court of
Judicature for Rajasthan at Jaipur Bench, in D.B. Criminal
Appeal Nos. 923/2008, 844/2008, and 606/2010. By the
impugned judgment and order, the High Court allowed the
appeals of the respondents/accused persons and set aside the
order of conviction and sentence passed by the Trial Court
against respondents/accused persons namely, Manoj Kumar,
Manjeet Kumar @ Billu, Balraj @ Tiloo, and Vijay Singh @ Sunder
under Sections 364 r/w 120B, 302 r/w 120 B, 396 and 201 of
the Indian Penal Code, 1860 [hereinafter referred to as “IPC”].
BRIEF FACTS
2. For the sake of brevity and for maintaining continuity, the
parties are referred to as per their nomenclature before the Trial
Court.
3. The factual matrix of the case is that on 28.04.2007, the
complainant, Pawan Kumar Sharma (P.W.1), submitted a written
2
report before the Police Station Khetri stating that on
26.04.2007, around 5:00 PM, two boys came to his shop and
hired a Bolero Jeep, operated as a taxi by his brother Ashok
Kumar Sharma [hereinafter referred to as “deceased”], to go
towards Lambi Road. The deceased was supposed to return on
the same night, however both the deceased as well as the vehicle
went missing.
4. The report came to be lodged at the instance of P.W. 1
Pawan Kumar Sharma/complainant. On lodgment of report i.e.,
the First Information Report Case no. 122/2007, the criminal
machinery was set into motion and the investigating agency
proceeded. In the course of investigation, four accused persons
namely, Manoj Kumar, Manjeet Kumar @ Billu, Balraj @ Tiloo,
Vijay Singh @ Sunder and Surendra Kumar were arrested. As per
prosecution accused Balraj @ Tiloo was arrested on 28.04.2007
and on the basis of his disclosure statement dead body of
deceased was discovered in a dry well on the same day.
5. The investigation concluded by filing charge sheet against
the accused persons for commission of offences under Sections
364, 302, 396 and 201 read with Section 120B IPC.
3
6. The learned Trial Court framed charges against the four
accused persons whereas one of the accused person namely,
Surender Kumar being juvenile was put to separate trial before
the Juvenile Justice Board.
7. Criminal Sessions Case No. 131/07 was registered against
Balraj @ Tiloo, Manjeet Kumar @ Billu, Vijay Singh @ Sunder, and
Manoj Kumar [hereinafter collectively referred to as
‘respondents/ accused persons’]. In order to prove its case, the
prosecution presented 18 witnesses and submitted 65
documents. The respondents/accused persons, however, did not
examine any witnesses but presented four documents in its
support.
8. The Trial Court on its appreciation of evidence holds all four
respondents/accused persons guilty and vide its judgment and
order dated 26.07.2008 convicted them for committing offences
under Sections 364/120B, 302/120B, 396, and 201 of IPC and
awarded sentences as follows:
IPC Section
found guilty
of
Punishment granted Punishment in
default of fine
364/120B Life Imprisonment + Rs. 500
fine
R.I. for Two
months
302/120B Life Imprisonment + Rs. 500 R.I. for Two
4
fine months
396 Life Imprisonment + Rs. 500
fine
R.I. for Two
months
201 R.I. for 3 years + Rs. 300 fine R.I. for One month
9. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order of the Trial
Court all the respondent/ accused persons challenged the
judgment and order of the Trial Court by way of three separate
appeals, D.B. Criminal Appeal Nos. 923/2008, 844/2008, and
606/2010 before the High Court of Rajasthan at Jaipur.
10. The High Court on its reappreciation and scrutiny of the
evidence found that the evidence led by the prosecution failed to
complete the chain of circumstances so as to hold them guilty for
recording the conviction and awarding the sentence. The High
Court also found that the evidence insofar as the identification is
concerned against one of the accused Vijay Singh @ Sunder is too
weak. Consequently, the High Court set aside the judgment and
order of conviction and sentence passed by the Trial Court.
Resultantly all the four respondents/ accused persons were
acquitted.
11. Aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the High
Court, complainant/Pawan Kumar Sharma and State of
Rajasthan have preferred separate appeals before us.
5
CONTENTIONS
12. Learned counsel for the appellants, namely, Ms. Sansriti
Pathak, A.A.G. learned counsel for the State of Rajasthan and Mr.
K.L. Janjani, learned counsel for the complainant have
vehemently submitted that the prosecution has established its
case beyond reasonable doubt. Learned counsel further
submitted that evidence in the form of recovery from the
respondent accused along with the other evidence completed the
chain of circumstantial evidence and with the help of this
evidence, the material facts were proved by the prosecution.
Learned counsel further submitted that in such a situation, the
High Court ought not to have granted benefit of doubt to the
accused persons.
13. Learned counsel for the complainant submitted that from
the first instance i.e. in the report lodged by the complainant
itself, it was stated that two boys came in the shop for hiring the
vehicle i.e. bolero and if these two persons are brought before
him, he can identify them. It was further submitted by learned
counsel that P.W.1 Pawan Kumar Sharma (complainant) and
P.W.8 Rajendra Kumar saw the accused persons in the company
of the deceased and it was obligatory on the part of the
6
respondents/ accused persons to explain as to what happened to
the person who was lastly seen in their company and
respondents/ accused persons failed to discharge this burden.
14. Learned counsel further submitted that the High Court
failed to consider the evidence in the form of recovery of the
material objects namely, tape recorder, quartz watch worn by the
deceased recovered at the instance of the accused Manjeet Kumar
@ Billu, towel recovered at the instance of accused Vijay Singh @
Sunder, the papers of bolero jeep of the deceased recovered at the
instance of accused Manoj Kumar and dead body of the deceased,
bolero jeep of the deceased and one lathi recovered at the
instance of accused Balraj @ Tiloo.
15. Learned counsel further submitted that the High Court
erred in appreciating the evidence in the form of postmortem
report which refers to the cause of death firstly due to bone
fractures and secondly strangulation. The postmortem report also
states that all injuries were anti-mortem in nature.
16. Learned counsel further submitted that the High Court
erroneously discarded the evidence in the form of recovery of
dead body from the accused Balraj @ Tiloo on the ground that an
offence under Section 302 IPC was added to the arrest memo
before the body was recovered. It is submitted that there is a
possible explanation for this addition namely, the investigating
officer found the body in dry well and after seeing the body, the
investigating officer naturally added Section 302 IPC in the arrest
memo. Learned counsel further submitted that the delay in the
recovery of dead body could not have been faulted with as the
delay caused due to the bona fide reason namely non-availability
of the chain pulling machine in the village. It is further submitted
that merely because the dead body was not recovered in the
presence of independent witness but in the presence of relative of
deceased could not have been ground to discard the entire
recovery.
17. Learned counsel further submitted that Test Identification
Parade is a tool under Section 9 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872
[hereinafter referred to as “Evidence Act”] and such test or
tool cannot be applied in the cases of recovery of immovable
articles and admissibility of such evidence would be governed by
Section 27 of Evidence Act.
18. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents/ accused
persons vehemently supported the judgment of the High Court to
submit that the High Court committed no error in just and
8
proper appreciation of the evidence and resultantly recorded an
order of acquittal.
19. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the respondents/
accused persons that the appeal thus being meritless are liable to
be dismissed.
20. Learned counsel then submitted that the piecemeal recovery
of certain articles which failed to establish the alleged guilt of the
respondents/accused persons. As such, the High Court
committed no error in giving the benefit of doubt to the
respondents/accused persons and resultantly acquitting the
accused persons.
21. The learned counsel in support of his submissions placed
heavy reliance on the judgment of this Court in Tulesh Kumar
Sahu v. State of Chhattisgarh Criminal Appeal No. 753 of
2021 wherein this Court had relied upon the decisions in Sunder
Lal alia Sundera v. State of Madhya Pradesh1 and Sanwant
Khan vs. State of Rajasthan2. The relevant discussion on the
point is in para No. 11.
“11. .....Be that as it may, in the absence of any direct or
circumstantial evidence whatsoever, from the solitary
circumstance of the unexplained recovery of the two articles
1 AIR 1954 SC 28
2 AIR 1956 SC 54
from the houses of the two appellants the only inference that
can be raised in view of illustration A to S.114 of the
Evidence Act is that they are either receivers of stolen
property or were the persons who committed the theft, but it
does not necessarily indicate that the theft and the murders
took place at one and the same time
In our judgment no hard and fast rule can be laid down as
to what inference should be drawn from a certain
circumstance. Where, however, the only evidence against an
accused person is the recovery of stolen property and
although the circumstances may indicate that the theft and
the murder must have been committed at the same time, it is
not safe to draw the inference that the person in possession
of the stolen property was the murdered. Suspicion cannot
take the place of proof.
(Emphasis supplied)
33. In the case of recovery of an article from an accused
person when he stands accused of committing offences other
than theft also, (in this instance murder), what are the tests:
i. The first thing to be established is that the theft and
murder forms part of one transaction. The circumstances
may indicate that the theft and murder must have been
committed at the same time. But it is not safe to draw the
inference that the person in possession of the stolen property
was the murderer [Sanwant Khan (supra)];
ii. The nature of the stolen article;
iii. The manner of its acquisition by the owner; A
iv. The nature of evidence about its identification;
v. The manner in which it was dealt with by the accused;
vi. The place and the circumstances of its recovery;
vii. The length of the intervening period;
viii. Ability or otherwise of the accused to explain its
possession [See Baiju v. State of Madhya Pradesh].”
ANALYSIS
10
22. We have heard learned counsels for the parties at length
and also perused the material placed on record.
23. As referred to above, it is not in dispute that the case of
prosecution entirely rests on circumstantial evidence. It is also
not in dispute that in series of judgments of this Court principles
are laid down by this Court so as to appreciate the substantial
evidence. Admittedly, in the present case, the Trial Court though
passed the judgment and order of conviction and awarded
sentence to the accused, the High Court on reappreciation of the
evidence overturned the judgment and order of the Trial Court
and acquitted the accused of the offences charged against them.
24. Thus, the question before us is whether the High Court was
justified in reversing the order of conviction by granting the
benefit of doubt to the respondents/ accused persons.
25. Before we undertook this exercise, it will not be out of place
to refer to certain judgments of this Court wherein the test for
exercising power under Article 136 of the Constitution of India is
discussed.
26. Firstly, we will refer to the judgment of this Court in State
of M.P. v. Paltan Mallah3. It was held that:
3 (2005) 3 SCC 169
11
“8. … This being an appeal against acquittal, this Court
would be slow in interfering with the findings of the High
Court, unless there is perverse appreciation of the evidence
which resulted in serious miscarriage of justice and if the
High Court has taken a plausible view this Court would not
be justified in interfering with the acquittal passed in favour
of the accused and if two views are possible and the High
Court had chosen one view which is just and reasonable,
then also this Court would be reluctant to interfere with the
judgment of the High Court.”
This view was again reiterated in State of Punjab v. Kewal
Krishan4 wherein it was held as under:
“14. ……Normally, this Court is reluctant to interfere with an
order of acquittal. But when it appears that the High Court
has on an absolutely wrong process of reasoning and a
legally erroneous and perverse approach to the facts of the
case and ignoring some of the most vital facts, acquitted the
respondent and the order of acquittal passed by the High
Court has resulted in a grave and substantial miscarriage of
justice, extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the
Constitution of India may rightfully be exercised (see : State
of U.P. v. Sahai [State of U.P. v. Sahai, (1982) 1 SCC 352 :
1982 SCC (Cri) 223] ).”
27. On the touchstone of these tests laid by this Court in above
referred judgments, we are of the opinion that the High Court
committed no error in reversing the judgment of conviction and
acquitting all the accused. We may state our reasons supporting
the conclusion arrived at by us as follows.
4 (2023) 13 SCC 695
12
28. The prosecution case, insofar as accused Balraj @ Tiloo,
Manjeet Kumar @ Billu and Manoj Kumar are concerned, rests
entirely on circumstantial evidence. In the case of accused Vijay
Singh @ Sunder, the prosecution case substantially rests upon the
theory of last seen together. The other incriminating
circumstances relied upon by the prosecution include the alleged
recovery of the dead body at the instance of accused Balraj @
Tiloo, the identification of accused Vijay Singh @ Sunder by PW1
Pawan Kumar Sharma and PW8 Rajendra Kumar, and the
recovery of certain articles/objects from the different accused
persons.
29. The High Court has, in our considered opinion, rightly
doubted the prosecution case insofar as the alleged recovery of
the dead body at the instance of accused Balraj @ Tiloo is
concerned. The reasons assigned by the High Court are cogent
and borne out from the record. Firstly, because at the time of
arrest of accused Balraj @ Tiloo police was not aware that the
deceased had been killed as PW1 merely filed a missing report,
then how come on the arrest memo filed on the very same date it
was mentioned that the accused was arrested for offence under
Sections 302, 394 and 201 of IPC. Secondly, the testimony of
P.W.5 Basant Singh, an independent witness, materially
undermines the prosecution case. PW5 in his testimony stated
that police had already visited and examined well from where the
dead body was discovered on 28.04.2007 itself, however since the
boring machine was not available, the dead body was recovered
on 29.04.2007. Further P.W.5 stated that none of the accused
people were present on the spot when the recovery was being
made. High Court observed that the Trial Court has totally
ignored the testimony of PW5, which is a crucial piece of evidence as the said testimony challenges the position of the prosecution. Thirdly, the requirement of independent witnesses, more particularly, as per Section 100(4) of Cr.P.C. is to provide
credibility to the investigation. In the present case, admittedly,
the dead body was recovered in the presence of one witness i.e.
P.W. 2 who happens to be uncle of deceased and another person
namely, Ramawtar who has not been produced by the
prosecution for his examination before the Court.
30. On the backdrop of these facts, the High Court observed
that Ramawtar who was an independent witness and failure to
produce him before the Court is nothing but withholding the
material witness and this creates a doubt about the recovery of
the dead body alleged at the instance of accused Balraj @ Tiloo.
Therefore, the High Court was justified in holding that the
prosecution failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the
recovery of dead body was made pursuant to the disclosure
statement of accused Balraj @ Tiloo.
31. It is consistently held by this Court that the suspicion
however strong it may be, cannot take place of the legal evidence
so as to convict an accused person. Considering this position of
law, the High Court was justified in not recording the conviction
against the accused persons on a weak piece of evidence i.e.
recovery of dead body.
32. Furthermore, the discovery of bolero jeep, vehicle belonging
to the deceased at the instance of accused Balraj @ Tiloo has
been rightly doubted by the High Court. As per the testimony of
PW 14, the recovery was made from the road and not from the
accused’s possession. In Jaikam Khan v. State of U.P5 it was
observed: –
5 (2021) 13 SCC 716
15
“One of the alleged recoveries is from the room where
deceased Asgari used to sleep. The other two recoveries are
from open field, just behind the house of deceased Shaukeen
Khan i.e. the place of incident. It could thus be seen that the
recoveries were made from the places, which were accessible
to one and all and as such, no reliance could be placed on
such recoveries.”
Thus, relying on the abovementioned position of law it is clear
that no reliance can be placed on the recovery of the Bolero Jeep.
33. As far as the evidence against Accused Vijay Singh @
Sunder is concerned, PW1 Pawan Kumar and PW8 Rajendra
Kumar have identified him in the Test Identification Parade (Ex
P5, P6, P25, P26) and these both the witnesses have stated before
the Court that they saw the accused Vijay Singh @ Sunder and
Juvenile Surendra had taken deceased with bolero vehicle on hire
basis in the presence of PW1 and PW8. High Court considering
the testimonies of PW1 and PW8 observed as follows:
“Hence, the three pieces of evidence stand out against Vijay:
firstly, the evidence of the last seen; secondly, his silence
about Ashok’s whereabouts; thirdly, his identification by
Pawan Kumar (P.W.1) and by Rajendra Kumar (P. W.2).
Before a person can be convicted; the prosecution must cover
the distance between “may be true” and “must be true.”
However, by establishing the three pieces of evidence,
mentioned above, the prosecution has failed to cover the said
distance. At best, there is a strong suspicion that Vijay may
have been involved in the murder of Ashok. But there is no
16
proof that he must have been Involved In his murder. In
catena of cases, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that
last seen is a weak sort of evidence. It is too weak a piece of
evidence to convict a person. Even the identification by
Pawan Kumar (P.W.1) and Rajendra Kumar (P.W.2) does not
unerringly point to the guilt of Vijay. His silence about the
whereabouts of Ashok may be a weakness of the defense,
but the weakness of the defense does not strengthen the
case of the prosecution. Most importantly, it would be utterly
unjust to convict Vijay merely on the basis of a strong
suspicion.”
34. An attempt was made by the Learned Counsel for the
appellant to submit that it was for the respondents/ accused
persons to explain as to what happened to the deceased, as
deceased was last seen in their company and thus burden shifted
upon respondents/ accused persons under section 106 of the
Evidence Act.
35. This Court in Manoj @ Munna v. State of Chhattisgarh,
2025 INSC 1466 has observed as follows:
“30. It is a settled principle that Section 106 of the Indian
Evidence Act, 1872 clearly provides that when a fact lies
especially within the knowledge of a person, the burden of
proving that fact rests upon him. Accordingly, when an
accused is shown to have been last seen in the company of
the deceased, it becomes incumbent upon him to explain
how and when they parted ways. The explanation furnished
must be reasonable, probable, and satisfactory in the opinion
of the Court. If such an explanation is offered, the burden
cast by Section 106 of the Evidence Act stands discharged.
17
However, if the accused fails to present a credible
explanation regarding facts within his special knowledge,
this failure constitutes an additional link in the chain of
circumstantial evidence established against him. At the same
time, it must be emphasized that Section 106 of the Evidence
Act does not shift the primary burden of proof, which in a
criminal trial always remains on the prosecution.
31. Thus, any adverse inference under Section 106 of the
Evidence Act is to be drawn against the accused person
when the prosecution has been able to establish the case
beyond a reasonable doubt.”
36. Further this Court in Manoj @ Munna v. State of
Chhattisgarh, 2025 INSC 1466 while reiterating principle laid
down in Kanhaiya Lal vs. State of Rajasthan6 observed as
follows:
“28. In Kanhaiya Lal vs. State of Rajasthan this Court held
that evidence on last seen together is a weak evidence and
conviction only on the basis of last seen together without
there being any other corroborative evidence against the
accused will not be sufficient to convict the accused for an
offence under Sections 302 and 201 of the IPC.”
37. Considering the aforesaid position of law and the
observations of High Court, it would be appropriate to hold that
the High Court, rightly held that it would be wholly unsafe and
unjust to convict accused Vijay Singh @ Sunder merely on the
basis of a strong suspicion arising from the evidence of last seen
6 (2014) 4 SCC 715
together and identification by PW1 and PW8. We find no infirmity
in the view taken by the High Court in extending the benefit of
doubt to the accused.
38. As far as the recoveries from the accused Manjeet Kumar @
Billu is concerned, though learned counsel for the appellant
heavily relied on the recoveries of the articles, we are unable to
accept the submission of learned counsel to that effect, in view of
the just and proper appreciation of the recoveries by the High
Court in following words:
“Most pertinently, neither the tape recorder, nor the wrist
watch has ever been subjected to the T.I. Parade. Even if
Rajendra Kumar (P. W .8) had identified the tape recorder
and the wrist watch as belonging to Ashok, even then such .
identification is absolutely meaningless In the eyes of law.
For, according to Rajasthan Police Rules, 1965, an object
which is recovered has to be subjected to a test identification
parade in order to assess its objective identification by a
witness. Since neither the tape recorder, nor the wrist watch
was subjected to a test identification parade, it would be too
conjectural to presume that the tape recorder came from the
Jeep and the wrist watch belonged to Ashok. Therefore, the
recovery is insignificant. It does not connect Manjeet to the
alleged crime. If he were to be convicted on the basis of this
flimsy recovery, he would be convicted on the basis of
conjectures and surmises. But under criminal jurisprudence,
a moral conviction is impermissible. The conviction has to be
a legal one.”
The view taken by the High Court also finds support from
the decision of this Court in Thammaraya & Anr. v. The State
Of Karnataka (2025) 3 SCC 590 wherein this Court has reiterated the law relating to Test Identification Parade of recovered articles. It observed as follows:
“27. Therefore, this material omission on part of the
Investigating Officer (PW-27) in not conducting a Test
Identification Parade (TIP) of the recovered articles, more
particularly when the case of prosecution is based solely
upon recoveries of these articles, has created holes in the
fabric of the prosecution story, which are impossible to
mend.
28. Every piece of relevant fact needs to be sewn via the
golden thread of duly proved circumstances, in order to
ultimately formulate the fabric of guilt. Sadly, in the present
case, the facta probantia fails to sustain and support the
alleged factum probando, rendering the prosecution’s case
miserably weak. Hence, the evidence led by the prosecution
against the accused person is woefully short of the mandate
to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt.”
39. Further, although the prosecution recovered a towel from
the house of accused Vijay Singh alleging the same to be the
murder weapon, such recovery is wholly immaterial inasmuch as
a towel is a common household object ordinarily found in every
residence and, therefore, in absence of any connecting material,
no inference can be drawn against the respondent/accused. It is
further the case of the prosecution that the lathi recovered at the
instance of Balraj @ Tiloo was used in the assault upon the
deceased, however, the said towel neither bore any bloodstains
nor any other incriminating material connecting towel to the
deceased. Consequently, the mere recovery of a towel without any
incriminating material does not connect the respondent/accused
with the alleged crime.
40. A holistic appreciation of the evidence confirms the High
Court’s observation that the prosecution’s evidence is disjointed
and not interlinked. Instead of placing the Court on a firm
footing, the prosecution has left it “groping in the dark”. We find
that the High Court meticulously “separated grain from the chaff”
and arrived at a plausible conclusion that the chain of
circumstances was incomplete.
41. The law regarding circumstantial evidence has been
crystallised by this Court in an oftenly quoted judgment of this
Court in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of
Maharashtra (1984) 4 SCC 116, as follows-
“152. Before discussing the cases relied upon by the
High Court we would like to cite a few decisions on
the nature, character and essential proof required in a
criminal case which rests on circumstantial evidence
alone. The most fundamental and basic decision of
this Court is Hanumant v. State of Madhya Pradesh
[(1952) 2 SCC 71 : AIR 1952 SC 343 : 1952 SCR 1091
: 1953 Cri LJ 129] . This case has been uniformly
followed and applied by this Court in a large number
of later decisions up-to-date, for instance, the cases of
Tufail (Alias) Simmi v. State of Uttar Pradesh [(1969) 3
SCC 198 : 1970 SCC (Cri) 55] and Ramgopal v. State
of Maharashtra [(1972) 4 SCC 625 : AIR 1972 SC
656] . It may be useful to extract what Mahajan, J.
has laid down in Hanumant case [(1952) 2 SCC 71 :
AIR 1952 SC 343 : 1952 SCR 1091 : 1953 Cri LJ 129]
:
“It is well to remember that in cases where the
evidence is of a circumstantial nature, the
circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to
be drawn should in the first instance be fully
established, and all the facts so established should be
consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the
accused. Again, the circumstances should be of a
conclusive nature and tendency and they should be
such as to exclude every hypothesis but the one
proposed to be proved. In other words, there must be a
chain of evidence so far complete as not to leave any
reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the
innocence of the accused and it must be such as to
show that within all human probability the act must
have been done by the accused.”
42. Thus, it is a settled position of law that to convict the
accused on the basis of circumstantial evidence, the prosecution
must prove beyond reasonable doubt each of the incriminating
circumstances on which it proposes to rely; the circumstance(s)
relied upon must be of a definite tendency unerringly pointing
towards the accused’s guilt and must form a chain so far
complete that there is no escape from the conclusion that within
all human probability it is the accused and no one else who had
committed the crime and they (it) must exclude all other
hypothesis inconsistent with his guilt and consistent with his
innocence.
43. For all the reasons above, while keeping in mind that the
view taken by the High Court is a plausible view, we do not find a
good reason to interfere with the order of acquittal passed by the
High Court. The appeals are accordingly dismissed.
........................................J.
[PANKAJ MITHAL]
.........................................J.
[PRASANNA B. VARALE]
NEW DELHI;
MAY 25, 2026.
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