Insofar as the Petitioner’s contention that he has subsequently
transferred the subject property in favour of his wife is concerned, it
is evident that any such transfer is purely derivative of the petitioner’s title. Upon lawful revocation of the original gift deed under the provisions of the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007, the very basis of the petitioner’s title stands divested, and consequently, any transfer effected by him would not, prima facie, create an indefeasible or superior right in favour of the transferee. At the same time, since the petitioner’s wife is not a party to the present proceedings, this Court refrains from rendering any conclusive adjudication upon her rights, if any, and leaves it open for her to avail such remedies as may be permissible in law. {Para 26}
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIRCUIT BENCH AT KOLHAPUR
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION NO. 12120 OF 2025
Shri. Sambhaji Balkrishna Zambre, Vs Smt. Chhaya Balkrishna Zambre,
CORAM : SACHIN S. DESHMUKH, J.
DATE : 6th MAY 2026.
Citation: 2026:BHC-KOL:3563
1. Heard. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith. By consent of
the parties. Petition is decided finally at admission stage.
2. The Petitioner assails the order dated 23/09/2025 rendered
by the Appellate Officer, Senior Citizens Welfare Tribunal and
District Magistrate Sangli in Appeal bearing No. Jeshtha Nagrik
Appeal/SR-01/2025 dismissing the appeal presented by the
Petitioner and endorsing the order passed by presiding Officer,
Senior Citizen Welfare Tribunal in Application bearing No.
MAG/J.Na./SR/20/2022.
3. The litigating parties are deeply interconnected yet stand as
two opposing sides. The Respondent is the aged mother of the
Petitioner, and the dispute pertains to the estate left behind by the
Petitioner’s father who passed away on 02-06-2007. The subject
matter involves several properties, including Revision Survey No.
159 situated in Kupwad and various City Survey numbers in Sangli,
which the Petitioner claims to be a combination of ancestral and
self-acquired assets. Following the demise of the father, the
Petitioner’s two sisters executed a registered relinquishment deed in
2013, which was followed by the Respondent-mother executing the
registered relinquishment deeds in favour of the Petitioner
respectively in the year 2015 and 2018.
4. Subsequently, the Petitioner transferred a portion of the suit
property in favour of his wife, purportedly in compliance with a
maintenance decree passed by the Family Court, Sangli, in 2020.
During this period, the Respondent initiated Special Civil Suit No.
1056/2020 before the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Sangli, seeking
the cancellation of the relinquishment deeds on the grounds of
fraud. Simultaneously, the Respondent filed an application under
the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act,
2007, before the Welfare Tribunal seeking maintenance and the
setting aside of the subject deeds.
5. The Welfare Tribunal allowed the Respondent’s application,
resulting in the cancellation of the registered relinquishment deeds
and a direction to the Petitioner to pay a monthly maintenance of
10,000. The Petitioner challenged this ₹ decision before the
Appellate Officer and District Magistrate, Sangli, after hearing
litigating sides, dismissed the appeal and upheld the findings of the
lower Tribunal. As such, the Petitioner is before this Court.
6. Learned counsel for the Petitioner Mr. Bhavake, submits that
the impugned orders are legally unsustainable as the Senior Citizens
Welfare Tribunal in absence of the jurisdiction to adjudicate upon
the validity of the relinquishment deeds while Special Civil Suit No.
1056 of 2020 was already pending before a competent Civil Court
for the same relief. He contends that the relinquishment deeds of
2015 and 2018 were executed voluntarily without any express
stipulation/condition of maintenance, and therefore, the summary
powers under Section 23 of the 2007 Act could not have been
invoked to void registered instruments. Furthermore, it is argued
that the Tribunal failed to consider that a portion of the property
had already been transferred to a third party, the Petitioner's wife,
under a Family Court decree, and gloss cannot be created on such
rights in a summary proceeding. Counsel further asserts that the
Petitioner has consistently cared for the Respondent and that the
direction to pay monthly maintenance of ₹10,000/- is arbitrary,
excessive, and was passed without a proper inquiry into the
Petitioner's financial means or the Respondent's actual requirements.
7. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner further submits that in
absence of specific conditions in the gift deed for providing
maintenance to the mother-transferor, the deed could not have been
revoked. To buttress the same, has placed reliance upon the Sudesh
Chhikara Vs. Ramti Devi and Anr1 and Veena Singh Vs. District
Registrar/Additional Collector and anr2.
8. Per contra, Mr. Chavan, learned counsel for the senior citizen
has vehemently opposed the petition submitting that failure and
1 2022 SCC Online SC 1684
2 (2022) 7 SCC 1
neglect on the part of the Petitioner to maintain his own natural
mother, a senior citizen would dis-entitle the Petitioner to claim any
relief much less the reliefs claimed in the present petition. It is
further submitted that the fact finding authorities have rendered a
positive finding in relation to neglect and incoherence with the
object of the provisions of the Act of 2007, especially Section 23,
therefore prayed for a dismissal of the petition.
9. Upon hearing the respective counsel for the litigating sides
and perusing the material on record, it is necessary to record that
there is no dispute regarding the fundamental facts governing the
relationship. It is admitted that the Respondent is the widowed
mother of the Petitioner and that, following the demise of the
patriarch Balkrishna Zambre, the parties continued to reside
together as a joint family unit. This familial proximity is a crucial
factor, as it provided the Petitioner with the position of trust and
influence necessary to facilitate the execution of the relinquishment
deeds in his favour. The record clearly establishes that the
Respondent, in her twilight years, was entirely dependent on the
Petitioner for her emotional and physical well-being.
10. The Hon’ble Apex Court in case of S. Vanitha v. Deputy
Commissioner, Bengaluru Urban District and Ors3 has observed as
under:
“Traditional norms and values of the Indian society laid stress on
providing care for the elderly. However, due to withering of the
joint family system, a large number of elderly are not being
looked after by their family. Consequently, many older persons,
particularly widowed women are now forced to spend their
twilight years all alone and are exposed to emotional neglect
and to lack of physical and financial support. This clearly reveals
that ageing has become a major social challenge and there is a
need to give more attention to the care and protection for the
older persons. Though the parents can claim maintenance under
the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the procedure is both
time- consuming as well as expensive. Hence, there is a need to
have simple, inexpensive and speedy provisions to claim
maintenance for parents.”
11. Thus, the statute recognizes the right of parents and senior
citizens for maintenance. The Tribunal can pass an order of
maintenance under Section 9, whereas Section 23 which is primarily
aimed to empower the Tribunal to declare the transfer made by
senior citizen upon fulfillment of certain conditions. Section reads as
under.
“23. Transfer of property to be void in certain
circumstances
1. Where any senior citizen who, after the
3 (2021) 15 SCC 730
commencement of this Act, has by way of gift or
otherwise, his property, subject to the condition that
the transferee shall provide the basic amenities and
basic physical needs to the transferor and such
transferee refuses or fails to provide such amenities
and physical needs, the said transfer of property shall
be deemed to have been made by fraud or coercion or
under undue influence and shall at the option of the
transferor be declared void by the Tribunal.
2. Where any senior citizen has a right to receive
maintenance out of an estate and such estate or part,
thereof is transferred, the right to receive maintenance
may be enforced against the transferee if the transferee
has notice of the right, or if the transfer is gratuitous;
but not against the transferee for consideration and
without notice of right.
3. If any senior citizen is incapable of enforcing the
rights under sub-sections (1) and (2), action may be
taken on his behalf by any of the organisation referred
to in Explanation to sub-section (1) of section 5.”
12. A reading of Section 23(1) of the Act of 2007 establishes that
when a property is transferred by a senior citizen, whether by gift or
otherwise, it is both implicitly vis-a-vis explicitly subject to the
condition that the transferee shall provide the transferor with basic
amenities and physical needs. The statute incorporates a legal
fiction that if the transferee, after obtaining the benefit of the
transfer, fails to fulfill these essential obligations, the transfer is
deemed to have been vitiated by fraud, coercion, or undue
influence. This deeming fiction operates upon the breach while not
providing maintenance. Consequently, in cases of such noncompliance
by the transferee, the Tribunal is statutorily empowered
to declare the transfer void at the option of the senior citizen,
ensuring that property rights do not supersede the fundamental
right to survival and dignity.
13. The contention raised by the learned counsel for the
Petitioner, suggesting that the senior citizen has disputed the very
execution of the relinquishment deeds. However, this submission is
premised upon misleading and misconstruction of the pleadings.
14. A careful perusal of the Respondent’s application
unequivocally establishes that applicant has narrated the specific
circumstances, under which the deeds were executed, rather than
issuing an express denial of her signatures or the act of execution
itself. Since the challenge is rooted in the circumstances of the
transfer and the subsequent failure to provide maintenance, the
"deeming fiction" under Section 23 is attracted. Consequently, the
Petitioner's reliance on the Veena Singh (Supra) judgment is
misplaced, as the facts of the present case do not pertain to a
dispute over the factum of execution, but rather in relation to the
failure of Petitioner to maintain a senior citizen.
15. The submission of the learned counsel for the Petitioner that
the filing of a substantive civil suit precludes the senior citizen from
taking recourse to the provisions of Section 23 is similarly devoid of
merit. The Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens
Act, 2007, was enacted to give effect to the guarantees of social
security and dignity for the elderly through a simplified,
inexpensive, and expeditious mechanism. Its provisions are
supplemental and operate in a distinct field, primarily the
immediate protection of a senior citizen's life and property. The
mere pendency of a protracted civil litigation cannot be used as a
weapon/tool to deny a senior citizen the summary and remedial
reliefs provided under this special statute, as doing so would
frustrate the very objective of providing urgent relief to those in
their twilight years.
16. At this juncture, it is imperative to refer to the verdict of the
Hon’ble Apex Court in Urmila Dixit v. Sunil Sharan Dixit and Ors4.,
wherein the Court, after considering the principles laid down in
Sudesh Chikara, delved into the nuances of Section 23 of the Act.
The Apex Court reiterated that beneficial legislations, such as the
Act of 2007, must receive a liberal and purpose-oriented
construction in consonance with social objectives. A literal
interpretation that defeats the legislative intent must be avoided;
instead, the Court’s duty is to discern the underlying "mischief" the
statute seeks to remedy, in this case, the abandonment and financial
exploitation of the elderly and adopt a construction that suppresses
the problem while advancing the remedy.
17. As held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Bharat Singh v. New
Delhi Tuberculosis Centre5 and Indian Performing Right Society Ltd.
v. Sanjay Dalia6, once the legislative intent is clear, the statute must
receive a functional interpretation. This principle ensures that
exemption clauses or technicalities do not provide a "deceptive
ground" for evading statutory obligations. In the context of the
Consumer Protection Act, as seen in Kozyflex Mattresses (P) Ltd. v.
4 (2025) 2 SCC 787
5 (1986) 2 SCC 614
6 (2015) 10 SCC 161
SBI General Insurance Co. Ltd 7 , and the Medical Termination of
Pregnancy Act in X2 v. State (NCT of Delhi)8, the judiciary has
consistently held that where two views are possible, the one that
favours the beneficiary of the social welfare legislation must prevail.
Consequently, the provisions of the Act of 2007 cannot be
interpreted in a narrow, pedantic manner that leaves a senior citizen
remediless.
18. In the backdrop of the legislative history discussed, I am of the
considered view that the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the
Act, which defines the protective purpose of the enactment, has
been restated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in S. Vanitha (Supra). The
preamble of the Act unequivocally declares its intent to provide a
more effective and robust framework for the maintenance and
welfare of parents and senior citizens, rights that are both
guaranteed and recognised under the Constitution. As a beneficial
piece of legislation, the Act is specifically designed to secure the
dignity of senior citizens against the unique vulnerabilities and
abandonment they often face in the twilight of their lives.
19. Consequently, the submission of the learned counsel for the
7 2024 INSC 234
8 (2023) 9 SCC 433
Petitioner, that the authorities below should have stayed their hands
due to the pendency of a civil suit, cannot be accepted. To hold
otherwise would be to allow procedural technicalities to defeat the
very "fast-track" social security net that the legislature has
introduced, created and conferred upon senior citizens like the
Respondent.
20. Adopting the same view, the verdict of the Hon’ble Apex Court
in Urmila Dixit (Supra), lends significant support to the findings of
the authorities below. Consequently, the Petitioner's plea that the
absence of a specific "maintenance clause" incorporated in the text
of the relinquishment deeds or the lack of pleadings regarding the
breach of such an obligation should defeat the Respondent's claim,
cannot be accepted.
21. In a beneficial piece of legislation such as the Act of 2007, the
focus is on the substantive reality of the senior citizen’s
abandonment rather than the formalistic perfection of the
pleadings. This Court must ensure to fulfill the primary aim and
object of the statute, which is to ensure the immediate protection
and subsistence of the senior citizen. To allow the Petitioner to rely
on the silence of the deeds to evade his natural and statutory duty
would be to frustrate the very "deeming fiction" that the legislature
has incorporated to prevent the exploitation of parents.
22. Similarly, the submission that the mere payment of
maintenance, whether under a Family Court decree or the Tribunal’s
order, would absolve the Petitioner from the applicability of Section
23 is entirely without merit, as such, does not warrant
consideration. The statutory obligation to provide maintenance is a
distinct and continuous duty that runs parallel to the consequences
of property transfers contemplated under the Act.
23. Section 23 is a statutory safeguard designed to restore the
property to a senior citizen when a transfer has been misused to
leave them destitute or vulnerable. Therefore, the subsequent
payment of a monthly sum does not "cure" or negate the underlying
breach of the condition of care that initially triggered the Tribunal’s
power to declare the relinquishment deeds void. To accept the
Petitioner's argument would allow a transferee to strip a parent of
their life’s assets and then seek to "buy off" the statutory protection
of the parent's property rights.
24. Regarding the challenge to the Appellate Authority’s order on
the grounds that it is merely a concurring view lacking independent
reasoning, a perusal of the record makes it apparent that the
Appellate Authority specifically considered the execution of the
relinquishment deeds and the subsequent departure on the part of
the Petitioner from his duty to provide basic amenities and physical
needs to his natural mother.
25. In any event, the legal position regarding concurring orders is
no longer res integra. The Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Apex
Court in S.N. Mukherjee v. Union of India (AIR 1990 SC 1984) has settled that an appellate or revisional authority, while affirming an order, is not required to record elaborate or separate reasons if it finds itself in agreement with the reasoning contained in the order under challenge. The requirement for detailed recording of reasons is
paramount at the original stage to ensure transparency; since the
Senior Citizens Welfare Tribunal’s original order was exhaustive and
well-reasoned, the Appellate Authority’s endorsement of those
findings does not suffer from any legal infirmity or lack of
jurisdiction. Consequently, the Petitioner's grievance that the
impugned order is "non-speaking" is flawed and legally unsustainable.
26. Insofar as the Petitioner’s contention that he has subsequently
transferred the subject property in favour of his wife is concerned, it
is evident that any such transfer is purely derivative of the
petitioner’s title. Upon lawful revocation of the original gift deed
under the provisions of the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007, the very basis of the petitioner’s title stands divested, and consequently, any transfer effected by him would not, prima facie, create an indefeasible or superior right in favour of the transferee. At the same time, since the petitioner’s wife is not a party to the present proceedings, this Court refrains from rendering any conclusive adjudication upon her rights, if any, and leaves it open for her to avail such remedies as may be permissible in law.
27. Resultantly, taking into account the totality of the
circumstances narrated hereinabove, and specifically the conduct of
the Petitioner in abdicating his fundamental obligation to provide
basic amenities and physical needs to the Respondent-mother, as
such, no case for interference is made out. The record demonstrates
that the Petitioner, rather than fulfilling his natural and statutory
duties, as such, has chosen to drag an aged/mother, a senior citizen
through protracted and multi-layered litigation, effectively depleting
her resources and peace of mind in her twilight years. Such conduct
further disentitles the Petitioner from seeking any relief, much less
the equitable and discretionary relief under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India.
28. The petition, being devoid of merit, stands dismissed. Rule is
discharged.
29. Considering that the Petitioner has left no stone unturned in
harassing the Respondent, age old mother and depleting her meager
resources through persistent litigation in her twilight years, I am of
the considered view that this is a fit case to impose exemplary costs
to discourage such challenges against welfare orders. The
Petitioner’s attempt of layering litigation while the Respondent
struggles for basic maintenance is a clear abuse of the legal process.
Accordingly, the Petitioner is directed to pay costs quantified at
₹50,000/- to the Respondent. This amount shall be deposited with
the Tribunal or paid directly to the Respondent within four weeks
from today, failing which the same shall be recovered as arrears of
land revenue.
[SACHIN S. DESHMUKH, J.]
30. At this stage, the learned counsel for the Petitioner prays for
the stay of this judgment and the continuation of the interim relief
previously granted. However, considering the findings recorded
hereinabove regarding the Petitioner's persistent failure to fulfill his
statutory obligations and the urgent, non-negotiable need of the
senior citizen for both maintenance and the restoration of her
property rights, I am of the opinion that further stay would only
serve to prolong the Respondent’s hardship.
31. The request for continuation of interim relief, therefore, does
not warrant consideration and is accordingly rejected.
[SACHIN S. DESHMUKH, J.]
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