Revision Is Not a Mini-Trial:
An order under Section 156(3) CrPC often marks the beginning of criminal investigation, but the challenge that follows in revision frequently tempts the revisional court to travel beyond its proper limits. The central question is not whether the accused may be heard at all, but whether the Sessions Judge can evaluate the accused’s defence on merits while deciding a criminal revision against such an order.
The answer, in law, is nuanced but clear. The Sessions Judge may hear the accused where the revisional order is likely to prejudice him, and may examine the legality, propriety, regularity, and jurisdictional soundness of the Magistrate’s order. But the revisional court cannot convert the hearing into a factual adjudication of the defence or a premature evaluation of disputed material.
The recurring error in revision proceedings
In practice, a revision filed against an order under Section 156(3) CrPC is often argued as if the revisional court were deciding a discharge application or a petition for quashing. The accused places reliance on correspondence, title documents, prior civil litigation, or surrounding circumstances to contend that the complaint is false, exaggerated, or purely civil in nature.
Such an invitation must be approached with caution. Revisional jurisdiction is meant to test the correctness, legality, propriety, or regularity of the impugned order; it is not meant to settle the truth of rival factual versions at a stage when investigation has either not begun or has only just commenced.
Scope of the Sessions Judge’s power
A Sessions Judge exercising revisional jurisdiction may certainly examine whether the Magistrate acted mechanically, failed to apply judicial mind, overlooked basic statutory requirements, or passed an order unsupported by the complaint itself. The court may also consider whether the allegations, taken at face value, disclose a cognizable offence at all.
What the revisional court cannot do is equally important. It cannot decide whether the defence version is more probable, whether the accused’s documents conclusively disprove the complaint, or whether the complainant is ultimately telling the truth. Those are matters ordinarily reserved for investigation, discharge, or trial, depending on the stage of the proceedings.
The most relevant recent Supreme Court decision for this issue is Anurag Bhatnagar & Anr. v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr., decided on 25 July 2025. The Supreme Court held that though a complainant should ordinarily approach the police under Sections 154(1) and 154(3) CrPC before invoking Section 156(3), the failure to do so does not automatically invalidate the Magistrate’s order; in the facts of that case, the lapse was treated as a procedural irregularity rather than a jurisdictional nullity.
More significantly, the Court emphasized that once the Magistrate has applied his mind and recorded satisfaction that the complaint discloses a cognizable offence, superior courts should not interfere by reassessing disputed factual material as though undertaking a merits inquiry. The judgment therefore reinforces a basic discipline of criminal process: at the Section 156(3) stage, the court examines whether investigation should be set in motion, not whether the accused has already disproved the accusation.
The value of Anurag Bhatnagar for revisional courts lies in this restraint. A Sessions Judge may correct a legally flawed order, but should resist the temptation to weigh the defence case in evidentiary detail merely because such material is placed on record in revision.
Right of hearing of the accused
The proposition that the accused may be heard in revision is well supported by Supreme Court authority. In Manharibhai Muljibhai Kakadia v. Shaileshbhai Mohanbhai Patel, the Supreme Court held that under Section 401(2) CrPC, no order prejudicial to the accused or “other person” can be passed by the revisional court without affording an opportunity of hearing.
That principle is important in the present context. Where the complainant challenges an order favourable to the accused, or where the revisional court proposes to revive or intensify criminal process to the prejudice of the accused, the accused is entitled to be heard. Yet this right of hearing is not a licence to convert revision into a full-fledged contest on facts. The hearing is to defend the order under challenge and to point out legal or jurisdictional errors, not to secure a final pronouncement on innocence.
Bombay High Court’s recent guidance
A significant and recent guidance for courts in Maharashtra comes from the Bombay High Court Full Bench in Arun P. Gidh v. Chandraprakash Singh & Ors., decided in April 2024. The Full Bench held that once an FIR has been registered pursuant to a Magistrate’s order under Section 156(3) CrPC, revisional jurisdiction under Section 397 CrPC is not an efficacious remedy for quashing that FIR, and the FIR does not automatically stand quashed merely because the Magistrate’s order is later set aside in revision.
This ruling is especially instructive for Sessions Judges. It marks a clear boundary between revisional scrutiny of the Magistrate’s order and the broader powers of the High Court under Article 226 or Section 482 CrPC for quashing proceedings. In other words, revision cannot be treated as an all-purpose jurisdiction to terminate the criminal process after the police have already exercised their statutory power to register the FIR and commence investigation.
The correct legal position
When these authorities are read together, the legal position becomes fairly settled. The Sessions Judge may hear the accused in revision if a prejudicial order is contemplated. The Sessions Judge may also examine whether the Magistrate applied his mind, whether the complaint discloses a cognizable offence, and whether the order suffers from legal, procedural, or jurisdictional infirmity.
However, the Sessions Judge should not decide the revision by accepting disputed defence material as conclusive. He should not compare rival versions as though recording findings after evidence, nor should he use revision as a substitute for quashing jurisdiction or trial adjudication.
Practical guidance for a Sessions Judge
A Sessions Judge faced with a revision against an order under Section 156(3) CrPC may usefully frame the inquiry around four limited questions: Did the Magistrate apply judicial mind; do the allegations on their face disclose a cognizable offence; is there any patent legal or procedural infirmity in the order; and would revisional interference improperly trench upon investigation or trial functions.
If the challenge rests mainly on the accused’s version of facts, disputed documents, or pleas that require detailed evidentiary assessment, the revisional court should ordinarily decline to decide those matters at that stage. If, on the other hand, the order is mechanical, jurisdictionally unsound, or unsupported by the complaint itself, revisional interference may be justified.
Concluding takeaway
The guiding principle is simple: the accused may be heard in revision, but his defence cannot be tried in revision. A Sessions Judge deciding a challenge to an order under Section 156(3) CrPC must remain within the boundaries of revisional scrutiny—examining the legality of the order, not the ultimate truth of the accusation.
For courts in Maharashtra, the Bombay High Court Full Bench in Arun P. Gidh provides valuable caution on the limited efficacy of revision after registration of FIR, while the Supreme Court in Anurag Bhatnagar underscores the need for restraint in interfering with a reasoned order directing investigation. Read together, they offer a balanced roadmap: hear the accused, test the order, but do not conduct a mini-trial.
Authorities
Anurag Bhatnagar & Anr. v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr., Supreme Court, 25 July 2025.
Arun P. Gidh v. Chandraprakash Singh & Ors., Bombay High Court Full Bench, April 2024.
Manharibhai Muljibhai Kakadia v. Shaileshbhai Mohanbhai Patel, Supreme Court.
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