The bench laid down the non-exhaustive guidelines have to be complied with while considering an application for summary judgment under Order XIII-A of the CPC:-
"(i) That the procedural mandate under Order XIII-A, CPC be strictly complied.
(ii) The Court should consider,
(a) Whether Plaintiff has no real prospect of succeeding on the claim or issue; or
(b) Whether the defendant has no real prospect of successfully defending the claim or issue; and
iii) The Court should also consider whether there is no other reason why the case or issue(s) should be allowed to go to trial.
(iv) While ascertaining above, the Court does not have to take everything on the face value, but it must also not conduct a mini trial at the same time.
(v) That the Court has to differentiate between a cause of action/defence respectively, which is real as opposed to fanciful prospect.
(vi) That the Court ought to grasp the nettle, when dealing with the summary judgment applications to decide short points of law and interpretations.
(vii) The Court must take into account not only the evidence before it but also the evidence that can reasonably be expected to be led/available at the trial.
(viii) That the Court's usage of power under Order XIII-A, CPC is exceptional as it cuts short the process of trial and ought to be exercised where oral evidence and full trial is not required.
(ix) In order to ascertain the need for full trial over summary judgment, the Court has to see whether, in the interest of justice, it is more suited to conduct trial to –
(a) Weigh the evidence,
(b) Evaluate the credibility of a deponents,
(c) Draw reasonable inferences from the evidence."
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2026
(Arising out of Special Leave Petition (C) No. 22100 of 2025)
RELIANCE EMINENT TRADING AND
COMMERCIAL PRIVATE LIMITED Vs DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
J.K. MAHESHWARI, J.
Citation: 2026 INSC 436.
1. Leave granted.
2. In between the twin sayings of ‘justice delayed is justice
denied’ and ‘justice hurried is justice buried’, lies a golden mean
which this Court must adopt to resolve the present case. It is in this
balanced perspective that the provisions of Order XIII-A of the Code
of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter “CPC”) fall to be interpreted and
applied.
3. The present appeal arises out of the impugned order dated
09.06.2025 passed by the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi (hereinafter
“High Court”) in I.A. No. 6914 of 2022 in CS (COMM) No. 582 of
2021, whereby the application filed by the appellant seeking
summary judgment under Rule 4 of Order XIII-A of the CPC came
to be dismissed.
4. The brief facts necessary for adjudication are that a public
notice was issued on 21.03.2007, by the Respondent – Delhi
Development Authority (hereinafter “DDA”) announcing a public
auction for various freehold commercial plots, including Plot No. 13
at the Non-hierarchical Commercial Complex, Jasola, New Delhi
(hereinafter “Subject Plot”), whose land-use was earmarked as
“Multi-level Parking/Commercial (No Multiplex).”
5. The appellant herein, being interested in acquiring the
Subject Plot, submitted its bid in respect thereof on 23.03.2007,
offering the amount of Bid/Lease Premium being Rs.
164,91,00,000/- (INR One hundred and sixty-four crores ninety-one
lakhs only) in respect of the same. The appellant also deposited 25%
(twenty-five percent) of the reserve price of the Subject Plot, i.e. a
sum of Rs. 42,25,00,000/- (INR Forty-two crores twenty-five lakhs
only) vide Demand Draft with the respondent towards earnest
money in respect of its bid, pursuant to the terms and conditions of
the auction.
6. The appellant was the highest bidder for the Subject Plot, and
the DDA, by its letter dated 07.06.2007, informed the appellant that
its bid has been accepted, and called upon to deposit the balance
sum of Rs. 122,66,00,045/- (INR One hundred and twenty-two
crores sixty-six lakhs and forty-five only), including the
documentation charges, within a period of 90 (ninety) days.
7. On 12.07.2007, the appellant paid the balance sum of Rs.
122,66,00,045/- in respect of the Subject Plot, followed by payment
of Rs. 9,89,46,025/- (INR Nine crores eighty-nine lakhs forty—six
thousand twenty-five only) towards the Stamp Duty and Transfer
Duty in respect of execution of the Conveyance Deed on 03.12.2007.
In this light, DDA called upon the appellant to take possession of
the Subject Plot on or before 15.01.2008.
8. Upon due completion of all necessary pre-requisites by the
appellant, including the payment of the entire sale consideration,
Stamp Duty and Transfer Duty; DDA executed the Conveyance Deed
dated 06.02.2008 in favour of the appellant for the Subject Plot on
a free-hold basis. The said Conveyance Deed was duly registered on
07.03.2008 at the office of the Sub-Registrar-VII, Delhi having
4
Registration No. 4,300 in Additional Book No. 1, Volume No. 2,886
at pages 83 to 86.
9. From the year 2008 onwards, pursuant to the execution of
the Conveyance Deed in respect of the Subject Plot in its favour, the
appellant, between assessment years of 2008-09 to 2017-18, also
made payments of a sum amounting to Rs. 24,00,036/- (INR
Twenty-four lakhs thirty-six only) towards property tax in respect of
the Subject Plot.
10. In the year 2015, unknown to the appellant herein, one Simla
Devi, claiming to be the erstwhile owner of the Subject Plot before
acquisition of the land by the DDA on behalf of the State, had filed
a Writ Petition being W.P. (C) No. 5688 of 2015 before the High
Court, seeking a declaration that the acquisition of land (hereinafter
“Subject Land”) had lapsed on account of the provisions of Section
24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land
Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (hereinafter
“Fair Compensation Act, 2013”).
11. The High Court, vide judgement dated 15.11.2016 in W.P. (C)
No. 5688 of 2015, held as under: –
“2. Though the respondents claimed that possession of the
said land was taken on 05.03.1997, the petitioner disputes
this and maintains that physical possession has not been
5
taken. However, insofar as the issue of compensation is
concerned, it is an admitted position that it has not be paid.
3. Without going into the controversy of physical possession,
this much is clear that the Award was made more than five
years prior to the commencement of the 2013 Act and the
compensation has also not been paid…
4. As a result, the petitioner is entitled to a declaration that
the said acquisition proceedings initiated under the 1894 Act
in respect of the subject land are deemed to have lapsed. It is
so declared.
5. The writ petition is allowed to the aforesaid extent. There
shall be no order as to costs.”
12. On 27.11.2016, the appellant claimed that some unknown
people, led by one Sachin Bidhuri, trespassed into the Subject Plot,
broke the boundary wall and damaged the pillars under
construction; and forcibly took illegal possession of the property
claiming to be the rightful owner of the Subject Land of which the
Subject Plot was a part.
13. Pursuant to the same, the appellant filed a police complaint
dated 13.12.2016 under Diary No. 54-B with Police Station Sarita
Vihar, Delhi, complaining of the aforementioned offences of
unlawful criminal trespass and causing loss of property, etc. On
02.01.2017, the appellant also wrote to the DDA intimating them
about the nuisance created by Mr. Sachin Bidhuri and others, as
well filing of the police complaint, and sought necessary
intervention.
6
14. On 03.04.2017, the DDA filed a Special Leave Petition being
SLP (C) No. 8526 of 2017 before this Court, challenging the order
dated 15.11.2016 passed by the High Court.
15. It ought to be noted that the appellant claims that even at this
stage, it was not intimated by DDA of the aforesaid order of High
Court or the proceedings filed before this Court, and was, as such,
not aware of the same.
16. The above SLP (C) No. 8526 of 2017 was converted to Civil
Appeal No. 6345 of 2017 and was dismissed by this Court vide
judgment dated 04.05.2017, wherein it was held as under: –
“5. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, the
appellant is given a period of six months to exercise its liberty
granted under Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation
and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and
Resettlement Act, 2013 for initiation of the acquisition
proceedings afresh.
6. We make it clear that in case no fresh acquisition
proceedings are initiated within the said period of six
months from today by issuing a Notification under
Section 11 of the Act, the appellant, if in possession,
shall return the physical possession of the land to the
owner.”
17. The appellant, claiming ignorance of the above proceedings,
made representation dated 25.04.2017 to DDA to address its
grievance. It is also claimed that a further representation dated
16.06.2017 was made.
7
18. At this juncture, it may be noted that the period of six
months, as stipulated in the order dated 04.05.2017 passed by this
Court for initiation of fresh acquisition proceedings, expired on
04.11.2017, however, admittedly, no action was initiated by DDA.
19. On 05.12.2017, the appellant claims that when its
representative visited the office of DDA to follow up on its earlier
representations, he was purportedly handed over a letter dated
20.11.2017, whereby the appellant was intimated the following: –
“Kindly refer to this officer letter of even number dated
04.10.2017 and its subsequent reminder dated 20.10.2017
drawing your attention to the order dated 04.052017 passed
by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in SLP No. 8526/2017
with reference to the above mentioned property/plot giving
direction therein for initiation of fresh acquisition proceedings
under Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and
Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and
Resettlement Act; 2013 within a period of six months from the
date of issue of order. The case has been processed and
examined by the Land, Management Deptt., DDA has advised
to seek commitment from allottee to bear additional financial
lability, on account of payment, of compensation under LARR
Act, 2013.
You are once again requested to submit an undertaking
within seven days from the date of issue of this letter on nonjudicial
stamp paper duly attested by Magistrate 1st Class
with confirmation that you will bear additional financial
liabilities on account of reacquisition proceedings of land to
enable DDA to initiate process of the reacquisition immediately
failing which you will be liable to face legal consequences
arising out of the directions of Hon’ble Supreme Court dated
04.05.2017.”
8
20. The appellant claims that in furtherance to the aforesaid
letter and the visit by its representative, it was informed for the very
first time of the legal proceedings that had ensued in respect of the
Subject Plot; including the order dated 04.05.2017 passed by this
Court in Civil Appeal No. 6345 of 2017. In light of the same, on
28.12.2017, the appellant wrote to DDA highlighting that it had
never received the aforementioned letters dated 04.10.2017 and
20.10.2017, and the letter dated 20.11.2017 was received by it only
on 05.12.2017, being much after lapse of the time period of six
months granted by this Court for initiating fresh acquisition
proceedings. In its letter, the appellant further emphasized as
follows: –
“8. …You will appreciate that we have in the year 2007 paid
the entire consideration for the said Plot and complied with the
auction terms. It was failure on your part by not paying the
compensation to the original land owner resulting in lapsing of
the said acquisition of the said Plot under the said auction
program no. XIV.
9. The order of the Hon’ble Supreme Court was passed on
04.05.2017, and since then a period of six (6) months have
already elapsed, however, to our knowledge, no fresh
acquisition proceedings has been initiated by you.
10. In the circumstances, we request to refund the full
consideration of Rs.164.91 crore paid by us towards purchase
of the subject Plot along with Rs.9,98,46,000/- paid towards
purchase of the subject Plot along with Rs.9,89,46,000/- paid
towards the stamp duty and `Rs.22,12,927/- paid towards
property tax together with interest at the rate of 15% PA from
the date of the said payments till realisation.”
9
21. Admittedly, from the date of the aforesaid communication, the
officials of the appellant consistently followed-up with the DDA for
refund of the above amounts. Further, the appellant also sent
multiple reminders for the refund vide letters dated 10.12.2018 and
07.08.2019.
22. Thereafter, the DDA filed a Review Petition before this Court
being R.P. No. 29817 of 2017 in the above mentioned Civil Appeal
No. 6345 of 2017. By order dated 17.10.2019, this Court dismissed
the review petition in the following terms: –
“There is delay of 807 days in filing the Review Petition for
which no satisfactory explanation has been given. Even
otherwise, we do not find any merit in the Review Petition. The
Review Petition is dismissed on the ground of delay as well as
merits.”
23. In continuation to its earlier letters, the appellant further
issued a letter dated 18.07.2020 reiterating its demand for refund
of all amounts paid to DDA along with interest. A reminder dated
19.10.2020 was also issued.
24. Ultimately, on 02.11.2020, the appellant filed a civil suit
being CS (Comm.) No. 582 of 2021 before the High Court for recovery
of the amount paid as sale consideration, Stamp Duty, Property Tax,
etc. for the Subject Plot. The aforesaid suit was filed after due notice
under Section 53B of the Delhi Development Act, 1957 as well as
10
mandatory mediation as prescribed under Section 12A of the
Commercial Courts Act, 2015. The suit so filed sought recovery of
an amount of Rs. 459,73,61,098/- with pendente lite interest which
included the following:
(i) Sale consideration of Rs. 164,91,00,000/-
(ii) Stamp & transfer duty of Rs. 9,89,46,025/-
(iii) Property Tax paid from FY 2008-09 to FY 2017-18 of
Rs 24,00,036/-
(iv) Interest @ 12% p.a. till date of filing suit i.e.
31.12.2020 being Rs 284,93,15,053/- and pendente
lite interest @12% р.а.
25. In the meanwhile, the DDA filed Curative Petition (C) No. 70
of 2021 before this Court, which came to be dismissed vide order
dated 19.05.2022. Thus, it is clear that this Court’s order in Civil
Appeal No. 6345 of 2017 has attained finality.
26. During such time period, on 18.01.2022, DDA filed its Written
Statement in the suit for recovery before the High Court. The
respondent primarily contended therein that the appellant had not
returned the possession of the Subject Land in order to claim
refund. It was further contended that the claim is time barred and
that the suit also suffers from non-joinder of Simla Devi i.e., the
11
original owner. On 07.03.2023, the appellant filed Replication to the
Written Statement of DDA in the civil suit.
27. Finally, on 27.04.2022, the appellant an application being I.A.
No. 6914 of 2022 in CS (Comm) No.582 of 2021, seeking summary
judgment under Rule 4 of Order XIII-A of the CPC.
28. The Single Judge of the High Court, vide impugned order
dated 09.06.2025 dismissed the application for summary judgment.
For ready reference, certain observations of the High Court are
reproduced below: –
“52. The Court is therefore, of the considered opinion that
without offering possession of 'plot' back to the DDA, or at least
establishing that the rightful owner is already in possession of
the 'plot', the plaintiff cannot claim refund of consideration
amount paid by it.
53. Ergo, the defence put forth. by the defendant cannot be
said to be baseless and illusory. The summary procedure as
prescribed in Order XIII-A CPC is to be resorted to by the
Courts for passing of judgment in commercial disputes, where
it could be disposed of without recording of oral evidence,
which is ·not possible in. the present case. Recording of oral
evidence appears to be imperative as regards the issue of
possession, which this Court finds to be contentious and
triable.
54. Thus, the suit cannot be determined in a summary
manner. The plaintiff in the present application has failed to
meet the twin tests that – (a) the defendant has no real
prospect of successfully defending the claim and; (b) there is
no such compelling reason why the claim should not be
disposed of before recording of oral evidence.
55. As this Court has opined that recording of oral evidence is
necessary and summary judgment cannot be passed, all other
12
issues are left open for the parties to be raised at the
appropriate stage.
56. In the overall conspectus of facts noted above, the present
application deserves to be dismissed. Ordered accordingly.”
29. Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgement of the High Court, the
present appeal has been preferred before this Court.
30. In the meanwhile, the DDA allegedly filed an application being
CM Appl. No. 50807 of 2023, alleging that the original owner Simla
Devi had played fraud on the Court since there was a dispute on her
identity. Perusal of the record indicates that the aforesaid
application was dismissed vide a detailed judgment dated
03.07.2024 by the Division Bench of the High Court. It was held
that after verifying the detailed submissions of both sides, no case
was made out by the DDA.
31. This aforesaid judgement of the Division Bench of the High
Court was challenged before this Court in SLP (C) Dairy No. 53900
of 2025. This Court, vide order dated 15.10.2025, while dismissing
the Special Leave Petition, granted time to DDA to re-acquire the
land within one year in terms of the directions passed in DDA v.
Tejpal, (2024) 7 SCC 433. While doing so, this Court recorded as
below:
“2. We have heard learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner as
well as learned Senior Counsel for the private respondent, who
13
is on caveat, and carefully perused the material placed on
record.
3. In our considered view, no case to interfere with the
impugned judgement dated 03.07.2024, passed by the High
Court of Delhi, is made out.
4. All the contentions sought to be raised before us are
essentially disputed question of facts, which were
unsuccessfully raised before the High Court. Knowing the
scope of our consideration under Article 136 of the
Constitution, we cannot entertain and determine such
questions.
xxx xxx xxx
8. It is clarified that the extension of one year, as granted to
the Authorities for completion of acquisition in paragraph 88.1
reproduced above, will commence from the date of this order.”
32. We have heard learned senior counsels, Mr. Shyam Divan for
the appellant and Mr. Kailash Vasdev for the respondent herein.
33. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and perusing
the records, the issue at hand is “whether the Appellant herein is
entitled for a summary judgment under Order XIII-A of the CPC, in the
present facts and circumstances?”
Winds of change
34. Before we address the issue at hand, there is a need to
address certain values inherent to the Indian judicial system. There
is no doubt that our justice delivery system is premised on being
fair, independent, and just. However, it is often criticized for delay.
Ordinary citizens complain about the cost and delay associated with
civil disputes. There are many instances in India which have the
14
bearings of the infamous fictional case of Jarndyce v. Jarndyce, as
recounted by Charles Dickens in his novel ‘Bleak House.’
35. The effectiveness of private arbitration, once seen as a solace
cannot be the panacea for all disputes. There is a need, as well as
growing support, for developing new extensive pre-trial processes.
A conventional trial no longer reflects modern reality and requires
re-calibration. In this light, to ensure balance, there is a
requirement of simplified and proportionate tools for efficacious
adjudication. This implores our system to adopt and embrace a shift
in the culture of efficiency in dispute resolution.
36. An effective justice system must enable a judge to adjudicate
the issue by ascertaining the necessary facts and applying the
appropriate legal principle in a fair and effective manner. However,
such adjudicatory processes cannot be meaningful unless they are
accessible. Accessibility, in this context, must be assessed in terms
of affordability, timeliness, and proportionality. The principle of
proportionality requires that procedural mechanisms be tailored to
the nature, complexity and stakes of the litigation; while ensuring
optimal use of judicial time and resources. In this context, a
summary judgement assumes significance as an important
procedural tool. It advances access to justice by providing a swift
15
and cost-effective alternative to a full-fledged trial, especially in
cases where prolonged adjudication would serve no real purpose.
37. In such a background, the scheme of Order XIII-A of the CPC
required to be analysed. Order XIII-A of the CPC was brought by
way of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015. The relevant portion of
statement or objections and reason of the Commercial Courts Act
2015 is as under: -
“to have a streamlined procedure which is to be adopted for
the conduct of cases in the Commercial Courts and in the
Commercial Divisions by amending the Code of Civil Procedure
1908, so as to improve the efficiency and reduce delays
in disposal of commercial cases. The proposed case
management system and provisions for summary
judgment will enable disposal of commercial disputes in
a time bound manner.”
(emphasis supplied)
38. The need for fast-track procedures in adjudication of
commercial suits was first expressed in the 188th Report of the Law
Commission on the ‘Proposals for constitution of Hi-tech Fast-Track
Commercial Divisions in High Courts.’ Thereafter, the aforesaid
subject matter was extensively considered in 253rd Report of the Law
Commission and examined the rules in jurisdictions such as the
United Kingdom and Singapore to formulate a draft bill which
contained provisions concerning summary procedure. This Report
emphasised that a new procedure for summary judgement be
16
brought into effect for the purpose of streamlining trial proceedings
with the intent to improve efficiency and reduce delay in disposal of
commercial cases. Accordingly, Act 14 of 2016 was passed, bringing
into force the ‘Commercial Courts Act, 2015.’ Order XIII-A was
introduced under the schedule to be added in the Civil Procedure
Code of 1908.
39. Discussing the pro-active approach brought by way of the
Commercial Courts Act, this Court in Ambalal Sarabhai
Enterprises Ltd. v. K. S. Infraspace LLP and Another, (2020) 15
SCC 585, observed as follows: –
“As per Justice R. Banumathi (concurring)
34. The Schedule to the Commercial Courts Act amends
various provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure and thereby
makes significant departure from the Code. After Order 13 of
the Code, Order 13-A "Summary Judgment" has been inserted.
Order 13-A contains the scope and classes of suits to which
Order 13-A applies, grounds for summary judgment,
procedure to be followed, evidence for hearing of summary
judgment, orders that may be made by Court in such
proceedings for summary judgment, etc. After Order 15 of the
Code, Order 15-A-"Case Management Hearing" has been
inserted. Order 15-A provides for first case management
hearing (Rule 1); recording of oral evidence on a day-to-day
basis (Rule 4); powers of the court in a case management
hearing (Rule 6); adjournment of case management hearing
(Rule 7); consequences of non-compliance with orders (Rule 8).
By way of amendment, several rules have been incorporated
to make the matters of commercial disputes on fast track. In
Order 20 of the Code "Judgment", Rule 1 has been substituted
that within ninety days of the conclusion of arguments, the
Commercial Court/Commercial Division/Commercial
Appellate Division to pronounce the judgment and copies
17
thereof shall be issued to all the parties to the dispute through
electronic mail or otherwise.
35. Various provisions of the Act, namely, case management
hearing and other provisions makes the court to adopt a proactive
approach in resolving the commercial dispute. A new
approach for carrying out case management and strict
guidelines for completion of the process has been introduced
so that the adjudicatory process is not delayed. I have referred
to the various provisions of the Act and the Schedule bringing
in amendments brought to the Civil Procedure Code to deal
with the commercial disputes, only to highlight that the trial of
the commercial dispute suits is put on fast track for disposal
of the suits expeditiously. Various provisions of the Act
referred to above and the amendments inserted to the Civil
Procedure Code by the Schedule is to ensure speedy resolution
of the commercial disputes in a time bound manner. The intent
of the legislature seems to be to have a procedure which
expedites the disposal of commercial disputes and thus
creates a positive environment for investment and
development and make India an attractive place to do
business.”
40. The evolution of summary judgments was aimed to resolve a
persistent challenge of common law litigation that often results in
considerable delays and large expenses. There is no gainsaying that
summary judgments did not exists in common law earlier, it evolved
through numerous statutory interventions under the English law as
a response to social and economic pressures. The evolution of
summary judgment was dependent on factual clarity and evidence;
it was granted only to plaintiffs in cases seeking factual certainty.
In this regard, the emergence of summary judgment under Indian
procedural law represents a significant ‘change of winds’, steering
18
the country’s litigation chapters to meet the contemporary demands
of factual certainty and judicial efficiency. Although fast-track
procedure existed under the CPC by way of Order XXXVII, it was
only applicable for limited purpose.
41. Order XIII-A of the CPC consists of eight rules, detailing the
procedure and substance for rendering a summary judgment. Rule
1 states that the summary judgement procedure can be adopted for
deciding the entire suit/counter claim, or a part of a claim or even
a particular question on which a claim (whether in whole or in part)
depends. It was further clarified that the summary procedure was
also applicable to suits filed under Order XXXVII of CPC.
42. Rule 2 of Order XIII-A of the CPC observes that application for
summary judgement is time bound and can be made any time after
the summons has been served on the defendant and before the
issues are framed.
43. Rule 3 of Order XIII-A of the CPC is the heart of the aforesaid
order and reads as under: –
“3. Grounds for summary judgment.— The Court may give
a summary judgment against a plaintiff or defendant on a
claim if it considers that–
(a) the plaintiff has no real prospect of succeeding on the claim
or the defendant has no real prospect of successfully
defending the claim, as the case may be; and
19
(b) there is no other compelling reason why the claim should
not be disposed of before recording of oral evidence.”
In such light, this Rule 3, as applicable to commercial disputes,
empowers the Court to grant a summary judgement against the
defendant where the Court considers that the defendant has no real
prospect of successfully defending the claim and there is no other
compelling reason why the claim should not be disposed of before
recording of oral evidence. The aforesaid provision is identical to
Rule 24.3 of the Civil Procedure Rules, 1998 as applicable in the
United Kingdom. The same reads as under: –
“24.2. The court may give summary judgement against
a claimant or defendant on the whole of a claim or on
an issue if–
(a) It considers that the party has no real prospect of
succeeding on the claim, defence or issue; and
(b) There is no other compelling reason why the case or issue
should be disposed of at a trial.”
44. Rule 4 of Order XIII-A of the CPC prescribes the procedural
aspects concerning the format of pleadings and other requirements
necessary for the Court to consider an application under the said
Order in the following manner: –
“4. Procedure.—
(1) An application for summary judgement to a Court shall
in addition to any other matters the applicant may
deem relevant, include the matters set forth in subclauses
(a) to (f) mentioned hereunder:–
20
(a) the application must contain a statement that it is
an application for summary judgement made under
this Order;
(b) the application must precisely disclose all material
facts and identify the point of law, if any;
(c) in the event the applicant seeks to rely upon any
documentary evidence, the applicant must,–
(i) include such documentary evidence in its
application, and
(ii) identify the relevant content of such
documentary evidence on which the applicant
relies;
(d) the application must state the reason why there are
no real prospects of succeeding on the claim or
defending the claim, as the case may be;
(e) the application must state what relief the applicant
is seeking and briefly state the grounds for seeking
such relief.
(2) Where a hearing for summary judgement is fixed, the
respondent must be given at least thirty days’ notice
of:–
(a) the date fixed for the hearing; and
(b) the claim that is proposed to be decided by the
Court at such hearing.
(3) The respondent may, within thirty days of the receipt
of notice of application of summary judgement or notice
of hearing (whichever is earlier), file a reply addressing
the matters set forth in clauses (a) to (f) mentioned
hereunder in addition to any other matter that the
respondent may deem relevant:–
(a) the reply must precisely–
(i) disclose all material facts;
(ii) identify the point of law, if any; and
(iii) state the reasons why the relief sought by the
applicant should not be granted;
(b) in the event the respondent seeks to reply upon any
documentary evidence in its reply, the respondent
must–
(i) include such documentary evidence in its reply;
and
(ii) identify the relevant content of such
documentary evidence on which the
respondent relies;
21
(c) the reply must state the reason why there are real
prospects of succeeding on the claim or defending
the claim, as the case may be;
(d) the reply must concisely state the issues that
should be framed for trial;
(e) the reply must identify what further evidence shall
be brought on record at trial that could not be
brought on record at the stage of summary
judgement; and
(f) the reply must state why, in light of the evidence or
material on record if any, the Court should not
proceed to summary judgement.”
45. Rule 5 relates to the evidentiary aspect of adjudicating
applications under Order XIII-A of the CPC. This has been inducted
to ensure that summary judgments are rendered in terms of Rule 3
by adducing any additional evidence in the following manner: –
“5. Evidence for hearing of summary judgement.–
(1) Notwithstanding anything in this Order, if the
respondent in an application for summary judgement
wishes to rely on additional documentary evidence
during the hearing, the respondent must:–
(a) file such documentary evidence; and
(b) service copies of such documentary evidence on
every other party to the application at least fifteen
days prior to the date of hearing.
(2) Notwithstanding anything in this Order, if the
applicant for summary judgement wishes to rely on
documentary evidence in reply to the defendant’s
documentary evidence, the applicant must:–
(a) file such documentary evidence in reply; and
(b) serve a copy of such documentary evidence on the
respondent at least five days prior to the date of
hearing.
(3) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary, sub-rules (1)
and (2) shall not require documentary evidence to be:–
(a) filed if such documentary evidence has already
been filed; or
22
(b) served on a party on whom it has already been
served.”
46. Rule 6 provides the different types of discretion available with
the Court while considering an application under Order XIII-A of the
CPC and the same includes: –
“6. Orders that may be made by Court.–
(1) On an application made under this Order, the Court
may make such orders that it may deem fit in its
discretion including the following:–
(a) judgement on the claim;
(b) conditional order in accordance with Rule 7
mentioned hereunder;
(c) dismissing the application;
(d) dismissing part of the claim and a judgement on
part of the claim that is not dismissed;
(e) striking out the pleadings (whether in whole or in
part); or
(f) further directions to proceed for case management
under XV-A.
(2) Where the Court makes any of the orders as set forth
in sub-rule (1)(a) to (f), the Court shall record its reasons
for making such order.”
47. Rule 7 and Rule 8 of Order XIII-A of the CPC provide specific
provisions on conditional orders and costs, respectively.
48. At the outset, the scheme of Order XIII-A of the CPC portrays
an adversarial adjudication. It cannot be inquisitorial, meaning that
a summary judgment under this Order cannot be upon the
inquisition of the Court. It is mandatory to serve the defendant, as
elucidated in Rule 2 of this Order.
23
49. At this point, it will not be out of context to note that the
consequences of ‘rejection of plaint’/’return of plaint’ and ‘summary
judgment’ are different. Res judicata operates only on the latter.
Accordingly, the test of adjudication must also be different between
Order VII Rule 11 and Order XIII-A of the CPC. Consequently, the
scope of enquiry for a Court under Order XIII-A of CPC is larger than
that Order VII Rule 11.
50. Coming back to the Order necessary for adjudication of the
present case, Rule 3 of Order XIII-A of the CPC provides that the
Court, while adjudicating an application for summary judgement,
has to bear in mind two things –
(i) the Court considers –
(a) whether the plaintiff has any real prospect of
succeeding on the claim or issue; or
(b) whether the defendant has any real prospect of
successfully defending the claim or issue; and
(ii) there is no other reason why the case or issue should
be allowed to go to trial.
51. This brings us to the expression ‘real prospect of success’, as
used in Rule 3 of Order XIII-A of the CPC. This phrase is, by its very
nature, self-explanatory and admits of no further interpretation. It
24
postulates that the likelihood of success must be real and
substantial, as opposed to being merely fanciful or speculative. In
other words, the standard envisages a degree of certainty higher
than that of a claim which is merely arguable. Accordingly, where
the Court finds that a claim or defence is so weak that it prima-facie
discloses no reasonable prospect of success, it is neither necessary
nor desirable to subject the parties to the rigours of a full-fledged
trial. The provision, thus, empowers the Court to arrest such
proceedings at the threshold, thereby preventing undue expenditure
use of judicial time and resources. At the same time, the provision
reflects the broader obligation of the Court to ensure expeditious
delivery of justice. In this regard, reference can be made to the
decision of the England and Wales Court of Appeal in Swain v.
Hillman, [2001] 1 All ER 91, which set the standard for summary
judgement under Part 24 of the Civil Procedure Rules, 1998 of the
United Kingdom. In this case, it was held that the power of
summary judgement is to be exercised where it is just and expedient
to do so, enabling parties to know their legal position without being
compelled to endure a trial.
52. The question then arises regarding the scope of enquiry under
Order XIII-A of the CPC. At one end of spectrum, it is to follow the
25
test laid out in Wenlock v. Moloney, [1965] 1 WLR 1238, wherein
the English Court of Appeal adopted rigid standard to state that: –
“…this summary jurisdiction of the court was never
intended to be exercised by a minute and protracted
examination of the documents and facts of the case, in
order to see whether the plaintiff really has a cause of
action. To do that is to usurp the position of the trial judge,
and to produce a trial of the case is chambers, on affidavits
only, without discovery and without oral evidence tested by
cross-examination in the ordinary way. This seems to me to
be an abuse of the inherent power of the court and not a
proper exercise of that power.”
53. A less stringent standard was adopted in William and
Humbert Ltd. v. W & H Trade Marks (Jersey) Ltd., [1986] AC
368, wherein the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit observed that a Court should, as a general rule, decline to
proceed with the argument unless it not only harbours doubts about
the soundness of the pleadings but, in addition, is satisfied that
striking out will obviate the necessity for a trial or will substantially
reduce the burden of preparing for the trial or the burden of the trial
itself.
54. In Three Rivers District Council v. Governor and company
of the Bank of England, [2001] UKHL 16, the House of Lords was
considering a suit for damages against the Bank of England for
misfeasance in public office arising from collapse of Bank of Credit
26
and Commerce International SA. While considering the application
of the defendant for summary judgement, it was held that: –
“95. I would approach that further question in this way. The
method by which issues of fact are tried in our courts is well
settled. After the normal processes of discovery and
interrogatories have been completed, the parties are allowed
to lead their evidence so that the trial judge can determine
where the truth lies in the light of that evidence. To that rule
there are some well-recognised exceptions. For example, it
may be clear as a matter of law at the outset that even if a
party were to succeed in proving all the facts that he offers to
prove he will not be entitled to the remedy that he seeks. In
that event a trial of the facts would be a waste of time and
money, and it is proper that the action should be taken out of
court as soon as possible. In other cases it may be possible to
say with confidence before trial that the factual basis for the
claim is fanciful because it is entirely without substance. It
may be clear beyond question that the statement of facts is
contradicted by all the documents or other material on which
it is based. The simpler the case the easier it is likely to be
take that view and resort to what is properly called summary
judgment. But more complex cases are unlikely to be
capable of being resolved in that way without
conducting a mini-trial on the documents without
discovery and without oral evidence. As Lord Woolf said
in Swain v Hillman, at p 95, that is not the object of the rule. It
is designed to deal with cases that are not fit for trial at all.”
55. Closer to the home, various High Courts have rendered their
opinions primarily on a cautionary note in adjudicating summary
judgments, which have been held to be applicable in exceptional
cases. Reference in this regard can be made to Bright Enterprises
Pvt. Ltd. v. MJ Bizcraft LLP & Anr., 2017 SCC Online Del 6394
and Su-kam Power Systems Ltd. v. Mr. Kunwer Sachdev & Anr.,
2019 SCC Online Del 10764.
27
56. If a case before the Court gives rise to a neat point of law or
construction, and if the Court is satisfied that it has all evidences
necessary for the proper determination of the question and that the
parties have had an adequate opportunity to address their
arguments; it should grasp the nettle and decide the same. While it
is simply not enough for the defendant to argue that something may
come up in trial, at the same time the defendant has to show from
the documents available on record, or portray that such evidence
likely exists and can be expected to be made available during the
trial.
57. There is no gainsaying that the Court ought not to conduct a
mini-trial in this regard, rather take the statements and facts on
the face, until any contemporaneous document indicates otherwise.
In doing so, the Court ought to not only take into account the
evidence actually available on the record, but also the evidence that
can be reasonably be expected to be available in the process of trial.
58. It may not be out of context to note that the use of summary
judgment will not be against the interest of justice if it will lead to a
fair and just result, and serve the goals of timeliness, affordability
and proportionality in light of the litigation as a whole.
59. Therefore, while considering an application for summary
judgment under Order XIII-A of the CPC, the following nonexhaustive guidelines have to be complied –
(i) That the procedural mandate under Order XIII-A,CPC be strictly complied.
(ii) The Court should consider,
(a) Whether Plaintiff has no real prospect of succeeding on the claim or issue; or
(b) Whether the defendant has no real prospect of
successfully defending the claim or issue; and
(iii) The Court should also consider whether there is no
other reason why the case or issue(s) should be
allowed to go to trial.
(iv) While ascertaining above, the Court does not have to
take everything on the face value, but it must also not
conduct a mini trial at the same time.
(v) That the Court has to differentiate between a cause
of action/defence respectively, which is real as
opposed to fanciful prospect.
29
(vi) That the Court ought to grasp the nettle, when
dealing with the summary judgment applications to
decide short points of law and interpretations.
(vii) The Court must take into account not only the
evidence before it but also the evidence that can
reasonably be expected to be led/available at the
trial.
(viii) That the Court’s usage of power under Order XIII-A,
CPC is exceptional as it cuts short the process of trial
and ought to be exercised where oral evidence and
full trial is not required.
(ix) In order to ascertain the need for full trial over
summary judgment, the Court has to see whether, in
the interest of justice, it is more suited to conduct
trial to –
(a) Weigh the evidence,
(b) Evaluate the credibility of a deponents,
(c) Draw reasonable inferences from the evidence.
Grasping the nettle
60. The case of the appellant herein is simple. It is undisputed
that it purchased the Subject Plot through public auction by paying
30
valuable consideration way back in the year 2007. Further, it is an
admitted position that the acquisition of the Subject Land was
challenged before the High Court by the original owner i.e., one
Simla Devi in W.P. (C) No. 5688 of 2015. It is a matter of record that
the High Court by order dated 15.11.2018, declared that the
aforesaid acquisition had lapsed. There is also no dispute that the
when this order was challenged before this Court in Civil Appeal No.
6345 of 2017, the appeal came to be dismissed vide order dated
04.05.2017 while giving DDA a last opportunity to re-acquire the
Subject Plot within six months. There is no dispute that even these
six months as provided by this Court expired on 04.11.2017,
without re-acquisition of the Subject Land. Moreover, it is a matter
of record that the Review Petition filed by DDA before this Court was
dismissed by order dated 17.10.2019, followed by dismissal of a
Curative Petition vide order dated 19.05.2022. Further, the lapse is
again confirmed in the order dated 15.10.2025 passed by this Court
in SLP (C) Dairy No. 53900 of 2025, with a further option given to
DDA to re-acquire the Subject Land within one year.
61. In light of the above admitted and conclusive facts, the
appellant herein instituted a suit for recovery of amount paid as
consideration with interest, before the High Court being C.S.
31
(Comm) No. 582 of 2021. In this context, an application being I.A.
No. 6914 of 2022 was filed by the appellant seeking summary
judgment under Rule 4 of Order XIII-A of CPC. In the said
application, the appellant pleaded that conveyance of the Subject
Plot in its favour was wholly dependent upon the validity of the
acquisition of the underlying land by the respondent DDA. It is an
admitted position that such acquisition stood rendered void-abinitio
due to failure of DDA to pay compensation to the original
landowners, resulting in lapse under Section 24(2) of the Fair
Compensation Act, 2013. In this regard, reliance was placed on the
judgement of the High Court dated 15.11.2016, as affirmed by this
Court in its judgement dated 04.05.2017, as well as the subsequent
review and curative proceedings. It was further contended that the
DDA failed to initiate fresh acquisition proceedings withing the
stipulated time period. In view of the aforesaid, despite payment of
the entire sale consideration, stamp duty, property tax and other
charges, the appellant was left with no subsisting right on the
Subject Plot. Thus, the suit and consequent application were filed
claiming that the amounts paid were liable to be refunded with
interest, for reasons solely attributable to the respondent. It was
also averred that despite repeated representations by the appellant,
32
no response was elicited from the respondent. It was only informed
belatedly vide a letter dated 20.11.2017 of the aforesaid
developments along with furnishing an undertaking to bear all
additional responsibility for re-acquisition, which was well beyond
the time period granted by the Courts.
62. It is, thus, clear from the pleadings and documents in the
application and the plaint, that the appellant is able to discharge
his burden in showing a real prospect of success. Now we must
examine the respondent’s position to see whether the defence
exhibits any actual prospect of success to mandate a trial.
63. The first defence of the DDA is that the appellant continued
the possession and lost the same due to some miscreants.
According to the respondent herein, in order for the appellant to
maintain a claim for refund, the appellant is first bound to handover
the peaceful possession of the subject land to the DDA. Therefore,
the aspect of possession is an issue to be adjudicated in trial.
64. Although this argument of the respondent appears to be
enticing, however the same has to be rejected for having no basis in
law. The history of litigation clearly indicates that the question of
lapse of acquisition has been conclusively put to rest by this Court
in view of dismissal of the Curative Petition. The fact that
acquisition has lapsed means that the situation as it existed before
initiation of the land acquisition process has been brought back.
There is nothing left for the respondent DDA to seek in the land.
Legally, the implication of lapse of acquisition is that the title flows
back to the erstwhile owner. But, the DDA has no interest to retain
the same. Moreover, the order dated 04.05.2017 passed by this
Court in Civil Appeal No. 6345 of 2017 was categorical that if the
re-acquisition is not carried out in six months, then the possession
be returned to the original owners i.e., Simla Devi and others.
65. The defence of the DDA herein is fanciful as they seek to claim
the possession from the appellant herein, whereas it is now for the
erstwhile owners to seek appropriate remedies. In addition, it is
necessary to observe that once, on a petition filed by the erstwhile
owner, lapsing of the acquisition was directed with liberty of reacquisition,
the auction proceedings have lost their efficacy. In
consequence, the Conveyance Deed of the Subject Plot, for which
the deposit of consideration was made, is required to be refunded
in order to revert the clock to the position as it existed on the date
of the auction. Further, in view of the orders passed by this Court,
it can well be perceived that in case the DDA decides to re-acquire
the land, they may have an occasion to auction the same, otherwise,
the title of the subject land will be lost by them. Hence, DDA does
not have any right to retain the bid amount which was deposited
well within time by the appellant.
66. In light of the above, the High Court completely erred in
reading the issue of refund as contingent to handing over of the
possession. There is nothing in law or fact to show that possession
is sine qua non for refund. The DDA is not able to dislodge the fact
that the acquisition lapsed by orders of this Court. A necessary
corollary is that refund has to be initiated for the auction purchaser.
Further, there is no valid reason portrayed by the respondent to
refuse refund or retain the amount any longer.
67. The High Court seems to have misdirected itself in finding a
triable issue on fact without adjudicating the relevancy of the
aforesaid issue to the case at hand. Even assuming that factum of
physical possession is contentious, the High Court failed to examine
as to how such fact affects the issue of refund.
68. The analysis of the High Court in equating possession to a
level ownership is completely misguided. Such understanding
renders categorical findings of this Court in the earlier round otiose.
Further, such examination provides the DDA a ruse to re-open the
litigation settled earlier by this Court. If such re-opening is allowed,
then there is no certainty of the judgments of this Court, more so
when the Curative Petition has already been dismissed against the
respondent herein.
69. Is this context, the letter dated 20.11.2017 sent by DDA to
the appellant herein is instructive, wherein the respondent has
itself admitted that by order dated 04.10.2017 of this Court, the
earlier acquisition lapsed and fresh direction for acquisition was
provided by the Court.
70. In addition, the order in Civil Appeal No. 6345 of 2017 was
an in rem adjudication. Any aspect dealt therein operates as a res
judicata on the party to re-agitate the aforesaid issue. The
adjudication was on the status of land acquisition over the Subject
Land, which has been categorically held to have been lapsed. In this
regard, the respondent cannot be allowed to re-agitate the issue
indirectly in a suit on issues which have been well-settled by way of
orders of this Court.
71. Viewed from the standpoint of restitution, the respondent has
sought to raise a defence of alleged ‘counter-restitution
impossibility.’ Notwithstanding the manner in which the defence
has been articulated, it is liable to be rejected. There exists no
corresponding benefit with the appellant that can be restored to the
respondent. Inasmuch as the acquisition itself has lapsed; no right,
title or benefit in respect of the Subject Land subsists with the
appellant, which can be the subject matter of counter-restitution.
The plea of restitution, insofar as it seeks to predicate a return of
possession, is thus wholly illusory and misconceived. Any
independent claim, including that of the original owner in respect
of possession, is extraneous to the present proceedings and may be
pursued in accordance with law in appropriate proceedings. On this
ground as well, the defence set up by the respondent is liable to fail.
72. The aforementioned issue of possession is also confirmed in
the proceedings before this Court vide order dated 15.10.2025 in
SLP (C) Dairy No. 53900 of 2025, wherein the DDA was directed to
initiate re-acquisition within one year. This order, in essence,
confirms that the earlier acquisition had lapsed, meaning that the
respondent is left with no choice but to refund the amount to the
appellant. The possibility of fresh acquisition cannot impede the
appellant herein from claiming their legitimate refund. The
consequence of respondents’ defence is that the parties would be
involuntarily bound by transactions to which they do not consent.
This Court cannot accept such bad faith arguments as it amounts
to abuse of process in coercing party to accept new transaction. It
is in this regard that liberty is preserved for the DDA to initiate
acquisition again and/or conduct fresh auction for the same, if they
deem it appropriate.
73. In light of the aforesaid analysis, since the issue of possession
is completely alien to the present adjudication, therefore, the
second defence of non-joinder of the original owners is not pertinent
to the present set of litigation.
74. The third defence specifically taken by the respondent in the
written statement is the issue of limitation. At the cost of repetition,
it can be noticed that the lapse of land acquisition was upheld by
this Court on 04.05.2017. The further six months’ period for the
acquisition ended on 04.11.2017. Thereafter, the appellant sent
various representations dated 28.12.2017, 10.12.2018 and
07.08.2019, which were not replied to by the respondent
authorities. Moreover, the Review Petition was dismissed by this
Court on 17.10.2019, followed by dismissal of the Curative Petition
on 19.05.2022.
75. The respondent has argued that the question of limitation is
a mixed question of law and facts, therefore the same cannot be
adjudicated as a summary judgment under Order XIII-A of the CPC.
In our view, such objection taken by the respondent is ex facie to
be rejected. The respondent does not dispute the existence of this
Court’s order dated 04.05.2017 in Civil Appeal No. 6345 of 2017.
The right to seek refund in terms of the order starts to accrue from
04.11.2017, when the time limit of six months, as provided by this
Court, expired. The argument of DDA that the limitation started to
accrue from 2016 is fanciful and nothing turns on the same. The
High Court fell short in this regard to decipher the fanciful defence
over the arguable and real ones.
76. There can be no dispute that limitation is ordinarily a mixed
question of law and fact, particularly where foundational facts are
in contest. In the present case, however, the issue of limitation rests
on admitted and undisputed material, particularly the order of this
Court dated 04.05.2017 and the expiry of the six-month period
stipulated therein. In such circumstances, no further factual
inquiry is warranted. This Court must, therefore, address the issue
decisively at this stage. To permit the matter to proceed to a full
trial, despite the clarity of the material on record, would be contrary
to the principle of proportionality and would needlessly prolong
litigation that is otherwise ripe for determination by way of
summary judgment.
77. Even under Rule 24.2 of Civil Procedural Rules of the United
Kingdom, the English Courts have adjudicated the issue of
limitation where there is no requirement of oral evidence and
extensive trial. In Graham Frank Davy v 01000654 Ltd., [2018]
EWHC 353 (QB), it was held as follows: –
“13. In applying the relevant principles to the summary
judgment limb of the Application I therefore bear in mind the
warning against conducting a mini-trial and also any
reasonable prospect there might be of further evidence,
beyond that filed on the Application, later coming before the
court. Those two propositions affirmed by the Easy Air
decision feed into the further point that, even in cases where
the summary judgment application does not appear to signal
the existence of any obvious conflict of fact or an issue for trial
of any great complexity, the court should be wary of granting
summary judgment where reasonable grounds exist for
believing that a fuller investigation at a trial (or, as
appropriate, a trial of a preliminary issue) might well produce
a different outcome between the parties. However, against
this guidance which might loosely be described as
amounting to giving the respondent the benefit of any
reasonable grounds for doubt, the same principles also
sound a note of caution against undue timidity in
engaging with the application and the evidence filed on
it. Caution which is justified by the need for the
respondent to engage with the "realistic" rather than
the "fanciful" and for the court to test whatever factual
assertions he is making against such contemporaneous
documents as are before it.”
(emphasis supplied)
78. In light of these facts, the suit for refund filed by the appellant
on 02.11.2020 cannot be said to be barred by limitation. Moreover,
even after filing the suit, the DDA continued to litigate the Review
Petition, followed by the Curative Petition before this Court.
Therefore, the defence of the suit being time-barred is completely
misplaced and fictitious. Thus, it is clear that there is nothing in
this issue that requires facts to be ascertained by oral evidence or
requires full trial.
Conclusion
79. Coming to the relief to be granted, the appellant has sought
refund under two heads, i.e., the consideration paid and property
tax paid along with 12% interest. During the oral arguments before
this Court, learned Senior Counsel Mr. Shyam Divan appearing for
the appellant gave up the prayer concerning stamp duty/transfer
duty i.e., Rs. 9,89,46,025/- and property tax i.e., Rs. 23,12,927/-.
Accordingly, the amount of initial consideration paid by the
appellant which amounts to Rs. 164,91,00,000/- needs to be
decreed as refund.
80. Consequentially, it is necessary that this Court set aside the
registered Conveyance Deed dated 06.02.2008 to do complete
justice, by exercising power under Article 142 of the Constitution of
India, as mutual restitution would be necessary to bring an end to
this dispute once and for all. Accordingly, the registered
Conveyance deed dated 06.02.2008, duly registered at the office of
Sub-Registrar-VII Delhi having Registration No. 4300 in Additional
Book No. 1 Volume 2886 at Pg. 83 to 86 dated 07.03.2006, executed
by the respondent in favour of appellant herein is set aside.
81. Although the amount of refund is claimed with 12% interest
from the date of payment of consideration till the final payment by
respondent, however, we deem it appropriate to reduce the interest
to 7.5% in the interest of justice and accordingly, award 7.5%
interest on the aforesaid amount from 12.07.2007 being the date
of complete payment of consideration by the appellant herein, till
the date of actual payment.
82. It was brought to our notice that by order dated 14.10.2024
before the High Court in I.A. No. 36226/2024, the respondent has
deposited a Fixed Deposit Receipt of Rs. 186,00,00,000/- (INR One
hundred eighty-six crores) before the High Court. The appellant
herein is at liberty to withdraw the said amount forthwith. The
balance amount in terms of this order be paid to appellant herein
within eight weeks. If the balance payment is not paid in the
stipulated time, the amount be computed at the prevailing prime
lending rate of the Reserve Bank of India.
83. Keeping in view the aforesaid findings and mandate of law,
the present appeal is allowed, however there shall be no order as to
costs. Accordingly, the suit is decreed in the above terms. The
Registry of this Court is directed to draw up the decree in the above
terms.
….…………………………J.
[J.K. Maheshwari]
….…………………………J.
[Atul S. Chandurkar]
New Delhi;
29th April, 2026
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