In these circumstances, continuing a full
sessions trial against the appellant alone,
while his co-accused stand acquitted on the
self-same evidence, would not further the
cause of justice but would subject the
appellant to the ordeal and stigma of a criminal
trial whose substratum has already collapsed.
The High Court, in the impugned judgment,
proceeded on the premise that the appellant's
reliance on the service certificate was a bare
plea of alibi of the kind considered in Rajendra
Singh (supra), and declined to examine
corroborating circumstances. This, in the
considered view of this Court, constituted a
failure to appreciate unimpeachable material
bearing directly on the question of abuse of
process, and calls for interference. {Para 34}
35. In light of the foregoing facts and
circumstances, and the analysis of the legal
precedents referred to above, this Court is of
the view that the four-steps as laid down in the
case of Rajiv Thapar (supra) are satisfied in
the present case. The service certificate is not
disputed as a document, its issuing authority
is not questioned, nor are its contents
disputed. Where the unimpeached
documentary record and the result of a
connected trial on identical evidence, taken
together, demonstrate that the continuation of
the prosecution against the appellant would be
a legal exercise in futility, the High Court, and
now this Court, would be failing in their duty
if they permitted the criminal process to
continue merely because a technical prima
facie case can be spelt out from the bare
averments of the F.I.R. The categories
identified in Bhajan Lal (supra) are
illustrative and not exhaustive, and the
present case falls squarely within the rationale
of categories 1, 3 and 6 concerning inherent
improbability of the allegations and abuse of
the process of the court.
36. For the foregoing reasons, this Court is
satisfied that the continuation of criminal
proceedings against the appellant amounts to
an abuse of the process of the court and
requires to be quashed qua the appellant
alone.
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2026
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (CRL.) NO.2939 OF 2026)
RAHUL Vs STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH
Author: AUGUSTINE GEORGE MASIH, J.
Citation: 2026 INSC 825
1. Leave granted.
2. This appeal, by special leave, is directed
against the final judgment and order dated
12.12.2025 passed by the High Court of
Judicature at Allahabad (hereinafter referred
to as the “High Court”) in Application under
Section 482 Cr.P.C. No. 23788 of 2018,
whereby the High Court declined to quash the
Chargesheet dated 15.07.2017 as well as the
Crl.A. @ SLP (C) No.2939/2026 Page 2 of 29
entire criminal proceedings of Case No. 147 of
2018 (State v. Rahul), arising out of Case
Crime No. 227 of 2016, registered under
Sections 498-A, 304-B of the Indian Penal
Code, 1860 and Sections 3/4 of the Dowry
Prohibition Act, 1961, at Police Station
Inchauli, District Meerut, pending before the
Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Meerut
(hereinafter referred to as the “trial court”).
3. The marriage between the appellant, Rahul,
and Anshul @ Payal, daughter of Respondent
No. 2 (Raj Kumar/complainant), was
solemnised on 21.04.2014 at Garden City,
Mawana. On 13.06.2016, Respondent No. 2
lodged First Information Report No. 227 of
2016 at Police Station Inchauli, District
Meerut, alleging that the appellant and his
family members namely, his mother Sheela,
father Ramnath, sister Parul, his father's
brother Surendra, and Surendra's son Ankur
had subjected his daughter Anshul (deceased)
to cruelty and harassment for dowry,
particularly for a Tata Safari motor car, and
Crl.A. @ SLP (C) No.2939/2026 Page 3 of 29
that on account of non-fulfilment of the said
demand, the deceased was done to death by
hanging on 13.06.2016.
4. On the same date, an inquest
(Panchayatnama) was conducted, during
which it was recorded that the room in which
the deceased was found hanging, as also the
main entrance of the house, were found locked
from inside, and had to be broken open by the
police in the presence of the Tehsildar. The
post-mortem examination conducted on
14.06.2016 recorded the cause of death as
asphyxia as a result of ante-mortem hanging,
with a ligature mark of 26 cm x 20 cm around
the neck.
5. The appellant, a member of the Border
Security Force (BSF), was on the relevant date
posted on the Indo-Bangladesh border. A
certificate dated 03.10.2016 issued by the
DC/ADJT for the Commandant, 141 Battalion,
BSF, records that the appellant was detained
on Dak-runner duty to carry official
Crl.A. @ SLP (C) No.2939/2026 Page 4 of 29
documents from Frontier Headquarters, BSF,
Meghalaya (Shillong) to New Delhi with effect
from 27.05.2016 to 22.06.2016, and that he
proceeded from Shillong to New Delhi on
14.06.2016 and remained stationed at Delhi
until 19.06.2016.
6. The appellant's earlier application under
Section 482 Cr.P.C. (Criminal Misc. Writ
Petition No. 24082 of 2016) came to be
disposed of on 24.11.2016, protecting him
from arrest till submission of the police report
under Section 173(2) Cr.P.C. Thereafter,
Charge-sheet No. 09A/16 was submitted on
15.07.2017 under Sections 498-A, 304-B IPC
and Sections 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act
against the appellant.
7. The appellant thereafter filed Criminal Misc.
Application No. 23788 of 2018 under Section
482 Cr.P.C. before the High Court, seeking
quashing of the chargesheet dated 15.07.2017
and the entire proceedings of Criminal Case
No. 147 of 2018 (State v. Rahul). The High
Crl.A. @ SLP (C) No.2939/2026 Page 5 of 29
Court, vide order dated 20.07.2018, stayed
further proceedings pending disposal of the
application.
8. In the meanwhile, the trial against the
appellant's parents, Ramnath and Sheela,
proceeded independently before the Court of
the Additional Sessions Judge/Fast Track
Court No. 1, Meerut, in Sessions Trial No. 653
of 2017, on charges under Sections 498-A,
304-B IPC (in the alternative, Section 302 read
with Section 34 IPC) and Sections 3/4 of the
Dowry Prohibition Act, arising out of the very
same F.I.R. No. 227 of 2016. Vide judgment
dated 17.10.2025, the court acquitted them
after a full-fledged trial, holding that the
prosecution had failed to establish allegations
of cruelty, dowry demand or homicidal
involvement beyond reasonable doubt.
9. Notwithstanding the acquittal of the coaccused
and the official documents relied upon
by the appellant, the High Court vide the
impugned judgment dated 12.12.2025,
Crl.A. @ SLP (C) No.2939/2026 Page 6 of 29
dismissed the appellant's application under
Section 482 Cr.P.C., placing reliance upon the
decision of this Court in Rajendra Singh v.
State of U.P. and Another1 that the plea of
alibi raised by the appellant was a question of
fact requiring proof at trial, that no finding on
alibi could be recorded for the first time in a
petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C., and that
whether the death was homicidal or suicidal,
and whether the appellant was present at the
place of occurrence, were disputed questions
of fact not amenable to adjudication in the
exercise of inherent jurisdiction.
10. Aggrieved, the appellant approached this
Court by way of the present appeal. Vide order
dated 27.02.2026, notice was issued and,
having regard to the order dated 17.10.2025
acquitting the appellant's parents and the
certificate dated 03.10.2016 issued by the
Commandant, 141 BN BSF, this Court
directed that no coercive action be taken
against the appellant and stayed further
1 (2007) 7 SCC 378
Crl.A. @ SLP (C) No.2939/2026 Page 7 of 29
proceedings in F.I.R./Crime No. 227 of 2016.
11. The learned counsel for the appellant submits
that the impugned judgment dated 12.12.2025
is erroneous inasmuch as it fails to accord due
weight to the appellant's plea, which rests not
on a bare denial but on official documentary
evidence. The F.I.R. itself is founded on
general, omnibus and unsubstantiated
allegations of dowry demand, without any
cogent evidence specifically attributable to the
appellant. The Inquest Report/
Panchayatnama dated 13.06.2016, prepared
in the presence of independent panchas,
records that both the main gate and the room
in which the deceased was found were locked
from inside and had to be broken open which
is prima facie inconsistent with the
prosecution's theory of a dowry death caused
by the family members acting in concert. The
Post-Mortem Report dated 14.06.2016 records
the cause of death as asphyxia due to antemortem
hanging with a single ligature mark
and no other ante-mortem injury indicative of
Crl.A. @ SLP (C) No.2939/2026 Page 8 of 29
homicidal violence, restraint or struggle,
consistent with the appellant's consistent
stand that the deceased died by suicide. The
appellant's absence is corroborated by the
certificate dated 03.10.2016 issued by the
Commandant, 141 Battalion, BSF showing
that he was detailed for Dak-runner duty from
Frontier Headquarters, BSF, Meghalaya
(Shillong) to Delhi for the period 27.05.2016 to
22.06.2016, remained at Shillong throughout
that period, and proceeded to Delhi only on
14.06.2016 i.e., a day after the incident,
remaining stationed there until 19.06.2016. It
was further submitted that the appellant's
parents stand acquitted by judgment dated
17.10.2025, the trial court having held that the
prosecution utterly failed to prove cruelty or
harassment for dowry beyond reasonable
doubt, which order erodes the very substratum
of the prosecution case.
12. The learned counsel further submits that the
High Court erred in treating the appellant's
defence as an ordinary disputed plea of alibi
Crl.A. @ SLP (C) No.2939/2026 Page 9 of 29
necessarily requiring trial, without
appreciating the distinction between (i) a
factual defence of alibi requiring evidentiary
appreciation, and (ii) a threshold legal
challenge founded on admitted,
unimpeachable official material which ex facie
demolishes the prosecution case, relying on
Harshendra Kumar D. v. Rebatilata Koley
and Others2, and on State of Haryana and
Others v. Bhajan Lal and Others3, Yin
Cheng Hsiung v. Essem Chemical
Industries4 and Mohd. Akram Siddiqui v.
State of Bihar and Another5.
13. Further, learned counsel submits that the case
of Rajendra Singh (supra) as relied upon by
the High Court, is distinguishable on facts,
since the alibi in that case rested on affidavits
filed for the first time before the High Court,
whereas here the defence rests on an official,
contemporaneous BSF service record whose
2 (2011) 3 SCC 351
3 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335
4 (2011) 15 SCC 207
5 (2019) 13 SCC 350
Crl.A. @ SLP (C) No.2939/2026 Page 10 of 29
authenticity has never been questioned by the
respondents at any stage. Continuation of
proceedings in the teeth of this impeccable
material and the acquittal of the co-accused
parents was submitted to fall within the
Bhajan Lal (supra) categories and to amount
to an abuse of process, and, the appellant
having no criminal antecedents, to occasion a
violation of Articles 14 and 21 of the
Constitution.
14. The learned counsel for Respondent No. 1
(State of U.P.), opposes the petition principally
on the ground that a plea of alibi is a matter of
evidence, the burden of establishing which lies
squarely on the appellant. Further submits
that the post-mortem report dated 14.06.2016
records the cause of death as asphyxia due to
ante-mortem hanging, with a ligature mark of
26 cm x 20 cm and other associated findings,
as reaffirmed by the doctor who conducted the
post-mortem. Except for the certificate dated
03.10.2016 and certain affidavits, the
appellant has failed to place on record any
Crl.A. @ SLP (C) No.2939/2026 Page 11 of 29
cogent or independent corroborative material
such as travel records, tickets, movement
orders, leave records or transportation details
to conclusively establish that he could not
have left his place of posting and travelled to
Delhi during the relevant period, and that a
bare certificate, unsupported by such material,
cannot be given evidentiary weight at this
stage. Reliance was placed on Sections 11 and
103 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872
(corresponding to Sections 9 and 105 of the
Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023), and on
Shaikh Sattar v. State of Maharashtra6,
for the proposition that a plea of alibi must be
proved with absolute certainty so as to
completely exclude the possibility of the
accused's presence at the relevant time and
place, as also on Rajendra Singh (supra) for
the proposition that no finding on a plea of alibi
can be recorded by a court for the first time in
a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C., the
burden being dischargeable only by leading
6 (2010) 8 SCC 430
Crl.A. @ SLP (C) No.2939/2026 Page 12 of 29
evidence at trial and not through affidavits or
documents filed before the Court. On this
basis, it was submitted that the appellant has
failed to make out any exceptional case
warranting interference, and that the petition
deserves to be dismissed.
15. The learned counsel for Respondent No. 2
(complainant) submits that the chargesheet
has been filed after due investigation and cites
as many as 17 witnesses, whose veracity,
credibility and evidentiary value can only be
tested through examination and crossexamination
at a full-fledged trial, and cannot
be pre-judged or short-circuited at the
threshold. The appellant’s plea of absence is,
in substance, a plea of alibi within the meaning
of the exception under Section 11 of the Indian
Evidence Act, 1872, the burden of proving
which lies on the appellant. Mere production of
a movement order or duty certificate without
the same being proved and tested through
evidence at trial, cannot discharge this burden
or be appreciated at the stage of a quashing
Crl.A. @ SLP (C) No.2939/2026 Page 13 of 29
petition and that whether the duty in fact
covered the precise date, time and place of
occurrence, and conclusively excluded the
appellant's presence, are matters requiring
appreciation of evidence and are within the
exclusive domain of the trial court.
16. Having heard the submissions made by all the
parties the following questions fall for our
consideration: (i) whether the High Court was
justified in declining to examine, at the
threshold, the effect of the official service
certificate establishing the appellant's absence
from the place of occurrence; (ii) whether the
acquittal of the co-accused appellant’s
parents, on an identical set of allegations and
evidence arising from the very same F.I.R., has
a material bearing on the continuation of
proceedings against the appellant; and (iii)
whether, on a cumulative reading of the
record, the continuation of criminal
proceedings against the appellant amounts to
an abuse of the process of the court,
warranting exercise of jurisdiction under
Crl.A. @ SLP (C) No.2939/2026 Page 14 of 29
Article 136 read with the principles governing
Section 482 Cr.P.C.
17. The contours of the power to quash an F.I.R.
or criminal proceedings are well settled. In
Bhajan Lal (supra) case, this Court, while
cautioning that the power under Section 482
Cr.P.C. is to be exercised sparingly and in the
rarest of rare cases, laid down illustrative
categories in which such power may be
exercised. The relevant categories as relied
upon in the present case are as follows:
“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of
the various relevant provisions of the Code
under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law
enunciated by this Court in a series of
decisions relating to the exercise of the
extraordinary power under Article 226 or the
inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code
which we have extracted and reproduced
above, we have given the following categories
of cases by way of illustration wherein such
power could be exercised either to prevent
abuse of the process of any court or otherwise
to secure the ends of justice, though it may not
be possible to lay down any precise, clearly
defined and sufficiently channelised and
inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to
give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases
wherein such power should be exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first
information report or the complaint, even if they
are taken at their face value and accepted in
Crl.A. @ SLP (C) No.2939/2026 Page 15 of 29
their entirety do not prima facie constitute any
offence or make out a case against the
accused.
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made
in the FIR or complaint and the evidence
collected in support of the same do not disclose
the commission of any offence and make out a
case against the accused.
xxx xxx xxx
(6) Where there is an express legal bar
engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code
or the concerned Act (under which a criminal
proceeding is instituted) to the institution and
continuance of the proceedings and/or where
there is a specific provision in the Code or the
concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for
the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly
attended with mala fide and/or where the
proceeding is maliciously instituted with an
ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the
accused and with a view to spite him due to
private and personal grudge.”
18. The power is undoubtedly to be exercised
sparingly, with circumspection, and never to
throttle a legitimate prosecution or to conduct
a mini trial at the threshold. These selfimposed
restraints, however, do not require
the court to shut its eyes to a proceeding that
is a manifest abuse. Where mala fide or an
oblique motive is alleged, the court is not
confined to the four corners of the complaint.
In Mahmood Ali and Others v. State of Uttar
Pradesh and Others7 this Court held that in
such a situation the court owes a duty to
examine the complaint with care and a little
more closely, and, where necessary, to read in
between the lines.
19. In Rajiv Thapar and Others v. Madan Lal
Kapoor8, this Court laid down a 4-step test to
determine if criminal proceedings can be
quashed on the basis of defense
material/official records prior to trial:
“30. Based on the factors canvassed in the
foregoing paragraphs, we would delineate the
following steps to determine the veracity of a
prayer for quashment raised by an accused by
invoking the power vested in the High Court
under Section 482 CrPC:
30.1. Step one: whether the material relied
upon by the accused is sound, reasonable, and
indubitable i.e. the material is of sterling and
impeccable quality?
30.2. Step two: whether the material relied
upon by the accused would rule out the
7 (2023) 15 SCC 488
8 (2013) 3 SCC 330
assertions contained in the charges levelled
against the accused i.e. the material is
sufficient to reject and overrule the factual
assertions contained in the complaint i.e. the
material is such as would persuade a
reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the
factual basis of the accusations as false?
30.3. Step three: whether the material relied
upon by the accused has not been refuted by
the prosecution/complainant; and/or the
material is such that it cannot be justifiably
refuted by the prosecution/complainant?
30.4. Step four: whether proceeding with the
trial would result in an abuse of process of the
court, and would not serve the ends of justice?
30.5. If the answer to all the steps is in the
affirmative, the judicial conscience of the High
Court should persuade it to quash such
criminal proceedings in exercise of power
vested in it under Section 482 CrPC. Such
exercise of power, besides doing justice to the
accused, would save precious court time,
which would otherwise be wasted in holding
such a trial (as well as proceedings arising
therefrom) specially when it is clear that the
same would not conclude in the conviction of
the accused.”
20. The first circumstance which assumes
considerable significance is the medical
evidence.
21. The post-mortem report unequivocally records
that the deceased died due to "asphyxia as a
result of ante-mortem hanging." Apart from the
ligature mark around the neck, no other antemortem
injuries were found on the body. The
medical officer did not notice abrasions,
contusions, nail marks, defensive wounds or
any injury suggestive of resistance, restraint or
physical assault.
22. Medical evidence undoubtedly does not by
itself determine whether death is suicidal or
homicidal. Nevertheless, where the
prosecution alleges homicidal violence
involving several accused acting in concert, the
complete absence of injuries ordinarily
expected in a struggle assumes considerable
evidentiary significance.
23. Equally significant is the contemporaneous
inquest report. The Panchayatnama prepared
immediately after the occurrence records that
both the main entrance of the house and the
room where the deceased was found hanging
Crl.A. @ SLP (C) No.2939/2026 Page 19 of 29
and were locked from inside and had to be
opened from outside.
24. An inquest report is not substantive evidence
regarding guilt. Nevertheless, being a
contemporaneous official record prepared
immediately after the occurrence constitutes
an important surrounding circumstance. The
prosecution has offered no satisfactory
explanation as to how, if the deceased had
been murdered by the accused persons and
thereafter hanged, the room and even the main
gate came to be found bolted from inside. This
circumstance assumes even greater
importance when read conjointly with the
medical evidence.
25. The third circumstance relates to the
appellant's official service records. The
appellant has relied upon a certificate issued
by the Commandant, 141 Battalion, Border
Security Force certifying that he had been
detailed for official duty during the relevant
Crl.A. @ SLP (C) No.2939/2026 Page 20 of 29
period and was stationed in connection with
official assignments outside Meerut.
26. The certificate dated 03.10.2016 ascertains
that appellant remained present at Ftr HQ BSF
Meghalaya (Shillong) except on 14.06.2016
i.e., a day after the incident and remained in
Delhi up to 19.06.2016. The relevant extract is
as follows:
“2. Further above individual was detailed for Dak
runner duty to carry official documents from Ftr HQ BSF
Meghalaya (Shillong) to Delhi we.f. 27.05.16 to
22.06.2016. As ascertained from Ftr HQ Meghalaya, he
was remained present at Ftr HQ BSF Meghalaya
(Shillong) except on following dates:
a) 14.06.2016 at 0530 hrs
vide Ftr HQ Megh GD No.
162
- Individual proceeded to
FHQ BSF New Delhi
from Ftr HQ BSF Megh
(Shillong) and remained
stayed at Delhi up to
19.06.16.
b) 20.06.2016 at 1210 hrs
vide Ftr HQ Megh GD
No.237
- Individual returned
from FHQ BSF New
Delhi to Ftr HQ BSF
Megh (Shillong) and
remain stayed at
Shillong
Place: Dhanakgre (Meghalaya) sd/-
Dated the 3, Oct. 2016 (ARBIND KUMAR) DC/ADJT
FOR COMMANDANT
141 BN BSF”
Crl.A. @ SLP (C) No.2939/2026 Page 21 of 29
27. This Court in Prashant Bharti v. State (NCT
of Delhi)9, while applying Rajiv Thapar
(supra) case held that where defence material
of sterling and unimpeachable quality is placed
on record, and such material completely
demolishes the prosecution case, the High
Court would be justified in quashing the
proceedings even at the pre-trial stage, since
no purpose is served in allowing a prosecution
to continue when the material produced
convincingly demonstrates that the allegations
are patently false. The Court further proceeded
to hold that to permit the prosecution to
proceed further in such circumstances would
itself be an abuse of the process of the court.
28. In Harshendra Kumar (surpa), this Court
reiterated that while exercising jurisdiction
under Section 482 Cr.P.C., the High Court can
look into material that has a bearing on the
question whether continuance of the criminal
proceedings would amount to an abuse of the
9 (2013) 9 SCC 293
Crl.A. @ SLP (C) No.2939/2026 Page 22 of 29
process of court, and that if, on the face of
documents which are beyond suspicion or
doubt, no case is made out against the
accused, the High Court would be justified in
exercising its jurisdiction to quash the
proceedings.
29. In Mirza Iqbal alias Golu and Another v.
State of Uttar Pradesh and Another10, this
Court considered the quashing of proceedings
where the accused's official duty record
demonstrated his absence from the place of
occurrence.
30. This Court is mindful of the statement of law
in Rajendra Singh (supra) that the burden of
proving a plea of alibi lies upon the accused
and is ordinarily to be discharged by leading
evidence at trial, and that a finding on alibi
cannot be recorded by the High Court for the
first time in a petition under Section 482
Cr.P.C. on the strength of affidavits of
interested persons which the prosecution has
10 (2022) 16 SCC 697
Crl.A. @ SLP (C) No.2939/2026 Page 23 of 29
had no opportunity to test by crossexamination.
31. However, that principle, was applied to a case
where the material relied upon consisted of
affidavits sworn by private individuals before
the police, whose veracity was inherently open
to challenge and required cross-examination.
It cannot be read as laying down an inflexible
rule that no species of documentary material
touching upon presence or absence of the
accused may ever be looked into at the
threshold, irrespective of its source, character,
and the absence of any dispute as to its
authenticity. Where the material in question is
an official record maintained in the ordinary
course of duty by a wing of the Armed Forces
of the Union, is placed on record from the
earliest stage of investigation itself, and has
never been impugned as forged, fabricated, or
otherwise unreliable by the prosecution at any
stage including before the IO, who himself
acknowledged that evidence emerged that
appellant was on his duty at the time of the
Crl.A. @ SLP (C) No.2939/2026 Page 24 of 29
incident such material partakes of the
character of unimpeachable material
contemplated in Prashant Bharti (supra) and
Harshendra Kumar (supra), and calls for
consideration even at the threshold. To hold
otherwise would be to elevate procedural
formalism over substantial justice and to
compel an undeniably absent accused to
undergo the ordeal of a full sessions trial
notwithstanding admitted and unimpeachable
proof to the contrary.
32. The offence under Section 304-B IPC requires
the prosecution to establish, inter alia, that the
deceased was subjected to cruelty or
harassment by her husband or his relatives
for, or in connection with, a demand for dowry,
"soon before" her death. It is true, as urged on
behalf of the respondents, that physical
presence at the precise moment of death is not,
by itself, an ingredient of the offence, and that
cruelty or harassment "soon before" death may
be established through conduct, including
telephonic threats occurring even while the
accused is stationed elsewhere. The
appellant's absence from place of occurrence
on date of incident does not, therefore, by
itself, exonerate him of the charge. However, no
call-detail records were ever obtained to
independently verify, establish or assert, even
this solitary telephonic thread that said to
connect the appellant to the alleged demand.
33. The fourth and last circumstance relates to the
effect of acquittal of appellant’s parents. An
order of acquittal of co-accused, rendered on
an identical body of evidence, does not
automatically bind or exonerate a differently
situated co-accused whose case may rest on
distinct material. That principle, however,
presupposes that the case of the co-accused
sought to be proceeded against is, in fact,
distinguishable on the evidence. Here, no such
distinguishing evidence exists. The evidence
relied upon by the prosecution against the
appellant is not merely similar to, but is the
very same evidence that was found
insufficient, on trial, to sustain a conviction of
his parents and the solitary additional element
said to distinguish the appellant's role viz, the
telephonic demand attributed to him alone
stands substantially neutralised by the
complete absence of any call-detail record to
verify even that solitary allegation and by the
unimpeached and, indeed, prosecutioncorroborated
proof of his absence from the
State at the relevant time.
34. In these circumstances, continuing a full
sessions trial against the appellant alone,
while his co-accused stand acquitted on the
self-same evidence, would not further the
cause of justice but would subject the
appellant to the ordeal and stigma of a criminal
trial whose substratum has already collapsed.
The High Court, in the impugned judgment,
proceeded on the premise that the appellant's
reliance on the service certificate was a bare
plea of alibi of the kind considered in Rajendra
Singh (supra), and declined to examine
corroborating circumstances. This, in the
considered view of this Court, constituted a
failure to appreciate unimpeachable material
bearing directly on the question of abuse of
process, and calls for interference.
35. In light of the foregoing facts and
circumstances, and the analysis of the legal
precedents referred to above, this Court is of
the view that the four-steps as laid down in the
case of Rajiv Thapar (supra) are satisfied in
the present case. The service certificate is not
disputed as a document, its issuing authority
is not questioned, nor are its contents
disputed. Where the unimpeached
documentary record and the result of a
connected trial on identical evidence, taken
together, demonstrate that the continuation of
the prosecution against the appellant would be
a legal exercise in futility, the High Court, and
now this Court, would be failing in their duty
if they permitted the criminal process to
continue merely because a technical prima
facie case can be spelt out from the bare
averments of the F.I.R. The categories
identified in Bhajan Lal (supra) are
illustrative and not exhaustive, and the
present case falls squarely within the rationale
of categories 1, 3 and 6 concerning inherent
improbability of the allegations and abuse of
the process of the court.
36. For the foregoing reasons, this Court is
satisfied that the continuation of criminal
proceedings against the appellant amounts to
an abuse of the process of the court and
requires to be quashed qua the appellant
alone.
37. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. The
impugned judgment and order dated
12.12.2025 passed by the High Court of
Judicature at Allahabad in Application under
Section 482 Cr.P.C. No. 23788 of 2018 is set
aside. F.I.R./Case Crime No. 227 of 2016
registered at Police Station Inchauli, District
Meerut, together with Charge-sheet No.
09A/16 dated 15.07.2017 and all consequent
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 147 of 2018
(State v. Rahul) pending before the Court of the
Chief Judicial Magistrate, Meerut, are hereby
quashed insofar as they concern the appellant.
38. For the avoidance of doubt, it is clarified that
this order does not, in any manner, disturb the
judgment dated 17.10.2025 passed by the
Additional Sessions Judge/Fast Track Court
No. 1, Meerut in Sessions Trial No. 653 of
2017, nor does it affect the status or rights of
any other person.
39. Pending interlocutory applications, if any,
stand disposed of.
…….……..………..………………..J.
[ SANJAY KAROL ]
…….……..………..………………..J.
[ AUGUSTINE GEORGE MASIH ]
NEW DELHI;
AUGUST 11, 2026.
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