Section 20 specifically addresses proceedings pending before a regular court. It authorises the court to record or maintain a
finding that the juvenile committed the offence, but prohibits an
adult sentence and requires the matter to be dealt with under the
juvenile justice framework. The Explanation, introduced by the
2006 amendment, makes the benefit applicable to pending trials,
appeals, revisions and other criminal proceedings even where
the person has crossed the age of eighteen. The saving provision
in Section 25 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of
Children) Act, 2015 preserves the application of the earlier law
to proceedings already pending. {Para 25}
26. The statutory position is settled by Hari Ram v. State of Rajasthan (2009) 13 SCC 211; Dharambir v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2010) 5 SCC 344; and Jitendra Singh @ Babboo Singh v. State of U.P. (2013) 11 SCC 193, whereby this Court recognized that a person below eighteen on the date of an offence committed even before 1st April, 2001 receives the benefit of the 2000 Act; This Court further held that a conviction on merits need not be annulled merely because the person was tried by a regular court; and however the adult sentence cannot survive.
NON-REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 64 OF 2011
DINESH KUMAR Vs THE STATE OF HARYANA
Author: ARAVIND KUMAR. J.
Citation: 2026 INSC 842.
Dated: AUGUST 12th , 2026.
A. THE APPEAL
1. This Criminal Appeal arises from the common Judgment and
Order dated 18th September, 2009 of the High Court of Punjab
and Haryana in Criminal Appeal No. 62-DB of 2001,
Criminal Appeal No.64 of 2011 Page 2 of 18
whereunder the High Court has dismissed the Appellant’s
appeal and affirmed the judgment of conviction dated 15th
September, 2000 and the order on sentence dated 18th
September, 2000 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge,
Sonepat in Sessions Case No. 134 of 1998.
2. The Appellant, along with Manoj and Mukesh Kumar, was
convicted for the offences punishable under Sections 302 read
with 34 and 392 read with 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860
(hereinafter referred to as ‘IPC’). For the offence under Section
302/34 IPC, each accused was sentenced to imprisonment for
life and a fine of Rs.10,000/- with a default sentence of three
years' rigorous imprisonment. For the offence under Section
392/34 IPC, each was sentenced to seven years' rigorous
imprisonment and a fine of Rs.5,000/- with a default sentence of
two years' rigorous imprisonment. The substantive sentences
were directed to run concurrently.
3. During the pendency of the present appeal, the appellant placed
on record an order dated 12th October, 2012 of the Principal
Magistrate, Juvenile Justice Board, Sonepat declaring that he
was a juvenile on the date of the offence and directing his
release, he having already undergone detention well beyond the
Criminal Appeal No.64 of 2011 Page 3 of 18
maximum permissible period under the juvenile justice law. The
record of that inquiry has since been called for by this Court.
The appeal, therefore, requires determination both on the merits
of the conviction and on the legal consequences of the
appellant's juvenility.
B. PROSECUTION CASE
4. Hari Om, the deceased, worked as a driver of Ambassador car
No. DHE-3836 owned by Partap Singh (PW-18), and plied it as
a taxi from Bhiwani. On the morning of 10th August, 1998 Hari
Om and his brother Sumer Singh (PW-13) were at the taxi stand.
At about 9.00 to 9.30 a.m., the appellant Dinesh Kumar, Manoj
and Mukesh Kumar hired the taxi for Sonepat. PW-13 knew the
three accused from before and saw Hari Om leave with them.
Hari Om did not return. PW-13 made inquiries and, on 13th
August, 1998 went with the car owner to village Thana Kalan,
viz., the village of the accused. They were informed that the
three accused were not seen in the village for several days. On
13th August, 1998 Shibban, who cultivated a sugarcane field
near the Yamuna bandh in village Jaunpur, found a decomposed
male body in the field and informed the police. Inquest
Criminal Appeal No.64 of 2011 Page 4 of 18
proceedings were conducted and the body was sent to PGIMS,
Rohtak because it was in an advanced stage of decomposition.
On 14th August, 1998 PW-13 and PW-18 reached the mortuary
and identified the body as that of Hari Om. The face and parts
of the body were mutilated, but the identification was made with
reference to the clothes and the remaining physical features
known to the witnesses. On the statement of PW-13, FIR No.
265 of 1998 was registered at Police Station Gannaur for
offences under Sections 302, 392 and 34 IPC. On 15th August,
1998 acting on secret information, a police party at Taraori
intercepted the three accused while they were allegedly
attempting to dispose of the Ambassador car. The accused were
apprehended with the car; its registration certificate and
insurance papers were seized. A country-made pistol was also
recovered from Mukesh in the separate case registered at Police
Station Butana.
5. During interrogation, separate disclosure statements were
recorded. The portions of those confessional statements were
not admissible. The prosecution, however, relied on the
discoveries said to have followed them. Manoj led the police to
a danda. The appellant and Mukesh led the police to a concealed
tiffin carrier bearing an identifying engraving and to Hari Om's
Criminal Appeal No.64 of 2011 Page 5 of 18
driving licence in the sugarcane field. The prosecution examined
nineteen witnesses and tendered the forensic report and the
relevant seizure and disclosure memoranda.
6. Dr P.K. Paliwal (PW-9), who conducted the post-mortem
examination, found the body in a highly decomposed and partly
scavenged condition, with maggots present and several soft
tissues and structures missing. No bony injury was detected and
the precise cause of death could not be ascertained. His estimate
of the post-mortem interval ranged broadly from about five days
to two weeks, while also acknowledging the difficulty of
precision in the condition in which the body was received.
C. DECISIONS OF THE COURTS BELOW
7. The Trial Court treated the case as one resting on circumstantial
evidence. It framed five principal issues: identification of the
body; the evidentiary value of the last-seen circumstance; the
effect of the medical evidence; the recoveries pursuant to
disclosure; and the alleged discrepancies in the prosecution
evidence.
8. The Trial Court accepted the identification by PW-13 and PW-
18, holding that facial identification was not the sole permissible
Criminal Appeal No.64 of 2011 Page 6 of 18
mode where a close relative could identify the body from clothes
and remaining physical features. It further held that the last-seen
circumstance was materially reinforced by the recovery of the
deceased's taxi from the three accused shortly thereafter and by
their attempt to sell it. The Trial Court regarded the medical
opinion as approximate because the body had lain exposed in a
field, had been attacked by animals and insects, and was in an
advanced state of decomposition. It also accepted the recoveries
of the danda, tiffin carrier and driving licence, observing that the
articles were concealed within a large sugarcane field and were
discovered at places specifically indicated by the accused. As
such, the Trial Court concluded that the prosecution succeeded
to prove the case against the Appellant beyond reasonable doubt.
9. In Appeal, the High Court independently excluded the
inadmissible confessional portions of the disclosure statements
and relied only on the information distinctly connected with the
discoveries under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, 1872. It held
that the last-seen evidence of PW-13, the possession of the
deceased's taxi by the three accused within a few days, their
attempt to dispose of it, and the recovery of the deceased's
driving licence and tiffin carrier formed a complete chain. As
such, the appeals were accordingly dismissed.
Criminal Appeal No.64 of 2011 Page 7 of 18
D. GROUNDS URGED IN THE APPEAL
10. We have heard Mrs. Prabhati Nayak, learned counsel appearing
on behalf of the Appellant. The conviction is assailed principally
on the ground that the dead body was beyond recognition; the
medical officer could neither ascertain the cause of death nor
find a bony injury; the post-mortem interval was said to be
inconsistent with the prosecution timeline; PW-13 was a related
and solitary witness on the last-seen circumstance; the
recoveries were from an accessible field; and the prosecution
failed to prove motive or an unbroken chain of circumstances.
11. On the other hand, the State relies on the concurrent findings and
emphasizes that PW-13 knew the accused, the deceased left with
them in the taxi, all three were apprehended within five days in
possession of the same taxi while attempting to dispose of it, and
the appellant participated in the discovery of the deceased's
driving licence and tiffin carrier. It is also material that the
connected appeal of co-accused Manoj, arising out of the same
common judgments and the same evidentiary record, was
disposed of by this Court on 6th August, 2025 without
interference with the conviction.
Criminal Appeal No.64 of 2011 Page 8 of 18
12. The subsequent declaration of juvenility does not, by itself, erase
a finding of guilt recorded on evidence. It principally affects the
forum and nature of the permissible disposition and renders the
adult sentence legally ineffective.
E. POINTS FOR DETERMINATION
13. Having perused the material on record, we are of the considered
view that the following questions arise: (i) whether the
concurrent conviction under Sections 302/34 and 392/34 IPC
calls for interference; (ii) whether the appellant was a juvenile
on the date of the offence; and (iii) if so, what order should
follow concerning the sentence and consequential
disqualifications.
F. CONVICTION ON MERITS
14. A conviction based entirely on circumstantial evidence can be
sustained only when each circumstance relied upon is firmly
proved; the proved circumstances form a complete chain; and
the chain is consistent only with the guilt of the accused and
inconsistent with a reasonable hypothesis of innocence. The five
Criminal Appeal No.64 of 2011 Page 9 of 18
principles stated in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of
Maharashtra1, continue to govern the inquiry.
15. The circumstance of last seen cannot ordinarily, by itself, sustain
a conviction for murder. In the present case, however, it does not
stand alone. PW-13 was not a chance witness unfamiliar with
the accused. He was the deceased's brother, was present at the
taxi stand, knew the three accused and saw deceased Hari Om
depart with them in the taxi on the morning of 10th August, 1998.
The accused were thereafter found absent from their village and
Hari Om was never seen alive again.
16. The most significant corroborative circumstance is the recovery
of the very taxi from the joint possession of the three accused at
Taraori on 15th August, 1998 accompanied by its registration
and insurance papers, when they were said to be attempting to
dispose of it. This was not an innocuous or remote recovery. It
occurred within five days of the hiring and shortly after the body
was discovered. No explanation was offered by the accused in
their statements recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. as to how
the taxi came into their possession.
1 (1984) 4 SCC 116
Criminal Appeal No.64 of 2011 Page 10 of 18
17. The absence of an explanation under Section 313 Cr.P.C. cannot
fill a gap in the prosecution case or relieve the prosecution of its
primary burden. Section 106 of the Evidence Act, 1872
“106. Burden of proving fact especially within knowledge.
–– When any fact is especially within the knowledge of any
person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him.
Illustrations
(a) When a person does an act with some intention other
than that which the character and circumstances of the act
suggest, the burden of proving that intention is upon him.
(b) A is charged with travelling on a railway without a
ticket. The burden of proving that he had a ticket is on him.”
Once the foundational facts of last seen and recent, unexplained
possession of the taxi belonging to deceased were independently
proved, and the failure to furnish any plausible account became
an additional link and not a substitute for proof.
18. The discoveries of the driving licence and the tiffin carrier of the
deceased at the instance of the appellant and Mukesh provide
further corroboration. The admissible circumstance is not the
narrative of the crime contained in the police statement, but the
fact that information supplied by persons in custody led to the
discovery of articles connected specifically with Hari Om at the
indicated place. The fact that the field was not owned by the
Criminal Appeal No.64 of 2011 Page 11 of 18
accused does not make the discovery valueless where the articles
were concealed in a large standing crop and the precise location
was demonstrably within their special knowledge. At the same
time, we treat this circumstance as corroborative rather than as
the sole foundation of guilt.
19. The challenge to the identification of the body must be evaluated
in the context of the complete record. The decomposition
prevented facial recognition, but PW-13 and PW-18 identified
the clothes and such remaining features as were available. More
importantly, the identity was objectively reinforced by the
disappearance of Hari Om with the taxi, the recovery of that taxi
from the accused, and the subsequent discovery of his driving
licence. The dead body retrieved cannot be treated as wholly
unconnected merely because decomposition had made ordinary
visual identification difficult.
20. The medical evidence deserves careful treatment. The postmortem
doctor – PW 9 could not ascertain the precise cause of
death and found no bone injury. That unquestionably limits the
medical corroboration available to the prosecution. Yet it is not
affirmative evidence that Hari Om died naturally, accidentally,
or before he left Bhiwani. The body had lain exposed, partly
Criminal Appeal No.64 of 2011 Page 12 of 18
scavenged and in an advanced state of decomposition; relevant
soft tissues and neck structures were missing. An estimate of the
post-mortem interval in such circumstances is necessarily
approximate. The marginal variation between the prosecution
date and the broad medical estimate is insufficient to override
the proved surrounding circumstances.
21. Pertinently, motive is not an indispensable element where the
circumstantial chain is complete. In any event, the immediate
appropriation and attempted sale of the taxi supplies a
discernible pecuniary motive. The minor variations concerning
the description of the vehicle used by the police, the exact
position of the body, or the names conveyed second-hand to
PW-18 do not affect the core circumstances proved by direct
evidence.
22. We have also borne in mind that the appellant's case arises from
the same occurrence, common trial and common High Court
judgment as the appeal of Manoj. By order dated 6th August,
2025 this Court examined the connected record and found no
ground to interfere with Manoj's conviction, modifying the
consequence only because he had been found to be a juvenile.
Consistency of judicial treatment is not a substitute for
Criminal Appeal No.64 of 2011 Page 13 of 18
independent scrutiny, but the appellant has shown no
distinguishing feature in the common evidentiary chain that
would justify a contrary merits conclusion.
23. The circumstances, taken cumulatively, therefore establish:
(a) Hari Om's departure with the appellant and the two coaccused
in the taxi;
(b) his disappearance and the recovery of his body along the
route within days;
(c) the accused's recent and unexplained possession of the taxi
belonging to deceased and its papers while attempting to dispose
of it; and
(d) the discovery of the deceased's personal articles at the
instance of the appellant and Mukesh.
The chain excludes a reasonable hypothesis consistent with
innocence. As such, we find no ground to disturb the conviction
under Sections 302/34 and 392/34 IPC.
G. DETERMINATION OF JUVENILITY
24. Section 7A of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of
Children) Act, 2000 permits a claim of juvenility to be raised
before any court at any stage, even after final disposal. Where
the person is found to have been a juvenile on the date of the
offence, the court is required to forward the matter for an
appropriate order under the Act and the sentence imposed by the
regular criminal court is deemed to have no effect.
25. Section 20 specifically addresses proceedings pending before a regular court. It authorises the court to record or maintain a
finding that the juvenile committed the offence, but prohibits an
adult sentence and requires the matter to be dealt with under the
juvenile justice framework. The Explanation, introduced by the
2006 amendment, makes the benefit applicable to pending trials,
appeals, revisions and other criminal proceedings even where
the person has crossed the age of eighteen. The saving provision
in Section 25 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of
Children) Act, 2015 preserves the application of the earlier law
to proceedings already pending.
26. The statutory position is settled by Hari Ram v. State of Rajasthan (2009) 13 SCC 211; Dharambir v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2010) 5 SCC 344; and Jitendra Singh @ Babboo Singh v. State of U.P. (2013) 11 SCC 193, whereby this Court recognized that a person below eighteen on the date of an offence committed even before 1st April, 2001 receives the benefit of the 2000 Act; This Court further held that a conviction on merits need not be annulled merely because the person was tried by a regular court; and however the adult sentence cannot survive.
27. The Principal Magistrate, Juvenile Justice Board, Sonepat
conducted an inquiry and, by order dated 12th October, 2012
accepted the appellant’s date of birth as 3rd February, 1981. The
Board calculated his age as seventeen years, six months and
eleven days by reference to 14th August, 1998, the date on which
the FIR was registered. The occurrence, however, is consistently
alleged to have taken place on 10th August, 1998. On that date,
the appellant was seventeen years, six months and seven days
old. The four-day difference in calculation is immaterial: since
on either date he had not completed eighteen years.
28. The record further shows that the Juvenile Justice Board directed
the appellant's immediate release after noting that he had already
undergone custody for more than three years. The maximum
period for which a juvenile could be sent to a special home under
Section 15(1)(g) of the 2000 Act was three years. The order of
juvenility has not been displaced, and this Court's order dated 9th
October, 2025 records that the proceedings culminated in a
declaration that Dinesh Kumar was a juvenile on the date of the
offence i.e., 10.08.1998.
29. We accordingly accept the declaration of juvenility. The
sentence of life imprisonment and the sentence of seven years'
rigorous imprisonment, together with the fine and default
stipulations imposed by the Trial Court, cannot operate against
the appellant. Ordinarily, the matter would be forwarded to the
Board for the appropriate disposition. That exercise has already
been completed: the Board has passed an order, found that the
appellant had undergone more than the statutory maximum and
directed his release. A fresh remand would be empty formality
and contrary to the rehabilitative object of the enactment.
30. The connected case furnishes direct parity. In Manoj v. State of
Haryana, Criminal Appeal No. 768 of 2011, decided on 6th
August, 2025 this Court maintained the conviction arising from
the same trial but held that the juvenile appellant, having already
undergone more than the permissible maximum, need not
surrender and discharged his bail bonds. The same consequence
must follow here. Section 19 of the 2000 Act further provides
that a juvenile dealt with under the Act shall not suffer any
disqualification attached to a conviction under another law. The
appellant shall therefore receive the statutory protection against
such disqualification, and the competent Board/authority shall
take the consequential steps regarding the records in accordance
with Section 19 and the applicable rules.
31. As such, Interlocutory Application No. 27571 of 2024 is allowed
and the Order dated 12th October, 2012 of the Juvenile Justice
Board, Sonepat, together with the connected inquiry record, is
taken on record. The finding that the appellant Dinesh Kumar
was a juvenile on the date of the offence, 10th August, 1998 is
accepted.
32. The conviction of the appellant for the offences punishable
under Sections 302 read with 34 and 392 read with 34 IPC is
affirmed. The sentences imposed by the Additional Sessions
Judge, Sonepat on 18 September 2000 and affirmed by the High
Court on 18 September 2009, including the substantive
imprisonment, fine and default stipulations, are set aside and
shall be treated as having no effect against the appellant in view
of Section 7A(2) read with Sections 15 and 20 of the Juvenile
Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000. As the
appellant has already undergone detention exceeding the
maximum period permissible under the 2000 Act and has been
Criminal Appeal No.64 of 2011 Page 18 of 18
released pursuant to the order of the Juvenile Justice Board/
interim orders of this Court, he shall not be required to surrender.
His bail bonds, if subsisting, shall stand discharged.
33. The Appellant shall not suffer any disqualification attached to
the conviction, in terms of Section 19 of the 2000 Act. The
Juvenile Justice Board, Sonepat shall ensure compliance with
the consequential statutory requirements concerning the records.
In the above terms, the Appeal is partly allowed.
34. Pending applications, if any, stands consigned to record.
...........................................................J.
[ARAVIND KUMAR]
............................................................J.
[VIPUL M. PANCHOLI]
NEW DELHI;
AUGUST 12th , 2026.

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