We are therefore unable to agree with the reasoning of the High Court. The High Court proceeded on the premise that the
mechanism contemplated under Sections 13, 14, 17 and 18 of
the 1993 Act constitutes the exclusive route through which an
alleged violation of human rights must travel before
prosecution can be initiated. In doing so, it read into the
statute a limitation which the text does not contain and failed
to give independent operation to Section 30 of the 1993 Act.
The High Court also treated Rule 6 as creating a parallel
substantive regime, whereas, as noted above, the Rule merely
provides the procedural machinery for a Human Rights Court
already contemplated by Parliament. Its further apprehension
that simultaneous recourse to the Commission and the
Human Rights Court may result in double jeopardy is equally
misplaced, since an inquiry or recommendation by the
Commission does not amount to a prior prosecution or
punishment so as to attract the constitutional protection
against double jeopardy. {Para 18}
19. In view of the foregoing discussion, we hold that Rule 6 of the
2006 Rules is not inconsistent with the 1993 Act and does not
travel beyond the rule-making power conferred upon the State
Government under Section 41 thereof. Rule 6 of the 2006
Rules is therefore intra vires the 1993 Act and is valid.
20. Consequently, the impugned judgment and order dated
17.07.2025 passed by the High Court of Karnataka in Writ
CRL. A. NO.4075 OF 2026 WITH CONNECTED 13
Petition No. 200873 of 2024 is set aside.
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.4075 OF 2026
[@SLP(CRL.) NO.16453 OF 2025]
SAYAD ASIFULLA Vs STATE OF KARNATAKA & ORS.
Author: VIKRAM NATH,J.
Citation: 2026 INSC 964
Dated: AUGUST 25, 2026
1. Leave granted.
2. The present appeals arise from the judgment and order dated
17.07.2025 passed by the High Court of Karnataka in Writ
Petition No. 200873 of 2024, whereby the High Court struck
down Rule 6 of the Karnataka State Human Rights Courts
Rules, 20061 as unconstitutional, inconsistent with the
provisions of the Protection of Human Rights Act, 19932 and
ultra vires the rule-making power conferred upon the State
Government under Section 41 of the said Act. As a
consequence, the High Court also quashed Crime No. 15 of
2024 registered at Jalanagar Police Station, Vijayapura, and
held that the order dated 20.01.2024 passed by the Principal
District and Sessions Judge and Special Judge, Human Rights
1 hereinafter referred to as “the 2006 Rules”
2 hereinafter referred to as “the 1993 Act”
CRL. A. NO.4075 OF 2026 WITH CONNECTED 2
Court, Vijayapura, in PCR No. 1 of 2024 directing investigation
did not survive for consideration.
3. Criminal Appeal No. 4075 of 2026 has been preferred by Sayad
Asifulla, who was respondent no. 2 before the High Court and
the complainant in PCR No. 1 of 2024. Criminal Appeal No.
4076 of 2026 has been preferred by the State of Karnataka,
which was respondent no. 1 before the High Court. The police
officers against whom the proceedings arising from PCR No. 1
of 2024 came to be initiated were the writ petitioners before
the High Court and are the contesting private respondents in
Criminal Appeal No. 4075 of 2026. Both appeals assail the
judgment and order dated 17.07.2025 passed by the High
Court in Writ Petition No. 200873 of 2024.
4. For ease of reference, Criminal Appeal No. 4075 of 2026 shall
be treated as the lead matter. Accordingly, Sayad Asifulla, the
appellant therein, shall hereinafter be referred to as “the
appellant”.
5. The facts giving rise to the present appeals are as follows:
5.1 The appellant was arrayed as an accused in Crime No. 30
of 2023 registered at Jalanagar Police Station,
Vijayapura. Thereafter, on 19.01.2024, he instituted a
private complaint before the Principal District and
Sessions Judge and Special Judge, Human Rights Court,
Vijayapura, alleging violation of his human rights by
certain police officials in connection with his custody.
5.2 The said complaint came to be registered as PCR No. 1 of
2024. By order dated 20.01.2024, the Principal District
and Sessions Judge and Special Judge, Human Rights
CRL. A. NO.4075 OF 2026 WITH CONNECTED 3
Court, Vijayapura, referred the complaint to the
Superintendent of Police, Vijayapura, for investigation
under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
19733.
5.3 Pursuant to the aforesaid order, Crime No. 15 of 2024
came to be registered at Jalanagar Police Station,
Vijayapura, against the concerned police officials.
5.4 The private respondents thereafter approached the High
Court by filing Writ Petition No. 200873 of 2024. They
challenged, inter alia, the validity of Rule 6 of the 2006
Rules and also sought quashing of Crime No. 15 of 2024
and the proceedings arising from PCR No. 1 of 2024.
5.5 By the impugned judgment dated 17.07.2025, the High
Court allowed the writ petition and held Rule 6 of the
2006 Rules to be unconstitutional, inconsistent with the
1993 Act and ultra vires the rule-making power conferred
upon the State Government under Section 41 thereof.
Consequently, Crime No. 15 of 2024 was quashed and
the order dated 20.01.2024 passed in PCR No. 1 of 2024
was held not to survive for consideration.
5.6 Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment, the appellant and
the State of Karnataka preferred the present proceedings
before this Court. By order dated 27.10.2025 passed in
the lead matter, this Court stayed the effect and operation
of the impugned judgment.
3 hereinafter referred to as ‘the CrPC’
CRL. A. NO.4075 OF 2026 WITH CONNECTED 4
6. We have heard the learned counsel appearing for the
respective parties. The principal question that arises for
consideration in the present appeals is whether Rule 6 of the
2006 Rules, insofar as it enables an aggrieved person to
directly approach the Human Rights Court and prescribes the
procedure to be followed on such a complaint, is inconsistent
with the scheme of the 1993 Act or travels beyond the rulemaking
power conferred upon the State Government under
Section 41 of the said Act.
7. Before examining the validity of Rule 6 of the 2006 Rules, it
would be necessary to first clarify the statutory scheme within
which the provision operates. The 1993 Act was enacted to
provide for the constitution of the National Human Rights
Commission, State Human Rights Commissions and Human
Rights Courts for the better protection of human rights and for
matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. Section 2(d)
defines “human rights” to mean the rights relating to life,
liberty, equality and dignity of the individual guaranteed by the
Constitution or embodied in the International Covenants and
enforceable by courts in India. Sections 12 to 18 of the 1993
Act prescribe the functions and powers of the Human Rights
Commissions and the manner in which complaints of human
rights violations may be inquired into and investigated. Section
18 further empowers the Commission, during or upon
completion of such inquiry, to recommend, inter alia, initiation
of proceedings for prosecution or such other suitable action as
it may deem fit.
CRL. A. NO.4075 OF 2026 WITH CONNECTED 5
8. Alongside the aforesaid institutional mechanism, Parliament
has separately provided for the constitution of Human Rights
Courts under Section 30 of the 1993 Act. The provision reads
as follows.
“30. Human Rights Courts.—For the purpose of
providing speedy trial of offences arising out of
violation of human rights, the State Government may,
with the concurrence of the Chief Justice of the High
Court, by notification, specify for each district a Court
of Session to be a Human Rights Court to try the said
offences:
Provided that nothing in this section shall apply if—
(a) a Court of Session is already specified as a special
court; or
(b) a special court is already constituted, for such
offences under any other law for the time being in
force.”
9. Section 41 of the 1993 Act confers rule-making power upon
the State Government. Insofar as relevant, it provides as
follows.
“41. Power of State Government to make rules.—
(1) The State Government may, by notification,
make rules to carry out the provisions of this
Act.
(2) In particular and without prejudice to the
generality of the foregoing power, such rules
may provide for all or any of the following
matters, namely—
(a) the salaries and allowances and other
terms and conditions of service of the
Chairperson and Members under Section 26;
CRL. A. NO.4075 OF 2026 WITH CONNECTED 6
(b) the conditions subject to which other
administrative, technical and scientific staff
may be appointed by the State Commission
and the salaries and allowances of officers and
other staff under sub-section (3) of Section 27;
(c) the form in which the annual statement of
accounts is to be prepared under sub-section
(1) of Section 35.”
10. In exercise of the power conferred by Section 41 of the 1993
Act, the State Government framed the 2006 Rules. Rule 6 of
the 2006 Rules, which is at the heart of the controversy before
us, reads as follows:
“6. Procedure and powers of Court.—(1) A victim of an offence
arising out of violation of human rights, his legal representative, or
a registered non-governmental Organisation or a public person
may file a complaint against a public servant who has committed
or abetted the commission of an offence of violation of human
rights, while acting under the colour of his office as a public
servant:
Provided a complaint on behalf of the victim may be filed by a
Non-Governmental Organisation or a public person only with
prior authorisation on affidavit by the victim.
(2) The Court on receipt of such complaint, shall either order an
investigation into the offence by a police officer not below the
rank of Superintendent of Police or it may proceed to conduct its
own inquiry into the complaint in accordance with the procedure
for dealing with private complaints in the Code:
Provided that the Superintendent of Police shall complete such
investigation as far as possible within fifteen days, failing which
he shall report the progress of the investigation to the Court
concerned with the case diaries and seek extension of time for
further investigation and complete the investigation within the
stipulated time.
CRL. A. NO.4075 OF 2026 WITH CONNECTED 7
(3) If after the investigation, the investigating officer reports to the
Court that no offence is made out, the Court shall serve the
complainant with a notice for the purpose of deciding whether or
not there is sufficient ground for proceeding.
(4) If on the basis of police report or the evidence collected during
preliminary inquiry, the Court is of the view that there is sufficient
material on record to proceed against the accused in appropriate
cases, the Court shall forward a copy of the complaint along with
the material evidence collected during investigation or inquiry, as
the case may be, to the Competent Authority for its perusal for the
purpose of grant of sanction for the prosecution of the accused.
(5) The Competent Authority shall dispose of the request for
sanction within a period of thirty days from the date of receipt of
communication from the Court.
(6) The trial before the Court shall be conducted in accordance
with the provisions regarding sessions trial prescribed under the
Code.
(7) The Court shall try the offence on day-to-day basis.”
Rule 6 of the 2006 Rules prescribes the procedure in respect
of complaints before a Human Rights Court. In substance, it
permits a victim of an offence arising out of violation of human
rights, his legal representative or, subject to the prescribed
authorization, a registered non-governmental organisation or
public person to file a complaint against a public servant
alleged to have committed or abetted such an offence while
acting under colour of his office. Upon receipt of the complaint,
the Human Rights Court may either direct investigation by a
police officer not below the rank of Superintendent of Police or
conduct an inquiry in accordance with the procedure
CRL. A. NO.4075 OF 2026 WITH CONNECTED 8
prescribed for private complaints under the Code. The Rule
further provides for the course to be followed upon receipt of
the investigation report, consideration of sanction for
prosecution wherever required, and the conduct of trial in
accordance with the procedure applicable to trials before a
Court of Session.
11. A conjoint reading of the aforesaid provisions reveals that the
1993 Act contemplates two distinct institutional mechanisms
for the protection and enforcement of human rights. On the
one hand are the National and State Human Rights
Commissions, which have been entrusted with powers of
inquiry, investigation and recommendation under Sections 12
to 18 of the 1993 Act. On the other hand, Section 30 thereof
expressly contemplates Human Rights Courts for the speedy
trial of offences arising out of violations of human rights. The
functions assigned to these two institutions are therefore not
identical. The Commission primarily performs an inquisitorial
and recommendatory role, whereas the Human Rights Court
exercises judicial power in relation to offences arising out of
violations of human rights.
12. The mere conferment of power upon the Commission to inquire
into a complaint and, where appropriate, recommend initiation
of prosecution cannot, in our view, be construed as making
such an inquiry or recommendation an indispensable
condition precedent to the initiation of criminal proceedings.
Nothing in Sections 12 to 18 of the 1993 Act expressly provides
that every prosecution concerning an offence arising out of a
violation of human rights must originate from a
CRL. A. NO.4075 OF 2026 WITH CONNECTED 9
recommendation of the Commission. Equally, Section 30
thereof does not make the jurisdiction of the Human Rights
Court dependent upon the completion of any prior proceeding
before the Commission. In our considered opinion, to read
such a limitation into the statute would amount to supplying
a condition which Parliament itself has not enacted.
13. Moreover, it must be noted that Rule 6 of the 2006 Rules does
not create any new offence, prescribe any new punishment or
enlarge the meaning of human rights under the 1993 Act. It
merely provides the procedural means by which the
jurisdiction conferred upon a Human Rights Court under
Section 30 of the 1993 Act may be invoked and exercised. The
offences which may ultimately be tried by such Court continue
to be offences punishable under the applicable penal law. The
Rule only regulates the manner in which a complaint alleging
such an offence may be received, investigated and thereafter
proceeded with in accordance with law.
14. We are also unable to accept the view that the rule-making
power of the State Government under Section 41 of the 1993
Act is confined only to the matters enumerated in sub-section
(2) thereof. Section 41(1) thereof expressly empowers the State
Government to make rules “to carry out the provisions of this
Act”. More importantly, sub-section (2) begins with the words
“in particular and without prejudice to the generality of the
foregoing power”. The language employed by Parliament makes
it clear that the matters specified in clauses (a) to (c) are
illustrative and do not exhaust the amplitude of the general
power conferred by sub-section (1).
CRL. A. NO.4075 OF 2026 WITH CONNECTED 10
15. It is well settled by this Court that a rule made in exercise of
delegated legislative power cannot travel beyond the parent
enactment or alter its substantive scheme.4 At the same time,
where the parent enactment confers a general rule-making
power for carrying its provisions into effect, the delegate may
prescribe the procedural machinery necessary for giving
meaningful operation to those provisions, so long as such
machinery is not inconsistent with the statute. The principle
was stated with particular clarity in St. Johns Teachers
Training Institute v. Regional Director, NCTE5, wherein
this Court held that rules cannot supplant the provisions of
the enabling Act but may supplement them by providing for
ancillary matters and filling up the details necessary for
effectuating the legislative scheme. Viewed in this light, Rule 6
of the 2006 Rules supplements Section 30 of the 1993 Act by
prescribing the procedure through which a Human Rights
Court may deal with offences arising out of violations of human
rights. It does not supplant the 1993 Act.
16. The aforesaid construction also finds direct support in the
decision of this Court in Paramvir Singh Saini v. Baljit
Singh6. While dealing with complaints relating to the use of
force in police stations, this Court expressly recognised that
such complaints may be made not only to the State Human
Rights Commission, which may exercise its powers under
Sections 17 and 18 of the 1993 Act, but also to the Human
4 See State of Karnataka v. H. Ganesh Kamath, (1983) 2 SCC 402; Kunj Behari Lal Butail v. State of
H.P., (2000) 3 SCC 40.
5 (2003) 3 SCC 321
6 (2021) 1 SCC 184
CRL. A. NO.4075 OF 2026 WITH CONNECTED 11
Rights Courts constituted under Section 30 thereof. Though
the validity of Rule 6 of the 2006 Rules was not directly in issue
in the said case, the decision clearly recognises that recourse
to a Human Rights Court is not dependent upon a prior inquiry
or recommendation by the Human Rights Commission. It thus
reinforces the construction which follows from the statutory
scheme itself, namely, that the remedies before the
Commission and the Human Rights Court are distinct and
complementary and that the former is not a mandatory
gateway to the latter.
17. The arguments put forth by the counsel for the private
respondents are also to no avail. The contention that Section
18 of the 1993 Act makes the Human Rights Commission the
exclusive route for initiation of prosecution finds no support in
the language of the statute, and Section 30 thereof contains
no condition making the jurisdiction of the Human Rights
Court dependent upon a prior inquiry or recommendation by
the Commission. Equally, Rule 6 of the 2006 Rules neither
creates a new offence nor confers a jurisdiction alien to the
1993 Act, but merely regulates the procedure to be followed by
a Court already contemplated under Section 30 thereof. The
pleas based on repugnancy and separation of powers also
cannot be sustained in the absence of any inconsistency
between Rule 6 of the 2006 Rules and the parent enactment.
As regards the requirement of sanction for prosecution, the
same is a matter to be considered in the facts of an individual
case in accordance with the applicable law and cannot furnish
a ground for invalidating Rule 6 of the 2006 Rules itself. Any
such defence available to the concerned accused shall
necessarily remain open to be urged before the competent
Court.
18. We are therefore unable to agree with the reasoning of the High Court. The High Court proceeded on the premise that the
mechanism contemplated under Sections 13, 14, 17 and 18 of
the 1993 Act constitutes the exclusive route through which an
alleged violation of human rights must travel before
prosecution can be initiated. In doing so, it read into the
statute a limitation which the text does not contain and failed
to give independent operation to Section 30 of the 1993 Act.
The High Court also treated Rule 6 as creating a parallel
substantive regime, whereas, as noted above, the Rule merely
provides the procedural machinery for a Human Rights Court
already contemplated by Parliament. Its further apprehension
that simultaneous recourse to the Commission and the
Human Rights Court may result in double jeopardy is equally
misplaced, since an inquiry or recommendation by the
Commission does not amount to a prior prosecution or
punishment so as to attract the constitutional protection
against double jeopardy.
19. In view of the foregoing discussion, we hold that Rule 6 of the
2006 Rules is not inconsistent with the 1993 Act and does not
travel beyond the rule-making power conferred upon the State
Government under Section 41 thereof. Rule 6 of the 2006
Rules is therefore intra vires the 1993 Act and is valid.
20. Consequently, the impugned judgment and order dated
17.07.2025 passed by the High Court of Karnataka in Writ
CRL. A. NO.4075 OF 2026 WITH CONNECTED 13
Petition No. 200873 of 2024 is set aside. The consequential
quashing of Crime No. 15 of 2024 and the finding that the
order dated 20.01.2024 passed by the Principal District and
Sessions Judge and Special Judge, Human Rights Court,
Vijayapura, in PCR No. 1 of 2024 did not survive for
consideration, are also set aside. The proceedings arising
therefrom shall continue from the stage at which they
presently stand, in accordance with law.
21. We clarify that we have expressed no opinion on the merits of
the allegations forming the subject matter of the aforesaid
proceedings. All contentions and defences available to the
parties, are left open to be considered by the competent Court
on their own merits.
22. The appeals are accordingly allowed.
23. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
………………………………..J.
[VIKRAM NATH]
………………………………..J.
[SANDEEP MEHTA]
NEW DELHI;
AUGUST 25, 2026
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