On an overall consideration of all the circumstances relied upon by the prosecution, we find that the evidence led by the prosecution is woefully short of pointing to the guilt of the appellant. The witnesses examined were not sure as to whether the appellant was last seen with the victim as they had their own doubts in that regard. The discovery effected under Section 27 of the Act of 1872 was from a place that was ordinarily visible to others, thus, requiring such discovery to be considered with caution. The DNA report in clear terms refers to the bone extracts being of male origin while the victim was a female. The said bones naturally did not match with the blood samples of the victim’s mother and sister. The report from the FSL also does not take the case of the prosecution any further. There is a doubt created as to whether the brown shawl claimed by the prosecution to be brought by the appellant from his mother was the same as the appellant’s mother had denied that it belonged to her. Therefore, the appellant’s statement under Section 313 of the Code cannot be taken as an additional link in the chain of circumstances. In other words, the chain of circumstances has not been formed on the basis of the prosecution evidence. The Sessions Court, in our view, failed to notice these material factors that were very much available on record. It, therefore, erred in convicting the appellant on the basis of circumstantial evidence. {Para 10}
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.107 OF 2018
SANTOSH GURUNG Vs STATE OF SIKKIM
ATUL S. CHANDURKAR, J.
Dated: OCTOBER 1, 2026.
1. The appellant assails his conviction for the offence
punishable under Sections 376(2)(i), 302 and 201 of the Indian
Penal Code, 18601 along with his conviction under Sections 4 and
6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012. The
Sessions Court sentenced him to undergo life imprisonment in
view of his conviction and the High Court of Sikkim2 in appeal has
maintained the same.
2. The case of the prosecution is that on 06.11.2013 at about
09.00 a.m., the appellant was asked by his mother3 to go and
purchase some vegetables. The appellant asked his maternal
1 For short, ‘the Penal Code’
2 For short, ‘the High Court’
3 For short, ‘the complainant’
niece4 to accompany him. However, the complainant did not permit
him to take her along. According to the prosecution, the appellant,
however, took the victim from the house. When the appellant and
the victim did not return after some time, the complainant
searched for them. She informed the victim’s mother that her child
was missing. On 12.11.2013, the complainant lodged a Missing
Report at Rongli Police Station giving details of the victim as well
as her maternal uncle, the appellant. The appellant was traced at
Siliguri much later. As per the First Information Report5 dated
13.05.2014, the appellant while being brought back from Siliguri
to Rongli had stated that he had raped the victim and had,
thereafter, throttled her to death on 06.11.2013. An offence was,
accordingly, registered and investigation was conducted. At the
conclusion of the investigation, the chargesheet was filed. The
appellant denied the charge and was, accordingly, tried. The
prosecution examined sixteen witnesses and relied upon various
circumstances to bring home the guilt of the appellant. The
defence of the appellant was of denial. The learned Judge of the
Sessions Court by the judgement dated 20.04.2016 held the
appellant guilty and, accordingly, sentenced him in the manner
4 For short, ‘the victim’
5 For short, ‘FIR’
Page 3 of 22
Criminal Appeal No.107 of 2018
stated hereinabove.
3. Being aggrieved, the appellant preferred an appeal under
Section 374 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 19736 challenging
his conviction. The High Court, on a re-appreciation of the entire
evidence on record, affirmed the order passed by the Sessions
Court and upheld the appellant’s conviction. Being aggrieved, the
appellant has come up in appeal.
4. Ms. Sangeeta Kumar, learned counsel for the appellant
submitted that the Sessions Court as well as the High Court erred
in convicting the appellant on the basis of circumstantial evidence.
The various circumstances referred to by the prosecution were not
sufficient to bring home the guilt of the appellant. Though
according to the prosecution, the appellant was last seen with the
victim, the evidence on record indicated otherwise. The
prosecution witnesses were not confident as to whether they had
last seen the appellant with the victim. Referring to the delay in
registration of the FIR, she submitted that the prosecution failed
to explain the steps taken since lodging of the Missing Report on
12.11.2013 and registration of the FIR on 13.05.2014. She referred
to the deposition of the prosecution witnesses to urge that the
6 For short, ‘the Code’
Page 4 of 22
Criminal Appeal No.107 of 2018
chain of circumstances was not complete and that on the basis of
such evidence, the appellant could not have been convicted. The
recovery effected under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act,
18727 was doubtful inasmuch as the items recovered were not
related to the victim. Even the spot from where the recovery was
effected was frequented by members of the public and, therefore,
it would not be safe to rely upon such recovery. The learned
counsel placed reliance on the decision in Kattavellai @ Devakar
Vs. State of Tamil Nadu8 in this regard. The report of the Forensic
Science Laboratory9 as well as the DNA testing report did not
support the case of the prosecution. Thus, in absence of any
material evidence connecting the appellant with the incident in
question, he had been convicted. It was, thus, submitted that the
impugned judgments were liable to be set aside and the appellant
ought to be acquitted.
5. On the other hand, Mr. Sameer Abhyankar, learned counsel
appearing for the State of Sikkim supported the impugned
judgments. According to him, in absence of any eye-witness, the
prosecution was justified in relying upon various clinching
7 For short, ‘the Act of 1872’
8 2025 INSC 845
9 For short, ‘FSL’
Page 5 of 22
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circumstances that pointed to the guilt of the appellant. Each
circumstance relied upon by the prosecution clearly indicated the
involvement only of the appellant and, therefore, both the Courts
were justified in holding him guilty. The learned counsel referred
to relevant portions of the evidence of the prosecution witnesses to
substantiate his contentions. He also submitted that in his
statement under Section 313 of the Code, the appellant failed to
give proper explanation of the various circumstances against him.
His admissions in that regard were also relevant and the same
strengthened the chain of circumstances. He, therefore, submitted
that as both the Courts had concurrently found the appellant
guilty, no interference with his conviction was called for. He placed
reliance on the decisions in Naib Singh Vs. State of Punjab and
Ors.10, State of Rajasthan Vs. Kashi Ram11 and Manik & Ors.
Vs. The State of Maharashtra12 and sought for dismissal of the
appeal.
6. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length.
With their assistance, we have also gone through the records of the
case including the deposition of all witnesses. We have, thereafter,
10 1983 INSC 41
11 2006 INSC 794
12 2024 INSC 734
Page 6 of 22
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given due consideration to the entire material on record. In our
view, the conviction of the appellant solely on the basis of
circumstantial evidence deserves to be interfered with since the
chain of circumstances does not appear to be complete. Rather,
the said chain of circumstances appears broken at various places.
7. Before proceeding to assess the entire material on record
brought by the prosecution to establish the guilt of the appellant,
it would be fruitful to bear in mind the following extract from the
decision of this Court in Hanumant Vs. The State of Madhya
Pradesh13 rendered by Bench of three learned Judges:
“In dealing with circumstantial evidence the rules specially applicable
to such evidence must be borne in mind. In such cases there is
always the danger that conjecture or suspicion may take the place of
legal proof and therefore it is right to recall the warning addressed by
Baron Alderson, to the jury in Reg v. Hodge14, where he said :-
"The mind was apt to take a pleasure in adapting circumstances
to one another, and even in straining them a little, if need be, to
force them to from parts of one connected whole; and the more
ingenious the mind of the individual, the more likely was it,
considering such matters to overreach and mislead itself, to
supply some little link that is wanting, to take for granted some
fact consistent with its previous theories and necessary to
render them complete."
It is well to remember that in cases where the evidence in of a
circumstantial nature, the circumstances from which the conclusion
of guilt is to be drawn should in the first instance be fully established,
and all the facts so established should be consistent only with the
hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. Again, the circumstances
should be of a conclusive nature and pendency and they should be
such as to exclude every hypothesis but the one proposed to be
proved. In other words, there must be a chain of evidence so far
complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion
consistent with the innocence of the accused and it must be such as
13 1952 INSC 41
14 (1838) 2 Lew. 227
Page 7 of 22
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to show that within all human probability the act must have been
done by the accused.”
8. According to the prosecution, the following circumstances
form a chain that links the appellant with the offence with which
he is charged:
a) The appellant was last seen with the victim.
b) The recovery of various articles on discovery under Section
27 of the Act of 1872.
c) The DNA report conducted on the bones and teeth recovered
at the instance of the appellant.
d) The report of the FSL conducted on various articles recovered
from the place of occurrence.
e) The brown shawl recovered at the instance of the appellant
which was used by him after killing the victim.
f) Silence of the appellant while recording his statement under
Section 313 of the Code.
It would, therefore, be necessary to consider each
circumstance independently to determine whether all such
circumstances when taken together form a complete chain so as
to point out only to one hypothesis, namely the guilt of the
appellant and no one else.
Page 8 of 22
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9. We may now consider each circumstance relied upon by the
prosecution for seeking the conviction of the appellant:
a) Appellant last seen with the victim:
(i) It is the case of the prosecution that since the appellant was
last seen with the victim, it was for him to dispel the grave doubt
created against him in this regard. PW2- Kunti Maya Gurung, the
grandmother of the victim, stated that the victim was residing with
her. On the day when the victim was found missing, she thought
that the appellant, who was the victim’s maternal uncle, was likely
to have taken her somewhere. While she did not find the victim,
she also noticed that the appellant was not seen around. The
prosecution relies upon the deposition of PW2 to substantiate this
circumstance. In her cross-examination, this witness stated that
on the relevant day, apart from the appellant, herself and the
victim, there was nobody else in the house. She, however, stated
that at the relevant time, two other persons from her village had
also visited her house. She further stated that after she started
performing her household chores, she did not notice whether the
appellant and the victim went together or whether they left
separately. She did not suspect the appellant to have killed the
victim. To a question asked by the Court, the witness stated that
Page 9 of 22
Criminal Appeal No.107 of 2018
when she along with the appellant and the victim were at home,
the two other persons from the village mentioned by her had
already left. From the deposition of PW2, it can be gathered that
she was not very sure as to whether the appellant and the victim
left together or that they had left the house separately.
(ii) PW1-Hari Prasad Gurung was posted as a Head Constable
at the village at the relevant point of time. In his crossexamination,
he admitted that it was true that there was no
witness who had seen the appellant taking the victim from the
complainant’s house. He further stated that no witness had seen
the appellant missing from the village on the day of the incident.
He also admitted that there was no complaint that the appellant
was missing from the village. This witness, therefore, admits that
there was no person who had witnessed the appellant taking the
victim from the complainant’s house.
(iii) PW3 is the mother of the victim. She stated that her mother
did not tell her as to from when her daughter had gone missing.
She also did not ask her mother as to with whom her daughter
had gone on the relevant day. In her cross-examination, she
admitted that her mother had told her that before the victim was
found missing, two persons from the village had visited their
Page 10 of 22
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house. However, she was not told their names. She further stated
that it was true that she could not say whether her daughter had
gone with the said two persons. The deposition of this witness
again creates a doubt as to whether the appellant was the only
person who was ‘last seen’ with the victim.
(iv) PW16 is the Investigating Officer who had conducted the
necessary investigation into the offence. In his cross-examination,
he admitted that there was no person who had seen the accused
taking the victim away from the house. He also stated that Missing
Report was lodged at Rongli Police Station on 12.11.2013 while
the victim had gone missing since 06.11.2013. This witness,
therefore, reiterates what was stated by the earlier witnesses that
the appellant was not seen by anyone taking away the victim.
Considering the aforesaid material on record relied upon by
the prosecution, a grave doubt is created as to whether the
appellant was, in fact, ‘last seen’ with the victim. There is no
specific evidence on record on the basis of which it could be
asserted that it was indeed the appellant who had taken the victim
from the house or that he was last seen with the victim after which
she was found missing.
Page 11 of 22
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(v) Another relevant factor to be borne in mind is that the FIR is
dated 13.05.2014. It states that besides the victim who was
missing, the appellant, her maternal uncle, had also been
missing. The appellant was traced on 12.05.2014 and on
investigation, it was revealed that he had raped the victim and
had thereafter killed her. The appellant was, thus, charged with
causing her death on 06.11.2013. Admittedly, the corpus of the
victim could not be traced. According to the prosecution, the
appellant was last seen with the victim on 06.11.2013 and the
victim was not discovered to be dead at least till 15.05.2014 when
certain bones and teeth were discovered on memorandum under
Section 27 of the Act of 1872. In the context of the period when it
was claimed that the appellant was last seen with the victim and
discovery of the bones and teeth by the prosecution six months
thereafter, reference can be made to the decision in State of U.P.
Vs. Satish15, wherein it was held as under:
“The last seen theory comes into play where the time-gap between the
point of time when the accused and the deceased were seen last alive
and when the deceased is found dead is so small that possibility of
any person other than the accused being the author of the crime
becomes impossible. It would be difficult in some cases to positively
establish that the deceased was last seen with the accused when
there is a long gap and possibility of other persons coming in between
exists. In the absence of any other positive evidence to conclude that
the accused and the deceased were last seen together, it would be
hazardous to come to a conclusion of guilt in those cases.”
15 2005 INSC 68
Page 12 of 22
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This circumstance, thus, is doubtful and it would be unsafe
to conclude that the appellant alone was the person who was ‘last
seen’ with the victim on the basis of the aforesaid material.
b) Recovery under Section 27 of the Act of 1872:
(i) According to the prosecution, on 15.05.2014, at the instance
of the appellant, discovery of clothes worn by victim and other
articles were made on memorandum. As per his statement at
Exhibit-4, the appellant volunteered to show the place where he
had kept the aforesaid articles. These articles were seized and
numbered as MO-I to MO-VIII.
(ii) PW5-Anirudh Gurung was witness to the aforesaid recovery.
He stated that the said recovery was effected in his presence. In
his cross-examination, he admitted that the spot from where the
aforesaid articles were recovered could be easily seen if a person
visits the said spot. The relevant portion of his cross-examination
reads as under:
“It is true that there is an old road and a footpath used by cattle
herders who collect fodder in the said area. It is true that the spot
from where the articles marked MO I to MO VIII were recovered is not
a thick jungle. It is true that people collecting fodder visit the said
area. It is true that the spot from where MO I to MO VIII were
recovered could be easily seen if a person visits the said spot.”
Page 13 of 22
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The deposition of this witness indicates that the place from
where the recovery was effected was frequently visited by people
for collecting fodder.
(iii) PW8-Surjay Rai was another witness when the recovery was
effected. In his cross-examination, he too reiterated that the spot
from where the recovery was effected was not covered with thick
forest growth and cow herders used to visit the said place for
collecting fodder.
(iv) PW2-Kunti Maya Gurung in her cross-examination admitted
that the place from where the said articles were recovered had a
water channel nearby. She admitted that people used to visit the
said spot to collect fodder and to graze their cattle. Whenever the
water channel was blocked, people used to come there to repair
the same.
(v) The aforesaid evidence indicates that recovery of the
aforesaid articles made under Section 27 of the Act of 1872 was
from a place that was frequented by people and the said spot could
be easily seen by any person visiting the same. The reliability of a
recovery effected under Section 27 of the Act of 1872 from a place
ordinarily visible to others should be examined with care. A note
Page 14 of 22
Criminal Appeal No.107 of 2018
of caution in this regard has been sounded in State of Himachal
Pradesh Vs. Jeet Singh16. It was observed as under:
“There is nothing in Section 27 of the Evidence Act which renders the
statement of the accused inadmissible if recovery of the articles was
made from any place which is “open or accessible to others”. It is a
fallacious notion that when recovery of any incriminating article was
made from a place which is open or accessible to others, it would
vitiate the evidence under Section 27 of the Evidence Act. Any object
can be concealed in places which are open or accessible to others.
For example, if the article is buried on the main roadside or if it is
concealed beneath dry leaves lying on public places or kept hidden
in a public office, the article would remain out of the visibility of the
others in normal circumstances. Until such article is disinterred its
hidden state would remain unhampered. The person who hid it alone
knows where it is until he discloses that fact to any other person.
Hence the crucial question is not whether the place was accessible to
others or not but whether it was ordinarily visible to others. If it is
not, then it is immaterial that the concealed place is accessible to
others.”
This factor will have to be borne in mind while assessing all
the circumstances together.
c) DNA report:
(i) The various items seized at the instance of the appellant
were subjected to DNA analysis. These included two pieces of
bones and a bunch of black hair. The said items were subjected
to DNA isolation by organic extraction method. The conclusion
recorded by the Deputy Director-cum-Assistant Chemical
Examiner to the Government of Tripura in report dated
27.11.2014 at Exhibit-37 is as under:
“Conclusion: -
On the basis of the above observations it can be concluded that:-
16 1999 INSC 104
Page 15 of 22
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i) The exhibit marked - A2 (source two pieces of bone ) was human
male origin and are not biologically related with the exhibit marked -
A6 (source : blood stain filter paper said to be the blood sample of
Mrs. Rita Gurung) and exhibit -A7 (source : blood stain filter paper
said to be the blood sample of Miss. Prabha Gurung).
ii) The autosomal STR analysis is not possible from exhibit -A5
(source : Bunch of black hairs)
iii) It is not possible to reply the queries No.iv, v, vi and viii”
(ii) PW13-Dr. O.T. Lepcha was working as Medico-legal
Specialist, STNM Hospital, Gangtok, who stated that various
specimens forwarded by Rongli Police Station were examined by
him and he had prepared his medical opinion report at Exhibit-
23. He admitted in his cross-examination that in his report, he
did not mention as to whether the three suspected flat bones were
human bones or animal bones. He further admitted that he could
not say as to whether the tooth mentioned in Exhibit-23 was that
of a human. Similarly, he stated that he was not sure as to
whether the piece of nail was, in fact, a nail or a piece of wood.
(iii) PW16, the Investigating Officer admitted that he could not
state as to whether the bones and the teeth found at the place of
occurrence belonged to the victim.
From the aforesaid material on record, it is clear that the two
pieces of bones marked as A2 were stated to be of human male
origin. They were not biologically related with Exhibit-A6 which
Page 16 of 22
Criminal Appeal No.107 of 2018
was a blood stain filter paper having the blood sample of the
victim’s mother and Exhibit- A7 which was a blood stain filter
paper with the blood sample of the victim’s sister. The
prosecution, therefore, has not been able to bring on record the
fact that the bones and teeth recovered at the instance of the
appellant, in fact, were of the victim. The DNA report at Exhibit-
37, on the contrary, indicates that the pieces of bone were of male
origin while the victim was a female. They naturally did not match
the blood samples of the victim’s mother and sister. The DNA
report at Exhibit-37, therefore, cannot be relied upon as a
circumstance against the appellant.
d) Report from the FSL:
(i) As noted above, articles MO-I to MO-VIII were sent for
examination at the Regional FSL. PW11-Pooja Lohar, who was
working as Analyst-cum-Assistant Chemical Examiner at village
at RFSL Saramsa deposed in this regard. As per her report, she
was unable to ascertain whether the dried blood found on the
brown shawl, MO-VI was either human blood or animal blood. She
further admitted that she was unable to ascertain the age of the
human scalp hair found on the shawl as well as other separate
strands of hair at MO-VII. Similarly, human remains could not be
Page 17 of 22
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detected in the soil sample at MO-VIII. The FSL report at Exhibit
16, thus, also cannot be relied upon as a circumstance.
e) Brown shawl:
(i) According to the prosecution, the appellant had taken a
brown shawl from the house of his sister and had laid down the
victim on the said shawl. He had, thereafter, covered the victim
with his black jacket. This according to the prosecution was stated
by the appellant while discovering various items on memorandum
under Section 27 of the Act of 1872. PW2, the mother of the victim,
however, could not identify the said brown shawl shown to her
when she was examined in the Court. She stated that she did not
know to whom the said shawl belonged to. PW16, the Investigating
Officer also admitted in his cross-examination that the said shawl
did not belong to the mother of the appellant though the appellant
had stated it belonged to his mother. He also admitted that he did
not find any witness who had seen the accused going to the
victim’s house to get the shawl. As noted above, as per the report
of Regional FSL dated 19.06.2014 at Exhibit-16, the origin and
blood group found on the said shawl could not be detected. This
circumstance again creates a doubt on the stand taken by the
Page 18 of 22
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prosecution regarding the appellant taking away a brown shawl
from the house and laying the victim on it.
f) Statement of appellant under Section 313 of the Code:
(i) The statement of appellant was recorded under Section 313
of the Code and various circumstances against him were put to
him. At Question 11, the appellant was referred to the deposition
of PW2 that while going for making some purchases, he wanted to
take the victim along with him. However, PW2 did not permit him
to do so. The appellant admitted this to be true. At Question 12, it
was put to the appellant that as per the evidence of PW2, when she
went inside the house after telling the appellant not to take the
victim with him, he was standing near the house while the victim
was standing near the door of the house. The appellant stated that
this was true but further stated that he had gone to the shop alone.
The appellant admitted while answering Question Nos.24 and 25
that he had gone to the residence of PW4 at about 01.00 p.m. on
the relevant day and that he was heavily drunk. The appellant
ultimately stated that he was falsely implicated at the behest of
PW4 and that he was innocent. He had been arrested on suspicion.
On a reading of the entire statement of appellant under
Section 313 of the Code, we do not find that there has been any
Page 19 of 22
Criminal Appeal No.107 of 2018
failure on his part to explain any incriminating circumstance
against him. It has to be borne in mind that only if an accused fails
to offer reasonable explanation in discharge of burden placed on
him in a case resting on circumstantial evidence, the same would
provide an additional link in the chain of circumstances proved
against him. Thus, the appellant’s silence or failure to provide any
reasonable explanation can merely act as an additional link that
would complete the chain. This, however, would not shift the
burden of proof on an accused in a criminal trial. This position has
been explained in Kashi Ram (supra) that was relied upon by the
learned counsel for the respondent.
(ii) We may in this connection refer to the decision in Raj Kumar
Singh @ Raju @ Batya Vs. State of Rajasthan17. While explaining
the relevance of statements made by the accused under Section
313 of the Code, it was held as under:
“36. In view of the above, the law on the issue can be summarised
to the effect that statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. is recorded to
meet the requirement of the principles of natural justice as it requires
that an accused may be given an opportunity to furnish explanation
of the incriminating material which had come against him in the trial.
However, his statement cannot be made a basis for his conviction.
His answers to the questions put to him under Section 313 Cr.P.C.
cannot be used to fill up the gaps left by the prosecution witnesses
in their depositions. Thus, the statement of the accused is not a
substantive piece of evidence and therefore, it can be used only for
appreciating the evidence led by the prosecution, though it cannot be
a substitute for the evidence of the prosecution. In case the
prosecution’s evidence is not found sufficient to sustain conviction of
17 2013 INSC 313
Page 20 of 22
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the accused, the inculpatory part of his statement cannot be made
the sole basis of his conviction. The statement under Section 313
Cr.P.C. is not recorded after administering oath to the accused.
Therefore, it cannot be treated as an evidence within the meaning of
Section 3 of the Evidence Act, though the accused has a right if he
chooses to be a witness, and once he makes that option, he can be
administered oath and examined as a witness in defence as required
under Section 315 Cr.P.C.
An adverse inference can be taken against the accused only and
only if the incriminating material stood fully established and the
accused is not able to furnish any explanation for the same. However,
the accused has a right to remain silent as he cannot be forced to
become witness against himself.”
Thus, when it is found that the chain of circumstances relied
upon by the prosecution is not complete and that the same does
not inspire confidence for its acceptance, the response of the
appellant recorded in his statement under Section 313 of the Code
cannot be a circumstance against him, especially when other
circumstantial evidence is not found to be satisfactory pointing out
to the guilt of the appellant alone and none other.
10. On an overall consideration of all the circumstances relied
upon by the prosecution, we find that the evidence led by the
prosecution is woefully short of pointing to the guilt of the
appellant. The witnesses examined were not sure as to whether the
appellant was last seen with the victim as they had their own
doubts in that regard. The discovery effected under Section 27 of
the Act of 1872 was from a place that was ordinarily visible to
others, thus, requiring such discovery to be considered with
caution. The DNA report in clear terms refers to the bone extracts being of male origin while the victim was a female. The said bones naturally did not match with the blood samples of the victim’s mother and sister. The report from the FSL also does not take the case of the prosecution any further. There is a doubt created as to whether the brown shawl claimed by the prosecution to be brought by the appellant from his mother was the same as the appellant’s mother had denied that it belonged to her. Therefore, the appellant’s statement under Section 313 of the Code cannot be taken as an additional link in the chain of circumstances. In other words, the chain of circumstances has not been formed on the basis of the prosecution evidence. The Sessions Court, in our view, failed to notice these material factors that were very much available on record. It, therefore, erred in convicting the appellant on the basis of circumstantial evidence. The High Court too failed
to notice all these infirmities in the case of the prosecution. The
guilt of the appellant has not been established beyond reasonable
doubt. A strong doubt about his involvement in the offence is
created in view of the prosecution evidence. It is also true that the
victim met an unfortunate end. However, on the basis of such
material on record, it would hardly be justifiable to convict the
appellant for the same when none of the circumstances point
towards his involvement. In the circumstances, he has to be given
the benefit of doubt.
11. Resultantly, the judgment of the Sessions Court in S.T.
(POCSO) Case No.20 of 2014 as affirmed by the High Court in
Criminal Appeal No.19 of 2016 is quashed and set aside. The
appellant is acquitted of the offence for which he was tried and
convicted. He shall be set free forthwith, if not required in any
other case. The Criminal Appeal is, accordingly, allowed in the
aforesaid terms.
…...………………………..J.
[ UJJAL BHUYAN ]
.…..………………………..J.
[ATUL S. CHANDURKAR]
NEW DELHI,
OCTOBER 1, 2026.
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