Therefore, to say that the role of the victim is limited
to being a witness, is not correct. A victim or the legal
guardian of the victim is a definite stakeholder in the
criminal justice system. Like the accused, she has also a
vested right to insist on a speedy trial and also for a fair
trial. Therefore, on a reading of the statutory scheme as
enumerated supra, certainly a victim has locus standi to seek
a speedy trial. She can certainly bring a petition under
Section 528 B.N.S.S. seeking a direction from the High Court
to the Trial Court to expedite the trial proceedings. {Para 20}
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL No.______OF 2026
(@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO.13468/2026)
RENUKA JAIN Vs THE STATE OF NCT OF DELHI & ORS.
Citation: 2026 INSC 1100.
1. Leave granted.
2. We have heard Ms. Fauzia Shakil, learned counsel for the
appellant; Mr. Davinder Pal Singh, learned A.S.G. assisted
by Mr. Akshat Aggarwal; and Ms. Vidhi Gupta, learned counsel
for the State of NCT of Delhi. Mr. Vikas Sharma, learned
counsel has appeared for respondent no. 2.
3. Though respondent nos. 3 and 4 have been served, none has
appeared on their behalf. Respondent no. 5 has not been
served. However, considering the nature of the order that we
propose to pass, service of notice upon respondent no. 5 may
not be necessary.
4. Appellant before us is the de facto complainant. She had
lodged FIR No. 211/2017 before the Farsh Bazar Police Station
against the accused persons named therein under Section 420 of
the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (I.P.C.).
5. On completion of investigation, charge sheet has been
filed whereafter, the case has been registered as C.R. No.
7850/2019 and assigned to the Court of Judicial Magistrate
First Class in the Shahdara District Courts, Karkardooma,
Delhi (‘Trial Court’ hereinafter).
6. Aggrieved by the delay in the trial, appellant had
earlier moved the Delhi High Court (‘High Court’ for short) in
W.P. Criminal No. 2090/2018 wherein an order was passed by the
High Court on 07.02.2023 directing the Trial Court to conclude
the trial within two years after framing of charges.
7. Since the trial did not progress much, a fresh petition
was filed by the appellant before the High Court under Section
528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (B.N.S.S.)
corresponding to Section 482 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C.) seeking a direction to the Trial
Court for expeditious disposal of the trial.
8. This time an objection was raised on behalf of the
prosecution questioning the locus standi of the appellant to
institute the proceedings.
9. Learned Single Judge vide the impugned order dated
06.01.2026 concurred with the submissions made on behalf of
the prosecution that the role of the complainant is limited to
being a witness. Therefore, it is only the State or the
accused who can bring in such a petition. Paragraph 4 of the
impugned order reads thus:
“4. I find substance in the submission of the learned
prosecutor that the subject case being a State case,
role of the complainant de facto is limited to being a
witness and therefore, it is only the State or the
accused who can bring such petition. In this regard, it
would be apposite to also note that the complainant de
facto can sustain action independent of prosecution
side only in certain situations explicitly laid down in
law. The present petition does not fall under that
category.”
2.
9.1. After holding the petition to be a frivolous one and a
drain on the already overflowing dockets of the Court, the same
was dismissed by the High Court with cost of Rs.10,000/-
(Rupees Ten Thousand).
10. This Court by order dated 24.07.2026 had issued notice
while calling upon the learned standing counsel for the State
of NCT of Delhi to inform the Court on the next date i.e.
today as to the stage of the trial. In the meanwhile,
paragraph 6 of the impugned order imposing cost upon the
appellant was stayed.
11. In the hearing today, learned standing counsel submits
that prosecution has cited a total of 22 witnesses to be
examined, out of which one has been deleted. Thus, there are
21 prosecution witnesses. PW-1 is presently being cross
examined.
12. Detailed submissions have been made by learned counsel
for the parties which have been duly considered.
13. Section 301 Cr.P.C. provides for appearance of the Public
Prosecutor and pleading by him before any Court in respect of
a case of which he is in charge. He can do so without any
written authority. Sub-section (2) of Section 301 is relevant
and is extracted hereinunder:
“(2) If in any such case any private person instructs a
pleader to prosecute any person in any Court, the
Public Prosecutor or Assistant Public Prosecutor in
charge of the case shall conduct the prosecution, and
the pleader so instructed shall act therein under the
directions of the Public Prosecutor or Assistant Public
Prosecutor, and may, with the permission of the Court,
submit written arguments after the evidence is closed
in the case.”
3.
14. We may also refer to sub-section (2) of Section 302
Cr.P.C. Section 302 deals with permission to conduct
prosecution. Ordinarily, the prosecution is to be conducted
by the Public Prosecutor or Assistant Public Prosecutor
without any written authority but any Magistrate inquiring
into or trying a case may permit the prosecution to be
conducted by any person other than the police officer below the
rank of Inspector but no person other than the Advocate
General or Government Advocate or a Public Prosecutor or
Assistant Public Prosecutor shall be entitled to do so without
such permission.
14.1. Sub-section(2) says that any person conducting the
prosecution may do so personally or by a pleader.
15. Section 24 Cr.P.C. deals with Public Prosecutors. As per
sub-section (8), the Central Government or the State
Government, as the case may be, may appoint a Special Public
Prosecutor for the purposes of any case or class of cases.
Proviso to sub-section (8) of Section 24 Cr.P.C. empowers the
Trial Court to permit the victim to engage an advocate of his
choice to assist the prosecution.
16. Victim has been defined in Section 2(wa) Cr.P.C. to mean a
person who has suffered any loss or injury caused by reason of
the act or omission for which the accused person has been
charged and the expression ‘victim’ includes his or her
guardian or legal heir.
17. The aforesaid provisions find place in the B.N.S.S. as
well. Section 2(y) of the B.N.S.S. defines victim to mean a
person who has suffered any loss or injury caused by reason of
the act or omission of the accused person and includes the
4.
guardian or legal heir of such victim.
18. Likewise, Section 301 Cr.P.C. finds its manifestation in
Section 338 B.N.S.S.; so also sub-section (2) of Section 339
of B.N.S.S. contains the same provision as Section 302(2)
Cr.P.C.
19. From an analysis of the aforesaid provisions, it is
evident that a victim, as defined earlier in the Cr.P.C. and
now in the B.N.S.S., is not a stranger to a criminal
proceeding in which he or she is the sufferer or the legal
guardian of such victim. The fact remains that it is due to
the loss or injury suffered by her at the hands of the accused
that has triggered the criminal process.
20. Therefore, to say that the role of the victim is limited
to being a witness, is not correct. A victim or the legal
guardian of the victim is a definite stakeholder in the
criminal justice system. Like the accused, she has also a
vested right to insist on a speedy trial and also for a fair
trial. Therefore, on a reading of the statutory scheme as
enumerated supra, certainly a victim has locus standi to seek
a speedy trial. She can certainly bring a petition under
Section 528 B.N.S.S. seeking a direction from the High Court
to the Trial Court to expedite the trial proceedings.
21. In Mangal Singh vs. Kishan Singh, (2009) 17 SCC 303, this
Court, while recognising the right of a victim to insist on a
speedy trial, held that it would be a grave mistake to assume
that delay in trial does not cause acute suffering and anguish to
the victim of the offence. In many cases, the victim may suffer
even more than the accused. There is, therefore, no reason to
give all the benefits on account of the delay in the trial to the
accused and to completely deny all justice to the victim of the
5.
offence.
22. This Court highlighted the importance of a speedy trial for
both the accused and the victim in Rattiram vs. State of Madhya
Pradesh, (2012) 4 SCC 516. This Court emphasized that the whole
purpose of speedy trial is intended to avoid oppression and to
prevent delay. It is a sacrosanct obligation of all
concerned with the justice dispensation system to see that
the administration of criminal justice becomes effective,
vibrant and meaningful. Para 59 of the said decision is
extracted hereunder:
"59. At this juncture, we would like to refer to two other
concepts, namely, speedy trial and treatment of a victim in
criminal jurisprudence based on the constitutional paradigm
and principle. The entitlement of the accused to speedy
trial has been repeatedly emphasised by this Court. It has
been recognised as an inherent and implicit aspect in the
spectrum of Article 21 of the Constitution. The whole
purpose of speedy trial is intended to avoid oppression and
prevent delay. It is a sacrosanct obligation of all
concerned with the justice dispensation system to see that
the administration of criminal justice becomes effective,
vibrant and meaningful. The concept of speedy trial cannot
be allowed to remain a mere formality (see Hussainara
Khatoon (1) v. State of Bihar [(1980) 1 SCC 81 and Raj Deo
Sharma v. State of Bihar (1998) 7 SCC 507].”
22.1. Insofar the right of the victim in a criminal trial
is concerned, this Court held that the right of a victim to
have a speedy trial cannot be overlooked. This Court held
thus:
“60. While delineating on the facets of speedy trial, it
cannot be regarded as an exclusive right of the accused.
The right of a victim has been given recognition in Mangal
Singh v. Kishan Singh [2009) 17 SCC 303] wherein it has
been observed thus: (SCC p. 307, para 14) "14.... Any
inordinate delay in conclusion of a criminal trial
undoubtedly has a highly deleterious effect on the society
generally, and particularly on the two sides of the case.
But it will be a grave mistake to assume that delay in
trial does not cause acute suffering and anguish to the
victim of the offence. In many cases the victim may suffer
even more than the accused. There is, therefore, no reason
to give all the benefits on account of the delay in trial
6.
to the accused and to completely deny all justice to the
victim of the offence."
23. We may also gainfully refer to the observations made by
this Court in Amir Hamza Shaikh vs. State of Maharashtra,
(2019) 8 SCC 387. Referring to the recommendations of the
Malimath Committee as well as to the amendment bought in to
the Cr.P.C. to provide a platform to the victim to assist the
Trial Court and to the three-Judge Bench decision of this
Court in J.K. International vs. State (NCT of Delhi), (2001) 3
SCC 462, where it has been held that the scheme in the Cr.P.C.
indicates that the person who is aggrieved by the offence
committed is not altogether wiped out from the scene of the
trial merely because the investigation was taken over by the
police, this Court held as under:
“9. This Court while considering the provisions of subsection
(2) of Section 301 and Section 302 CrPC, held as
under: (J.K. International case, SCC pp. 465-67, paras 9-
12)
"9. The scheme envisaged in the Code of Criminal
Procedure indicates that a person who is aggrieved by
the offence committed, is not altogether wiped out from
the scenario of the trial merely because the
investigation was taken over by the police and the
charge-sheet was laid by them. Even the fact that the
court had taken cognizance of the offence is not
sufficient to debar him from reaching the court for
ventilating his grievance. Even in the Sessions Court,
where the Public Prosecutor is the only authority
empowered to conduct the prosecution as per Section
225 of the Code, a private person who is aggrieved by
the offence involved in the case is not altogether
debarred from participating in the trial. This can be
discerned from Section 301(2) of the Code which reads
thus:
'301. (2) If in any such case any private person
instructs a pleader to prosecute any person in any
court, the Public Prosecutor or Assistant Public
Prosecutor in charge of the case shall conduct the
prosecution, and the pleader so instructed shall act
therein under the directions of the Public Prosecutor
or Assistant Public Prosecutor, and may, with the
permission of the court, submit written arguments
after the evidence is closed in the case.'
7.
xxxxxxx
13. In J.K. International, it has been held that if the
cause of justice would be better served by granting such
permission, the Magistrate's Court would generally grant
such permission. An aggrieved private person is not
altogether eclipsed from the scenario when the criminal
court take cognizance of the offences based on the report
submitted by the police.
xxxxxxxx
15. In view of such principles laid down, we find that
though the Magistrate is not bound to grant permission at
the mere asking but the victim has a right to assist the
court in a trial before the Magistrate. The Magistrate may
consider as to whether the victim is in a position to
assist the court and as to whether the trial does not
involve such complexities which cannot be handled by the
victim. On satisfaction of such facts, the Magistrate would
be within his jurisdiction to grant permission to the
victim to take over the inquiry of the pendency before the
Magistrate.”
24. In the recent case of Keshvendra Singh vs. Shankar Singh,
2026 SCC Online SC 1588, this Court highlighted that the right
to speedy trial is not only the prerogative of the accused but
is also a valuable right of the victim. This Court analysed
the same in the following manner:
“23. "There is one more significant aspect of the matter.
Article 21 of the Constitution of India guarantees right to
speedy trial. This Court has held that right to speedy
trial is not only the prerogative of the accused but is
also a valuable right of the victim and any inordinate
delay in the conclusion of the trial, could have a
deleterious effect on the society in general. If the
interpretation canvassed by the respondent-accused is
accepted, it will render Section 12 of the Gangsters Act
ultra vires Article 21 of the Constitution of India. It
will also give a handle to the accused to delay all other
cases under the pretext that the proceedings are pending
under the Gangsters Act. Tremendous injustice will result
as with every day's delay, preservation of evidence will
become a challenge. Witnesses will be that much less
forthcoming and even if they are, with passage of time,
human memory would have begun to fade. This Court cannot
countenance any such interpretation which will make a
mockery of the judicial process.”
8.
25. That being the position, we are unable to agree with the
view taken by the High Court castigating the victim for
bringing a petition before the Court seeking a speedy trial as
being completely frivolous and a drain on the overflowing
dockets of the Court. It is based on a complete misreading of
the legal and constitutional provisions and cannot be
sustained.
26. We, therefore, set aside the impugned order of the High
Court dated 06.01.2026 and direct the Trial Court to conclude
the trial in C.R. Case No. 7850/2019 expeditiously and within
an outer limit of one year from today. We clarify that we
have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the case and
all contentions are kept open.
27. The Criminal Appeal is, accordingly, allowed.
28. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed
of.
…………………………………………………...J.
[UJJAL BHUYAN]
…………………………………………………...J.
[ATUL S. CHANDURKAR]
NEW DELHI;
24th SEPTEMBER, 2026.
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