Sunday, 15 November 2026

Allahabad HC: Second Arrest Of Accused Already In Custody In Another Case Is Fresh Arrest; Its Grounds Must Be Communicated

 Answer to question No. B

18. Once it has been held that subsequent formal arrest of an accused who is already under custody would amount to a fresh arrest, it necessarily follows that provisions of Article 22(1) read with section 48(2) BNSS would require to be followed.

19. It is quite evident that such a right of an accused to be informed with regard to grounds of arrest have been clearly indicated as a fundamental right in part III of the Constitution of India. The consequential right emanating from section 48(2) of BNSS would thus require to be followed without any violation.

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD

LUCKNOW

APPLICATION U/S 528 BNSS No. - 2601 of 2026

 Moti Ram Jaat @ Moti Ram Jaat Fauji vs. State Of U.P. Thru. Addl. Chief Secy. Prin. Secy. Home Lko. And Another 2026

Author: HON'BLE MANISH MATHUR, J.

Delivered on 01.10.2026

1. Heard Mr. Shantanu Singh and Mr. Saiyad Farhan Ali learned counsel for

petitioner and Mr. Shivnath Tilhari, learned Additional Government

Advocate for respondents.

2. Petition under section 528 BNSS has been filed challenging the order of formal arrest of petitioner dated 29th August 2025 and subsequent remand orders dated 29th August 2025 and 11th September 2025 whereby

judicial/police custody of remand of petitioner was allowed.

3. It is submitted that present case arises out of FIR registered as case crime

number 4 of 2025 pertaining to offences under section 148, 152 and 61 (2)

BNS and is a complaint case. It is further submitted that petitioner has been

arrayed as accused number 2 in supplementary charge sheet/supplementary

final report filed by UP Anti-terrorist Squad in sessions case number 131 of

2025 under the aforesaid sections.

4. It is submitted that Anti-Terrorist Squad (hereinafter referred to as 'ATS')

sought production of petitioner on 29th August 2025 through the production

warrant dated 13th August 2025 and in pursuance thereof, was initially remanded to judicial custody on 29th August 2025 and subsequently to police custody on the remand application dated 11th September 2025. The petitioner was produced before special court on the basis of production warrant dated 13th August 2025 and was formally arrested on the P.T. warrant and remanded to judicial custody.

5. The primary ground of challenge to the aforesaid orders of remand is violation of fundamental right enshrined under article 22 (1) of Constitution of India. It is submitted that since no grounds of arrest were provided either to the petitioner as an accused or even to his family members, the fundamental rights under article 22 (1) having been infringed, the remand order is liable to be set aside. It is also submitted that there is no specific order approving judicial custody of the petitioner on 29th August 2025. Noncompliance of section 48(4) BNSS has thereafter been alleged.

6. Learned counsel has placed reliance on judgments rendered by Supreme Court in the cases of Vihaan Kumar versus State of Haryana, LAWS (SC)- 2025-2-20; Prabir Purkayastha versus state (Nct of Delhi) LAWS(SC)-2024- 5-46; Pankaj Bansal versus Union of India LAWS (SC) -2023-10-3; Mihir Rajesh Shah v. State of Maharashtra, (2026) 1 SCC 500, Kasireddy Upender Reddy versus State of Andhra Pradesh, LAWS (SC)-2025-5-148 to buttress his submissions.

7. Learned AGA appearing on behalf of respondents has opposed the petition with submission that at the time of passing of remand order which is under challenge, the petitioner was already under custody and remand with regard to previous FIR and therefore since there was only a change of custody and not a fresh arrest, there was no occasion to comply with the provisions of Article 22 (1) of Constitution of India or even section 48(3) BNSS.

8. It is secondly submitted that after the impugned remand order has been passed, charge sheet was filed on 25th November, 2025 and cognizance order was also passed on 27th January 2026. It is therefore submitted that once charge sheet has been filed and cognizance order has been passed, the remand sought and granted under section 167 (2) Cr.P.C. looses its significance and the remand order can now be challenged only once the cognizance order is under challenge. Learned counsel has placed reliance on judgment rendered in the case of Neeraj and another versus State of U.P. and another, Habeas Corpus Writ Petition No. 218 of 2026 passed by Division

Bench of this Court to buttress his submissions.

9. Upon consideration of submissions advanced by learned counsel for parties and perusal of material on record, the questions therefore requiring adjudication are as follows:-

(A) Whether the order of remand passed against an accused

pertaining to a particular FIR while he is under custody with

regard to an earlier FIR would amount to merely change of

custody or would be a fresh arrest?

(B) Whether in the scenario envisaged in question number 1, noncompliance of Article 22 of constitution of India would render theremand/detention illegal ?

(C) Whether the division bench judgment rendered in the case of

Neeraj (supra) would amount to stare decisis and would be a

binding precedent in the present case.

Answer to question No. A

10. With regard to said question, it is admitted between the parties that present remand order which is impugned in the petition has been passed while the petitioner was already in custody with regard to an earlier FIR.

11. The aforesaid aspect has been dealt with by Supreme Court in the case of Dhanraj Aswani versus Amar S. Mulchandani and another (2024) 10 SCC 336 and had noticed conflicting judgments on that issue by various High Courts. After elaborate analysis and discussion, the Supreme Court accepted the version indicated by Orissa High Court in the case of Sanjay Kumar Sarangi versus State of Odisha, 2024 SCC OnLine Ori 1334 which held that there are two ways in which a person who is already in custody may be arrested with the first being that no sooner than he is released from custody in the first case, arrest can occasion with regard to a different case and secondly, even before he is set free from custody in the first case, he can again be formally arrested and a prisoner transit order can be obtained under section 267 Cr.P.C. from the jurisdictional magistrate for the other offense.Another condition envisaged was that instead of effecting a formal arrest, the investigating officer could make an application before the jurisdictional magistrate seeking a transit warrant for production of accused from prison.

12. The aforesaid judgment therefore is a proposition that an accused who is in custody with regard to a previous criminal case can subsequently also be arrested again. It has also been held that such formal arrest does not bring the accused in the custody of the police officer as the accused continues to remain in custody of magistrate who remanded him to judicial custody with regard to the first offence and it is only once the formal arrest has been made that the police officer has to make an application under section 267 Cr.P.C. for issuance of a transit warrant and based on the requirements prescribed under section 267 Cr.P.C., a transit warrant can be issued by the jurisdictional magistrate whereafter the accused has to be produced before such magistrate.

13. It has therefore been held that in such circumstances, the second arrest/detention cannot be construed to be a continuing arrest and would in fact come within scope of a fresh arrest.

14. Relevant paragraphs of the judgment rendered by Supreme Court in the case of Dhanraj Aswani versus. Amar S. Mulchandani, (2024) 10 SCC 336 are as follows:-

"56. As pointed out in the preceding paragraphs, a police officer can formally arrest a person in relation to an offence while he is already in custody in a different offence. However, such formal arrest does not bring the accused in the custody of the police officer as the accused continues to remain in the custody of the Magistrate who remanded him to judicial custody in the first offence. Once such formal arrest has been made, the police officer has to make an application under Section 267CrPC before the jurisdictional Magistrate for the issuance of a PT warrant without delay. If, based on the requirements prescribed under Section 267CrPC, a PT warrant is issued by the jurisdictional Magistrate, then the accused has to be produced before such Magistrate on the date and time mentioned in the warrant, subject to Sections 268 and 269 respectively of CrPC. Upon production before the jurisdictional Magistrate, the accused can be remanded to police or judicial custody or be enlarged on bail, if applied for and allowed.

57. The only reason why we have delineated the procedure followed in cases where a person already in custody is required to be arrested in relation to a different offence is to negate the reasoning of the Rajasthan, Delhi and Allahabad High Courts that once in custody, it is not possible to re-arrest a person in relation to a different offence. When a person in custody is confronted with a PT warrant obtained in relation to a different offence, such a person has no choice but to submit to the custody of the police officer who has obtained the PT warrant. Thus, in such a scenario, although there is no confinement to custody by touch, yet there is submission to the custody by the accused based on the action of the police officer in showing the PT warrant to the accused. Thereafter, on production of the accused before the jurisdictional Magistrate, like in the case of arrest of a free person who is not in custody, the accused can either be remanded to police or judicial custody, or he may be enlarged on bail and sent back to the custody in the first offence. A number of decisions have held that although Section 267CrPC cannot be invoked to enable production of the accused before the investigating agency, yet it can undoubtedly be invoked to require production of the accused before the jurisdictional Magistrate, who can thereafter remand him to the custody of the investigating agency. Such an interpretation of the provision would give true effect to the words “other proceedings” as they appear in the text of Section 267CrPC, which cannot be construed toexclude proceedings at the stage of investigation. [See : C. Natesan v. State of T.N. [C. Natesan v. State of T.N., 1998 SCC OnLine Mad 931] , Ranjeet Singh v. State of U.P. [Ranjeet Singh v. State of U.P., 1994 SCC OnLine All 797 : 1995 Cri LJ 3505] and State of Maharashtra v. Yadav Natthuji Kohachade [State of Maharashtra v. Yadav Natthuji Kohachade, 1999 SCC OnLine Bom 422 : 2000 Cri LJ 959] .]

58. Thus, contrary to the view taken by the Rajasthan, Allahabad and Delhi High Courts, a person, while in custody in relation to an offence, can be arrested in relation to a different offence, either after getting released from custody in the first offence, or even while remaining in custody in the first offence. In such circumstances, it follows that a person, while in custody in relation to an offence, can have “reason to believe” that he may be arrested in relation to a different cognizable offence. We find no restriction in the text of Section 438 or the scheme of CrPC precluding a person from seeking anticipatory bail in relation to an offence while being in custody in relation to another offence. In the absence of any such restriction, we find no valid reason to read any prohibition in the text of Section 438CrPC, to preclude a person in custody from seeking anticipatory bail in relation to different offences."

15. In view of aforesaid judgments and discussion made herein-above, it is thus evident that arrest of an accused while he is under remand in a previous case would amount to a fresh arrest in case of subsequent detention and the subsequent remand order having been passed.

16. The question number A therefore is answered to the extent that secondarrest while in custody would amount to a fresh arrest.

17. The question is answered accordingly.

Answer to question No. B

18. Once it has been held that subsequent formal arrest of an accused who is already under custody would amount to a fresh arrest, it necessarily follows that provisions of Article 22(1) read with section 48(2) BNSS would require to be followed.

19. It is quite evident that such a right of an accused to be informed with regard to grounds of arrest have been clearly indicated as a fundamentalright in part III of the Constitution of India. The consequential right emanating from section 48(2) of BNSS would thus require to be followed without any violation.

20. The said aspect has also been considered by Supreme Court in the case of Vihaan Kumar versus State of Haryana, LAWS (SC)-2025-2-20 in the following manner:-

" CONCLUSIONS

21. Therefore, we conclude: a) The requirement of informing a person arrested of grounds of arrest is a mandatory requirement of Article 22(1);

b) The information of the grounds of arrest must be provided to the

arrested person in such a manner that sufficient knowledge of the basic facts constituting the grounds is imparted and communicated to the arrested person effectively in the language which he understands. The mode and method of communication must be such that the object of the constitutional safeguard is achieved;

c) When arrested accused alleges non-compliance with the requirements of Article 22(1), the burden will always be on the Investigating Officer/Agency to prove compliance with the requirements of Article

22(1);

d) Non-compliance with Article 22(1) will be a violation of the

fundamental rights of the accused guaranteed by the said Article.

Moreover, it will amount to a violation of the right to personal liberty

guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution. Therefore, non-compliance with the requirements of Article 22(1) vitiates the arrest of the accused. Hence, further orders passed by a criminal court of remand are also vitiated. Needless to add that it will not vitiate the investigation, charge sheet and trial. But, at the same time, filing of chargesheet will not validate a breach of constitutional mandate under Article 22(1);

e) When an arrested person is produced before a Judicial Magistrate for remand, it is the duty of the Magistrate to ascertain whether compliance with Article 22(1) and other mandatory safeguards has been made; and

f) When a violation of Article 22(1) is established, it is the duty of the court to forthwith order the release of the accused. That will be a ground to grant bail even if statutory restrictions on the grant of bail exist. The statutory restrictions do not affect the power of the court to grant bail when the violation of Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution is established."

21. The said enunciation has been concurred with by the other member of the Bench in the following manner:-

" 2. The issue on the requirement of communication of grounds of arrest to the person arrested, as mandated under Article 22(1) of the

Constitution of India, which has also been incorporated in the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 under Section 19 thereof has been succinctly reiterated in this judgment. The constitutional mandate of informing the grounds of arrest to the person arrested in writing has beenexplained in Pankaj Bansal [Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India, (2024) 7 SCC 576 : (2024) 3 SCC (Cri) 450] so as to be meaningful to serve the intended purpose which has been reiterated in Prabir Purkayastha[Prabir Purkayastha v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2024) 8 SCC 254 : (2024) 3 SCC (Cri) 573] . The said constitutional mandate has been incorporated in the statute under Section 50CrPC (Section 47 of the BNSS). It may also be noted that the aforesaid provision of requirement for communicating the grounds of arrest, to be purposeful, is also required to be communicated to the friends, relatives or such other persons of the accused as may be disclosed or nominated by the arrested person for the purpose of giving such information as provided under Section 50-ACrPC. As may be noted, this is in the addition of the requirement as provided under Section 50(1) CrPC.

3. The purpose of inserting Section 50-ACrPC, making it obligatory on

the person making arrest to inform about the arrest to the friends,

relatives or persons nominated by the arrested person, is to ensure that

they would be able to take immediate and prompt actions to secure the

release of the arrested person as permissible under the law. The arrested

person, because of his detention, may not have immediate and easy access

to the legal process for securing his release, which would otherwise be

available to the friends, relatives and such nominated persons by way of

engaging lawyers, briefing them to secure release of the detained person

on bail at the earliest. Therefore, the purpose of communicating the

grounds of arrest to the detenue, and in addition to his relatives as

mentioned above is not merely a formality but to enable the detained

person to know the reasons for his arrest but also to provide the

necessary opportunity to him through his relatives, friends or nominated

persons to secure his release at the earliest possible opportunity for

actualising the fundamental right to liberty and life as guaranteed under

Article 21 of the Constitution. Hence, the requirement of communicating

the grounds of arrest in writing is not only to the arrested person, but

also to the friends, relatives or such other person as may be disclosed or

nominated by the arrested person, so as to make the mandate of Article

22(1) of the Constitution meaningful and effective failing which, such

arrest may be rendered illegal. "

22. The aforesaid judgment therefore clearly indicates that non compliance

of Article 22 (1) of constitution of India would be a violation of fundamental

rights of accused guaranteed under the said Article and non compliance

therefore not only vitiates the arrest of accused but further orders also passed

by criminal court of remand. It has also been held that filing of charge sheet

will not validate a breach of constitutional mandate under Article 22(1) of

the Constitution. The judgment also holds that when violation of Article

22(1) is established, it is the duty of the court to forthwith order release of

accused. In the concurring but separate judgment, reliance has been placed

on the judgment rendered by Supreme Court in the case of Pankaj Bansal

versus Union of India 2024 7 SCC 576 as well as the case of Prabir

Purkayastha versus State ( NCT of Delhi) 2024 8 SCC 254 and it has been

held that constitutional mandate under Article 22(1) of Constitution of India

also extends for communicating the grounds of arrest not only to the accused

but also to the friends, relatives or other such persons interested in the

welfare of the accused who may be disclosed or nominated by the arrested

person for purposes of providing such information in terms of Section 50-A

Cr.P.C. It has therefore been held that in terms of Section 50-A Cr.P.C., it is

obligatory upon the person making arrest to inform the grounds of arrest not

only to the accused but also to his relatives, friends and other nominated

person.

23. The aforesaid judgment rendered in the case of Vihaan Kumar (supra)

has recently been followed by division bench of this court in the case of

Rakesh versus State of UP and others, Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No.

25626 of 2025 wherein it has been held that in case of failure to ensure

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compliance of requirements of Article 22 (1) of Constitution of India, an

order of remand would be rendered illegal.

24. In view of aforesaid pronouncements by Supreme Court as well as by

division bench of this court, it is therefore held that in case of violation of

specific provisions of Article 22 (1) of Constitution of India, the initial

detention as well as an order of remand would be rendered illegal due to

which an accused is required to be set at liberty forthwith.

25. The question No. B therefore answered accordingly.

Answer to question No. C

26. A discordant note however is noticed in the judgment rendered by

division bench of this court in the case of Neeraj and others (supra)

whereunder the division bench noticing the judgments rendered in the cases

of Vihaan Kumar versus State of Haryana, LAWS (SC)-2025-2-20; Prabir

Purkayastha versus state (Nct of Delhi) LAWS(SC)-2024-5-46; Pankaj

Bansal versus Union of India LAWS (SC) -2023-10-3; Mihir Rajesh Shah v.

State of Maharashtra, (2026) 1 SCC 500, Kasireddy Upender Reddy versus

State of Andhra Pradesh, LAWS (SC)-2025-5-148 has held the same not to

be a binding precedent on the proposition that they have been rendered

without considering previous judgments of Supreme Court particularly the

case of Naranjan Singh Nathawan 1952 1 SCC 118; Sanjay Dutt versus State

through CBI, Bombay, 1994 5 SCC 410, Col. Dr. B.R. Ramachandra Rao

versus State of Orisa and others 1972 3 SCC 256.

27. It is on that basis that it has been held in the case of Neeraj (supra) that

subsequent set of judgments of Vihaan Kumar (supra), Prabir Purkayastha

(supra) and Pankaj Jaiswal (supra) etc. would not have any binding effect. It

is however a relevant aspect that the questions under consideration in the

case of Neeraj (supra) pertain to maintainability and entertainability of a writ

petition in the nature of habeas corpus on the ground of violation of Articles

21 and 22 of Constitution of India. The questions so framed in the case of

Neeraj (supra) are as follows:-

" (i) whether it is open for the person arrested / detained to prefer a

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habeas corpus petition on the ground of violation of Article 21 and 22 of

the Constitution of India any time after his remand, till the conclusion of

trial, at any stage of investigation and trial.

(ii) whether there is no time line fixed for filing a habeas corpus petition

before the court. "

28. The division bench has thereafter examined the scope and came to a

conclusion that there are two sets of judgments rendered by Supreme Court

and made a distinction between the old set and a new set with the judgments

of old sets being in the cases of Naranjan Singh Nathawan (Supra); Sanjay

Dutt (Supra); A.K. Gopalan and Another, AIR 1966 SC 816; Col. Dr. B.R.

Ramachandra Rao (Supra); Kanu Sanyal versus District Magistrate,

Darjeeling and others, (1974) 4 SCC 141 and few others and second set of

recent judgment of the Apex Court in the cases of Vihaan Kumar (Supra);

Prabir Purkayastha(Supra), Pankaj Bansal (Supra) and Mihir Rajesh (Supra)

and some other judgments.

29. After analysis, the division bench held that old judgments of Supreme

Court indicate that there is presumption of legality of custody when a

petition of habeas corpus is filed and it was also held that initial detention

cannot be held to be illegal when subsequent stages of investigation/trial

have passed after filing of charge sheet or while serving sentence awarded

by court.

30. The second set of judgments of Supreme Court have thereafter been

examined and it has been held that they have been passed without

considering the earlier set of judgments and it is on that ground that the

second set judgment were held not to be binding.

31. The division bench has therefore followed the earlier set of judgments

and came to the conclusion that once charge sheet has been filed and

cognizance order has been passed, no challenge can be raised to the first

order of remand in light of Sections 209 and 309 Cr.P.C.

32. Learned AGA has heavily relied upon the aforesaid judgment rendered

by division bench in the case of Neeraj (supra).

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33. At the very outset, it is evident from the questions framed in the case of

Neeraj (supra) that it is confined to the aspect of maintainability of a petition

for habeas corpus on the ground of violation of Articles 21 and 22 of

Constitution of India any time after remand and it is on that basis that it has

been held that there will be a presumption of validity of custody of an

accused due to which a petition for habeas corpus would not be

maintainable.

34. Evidently the aforesaid judgment would be inapplicable in the present

case where a petition under section 528 BNSS has been filed challenging the

very legality of the detention/remand order. If left to itself, such a finding by

this court would suffice for inapplicability of judgment rendered in the case

of Neeraj (supra) in the present facts and circumstances since the questions

which have been answered subsequently would be inapplicable to record a

finding on that basis in the present case where Habeas Corpus has not been

sought.

35. Nonetheless since the said division bench judgment of Neeraj (supra) has

also held the subsequent judgments of Supreme Court in the cases of Vihaan

Kumar etc. not to be binding precedent, this court is compelled to adjudicate

upon the aforesaid aspect as well since the primary thrust of submissions of

learned counsel for petitioner is based on the very same judgments of Vihaan

Kumar(supra), Prabir Purkayastha(supra), Pankaj Bansal(supra) etc.

36. In the case of Neeraj (supra) the division bench has examined the

aforesaid both sets of judgments and has indicated its view that the validity

of initial detention and subsequent detention orders can be considered as the

basis of maintaining a petition for habeas corpus only till investigation is in

progress and once charge sheet is submitted and order of cognizance is

passed, the right to challenge the initial illegality in the order of remand

cannot be enforced.

37. The division bench also was of the view that once the charge sheet has

been filed and cognizance is taken, it amounts to a judicial order which

stands on a higher footing than an order of remand passed under Section

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167 Cr.P.C. which is merely a pre investigation judicial order and till order

of cognizance is passed, the initial order of detention and remand could be

challenged.

38. In view of the finding which has been recorded in the case of Neeraj

(supra), the judgments enunciated by Supreme Court which have been

identified by division bench as the first set of judgments would require

examination.

39. The case of Naranjan Singh Nathwan (supra), was a case of preventive

detention where a fresh order of detention had been passed and cognizance

had not been taken. The judgment examined the proposition laid down in

earlier judgment of Basanta Chandra Ghosh versus Emperor, AIR 1945, FC

18 and enunciated that the question was not whether the latter order validates

earlier detention but whether in the face of latter valid order, a court can

direct release of petitioner. After examining proposition laid down in the

case of Makkhan Singh Tarsikka versus State of Punjab, 1951 SCC 1440, it

has been enunciated that a detention order may at any time be revoked or

modified and that such revocation shall not bar making of a fresh detention

order. It has also been held that the aspect of valid detention is to be seen not

with regard to the date of institution of proceedings but with regard to the

time of return of notice. The relevant paragraphs of the judgment rendered in

the case of Naranjan Singh Nathwan (supra) are as follows:

"9. It is contended by the Advocate General of the Punjab that the

decision in Basanta Chandra Ghose v. Emperor [Basanta Chandra

Ghose v. Emperor, AIR 1945 FC 18 : (1945) 7 FCR 81 : 1945 SCC

OnLine FC 3] is a clear authority in support of the validity of the

aforesaid order. On essentially similar facts the Court laid down two

propositions both of which have application here : (1) where an earlier

order of detention is defective merely on formal grounds, there is nothing

to preclude a proper order of detention being based on the pre-existing

grounds themselves, especially in cases in which the sufficiency of the

grounds is not examinable by the courts, and (2) if at any time before the

court directs the release of the detenu, a valid order directing his

detention is produced, the court cannot direct his release merely on the

ground that at some prior stage there was no valid cause for detention.

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The question is not whether the later order validates the earlier detention

but whether in the face of the later valid order the court can direct the

release of the petitioner. The learned Judges point out that the analogy of

civil proceedings in which the rights of parties have ordinarily to be

ascertained as on the date of the institution of the proceedings has no

application to proceedings in the nature of habeas corpus where the

Court is concerned solely with the question whether the applicant is being

lawfully detained or not.

10. The petitioner's learned counsel conceded that he could not challenge

the correctness of the second proposition, but took exception to the first

as being no longer tenable after the Indian Constitution came into force.

It was urged that Article 22 lays down the procedure to be followed in

cases of preventive detention and the said procedure must be strictly

observed as the only prospect of release by a court must be on the basis of

technical or formal defects, a long line of decisions having held that the

scope of judicial review in matters of preventive detention is practically

limited to an enquiry as to whether there has been strict compliance with

the requirements of the law. This is undoubtedly true and this Court had

occasion in the recent case of Makhan Singh Tarsikka v. State of Punjab

[Makhan Singh Tarsikka v. State of Punjab, 1951 SCC 1140] to observe :

(SCC p. 1142, para 7)

“7. … It cannot be too often emphasised that before a person is deprived

of his personal liberty the procedure established by law must be strictly

followed and must not be departed from to the disadvantage of the person

affected.”

This proposition, however, applied with equal force to cases of preventive

detention before the commencement of the Constitution, and it is difficult

to see what difference the Constitution makes in regard to the position.

Indeed, the position is now made more clear by the express provisions of

Section 13 of the Act which provides that a detention order may at any

time be revoked or modified and that such revocation shall not bar the

making of a fresh detention order under Section 3 against the same

person. Once it is conceded that in habeas corpus proceedings the court

is to have regard to the legality or otherwise of the detention at the time

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of the return and not with reference to the date of the institution of the

proceeding, it is difficult to hold, in the absence of proof of bad faith, that

the detaining authority cannot supersede an earlier order of detention

challenged as illegal and make a fresh order wherever possible which is

free from defects and duly complies with the requirements of the law in

that behalf."

40. The second judgment on the point is in the case of Ram Narayan Singh

versus State of Delhi [(1953) 1 SCC 389 which pertained to a petition of

habeas corpus and it was held that legality or otherwise of detention is not to

be seen with reference to institution of proceedings but with regard to time

of return of notice. The relevant paragraph of the judgment rendered in the

case of Ram Narayan Singh (supra) is as follows:

"4. It has been held by this Court that in habeas corpus proceedings, the

Court is to have regard to the legality or otherwise of the detention at the

time of the return and not with reference to the institution of the

proceedings. The material date on the facts of this case is 10th March,

when the affidavit on behalf of the Government was filed justifying the

detention as a lawful one. But the position, as we have stated, is that on

that date there was no order remanding the four persons to custody. This

Court has often reiterated before that those who feel called upon to

deprive other persons of their personal liberty in the discharge of what

they conceive to be their duty, must strictly and scrupulously observe the

forms and rules of the law. That has not been done in this case. The

petitioners now before us are therefore entitled to be released, and they

are set at liberty forthwith.

Writ petition allowed"

41. In the case of Kanu Sanyal (supra) which also pertained to a petition of

habeas corpus, the aspect of examination of validity of detention has again

been enunciated upon that in case the detention is seen as legal at the time of

hearing of the application for habeas corpus, a court cannot order release of a

person detained by issuing a writ of habeas corpus. The relevant paragraph

of the judgment rendered in the case of Kanu Sanyal (supra) is as follows:

"4. These two grounds relate exclusively to the legality of the initial

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detention of the petitioner in the District Jail, Darjeeling. We think it

unnecessary to decide them. It is now well settled that the earliest date

with reference to which the legality of detention challenged in a habeas

corpus proceeding may be examined is the date on which the application

for habeas corpus is made to the Court. This Court speaking through

Wanchoo, J., (as he then was) said in A.K. Gopalan v. Government of

India: [AIR 1966 SC 816 : (1966) 2 SCR 427 : 1966 Cri LJ 602]

“It is well settled that in dealing with the petition for habeas corpus the

Court is to see whether the detention on the date on which the application

is made to the Court is legal, if nothing more has intervened between the

date of the application and the date of the hearing.”

In two early decisions of this Court, however, namely, Naranjan Singh v.

State of Punjab [(1952) 1 SCC 118 : AIR 1952 SC 106 : 1952 SCR 395 :

1952 Cri LJ 656] and Ram Narayan Singh v. State of Delhi [(1953) 1

SCC 389 : 1953 SCR 652 : AIR 1953 SC 277 : 1953 Cri LJ 1113] a

slightly different view was expressed and that view was reiterated by this

Court in B.R. Rao v. State of Orissa [(1972) 3 SCC 256, 259 : 1972 SCC

(Cri) 481] where it was said (at p. 259, para 7):

“in habeas corpus proceedings the Court is to have regard to the legality

or otherwise of the detention at the time of the return and not with

reference to the institution of the proceedings”.

and yet in another decision of this Court in Talib Hussain v. State of

Jammu & Kashmir [(1971) 3 SCC 118, 121] Mr Justice Dua, sitting as a

Single Judge, presumably in the vacation, observed that (at p. 121, para

6):

“in habeas corpus proceedings the Court has to consider the legality of

the detention on the date of the hearing.”

Of these three views taken by the Court at different times, the second

appears to be more in consonance with the law and practice in England

and may be taken as having received the largest measure of approval in

India, though the third view also cannot be discarded as incorrect,

because an inquiry whether the detention is legal or not at the date of

NA528 No. 2601 of 2026

16

hearing of the application for habeas corpus would be quite relevant, for

the simple reason that if on that date the detention is legal, the Court

cannot order release of the person detained by issuing a writ of habeas

corpus. But, for the purpose of the present case, it is immaterial which of

these three views is accepted as correct, for it is clear that, whichever be

the correct view, the earliest date with reference to which the legality of

detention may be examined is the date of filing of the application for

habeas corpus and the Court is not, to quote the words of Mr Justice Dua

in B.R. Rao v. State of Orissa, “concerned with a date prior to the

initiation of the proceedings for a writ of habeas corpus”. Now the writ

petition in the present case was filed on January 6, 1973 and on that date

the petitioner was in detention in the Central Jail, Vizakhapatnam. The

initial detention of the petitioner in the District Jail, Darjeeling had come

to an end long before the date of the filing of the writ petition. It is,

therefore, unnecessary to examine the legality or otherwise of the

detention of the petitioner in the District Jail, Darjeeling. The only

question that calls for consideration is whether the detention of the

petitioner in the Central Jail, Vizakhapatnam is legal or not. Even if we

assume that grounds A and B are well founded and there was infirmity in

the detention of the petitioner in the District Jail, Darjeeling, that cannot

invalidate the subsequent detention of the petitioner in the Central Jail,

Vizakhapatnam. See para 7 of the judgment of this Court in B.R. Rao v.

State of Orissa. The legality of the detention of the petitioner in the

Central Jail, Vizakhapatnam would have to be judged on its own merits.

We, therefore, consider it unnecessary to embark on a discussion of

grounds A and B and decline to decide them.

Re: Ground C."

42. The case of Sanjay Dutt (supra) pertained to default bail under Section

20(4)(bb) of Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention Act) 1987 in

which it has been held that such an aspect can be seen pertaining to custody

of accused only till the issue is governed by Section 167 Cr.P.C. but if such a

right specifically pertaining to default bail, remain unenforced till filing of

challan/(sic charge sheet), then there is no question of enforcement of such a

right since it extinguishes the moment challan/(sic charge sheet) is filed

because Section 167 Cr.P.C. ceases to apply. It has also been held that if on

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the date of return of the rule, the custody or detention is on the basis of a

valid order, a writ of habeas corpus cannot be issued. The relevant paragraph

of the judgment rendered in the case of Sanjay Dutt (supra) is as follows:

" 48. We have no doubt that the common stance before us of the nature of

indefeasible right of the accused to be released on bail by virtue of

Section 20(4)(bb) is based on a correct reading of the principle indicated

in that decision. The indefeasible right accruing to the accused in such a

situation is enforceable only prior to the filing of the challan and it does

not survive or remain enforceable on the challan being filed, if already

not availed of. Once the challan has been filed, the question of grant of

bail has to be considered and decided only with reference to the merits of

the case under the provisions relating to grant of bail to an accused after

the filing of the challan. The custody of the accused after the challan has

been filed is not governed by Section 167 but different provisions of the

Code of Criminal Procedure. If that right had accrued to the accused but

it remained unenforced till the filing of the challan, then there is no

question of its enforcement thereafter since it is extinguished the moment

challan is filed because Section 167 CrPC ceases to apply. The Division

Bench also indicated that if there be such an application of the accused

for release on bail and also a prayer for extension of time to complete the

investigation according to the proviso in Section 20(4)(bb), both of them

should be considered together. It is obvious that no bail can be given even

in such a case unless the prayer for extension of the period is rejected. In

short, the grant of bail in such a situation is also subject to refusal of the

prayer for extension of time, if such a prayer is made. If the accused

applies for bail under this provision on expiry of the period of 180 days

or the extended period, as the case may be, then he has to be released on

bail forthwith. The accused, so released on bail may be arrested and

committed to custody according to the provisions of the Code of Criminal

Procedure. It is settled by Constitution Bench decisions that a petition

seeking the writ of habeas corpus on the ground of absence of a valid

order of remand or detention of the accused, has to be dismissed, if on the

date of return of the rule, the custody or detention is on the basis of a

valid order. (See Naranjan Singh Nathawan v. State of Punjab [(1952) 1

SCC 118 : 1952 SCR 395 : AIR 1952 SC 106 : 1952 Cri LJ 656] ; Ram

Narayan Singh v. State of Delhi [(1953) 1 SCC 389 : 1953 SCR 652 : AIR

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1953 SC 277 : 1953 Cri LJ 1113] and A.K. Gopalan v. Government of

India [(1966) 2 SCR 427 : AIR 1966 SC 816 : 1966 Cri LJ 602] .)"

43. The said aspect has also been dealt with by Full Bench of this Court in

the case of Bal Mukund Jaiswal versus Superintendent, District Jail,

Varanasi and another, 1997 SCC OnLine All 960 wherein it has been held

that where an accused is in judicial custody on the basis of a valid remand

order under Sections 209 or 309 Cr.P.C., such a person cannot be set at

liberty by issuing a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that his initial

detention was violative of constitutional guarantee under Articles 21 and 22

of the Constitution of India. The relevant paragraphs of the judgment

rendered in the case of Bal Mukund Jaiswal (supra) are as follows:

11. Sri D.S. Mishra has placed very strong reliance of this observation of

the Supreme Court in paragraph 13 in Madhu Limaye's case ((1969) 1

SCC 292 : AIR 1969 SC 1014) (supra) that the petitioners were entitled to

be released on this ground alone. However what is to be noted at this very

juncture is another important observation in the case of Madhu Limaye.

In the very next paragraph i.e. paragraph 14 their lordships observed as

follows:—

“Once it is shown that the arrest made by the police officers

were illegal, it was necessary for the State to establish that at

the stage of remand the Magistrate directed detention in jail

custody after applying his mind to all relevant matters. This

the State has failed to do. The remand orders are patently

routine and appear to have been made mechanically. All that

Mr. Chagla has said is that if the arrested persons wanted to

challenge their legality the High Court should have been

moved under appropriate provisions of the Criminal

Procedure Code. But it must be remembered that Madhu

Limaye and others have, by moving this Court under Article

32 of the Constitution, complained of detention or

confinement in jail without compliance with the

constitutional and legal provisions. If their detention in

custody could not continue after their arrest because of the

violation of Article 22(1) of the Constitution they were

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entitled to be released forthwith. The orders of remand are

not such as would cure the constitutional infirmities. This

disposes of the third contention of Madhu Limaye.”

xxx xxx xxx

12. From this observation of their lordships of the Supreme Court in the

case of Madhu Limaye ((1969) 1 SCC 292 : AIR 1969 SC 1014) (supra) it

is clear that their lordships did not stop after holding in paragraph 13

that Madhu Limaye and others were entitled to be released on the ground

of non-compliance of the provisions of Article 22(1) of the Constitution

but they further examined the second point formulated in paragraph 7 of

the said judgment to examine whether a valid order of remand existed or

not. Once their lordships found that the remand order by the magistrate

directing detention in jail custody was without application of mind to all

relevant matters and were not such as could cure the constitutional

infirmities, their lordships observed that the detention in custody being in

violation of Article 22(1) of the Constitution Madu Limaye and other were

entitled to be released forthwith. This observation negatives the

contention of Sri D.S. Mishra that the Courts are not competent to

examine in a case similarly placed where despite violation of the

provisions of Article 27(1) of the Constitution rendering initial detention

illegal that the custody at a subsequent stage had been validated by a

valid order of remand passed by the magistrate.

xxx xxx xx

24. We are afraid that Sri Misra is not right in his contention that in the

case of Madhu Limaye ((1969) 1 SCC 292 : AIR 1969 SC 1014) (supra)

the Supreme Court was not considering the question of legality of

detention of the ground whether after the initial arrest of Madhu Limaye

and others had been found to be bad in the eyes of law it would be still

validated by a subsequent valid order. We have quoted paragraph 14 of

the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Madhu Limaye (supra)

earlier which clearly shows that their lordships in the case of Madhu

Limaye also considered the question of validity of Madhu Limaye's

detention pursuant to orders of remand. It is a different matter that in the

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20

case of Madhu Limaye their lordships of the Surpeme Court did not find

the remand orders to be valid and hence the petition of Madhu Limaye

was allowed whereas in the case of Kanu Sanyal the subsequent order

passed by the Visakhapatnam Court was found to be valid and hence the

petition was dismissed. That however does not mean that the Supreme

Court in the case of Madhu Limaye did not consider the question of

illegal detention being validated at subsequent stage despite the fact that

the initial illegality was rendered on account of non-compliance of the

provisions of the Constitution.

xxx xxx xxx

28. We have not been able to agree with the view taken in the case of

Hazari Lal v. State of U.P. (1991 Lucknow LJ 230) (supra) as also in the

case of Ashok Kumar Singh v. State of U.P. (1997 Lucknow LJ 273)

(supra) which have gone to the extent of saying that once the detentioin of

a person is rendered illegal on account of non-fulfilment of provisions of

Article 22(1) of the Constitution, then such an illegality cannot be cured

even by a subsequent valid order of remand. Accordingly the case of

Hazari Lal and Ashok Kumar Singh as also the cases mentioned therein

taking the same view are overruled. Our answer to the question referred,

therefore, is as follows:—

“Where an accused person is in judicial custody on the basis

of a valid remand order passed u/ss. 209 or 309 Code of

Criminal Procedure by the magistrate or by any other

competent Court then such accused person cannot be set at

liberty by issuing a writ of habeas corpus solely on the

ground that his initial detention was violative of a

constitutional guarantee enshrined in Articles 21 and 22 of

the Constitution of India.”

44. The proposition as enunciated in the aforesaid judgments therefore

clearly is to the effect that if on the date of either filing of charge sheet or

return of notice, the detention order is found to be valid, the detained person

cannot be released only on the ground of invalidity of earlier detention order,

either for violation of any statutory principle or even for violation of Articles

21 or 22 of the Constitution of India.

NA528 No. 2601 of 2026

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45. It is however a relevant fact that aforesaid judgments pertained either to

issuance of writ in the nature of habeas corpus or to preventive detention and

in none of the aforesaid judgments was the remand order under challenge.

46. In the second set of judgments, subsequently in the case of Pankaj

Bansal (supra) the aspect pertained to detention under Prevention of Money

Laundering Act, 2002 whereunder the arrest orders, consequential

proceedings arising therefrom and remand order were under challenge.

Hon'ble Supreme Court after considering various aspects, distinguished the

earlier judgments essentially on the ground that the previous judgments dealt

with the issue of a writ of habeas corpus and therefore the ratio laid down in

such cases were inapplicable. The issue considered was the arrest of

appellants therein under Section 19 of the said Act and it was held that mere

passing of an order of remand would be insufficient to validate the arrest if

such arrest was not in conformity with the requirements of Section 19 of the

said Act. After examination of provisions of Article 22 of the Constitution of

India, the Court enunciated that grounds of arrest recorded in terms of

Section 19 (1) of the Act of 2002 would be necessarily required to be

provided to the arrested person. The form of communication was also

indicated and it was held that since the arrest therein did not comply with the

said provisions, it was bad in law.

47. It is however relevant that the said judgment pertained to the aspect that

an FIR was registered against the appellant therein registered as enforcement

case information report, (ECIR) in which interim protection was granted

whereafter the appellants therein had been summoned by the Enforcement

Directorate for their statements but upon their presentation, were arrested in

a subsequent ECIR. The said judgment also is not a proposition pertaining to

challenge to any order of remand in exercise of power under Section 209 or

309 Cr.P.C., as in the present case. It was also held that it is in terms of

Section 19(3) of the Act of 2002 that provisions of Section 167 Cr.P.C.

would necessarily have to be complied with.

48. The aspect of violation of Article 22 of Constitution of India has

thereafter been a subject matter of consideration of Supreme Court in the

case of Prabir Purkayastha (supra), wherein provisions of unlawful Activities

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(Prevention) Act, 1967 read with provisions of IPC were examined. The said

judgment also noticed the previous judgments and was again primarily on

the ground of challenge to the initial order of remand but it was held that

despite arrest having been made under provisions of UAPA, the arrested

person had a fundamental right to be informed of grounds of arrest. It was

also held that the mere fact that a charge sheet has been filed in the matter

would not validate the illegality and unconstitutionality committed at the

time of arresting of accused and the ground of initial police custody remand

to the accused (emphasis supplied). The relevant paragraph of the judgment

rendered in the case of Prabir Purkayastha (supra) is as follows:

"22. The right to be informed about the grounds of arrest flows from

Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India and any infringement of this

fundamental right would vitiate the process of arrest and remand. Mere

fact that a charge-sheet has been filed in the matter, would not validate

the illegality and the unconstitutionality committed at the time of

arresting the accused and the grant of initial police custody remand to the

accused."

49. Subsequently the Supreme Court in the case of Vihaan Kumar (supra)

has also held that non-compliance of Article 22(1) of Constitution of India

would be a violation of fundamental rights and also a violation of right to

personal liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of Constitution of India, which

would vitiate the arrest. The Hon'ble Court has also held that further orders

passed by a tribunal court of remand would also be vitiated and that filing of

a charge sheet would not validate a breach of constitutional mandate under

Article 22(1) of Constitution of India. A note of caution was however added

that such violation would not vitiate the investigation, charge sheet and trial.

50. The said judgment in the case of Vihaan Kumar (supra) therefore has

been specifically relied upon by learned counsel for petitioner to submit that

once non-compliance of Article 22(1) of Constitution of India is established,

further orders passed by a criminal court of remand would also be vitiated

even if subsequent remand orders are passed under Sections 209 and 309

Cr.P.C.

51. The aforesaid aspect has thereafter been considered by Supreme Court in

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the case of Mihir Rajesh Shah (supra), particularly with regard to violation

of provisions of BNS and IPC, particularly with regard to non-compliance of

Section 50 Cr.P.C. (now Section 47 BNS 2023). After analysis of previous

judgments it has been held in the case of Mihir Rajesh Shah (supra) as

follows:

"52. We thus hold, that, in cases where the police are already in

possession of documentary material furnishing a cogent basis for the

arrest, the written grounds of arrest must be furnished to the arrestee on

his arrest. However, in exceptional circumstances such as offences

against body or property committed in flagrante delicto, where informing

the grounds of arrest in writing on arrest is rendered impractical, it shall

be sufficient for the police officer or other person making the arrest to

orally convey the same to the person at the time of arrest. Later, a written

copy of grounds of arrest must be supplied to the arrested person within a

reasonable time and in no event later than two hours prior to production

of the arrestee before the Magistrate for remand proceedings. The

remand papers shall contain the grounds of arrest and in case there is

delay in supply thereof, a note indicating a cause for it be included for the

information of the Magistrate.

xxxx xxx xxx

54. In view of the above, we hold with regard to the second issue that

non-supply of grounds of arrest in writing to the arrestee prior to or

immediately after arrest would not vitiate such arrest on the grounds of

non-compliance with the provisions of Section 50CrPC (now Section 47

of BNSS 2023) provided the said grounds are supplied in writing within a

reasonable time and in any case two hours prior to the production of the

arrestee before the Magistrate for remand proceedings."

52. The aforesaid judgment therefore is only for a proposition that

compliance of Section 50 Cr.P.C. could be made subsequent to the arrest as

well but within a two-hour threshold before production for remand for

purposes of safeguarding the arrestee's constitutional right under Article

22(1) of Constitution. This aspect was again considered by Supreme Court in

the case of Kasireddy Upender Reddy Versus State of Andhra Pradesh and

Others, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1228 (supra) and while following the case of

NA528 No. 2601 of 2026

24

Vihaan Kumar (supra) a distinction was drawn in following manner:

19. We must clarify one important aspect of Vihaan Kumar (supra). In

Vihaan Kumar (supra) the case was that there was an absolute failure on

the part of the police to provide the grounds of arrest. In Vihaan Kumar

(supra) reliance was placed upon the entry in the case diary which

recorded that the appellant therein was arrested after informing him of

the grounds of arrest. In the case at hand, it is not in dispute that the

grounds of arrest were supplied to the arrestee, however, the case put up

is that those grounds are not meaningful and are bereft of necessary

essential information.

20. In this appeal our endeavor would be to consider whether the grounds

of arrest supplied to the appellant's son at the time of his arrest could be

said to be meaningful and sufficient enough to give a broad idea to the

person arrested of the accusations levelled and as to why he was being

taken into custody.

xxx xxx xxx

36. If a person is arrested on a warrant, the grounds for reasons for the

arrest is the warrant itself; if the warrant is read over to him, that is

sufficient compliance with the requirement that he should be informed of

the grounds for his arrest. If he is arrested without a warrant, he must be

told why he has been arrested. If he is arrested for committing an offence,

he must be told that he has committed a certain offence for which he

would be placed on trial. In order to inform him that he has committed a

certain offence, he must be told of the acts done by him which amounts to

the offence. He must be informed of the precise acts done by him for

which he would be tried; informing him merely of the law applicable to

such acts would not be enough. (See : Vimal Kishore Mehrotra (supra)"

53. The aforesaid judgment therefore is a proposition to the effect that in

case a person is arrested on a warrant, the grounds for reasons of arrest are

the warrant itself and in case such a warrant is read over to the said person,

there would be sufficient compliance of Article 22(1) of Constitution.

54. However, after analysis of the aforesaid judgments, it transpires that

NA528 No. 2601 of 2026

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same pertain to compliance of Article 22(1) of Constitution of India at the

stage of initial arrest which would be governed by Section 167 Cr.P.C.

Although in the case of Vihaan Kumar (supra), it has been held that in case

of violation of Article 22(1) of Constitution, further orders passed by a

Criminal Court of remand would be vitiated but has also held that it would

not vitiate investigation, charge sheet and trial. It is thus evident that

judgment rendered in the case of Vihaan Kumar (supra) would be restricted

till the operation to the stage of Section 167 Cr.P.C. and not subsequently.

55. The primary reason of this court for reaching such a finding is due to the

fact that in the case of Vihaan Kumar (supra), the aspects governing remand

under Section 209 and 309 Cr.P.C. have neither been discussed nor

considered.

56. For proper appreciation of the current controversy, it would be

conducive to refer to the aforesaid two sections along with Sections 167,

204, 207 Cr.P.C., which are as follows:

167 Cr.P.C.

"167. Procedure when investigation cannot be completed in twenty-four

hours.

(1)Whenever any person is arrested and detained in custody, and it

appears that the investigation cannot be completed within the period of

twenty-four hours fixed by section 57, and there are grounds for believing

that the accusation or information is well-founded, the officer-in-charge

of the police station or the police officer making the investigation, if he is

not below the rank of sub-inspector, shall forthwith transmit to the

nearest Judicial Magistrate a copy of the entries in the diary hereinafter

prescribed relating to the case, and shall at the same time forward the

accused to such Magistrate.

(2)The Magistrate to whom an accused person is forwarded under this

section may, whether he has or has not jurisdiction to try the case, from

time to time authorise the detention of the accused in such custody as

such Magistrate thinks fit, for a term not exceeding fifteen days in the

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26

whole; and if he has no jurisdiction to try the case or commit it for trial,

and considers further detention unnecessary, he may order the accused to

be forwarded to a Magistrate having such jurisdiction :Provided that -

(a)[ the Magistrate may authorise the detention of the accused person,

otherwise than in the custody of the police, beyond the period of fifteen

days, if he is satisfied that adequate grounds exist for doing so, but no

Magistrate shall authorise the detention of the accused person in custody

under this paragraph for a total period exceeding, - [Substituted by Act

45 of 1978, Section 13, for paragraph (a) (w.e.f. 18-12-1978).]

(i) ninety days, where the investigation relates to an offence punishable

with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of not less

than ten years;

(ii) sixty days, where the investigation relates to any other offence, and,

on the expiry of the said period of ninety days, or sixty days, as the case

may be, the accused person shall be released on bail if he is prepared to

and does furnish bail, and every person released on bail under this subsection

shall be deemed to be so released under the provisions of Chapter

XXXIII for the purposes of that Chapter;]

(b) [ no Magistrate shall authorise detention of the accused in custody of

the police under this Section unless the accused is produced before him in

person for the first time and subsequently every time till the accused

remains in the custody of the police, but the Magistrate may extend

further detention in judicial custody on production of the accused either

in person or through the medium of electronic video linkage.]

[Substituted by the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2008

(5 of 2009), Section 14 (a) (i), for Cl. (b). Prior to its substitution, Cl (b)

read as under.-[(b) no Magistrate shall authorise detention in any

custody under this Section unless the accused is produced before him;].]

(c) no Magistrate of the second class, not specially empowered in this

behalf by the High Court, shall authorise detention in the custody of the

police.

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[Explanation I - For the avoidance of doubts, it is hereby declared that,

notwithstanding the expiry of the period specified in paragraph (a), the

accused shall be detained in custody so long as he does not furnish bail.]

[Original Explanation numbered as Explanation II thereof and

Explanation I inserted by Act 45 of 1978, Section 13 (w.e.f. 18-12-1978).]

[Explanation II. - If any question arises whether an accused person was

produced before the Magistrate as required under clause (b), the

production of the accused person may be proved by his signature on the

order authorising detention or by the order certified by the Magistrate as

to production of the accused person through the medium of electronic

video linkage, as the case may be:] [Substituted by the Code of Criminal

Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2008 (5 of 2009), Section 14 (a) (ii), for

Explanation II. Prior to its substitution, Explanation II read as under :-

[Explanation II. - If any question arises whether an accused persons was

produced before the Magistrate as required under paragraph (b), the

production of the accused person may be proved by his signature on the

order authorising detention].]

[Provided further that in case of woman under eighteen years of is, the

detention shall be authorised to be in the custody of a remand home or

recognized social institution.] [Inserted by the Code of Criminal

Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2008 (5 of 2009), Section 14 (b).]

[(2-A) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section or (1) subsection

(2), the officer-in-charge of the police station or the police officer

making the investigation, if he is not below the rank of a sub-inspector,

may, where a Judicial Magistrate is not available, transmit to the nearest

Executive Magistrate, on whom the powers of a Judicial Magistrate, or

Metropolitan Magistrate have been conferred, a copy of the entry in the

diary, hereinafter prescribed relating to the case, and shall, at the same

time, forward the accused to such Executive Magistrate, and thereupon

such Executive Magistrate, may, for reasons to be recorded in writing,

authorise the detention of the accused person in such custody as he may

NA528 No. 2601 of 2026

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think fit for a term not exceeding seven days in the aggregate; and, on the

expiry of the period of detention so authorised, the accused person shall

be released on bail except where an order for further detention of the

accused person has been made by a Magistrate competent to make such

order, and where an order for such further detention is made, the period

during which the accused person was detained in custody under the

orders made by an Executive Magistrate under this sub-section, shall be

taken into account in computing the period specified in paragraph (a) of

the proviso to sub-section (2) :

Provided that before the expiry of the period aforesaid, the Executive

Magistrate shall transmit to the nearest Judicial Magistrate the records

of the case together with a copy of the entries in the diary relating to the

case which was transmitted to him by the officer-in-charge of the police

station or the police officer making the [investigation] [Inserted by Act 45

of 1978, Section 13 (w.e.f. 18-12-1978).], as the case may be.]

(3)A Magistrate authorising under this section detention in the custody of

the police shall record his reasons for so doing.

(4)Any Magistrate other than the Chief Judicial Magistrate making such

order shall forward a copy of his order, with his reasons for making it, to

the Chief Judicial Magistrate.

(5)If in any case triable by a Magistrate as a summons case, the

investigation is not concluded within a period of six months from the date

on which the accused was arrested, the Magistrate shall make an order

stopping further investigation into the offence unless the officer making

the investigation satisfies the Magistrate that for special reasons and in

the interest of justice the continuation of the investigation beyond the

period of six months is necessary.

(6)Where any order stopping further investigation into an offence has

been made under sub-section (5), the Sessions Judge may, if he is

satisfied, on an application made to him or otherwise, that further

investigation into the offence ought to be made, vacate the order made

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under sub-section (5) and direct further investigation to be made into the

offence subject to such directions with regard to bail and other matters as

he may specify.

Section 204 Cr.P.C.

"204. Issue of process.

(1)If in the opinion of a Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence there

is sufficient ground for proceeding, and the case appears to be -

(a)a summons case, he shall issue his summons for the attendance of the

accused, or

(b)a warrant case, he may issue a warrant, or, if he thinks fit, a summons,

for causing the accused to be brought or to appear at a certain time

before such Magistrate or (if he has no jurisdiction himself) some other

Magistrate having jurisdiction.

(2)No summons or warrant shall be issued against the accused under subsection

(1) until a list of the prosecution witnesses has been filed.

(3)In a proceeding instituted upon a complaint made in writing, every

summons or warrant issued under sub-section (1) shall be accompanied

by a copy of such complaint.

(4)When by any law for the time being in force any process-fees or other

fees are payable, no process shall be issued until the fees are paid and, if

such fees are not paid within a reasonable time, the Magistrate may

dismiss the complaint.

(5)Nothing in this section shall be deemed to affect the provisions of

section 87. "

Section 207 Cr.P.C.

"207. Supply to the accused of copy of police report and other documents.

- In any case where the proceeding has been instituted on a police report,

the Magistrate shall without delay furnish to the accused, free of post, a

copy of each of the following:-

(i)the police report;

(ii)the first information report recorded under section 154;

(iii)the statements recorded under sub-section (3) of section 161 of all

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persons whom the prosecution proposes to examine as its witnesses,

excluding there frorm any part in regard to which a request for exclusion

has been made by the police officer under sub-section (6) of section 173;

(iv)the confessions and statements, if any, recorded under section 164;

(v)any other document or relevant extract thereof forwarded to the

Magistrate with the police report under sub-section (5) of section 173 :

Provided that the Magistrate may, after perusing any such part of a

statement as is referred to in clause (iii) and considering the reasons

given by the police officer for the request, direct that a copy of that part

of the statement or of such portion thereof as the Magistrate thinks

proper, shall be furnished to the accused :Provided further that if the

Magistrate is satisfied that any document referred to in clause (v) is

voluminous, he shall, instead of furnishing the accused with a copy

thereof, direct that he will only be allowed to inspect it either personally

or through pleader in Court."

Section 209 Cr.P.C.

"209. Commitment of case to Court of Session when offence is triable

exclusively by it.

- When in a case instituted on a police report or otherwise, the accused

appears or is brought before the Magistrate and it appears to the

Magistrate that the offence is triable exclusively by the Court of Sessions,

he shall -

(a)[ commit, after complying with the provisions of section 207 or section

208, as the case may be, the case to the Court of Session, and subject to

the provisions of this Code relating to bail, remand the accused to

custody until such commitment has been made;] [Substituted by Act 45 of

1978, Section 19 for Cl (a) (w.e.f. 18-12-1978).]

(b)subject to the provisions of this Code relating to bail, remand the

accused to custody during, and until the conclusion of the trial;

(c)send to that Court the record of the case and the documents and

articles, if any, which are to be produced in evidence;

(d)notify the Public Prosecutor of the commitment of the case to the Court

of Session. "

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Section 309 Cr.P.C.

"309. Power to postpone or adjourn proceedings.-

[(1) In every inquiry or trial the proceedings shall be continued from dayto-

day until all the witnesses in attendance have been examined, unless

the Court finds the adjournment of the same beyond the following day to

be necessary for reasons to be recorded:Provided that when the inquiry

or trial relates to an offence under section 376, [section 376A, section

376AB, section 376B, section 376C, section 376D, section 376DA, section

376DB of the Indian Penal Code, the inquiry or trial shall] [Substituted

by Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013 ] be completed within a period

of two months from the date of filing of the charge sheet.]

(2)If the Court, after taking cognizance of an offence, or commencement

of trial, finds it necessary or advisable to postpone the commencement of,

or adjourn, any inquiry or trial, it may, from time to time, for reasons to

be recorded, postpone or adjourn the same on such terms as it thinks fit,

for such time as it considers reasonable and may by a warrant remand

the accused if in custody :Provided that no Magistrate shall remand an

accused person to custody under this section for a term exceeding fifteen

days at a time :Provided further that when witnesses are in attendance,

no adjournment or postponement shall be granted, without examining

them, except for special reasons to be recorded in writing :[Provided also

that no adjournment shall be granted for the purpose only of enabling the

accused person to show cause against the sentence proposed to be

imposed on him.] [Inserted by Act 45 of 1978, Section 24 (w.e.f. 18-12-

1978).][Provided also that-

(a)no adjournment shall be granted at the request of a party, except

where the circumstances are beyond the control of that party;

(b)the fact that the ple3ader of a party is engaged in another Court, shall

not be a ground for adjournment;

(c)where a witness is present in Court but a party or his pleader is not

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present or the party or his pleader though present in Court, is not ready

to examine or cross-examine the witness, the Court may, if thinks fit,

record the statement of the witness and pass such orders as it thinks fit

dispensing with the examination-in-chief or cross-examination of the

witness, as the case may be.]

Explanation 1. - If sufficient evidence has been obtained to raise a

suspicion that the accused may have committed an offence, and it appears

likely that further evidence may be obtained by a remand, this is a

reasonable cause for a remand.

Explanation 2. - The terms on which an adjournment or postponement

may be granted include, in appropriate cases, the payment of costs by the

prosecution or the accused."

57. Upon a subjective analysis of the aforesaid sections, the cobwebs of

obfuscation stand removed and situation appears to be clarified to the extent

that initial detention and remand is under Section 167 Cr.P.C., which

continues till filing of charge sheet under Section 173 Cr.P.C. with filing of

police report on completion of investigation and cognizance thereof is taken

under Section 190 Cr.P.C. It also appears that upon taking cognizance,

summons are issued under Section 204 Cr.P.C. and Section 207 Cr.P.C.

provides for supply to accused a copy of police report and other relevant

documents, which are indicated in the body of the section. Once the said

proceedings conclude, commitment of a case is required to be done to the

Court of Session under Section 209 Cr.P.C., which also provides remand of

the accused to custody during, and until conclusion of trial. Charges are

thereafter framed under Section 211 Cr.P.C. and in cases not covered by

Section 209 Cr.P.C., remand can be directed under Section 309 (2) Cr.P.C..

It thus transpires that first arrest and remand is the initial stage of

proceedings under Section 167 Cr.P.C. and prior to that there is no provision

for intimating the accused of any reasons or ground of arrest as envisaged

under Article 22 of Constitution of India. It is in such circumstances that the

provisions of Article 22(1) of Constitution would be applicable to make an

accused and his family members aware with regard to the grounds and

reasons for his arrest so as to raise an effective defence.

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58. From a perusal of Section 207 Cr.P.C., it therefore transpires that once

the copy of police report and other documents indicated in the body of

Section have been supplied to the accused, then only any further remand

under Section 209 or Section 309 Cr.P.C. can take place. Evidently, once

provisions of Section 207 Cr.P.C. stand complied with, obviously the

accused is aware of the allegations levelled against him and also with regard

to the outcome of the investigation against him. At this stage, therefore, it

cannot be said that he is again required to be made aware of the reasons and

grounds of arrest as envisaged under Article 22(1) of Constitution.

59. The aforesaid provisions therefore clearly implicate a situation where

provisions of Article 22(1) of Constitution would be required to be followed

only till the existence of the stage of Section 167 Cr.P.C. and not thereafter,

particularly not after Section 207 Cr.P.C. stands complied with.

60. In the alternative, if it is held that even after compliance of Section 207

Cr.P.C., Article 22(1) of Constitution is required to be adhered to between

the stages of Section 207 Cr.P.C. and Section 209/309 Cr.P.C., it would

render Section 207 Cr.P.C. redundant, which cannot be the intention of

legislature or even of the purpose of incorporating the provisions of Article

22(1) of Constitution of India.

61. The underlying purpose of Article 22(1) of Constitution is that an

accused should not remain in the dark with regard to allegations levelled

against him and the reasons and grounds of his arrest so that he or his family

members can raise an effective defence against such allegations. The broad

contours of Article 22(1), therefore, stand substantively satisfied at the stage

of Section 207 Cr.P.C.

62. It is in this context that judgment rendered by Supreme Court in the case

of Vihaan Kumar (supra) assumes particular importance. It is relevant that

the aforesaid judgment of Vihaan Kumar (supra) does not discuss the aspects

of Sections 204, 207, 209, or 309 Cr.P.C. In the considered opinion of this

Court, the non-consideration of such sections is useful to understand the

purport of the judgment. It is thus obvious that judgment rendered in Vihaan

Kumar (supra) by its very discussion is applicable only till stage of Section

167 Cr.P.C and certainly not after applicability of Section 207 Cr.P.C.

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63. The conclusion recorded in the case of Vihaan Kumar (supra) in

paragraph 21 to the effect 'that in view of non-compliance of requirements of

Article 22(1) would vitiate the arrest of accused and also further orders

passed by a criminal court of remand', obviously pertains to the initial stage

of remand after arrest and not subsequent remand either under Section 209

or Section 309 Cr.P.C particularly since in the same paragraph, it has been

held that such violation of Article 22 (1) would not vitiate the investigation,

charge sheet and trial. Since trial in a criminal case commences with charge

sheet having been filed and framing of charges, obviously as indicated

herein above, once cognizance is taken under Section 190 Cr.P.C and after

Section 204 and 207 Cr.P.C. have been complied with, the said observations

made in Vihaan Kumar (supra) would be of no consequence. It is also

relevant as held in the case of Kasireddy (supra) that when a person has been

arrested on warrant, the grounds of reasons for arrest is the warrant itself and

if such warrant is read over to accused, it has been held that it would render

sufficient compliance with requirement that he should be informed of the

grounds of arrest. The said judgment therefore has carved out this distinction

with regard to warrant cases.

64. In the light of discussion made herein above, it thus appears that there is

no contradiction in judgments rendered in the case of Vihaan Kumar (supra)

with earlier judgments of Supreme Court including Constitution bench

judgments in the cases of Naranjan Singh Nathawan (supra), Sanjay Dutt

(supra), A.K. Gopalan (supra), Kanu Sanyal (supra), Col. Dr. B.R.

Ramchandra Rao (supra), etc.

65. Another relevant aspect requiring consideration is the terminology used

in Section 309(2) Cr.P.C that court after taking cognizance of an offence or

commencing a trial finds it necessary to postpone the inquiry or trial for

reasons to be recorded, may postpone or adjourn the same on such grounds

as it thinks fit for such time as it considers reasonable and may by warrant

remand of accused if in custody. The said provision that the subsequent

remand under Section 309 Cr.P.C can be made only in case the accused is in

custody is also to be read in conjunction with Section 167 Cr.P.C,

particularly Explanation I, which is as follows:

"[Explanation I - For the avoidance of doubts, it is hereby declared that, notwithstanding the expiry of the period specified in paragraph (a), the accused shall be detained in custody so long as he does not furnish bail.]

[Original Explanation I renumbered as Explanation II and Explanation I added by CR.P.C.(Amendment) Act, 1978, S.13.]"

66. The said explanation therefore is a proposition that in case an accused

does not furnish bail till applicability of provisions of Section 309 Cr.P.C, he

would be considered to be under custody even if he has been granted bail

and in such circumstances the subsequent remand order under Section 309

Cr.P.C would be valid.

67. In view of discussion made herein above, it is therefore evident that challenge to the initial detention and initial order of remand can be challenged for violation of Article 22(1) Cr.P.C. only till existence of thestage of Section 167 Cr.P.C and not thereafter.

68. In the present case, it is evident that the stage of Section 167 Cr.P.C is over with charges having been framed and trial on its way. In view of discussion made herein above, since the petitioner did not furnish bail till existence of proceedings under Section 167 Cr.P.C, he would be considered to be under custody and therefore now cannot raise a plea of violation of Article 22(1) of Constitution at this belated stage.

69. The question is therefore answered negatively against petitioner.

70. Considering aforesaid facts and circumstances, the petition being devoid

of merits is hereby dismissed.

October 1, 2026


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