Saturday, 21 November 2026

Supreme Court: In Case Of Child Born To Unwed Parents, Mother Has Better Prima Facie Claim Of Custody

 It is recognised across legal jurisdictions that, unless otherwise proved, preference in the law is to give custody of the child to the mother when there is a dispute between the parents. Further, under the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890, there is no legal provision that disables the mother from having a prima facie claim of custody of a child of a tender age of four years.Thus, jurisprudentially, the mother has a preferential custody right over the child. There is no reason to depart from this well settled legal position. The recognized international jurisprudence is an additional reason that establishes the prima facie case in favour of granting custody to the mother. Therefore,in the case of a child born to unwed parents, the mother has a better prima facie claim of custody. {Para 68}

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2026

(@SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRL.) NO. 11625 OF 2026)

HELENA ANNA MARIA LERSCH  Vs  STATE OF GOA & ANR.

Citation:  2026 INSC 1248.

Dated: NOVEMBER 19, 2026.

Author: NONGMEIKAPAM KOTISWAR SINGH, J.

“On the seashore of endless worlds children meet.

The infinite sky is motionless overhead and the restless water is boisterous.

On the seashore of endless worlds the children meet with shouts and dances.

They build their houses with sand, and they play with empty shells. With

withered leaves they weave their boats and smilingly float them on the vast deep.

Children have their play on the seashore of worlds.

They know not how to swim, they know not how to cast nets. Pearl-fishers

dive for pearls, merchants sail in their ships, while children gather pebbles and

scatter them again. They seek not for hidden treasures, they know not how to

cast nets.”

- Rabindranath Tagore, “On the Seashore”.

Leave granted.

2. In this proceeding, we are seeking to protect the

autonomy of a child and help preserve the child’s magical world,

which unfortunately appears to be seriously jeopardised by the

bitter bickering between the parents.

3. This Court is confronted with an unusually piquant

situation wherein an unmarried German mother is seeking

access to her minor son of four years, who she claims has

German citizenship and has been issued a German passport, but

is being denied access and custody by the father. She is also

fervently urging this Court to allow her to take the child to

Singapore, where she is presently employed, for his school

education. These pleas obviously have been stoutly resisted by

the father of the child, an Indian citizen, not only on merits, but

also by doubting the jurisdictional competency of this Court

under Article 136 of the Constitution in passing any further

orders other than to grant access to the mother of the child, as

the present proceeding arises out of a habeas corpus petition

pending before a High Court, and more particularly, when a

guardianship proceeding has been already initiated by the father

in the meantime in India.

4. While the unwed status of the parents, both of whom

have different nationalities and citizenships, and their complete

lack of convergence on the core issue of the custody of the child

are facts that may pose challenges to any court in determining

an equitable solution, the problem has been compounded in the

present case by the multiple related proceedings arising out of

the same facts.

5. In view of the pendency of multiple proceedings, this

Court has to address the foundational jurisdiction question

raised by the father. However, in our opinion, it need not be

considered as a preliminary issue and can be addressed in due

course as we consider other issues by delving into the peculiar

facts and circumstances arising in this proceeding, which will

also provide the backdrop in deciding this fundamental

question.

CERTAIN RELEVANT FACTS

6. The Petitioner herein is the mother of the minor boy,

while Respondent No. 2 is the father. Their minor son in question

is Master Marcus Johannes Mukerji, born on 15.07.2022, who

is four years of age at the time of passing this order.

7. The mother is a German citizen who ordinarily lives and

works in Singapore as TikTok’s Vice President of Public Policy,

while the father is a lawyer who runs his own law firm, PLR

Chambers, in New Delhi, India. The parents are not married. The

parties began a relationship in 2019, and in October 2021, the

mother became pregnant with the child. Two months before the

child’s birth, the mother moved to New Delhi to facilitate the

father’s involvement in the child’s birth and life, as he was

primarily based in India pursuing his legal profession.

8. The child was born on 15.07.2022 in New Delhi. In

October 2022, both parents, the child, and a full-time nanny

shifted to Goa due to Delhi’s worsening winter air pollution.

From the child’s birth until February 2026, per the mother and

father’s own admissions, the child and the parents primarily

lived in New Delhi and Goa, with intermittent time spent in

Germany with the mother and her family. During this time, the

mother also frequently travelled between India and Singapore for

work, as TikTok, the company where she is employed, was

banned in India in 2020, restricting her ability to stay in India

for extended periods. For the purpose of formal schooling, the

child was enrolled in the German Embassy School in New Delhi

and the Yellow House in Goa.

9. During this period, the relationship of the parents came

under considerable strain and underwent rough patches, and at

present, their relationship has ruptured to the extent that they

have mostly remained separated. However, they continued to

attempt to maintain cordial relations only for the child’s sake,

with limited success.

10. In October 2025, the mother obtained a negative

declaration from the German Embassy stating that she is the

child's sole legal guardian under German Civil Law, supported

by the German passport issued to the child within a month of

his birth in India. Thereafter, she travelled with the child from

New Delhi to Germany. Within days, the father joined them, and

in November 2025, the father brought the child back from

Germany to Goa, India, with the mother's consent. During the

period the child was in Germany, he was allegedly enrolled in a

school in Germany but was later withdrawn when it was felt that

raising the child in Germany may not be suitable.

11. In December 2025, the parents apparently decided to

consider moving the child to Singapore and explored admission

to United World College South East Asia (hereafter “UWCSEA”),

one of the finest schools in Singapore. According to the mother,

the father assisted in preparing the admissions application over

email throughout December 2025 and January 2026. However,

in a later email dated 04.02.2026, he backtracked, stating that

he did not consent to the child being enrolled in a school in

Singapore.

12. During that phase in December 2025, both parents took

the child to Germany for Christmas and then went to Singapore.

After a dispute between the parties, which ended with the

mother lodging a complaint against the father with the Singapore

Police on 3rd January 2026, the father brought back the child

to Goa from Singapore, allegedly with the consent of the mother.

13. At the beginning of February 2026, the mother travelled

from Singapore to Goa specifically to spend time with the child,

but the father took the child to Kolkata to allegedly attend a

friend’s wedding, which was a trip the mother had specifically

objected to as soon as she was informed of it.

14. Being prevented from meeting the child despite

communicating her plans and wishes for the same to the father,

the mother filed a habeas corpus writ petition before the Goa

Bench of the High Court of Bombay (hereafter “the Bombay High

Court”) on 17.02.2026. The Bombay High Court granted the

mother interim custody of the child for ten days (from

27.02.2026 to 08.03.2026) in Kolkata. On 04.03.2026, the

mother’s compliance with the conditions imposed was recorded.

On 08.03.2026, the mother duly returned the child to the

father’s custody.

15. During the pendency of the habeas corpus petition

before the Bombay High Court, the father instituted

guardianship proceedings in the Court of the District Judge at

South-24, Parganas at Alipore, West Bengal and obtained an exparte

order on 02.04.2026 restraining the mother from taking

custody of the child, wherein the Family Court noted Kolkata as

the ordinary place of residence of the child.

16. The mother challenged the Family Court's ex-parte

order before the Calcutta High Court, and on 23.04.2026, the

Calcutta High Court directed the Family Court to decide the

jurisdictional issue before passing any substantive orders in the

guardianship proceedings. Thereafter, the mother filed an

application for rejection of the guardianship petition under

Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, which

came to be rejected on 05.05.2025, holding that the question of

jurisdiction required a factual analysis on merits and could not

be decided in an Order VII Rule 11 application.

17. The mother alleges that during the pendency of

proceedings before the Bombay High Court and in Kolkata, the

father prevented the mother from meeting the child and from

communicating properly with the child.

18. In that background, the Bombay High Court, on

08.04.2026, directed that video interactions between the mother

and child be facilitated and supervised by a state-appointed

counsellor. The Bombay High Court thereafter noted on

15.04.2026 that the counsellor found the interaction between

the mother and the child to be healthy and directed a schedule

for supervised video interactions.

19. The mother, however, alleged that the father obstructed

her interactions. The father allegedly used the court-appointed

counsellor’s non-availability to prevent any communication

between the child and mother. The mother claims that the father

cut off all communication with the child for more than six weeks,

from 16.04.2026 to 25.05.2026, when all calls the mother made

to the father went unanswered.

20. According to the mother, having no other alternative,

she filed an application on 25.05.2026 seeking custody and

urgent directions from the Bombay High Court, stating that

communication between her and the child had completely

broken down and was being obstructed. On 26.05.2026, the

Bombay High Court granted video interaction with the mother,

but the father retained custody of the child.

21. On 02.06.2026, the mother informed the father by

email that she would be travelling to Kolkata from 05.06.2026 to

08.06.2026 to spend time with the child but received no

response. On 05.06.2026, when the mother arrived in Kolkata

and informed the father, the father replied that he was with the

child in Bangalore. The mother immediately flew to Bangalore

and sought the child's exact location and address. However, on

07.06.2026, the father informed the mother that they were in

Mysore.

22. On 11.06.2026, the mother filed an additional affidavit

before the Bombay High Court regarding the father’s obstruction

across Kolkata, Bangalore, and Mysore in a hide-and-seek

manner. The matter, however, was adjourned on 15.06.2026

until 26.06.2026.

23. Against this adjournment, the mother filed the present

Special Leave Petition before this Court on 19.06.2026, and the

matter has come up before us and is being considered in this

background.

24. On the first date of hearing, this Court directed both

parties to be present in Court, and the father was directed to

produce the child before this Court. Over the next several

hearings, we encouraged the parties to attempt mediation,

considering the child's best interests and the parents' custody

rights. However, the parents could not reach a consensus on the

child's custody.

25. The parties’ pleadings and submissions before this

Court reveal a deep divide between the parents. Their

relationship appears acrimonious and severely strained, with

tension easing only in the child’s presence. They have been

unable to agree on a mutually acceptable custody arrangement.

We note that their entrenched differences have left the child’s

welfare caught in the vortex of their discord.

26. With the guardianship proceedings pending and in the

absence of any agreement between the parents or court-directed

interim custody granted to either parent, in the backdrop of the

case as discussed above, this Court felt that it would best serve

the welfare of the child if temporary custody is given to one of

the parents. This would require determining whether the

temporary custody of the child be given to the father, in which

event the child would remain in India; or be given to the mother,

in which case the mother has to be allowed to take the child to

Singapore, where the mother is presently based. There is some

indication that both parents had considered the latter option of

admitting the child in a Singaporean school, before their

relationship irreversibly deteriorated.

27. As the child’s best interests remain paramount and take

precedence over the parents’ interests and other considerations,

and in light of the peculiar background of the case, this Court

considered it appropriate to have the parents and the child

examined by NIMHANS, the country’s premier mental health

institution, to understand their psychological and mental

conditions.

28. Accordingly, this Court, by order dated 11.08.2026,

directed the parents and the child to undergo individual and

family assessments at NIMHANS, Bengaluru.

29. We have thus felt it apposite to reproduce the order of

this Court passed on 11.08.2026, which reads as follows:

“1. This Court is presently seized of the matter pertaining

to the rival claims of the parents in seeking custody of

their child, who is about four years and one month old

(born on 15.07.2022).

2. Admittedly, the mother and father are not married to

each other. The relationship between the parties

commenced sometime in January 2019 in the course of

their professional interactions. Subsequently, a child was

born on 15.07.2022 at La Femme, Hospital, New Delhi,

India. The mother is a German citizen employed as a Vice

President of Public Policy at TikTok, based in Singapore.

The father is admittedly a practicing lawyer, and partner

of a law firm, PLR Chambers, based in Delhi.

3. This Court is considering the rival claims of the parties

for custody of their child. We have interacted with the

mother and father in person on several occasions and

have also observed the behavior of the child. Though

certain allegations and counterallegations have been

made by the parties against each other, the child does

not appear to have any aversion towards either of the

parents. Both parents also appear to be doting parents.

The child is presently in India. For varying periods of

time, the child has stayed with the parents in India,

including in Delhi and Goa, and has recently stayed with

the father in Kolkata, which according to the mother was

without her consent. The child has also travelled to and

stayed in Singapore on a couple of occasions, along with

his parents, and has travelled to and stayed in Germany

with the family of the mother.

4. The mother initiated writ proceedings before the High

Court of Bombay at Goa Bench, in February 2026,

seeking access to the child, as she claims to have been

denied access to the child by the father without any

reason. The matter is pending before the High Court of

Bombay at Goa Bench out of which the present

proceeding has arisen before this Court. The High Court

initially granted the mother access to the child for 10

days, and thereafter passed certain orders for continued

access to the child, the details of which may not be

necessary to be referred to herein. After the filing of the

writ proceedings before the High Court of Bombay at Goa,

the father filed a petition under the Guardians and Wards

Act, 1890 in the Court of the District Judge, South 24-

Parganas at Alipore in April 2026, seeking protection and

custody of the child. In the writ petition filed by the

mother, she also sought custody of the child and

permission to take the child to Singapore. The mother is

keen to provide education to the child in Singapore, where

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she lived for the last several years. The child’s admission

to one of the best schools in Singapore is stated to be

under process, where the mother would also be able to

provide quality time to the child in Singapore. The father,

on the other hand, seeks to retain custody of the child in

India, which he claims to be the child's habitual residence

and will be in the child's welfare where quality education

can be provided.

5. In considering such rival claims and counter-claims,

this Court has to keep the best interests of the child as

the foremost consideration, apart from the claim of the

biological mother based on maternal love, affection and

maternal instincts, as well as that of the father. In our

view, this would obviously necessitate an evaluation of

the various physical and mental conditions of all

concerned, including the child, as neither have agreed to

joint custody so far.

6. The father is primarily based in India because of his

legal profession, while the mother is primarily based in

Singapore because of her professional commitments.

Therefore, if the child is to remain in India with the father,

the mother will not have access to the child for a

substantial period of time, except during occasional visits

to India. Similarly, if the child is placed in Singapore as

desired by the mother, the father will not be in a position

to spend substantial time with the child, except during

occasional visits. Under such circumstances, accepting

the request of either parent would necessarily entail

dislocation of the other parent for a substantial period of

time. In absence of any agreement between the parties,

the child has to remain either in India or in Singapore.

7. Under the circumstances, this Court has felt the

necessity to seek the views of experts, particularly child

psychologists/behavioural specialists, who may interact

with the child as well as with the parents, either

separately or together, as the psychologists/experts may

deem fit and appropriate, and apprise this Court of their

views. Thereafter, this Court will be in a better position to

understand the psychological impact on the child if either

parent is unable to remain with the child for a prolonged

period of time, and thereafter to determine the issue of

custody of the child. Therefore, this Court would like to

ascertain the comparative psychological impact on the

child of the two possible arrangements, namely, the child

continuing to reside in India with the father in the

absence of the mother for substantial period, or the child

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residing in Singapore with the mother in the absence of

the father for substantial period, and which of these two

arrangements would better serve the welfare and best

interests of the child. The experts may accordingly

examine the comparative merits, demerits and

implications of both alternatives and place their

considered opinion before this Court, keeping in mind that

the child is only about 4 years old, the psychological harm

it may cause if the child is deprived of the maternal love

and affection for a prolonged period, as compared to

deprivation of the love and affection of his father. In either

eventuality, the parent with whom the child does not

ordinarily reside shall have reasonable and meaningful

access to the child, including regular interaction through

video conferencing and appropriate weekly/monthly

visitation rights, as may be feasible and conducive to the

best interests of the child.

8. From the records, we have also seen that the child has

been looked after by nannies named, Kusum and Anu,

for a substantial period of time. If the experts so desire,

they may examine them also, as they may provide

valuable insights into the behaviour predisposition of the

child and the role of the parents.

9. The experts may also give their views as to whether

they need to visit any particular place, either in India or

in Singapore, as the case may be, to ascertain the

proposed physical environment of the child where the

child may be placed for the time being, for which the

parties shall make the necessary arrangements for travel

and stay and both the parties will share the expenses.

10. For the aforesaid purpose, we request the National

institute of mental health and Neuro Sciences (hereinafter

‘NIMHANS’) at Bengaluru to immediately constitute a

panel of experts consisting of such members as they may

deem fit and appropriate who shall examine the child and

parents, considering the aforementioned background and

desire of the parents, keeping in mind the best interests

of the child.

11. Considering the nature of the case and also the

limitations on the mother to physically remain in India

beyond a limited period, which have been appreciated by

all, including the father, we would request the NIMHANS

authorities to initiate the process of interaction without

any further delay.

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12. The parties have agreed to visit NIMHANS,

Bengaluru, with the child immediately and shall report to

NIMHANS at such time and place as may be required. If

the NIMHANS authorities feel that it would be better for

the parties to stay in their complex for some time, the

parties shall cooperate and stay in the complex.

Otherwise, they may stay at a hotel near NIMHANS, as

per their convenience.

13. The mother has expressed that her child is very

proficient in German language and that she would like to

interact with the child in German during the interaction,

and the experts may also interact with the child in

German with the help of an expert/ interpreter.

14. Considering the nature of the case, we have

requested Ms. Aishwarya Bhati, learned ASG, to assist

the Court for expediting the constitution of the Board of

experts by NIMHANS and also to render necessary

assistance in requesting the services of a

Germanspeaking person fluent in English, preferably a

German national based in Bengaluru to assist the Board

of Experts and also the mother and child.

15. NIMHANS is requested to submit a report before this

Court in a sealed cover, preferably within a period of 2–3

weeks, from today. However, if the NIMHANS authorities

feel the need for extension of time for this exercise, they

may do so, which may be communicated to the learned

ASG, Ms. Aishwarya Bhati, who will apprise this Court of

such requirement. NIMHANS shall accordingly inform

both parties through email as well as text messages on

their mobile phones and shall also inform their respective

lawyers/counsels regarding the date and time of their

presence required at NIMHANS, Bengaluru.

16. This Court, for obvious reasons, is not going to make

any observation at this stage regarding the claims and

counter-claims or allegations/counter-allegations of the

parties. However, to apprise the Board of Experts, of the

background of the case, the parties are at liberty to

submit, in writing, their respective cases, with a short

synopsis/list of dates, before the Medical Board of

NIMHANS within two days from today. The same shall

not exceed three pages/2000 words. Further, the parties

shall also submit their updated concrete plan/ proposals

regarding the custody and care of the child to the Board

of Experts also, which was earlier directed to be

submitted before this Court.

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17. During this period, the interim custody of the child

shall remain with the mother during her stay in India.

Obviously, the father will also have access to the child at

such convenient time and place, as may be agreed

between the parents. The respective counsel of the

parties may help in this regard to the parties. It goes

without saying that, in the absence of the mother in India,

the interim custody of the child will revert back to the

father, till the mother returns to India who shall then take

custody of the child again from the father until such order

of the Court.

18. Regarding the pending guardianship petition bearing

‘Act VIII Case No. 69 of 2026 (R-69)’, before the Court of

the District Judge, South 24-Parganas at Alipore, it has

been agreed by the both parties that the same can

conveniently be transferred to an appropriate Court in

Delhi. The Chief Justice of the High Court of Delhi is

requested to assign the matter to a specific Court in Delhi

at the earliest. The concerned Court at Alipore is directed

to send the records immediately to the High Court of

Delhi, which is to be sent to the appropriate Court in Delhi

as per the directions of the Chief Justice of the High Court

of Delhi.

19. The costs of the entire exercise involved in the

assessment to be conducted by NIMHANS shall be borne

by both parents equally, for which each parent shall

deposit a sum of Rs.2 lakhs with the Registry of this

Court within a period of 2 days. The expenses incurred

by NIMHANS towards payment of fees to counsellors,

experts and other ancillary expenditures shall be

reimbursed from the amounts so deposited by the parties

in this regard. Any additional amount, so required, shall

be borne by the parties by depositing the same with the

Registry of this Court, as may be intimated to the Registry

by the NIMHANS.

20. The passport of the petitioner, Helena Anna Maria

Lersch, may be returned to her so as to enable her to

make the necessary arrangements for her travel in India

and abroad, without any restrictions. However, the

passport of the child shall remain with the Registry of this

Court. The interim direction issued by this Court

restraining the removal of the child from the country

without the leave of the Court and other incidental

directions issued earlier shall also remain in force,

subject to what has been ordered today.


21. A copy of this order be furnished to Ms. Aishwarya

Bhati, learned ASG, with a request that the authorities at

NIMHANS be duly intimated and also for engagement of

an interpreter.

22. We place on record our appreciation for the assistance

rendered by Ms. Aishwarya Bhati, assisted by Mr.

Sachin Sharma and Ms. Madhulika Upadhyay, learned

counsels, on behalf of the Ministry of Health and Family

Welfare, who have appeared at the request of this Court

since the matter involves the participation of NIMHANS.

23. Counsels may apprise this Court on 14.08.2026 of

the steps taken and developments in this regard in terms

of the directions issued today. The parties may not be

required to be present on 14.08.2026 in person unless

they so desire.

24. The guardianship proceedings shall commence

immediately without any loss of time by the concerned

Court in Delhi on receipt of the records at the Court, and

the Court is requested to proceed with the matter on a

day-to-day basis, subject to other judicial commitments,

and dispose of the same as expeditiously as possible. It

is also made clear that the concerned Court shall proceed

with the matter without being influenced by the

proceedings and orders that have been passed by this

Court in the present proceedings.

25. List the matter on 14.08.2026 at 2:00 p.m.”

30. The NIMHANS report was received on 21.09.2026 and

copies were furnished to the parties.

31. The pending Guardianship Petition bearing ‘Act VIII

Case No. 69 of 2026 (R-69)’ before the Court of the District

Judge, South 24-Parganas, at Alipore, has now been transferred

to the Family Court, Patiala House Courts, New Delhi, upon the

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mother and father agreeing to the same. The case is now at the

initial stage, and the parents are participating in the same.

32. We will now consider the arguments put forth on behalf

of the parents seeking interim custody of the child.

33. Learned Senior Advocate for the mother, Ms. Geetha

Luthra, submits that per the Tender Years Doctrine as

enunciated in Queen v. Maria Clarke,1 Section 1626(b) of the

German Civil Code, and per Section 6 of the Hindu Minority and

Guardianship Act, 1956, the mother is the natural guardian of

a very young child. Additionally, where the child is born out of

wedlock, the mother is the child’s natural guardian. Further, it

is submitted that, under the doctrine of nurture, a child so

young is best cared for by the mother. The learned Senior

Counsel also relied on paragraph 18 of ABC v. State (NCT of

Delhi),2 which held that where the parents are not married, the

mother should have custody of the child. Similarly, per Gohar

Begum v. Suggi alias Nazma Begam and Ors.,3 an unwed

mother has the best claim over the minor child.

1 1857 SCC OnLine EWHC 1: 119 ER 1217.

2 (2015) 10 SCC 1.

3 1959 SCC OnLine SC 8: (1960) 1 SCR 597.

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34. It is thus submitted that it is in the best interest of the

child to allow the mother to have custody of the child in

Singapore, as this will not amount to dislocating the child if the

parent is compelled to move the child because of their profession

or employment. The mother also avers that, to ensure the

father’s access to the child in Singapore is not disrupted, access

will be maintained through telephone/video calling or physical

access, as may be agreed.

35. Ms. Luthra also submits that the child is very attached

to the mother and becomes very distressed upon separation from

the mother during many custody exchanges between the father

and mother. It is also submitted that the father’s proposal

involves moving the child to Kolkata, a city the child has never

spent any significant time, where the child has no familiar

environment and where the father has no work-related reason to

be present.

36. On the other hand, learned Senior Advocate for the

father, Mr. Gopal Sankaranarayanan, submits that this Court’s

jurisdiction was invoked fraudulently, that the habeas corpus

writ petition has become infructuous now that the mother’s

continuous contact with the child has been restored, and that

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the matter is being heard and argued in a custody petition before

a jurisdictional court.

37. It is also submitted that since the child's birth, the

mother has been ‘absent’ for nearly half the time, and the father

has been the child's primary caregiver. It is further submitted

that the father has built a ‘well-drawn’ cocoon for the child, and

that introducing the child to the ‘alien’ city of Singapore during

the pendency of the Family Court proceedings would be against

the child's interests.

38. Mr Sankaranarayanan also submits that the Hindu

Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 will not apply, as the

father claims to be a Christian and the mother is also not a

Hindu. Therefore, the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 will apply,

and Section 17 of that Act provides only that the guardianship

of a minor child is to be determined according to what appears

to be in the welfare of the minor. It is vehemently submitted that

allowing the mother to take the child to Singapore would

dislocate the child and would not be in his best interests.

39. We have heard the arguments of the parties and

perused all the materials placed before us.

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HABEAS CORPUS JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT:

40. The father and the mother seek conflicting custody

arrangements that are incompatible with each other. The mother

wishes to have the child educated in Singapore, where she works

and resides, while the father wishes to raise the child in Kolkata.

In either case, one parent will have less contact with the child

than the other, as the parents' occupations necessitate their

long-term presence in different locations/countries. This issue

will also need to be addressed by the jurisdictional court when

determining the child’s final guardianship/custody

arrangement, because of the complete lack of overlap between

the interim custody and final custody arrangements sought by

each party.

41. Mr. Sankaranarayanan argued vehemently that the

matter should be remitted to the jurisdictional court handling

the guardianship proceedings, in which the mother is already

participating. He contended that her participation renders the

reliefs she seeks from this Court infructuous, and that the

present Special Leave Petition should therefore be disposed of as

infructuous in light of Guardianship Petition No. 37 of 2026,

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pending before the Family Court at the Patiala House Courts,

New Delhi.

42. It may be noted that while the habeas corpus petition

was filed in February 2026, the father instituted the

guardianship proceedings in Alipore, West Bengal, only in April

2026, after participating in the Bombay High Court proceedings.

The Family Court, now seized of the guardianship petition, will

continue to have jurisdiction despite the habeas corpus

proceedings, as it will deal with the final determination of the

child's guardianship. Similarly, the subsequent filing of the

guardianship petition cannot render the habeas corpus petition

infructuous.

43. A relief sought becomes infructuous when it either

becomes not necessary or impossible for such relief to be

granted. This Court in M. Sudakar v. V. Manoharan4 held that:

“15. …..In our opinion a writ petition broadly speaking is

held infructuous when the relief sought for by the

petitioner is already granted or because of certain events,

there may not be necessity to decide the issue involved in

the writ petition….”

44. Further, in Nirmala v. Kulwant Singh & Ors,5 it was

held as follows:

4 (2011) 1 SCC 484.

5 2024 INSC 370.

Page - 23 - of 81

“16. It can thus be seen that no hard and fast rule can be

laid down insofar as the maintainability of a habeas

corpus petition in the matters of custody of a minor child

is concerned. As to whether the writ court should exercise

its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the

Constitution of India or not will depend on the facts and

circumstances of each case.”

45. Based on a conjoint reading of M. Sudakar (supra) and

Nirmala (supra), the pertinent question is whether, in light of

the specific facts and circumstances, it is no longer necessary

for this Court to decide the question of interim custody now that

a petition for guardianship has been instituted by the father.

46. In this regard, we may recall the observations In

Rajeswari Chandrasekar Ganesh v. State of T.N.,6 wherein

this Court held that the parens patriae jurisdiction being

exercised by this Court is foremost for the protection of the minor

and is independent of the statutory framework. The relevant

paragraphs are reproduced below:

“99. Thus, it is well established that in issuing the writ

of habeas corpus in the case of minors, the jurisdiction

which the Court exercises is an inherent jurisdiction as

distinct from a statutory jurisdiction conferred by any

particular provision in any special statute. In other

words, the employment of the writ of habeas corpus in

child custody cases is not pursuant to, but independent

of any statute. The jurisdiction exercised by the court

rests in such cases on its inherent equitable powers and

exerts the force of the State, as parens patriae, for the

protection of its minor ward, and the very nature and

scope of the inquiry and the result sought to be

accomplished call for the exercise of the jurisdiction of a

6 (2023) 12 SCC 472.

Page - 24 - of 81

court of equity. The primary object of a habeas corpus

petition, as applied to minor children, is to determine in

whose custody the best interests of the child will

probably be advanced. In a habeas corpus proceeding

brought by one parent against the other for the custody

of their child, the Court has before it the question of the

rights of the parties as between themselves, and also has

before it, if presented by the pleadings and the evidence,

the question of the interest which the State, as parens

patriae, has in promoting the best interests of the child.”

(emphasis added)

47. There is a distinction between a guardianship petition

and a habeas corpus petition for custody. From a perusal of the

record and pleadings, it is clear that what is now being sought

from this Court is not final adjudication of the guardianship of

the child, but, in the peculiar facts of the case, consideration of

the plea for interim custody of the child.

48. It is also apposite to reproduce the reliefs sought by the

father in the petition now pending before the Principal Judge of

the Family Court, Patiala House Courts, being Guardianship

Petition No. 37 of 2026, as follows:

“It is therefore, most respectfully prayed that this

Hon’ble Court may be pleased to:

a) Appoint the Petitioner as the permanent

guardian of the minor son Marcus Johannes

Mukerji,

b) Grant permanent custody of the minor son

Marcus Johannes Mukerji to the Petitioner father,

c) Pass an order of permanent injunction

restraining the Respondent from disturbing the

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peaceful enjoyment of the minor at his ordinary

place of residence while staying with the Petitioner.

Pass any other orders that this Court may deem fit in

the interest of justice.”

49. These prayers clearly distinguish the guardianship

petition from the habeas corpus proceedings. In the former, the

father seeks a final adjudication on the permanent guardianship

of the child, whereas in the latter, the remaining relief sought by

the mother is purely interim, namely, to take the child to

Singapore for the child's education.

50. It could also be argued that under Section 12 of the

Guardians and Wards Act, 1890, the Family Court is also

equipped to decide interim custody of the child. However, we are

of the opinion that for a court of equity to subject a minor child

of the tender age of four years to multiple proceedings and to

delay a decision on interim custody, while being fully aware of

the absolute lack of cooperation between the parents, would be

to neglect the duty of this Court towards the child under the

parens patriae jurisdiction.

51. We are also of the opinion that, irrespective of the nature

of the proceeding before a court, when the custody right over a

child is involved, the child’s best interests must be the

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preeminent consideration; it must prevail over all other

considerations. Hence, once the child’s best interests become the

core issue, all other interests and considerations must be

subservient to it, and such collateral interests, however

important they may appear to the contesting parents, must be

moulded accordingly. Their interests must not be allowed to

override the best interests of the child. A fortiori, procedural law,

including jurisdictional issues, must yield if it stands in the way

of the child’s best interests. Even international jurisdictional

issues cannot come in the way of the best interests of the child.

52. In that regard, we may refer to the observations in

Sheetal Vasant Thakur v. Chirag Arora,7

“51. Through a series of judgments, this Court has laid

down firmly that welfare of the child is the overarching

and the determining factor even in matters relating to

custodial and visitation rights of the parents. All other

factors are subservient to the welfare of the child.

This Court in Gaurav Nagpal v. Sumedha

Nagpal,8 after a survey of law in this country as well as

in foreign jurisdictions, affirmed that child welfare is the

paramount consideration and also highlighted the legal

proposition of parens patriae jurisdiction of the court for

the welfare of the child. This Court even went to the extent

of ignoring orders of foreign courts by keeping the welfare

of the child as the paramount consideration.

7 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1110.

8 (2009) 1 SCC 42 : (2009) 1 SCC (Civ) 1.

Page - 27 - of 81

In Yashita Sahu v. State of Rajasthan,9 and

Rajeswari Chandrasekar Ganesh v. State of Tamil

Nadu10 this Court held that though this Court will accord

substantial weight to foreign custody orders, it will be like

other factors which will be subordinate to the prime

consideration of the welfare of the child. Comity or first

strike consideration will be subordinate to the welfare of

child, affirming the supremacy of the child welfare

principle. We may not burden ourselves any further with

the numerous decisions in this regard in reiterating the

dominant principle of the welfare of the child.

52. In Gaurav Nagpal (supra) this Court emphasised that

welfare must be understood in the widest sense, from

moral and ethical perspectives keeping in mind physical,

emotional and educational needs of the child. In other

words, all those factors which are conducive to the

physical, moral and intellectual development of the child,

and not merely confined to material aspects, must be

taken into consideration by the court. In the aforesaid

case, this Court also considered the conduct of the

parents, psychological impact on the child which may

result because of tutoring by either of the parents etc. in

seeking to ascertain what would be in the best interest of

the child.

This Court observed in Gaurav Nagpal (supra) as

follows:—

“50. When the court is confronted with

conflicting demands made by the parents, each

time it has to justify the demands. The court has

not only to look at the issue on legalistic basis,

in such matters human angles are relevant for

deciding those issues. The court then does not

give emphasis on what the parties say, it has to

exercise a jurisdiction which is aimed at the

welfare of the minor. As observed recently in

9 (2020) 3 SCC 67 : (2020) 2 SCC (Civ) 39.

10 (2023) 12 SCC 472.

Page - 28 - of 81

Mausami Moitra Ganguli case,11 the court has to

give due weightage to the child's ordinary

contentment, health, education, intellectual

development and favourable surroundings but

over and above physical comforts, the moral and

ethical values have also to be noted. They are

equal if not more important than the others.

51. The words “welfare” used in Section 13 of the

Act has to be construed literally and must be

taken in its widest sense. The moral and ethical

welfare of the child must also weigh with the

court as well as its physical well-being. Though

the provisions of the special statutes which

govern the rights of the parents or guardians

may be taken into consideration, there is nothing

which can stand in the way of the court

exercising its parens patriae jurisdiction arising

in such cases.”

53. In the light of the above position we can say that

emotional stability, psychological security, dignity and

mental health constitute vital components of the concept

of the welfare of the child. Consequently, any such factors

which may impede and seen to be disruptive to the

welfare of the child must be abjured while considering the

welfare of the child. Any process which leads to the

detriment of the welfare of the child must be avoided by

the court while passing orders relating to the

custody/visitation rights claimed by any of the parents.

The court is required to remain responsive not merely to

the legal consequences but also the impact which the

judicially ordained process may have upon the welfare of

the child.”

11 (2008) 7 SCC 673.

Page - 29 - of 81

53. In the aforesaid case of Gaurav Nagpal (supra), it was

also observed as follows:

“ 43. The principles in relation to the custody of a minor

child are well settled. In determining the question as to

who should be given custody of a minor child, the

paramount consideration is the “welfare of the child” and

not rights of the parents under a statute for the time being

in force.

xxx

45. In Saraswatibai Shripad Ved v. Shripad Vasanji Ved

[AIR 1941 Bom 103 : ILR 1941 Bom 455] , the High Court

of Bombay stated : (AIR p. 105)

“… It is not the welfare of the father, nor the welfare of

the mother, that is the paramount consideration for the

court. It is the welfare of the minor and of the minor alone

which is the paramount consideration….” (emphasis

supplied)

xxx

47. Again, in Thrity Hoshie Dolikuka v. Hoshiam

Shavaksha Dolikuka [(1982) 2 SCC 544 : 1982 SCC (Cri)

505] , this Court reiterated that the only consideration of

the court in deciding the question of custody of minor

should be the welfare and interest of the minor. And it is

the special duty and responsibility of the court. Mature

thinking is indeed necessary in such a situation to decide

what will ensure to the benefit and welfare of the child.”

54. Thus, the primacy of consideration of the best interests

of the child by the court has been the consistent judicial norm

adopted in this country. Reference to a few more decisions in

that regard would suffice.

(i) Nil Ratan Kundu v. Abhijit Kundu,12

“ Principles governing custody of minor children

52. In our judgment, the law relating to custody of a child

is fairly well settled and it is this: in deciding a difficult

and complex question as to the custody of a minor, a court

of law should keep in mind the relevant statutes and the

rights flowing therefrom. But such cases cannot be

12 (2008) 9 SCC 413.

Page - 30 - of 81

decided solely by interpreting legal provisions. It is a

human problem and is required to be solved with human

touch. A court while dealing with custody cases, is

neither bound by statutes nor by strict rules of evidence

or procedure nor by precedents. In selecting proper

guardian of a minor, the paramount consideration should

be the welfare and well-being of the child. In selecting a

guardian, the court is exercising parens patriae

jurisdiction and is expected, nay bound, to give due

weight to a child's ordinary comfort, contentment, health,

education, intellectual development and favourable

surroundings. But over and above physical comforts,

moral and ethical values cannot be ignored. They are

equally, or we may say, even more important, essential

and indispensable considerations. If the minor is old

enough to form an intelligent preference or judgment, the

court must consider such preference as well, though the

final decision should rest with the court as to what is

conducive to the welfare of the minor.”

(ii) Tejaswini Gaud v. Shekhar Jagdish

Prasad Tewari,13

“ Welfare of the minor child is the paramount

consideration

26. The court while deciding the child custody cases is

not bound by the mere legal right of the parent or

guardian. Though the provisions of the special statutes

govern the rights of the parents or guardians, but the

welfare of the minor is the supreme consideration in

cases concerning custody of the minor child. The

paramount consideration for the court ought to be child

interest and welfare of the child.”

(iii) Rajeswari Chandrasekar Ganesh v. State

of T.N. (supra)

“ 127. We would therefore hold that in the case at Bar, the

dominant consideration to which all other considerations

must remain subordinate must be the welfare of the child.

This is not to say that the question of custody will be

determined by weighing the economic circumstances of

the contending parties. The matter will not be determined

13 (2019) 7 SCC 42.

Page - 31 - of 81

solely on the basis of the physical comfort and material

advantages that may be available in the home of one

contender or the other. The welfare of the child must be

decided on a consideration of these and all other relevant

factors, including the general psychological, spiritual and

emotional welfare of the child. It must be the aim of the

court, when resolving disputes between the rival

claimants for the custody of a child, to choose the course

which will best provide for the healthy growth,

development and education of the child so that he or she

will be equipped to face the problems of life as a mature

adult.

(iv) Vasudha Sethi v. Kiran V. Bhaskar,14

“32. The decision of this Court in Kanika [Kanika Goel v.

State (NCT of Delhi), (2018) 9 SCC 578 : (2018) 4 SCC

(Civ) 411] reiterates the well-settled law that the issue

regarding custody of a minor child and the issue of the

repatriation of the child to the native country has to be

addressed on the sole criteria of the welfare of the minor

and not on consideration of the legal rights of the parents.

The principle that the welfare of the minor shall be the

predominant consideration and that the rights of the

parties to a custody dispute are irrelevant has been

consistently followed by this Court.”

55. At the same time, this Court also observed in the

aforesaid case of Vasudha Sethi (supra) that each case has to

be decided on its own facts and circumstances and no hard and

fast rule can be laid down, and the factual aspects are required

to be tested on the touchstone of the principle of the welfare of

the minor child.

56. In light of the above well-settled principles, this Court

must approach the dispute only from the lens of the best

14 (2023) 17 SCC 478.

Page - 32 - of 81

interests of the child. Given the lack of cooperation of the parents

with each other as to an interim arrangement during the

pendency of the guardianship petition, this Court proposes to

exercise its parens patriea jurisdiction to decide an interim

arrangement to ensure the child is not exposed to multiple

proceedings and the harms that thus follow.

57. We are conscious that this Court has to address the

fundamental question posed by Mr. Sankaranarayanan and Ms.

Malavika Rajkotia, that if any order is passed at this stage

allowing the mother to take the child to Singapore, it would

amount to passing a final order and practically render the

pending guardianship proceeding in Family Court, Patiala House

Courts infructuous.

58. This is an aspect which, in our opinion, can be answered

in due course when we consider the core issue of the best

interests of the child in the light of the expert opinion before us.

In our view, the expert opinion which has given by NIMHANS

after a comprehensive clinical examination of the parents and

child for a fairly well-extended period of time, provides a reliable,

relevant and material basis for evaluating the contesting claims

of the parents, even in a parallel proceeding arising out of the

Page - 33 - of 81

habeas corpus petition. It highlights to us that there is sufficient

reason for this Court to intervene at this stage.

59. Further, we are mindful of the fact that when

considering the best interests of a child in any proceeding, any

determination made by a court is essentially temporary in

nature, in as much we are dealing with an ever-growing child

whose needs and aspirations also keep on evolving and

changing. What is in the best interests of a child who is four

years old will not be the same once the child is ten or fifteen

years old. Similarly, the parents' circumstances, be it

psychological, financial, or social, may also fluctuate,

necessitating a revision of the custody arrangements. Further,

as warring parents move on from the heat of a dispute, it may

even be possible for them to become more agreeable to changing

the custody arrangement based on what may be required or

needed, based on the evolving needs of the child.

60. In this regard, we may refer to the observations of this

Court in Neethu v. Rajesh Kumar,15 which are pertinent in

understanding/guiding the nature of relief that grants custody

to a parent/guardian:

15 (2025) 10 SCC 436.

Page - 34 - of 81

“15. Further, since the case at hand is a custody matter,

it becomes imperative for us to lay down the universally

accepted tenets that such matters are to be dealt

sensitively with due consideration to the emotional,

intellectual, physical, financial, social and cultural needs

of a growing child. Therefore, custody orders are always

considered interlocutory orders and by the nature of such

proceedings, custody orders cannot be made rigid and

final. Rather, the courts are entitled to alter and mould

the custody orders in view of the best interest of the

minor.

16. The core and inalienable standard is the paramount

consideration of the child's welfare, which is affected by

an array of factors, is ever evolving and cannot be

confined in a straitjacket. Therefore, each case has to be

dealt with on the basis of its unique facts and take into

account any change in circumstances which have an

impact on the quality of a child's upbringing.

17. In light of the aforesaid legal principles surrounding

review jurisdiction of this Court and the role of courts in

custody matters, it is a natural corollary that judicial

discretion has to be properly balanced between the

statutory provisions that advocate for limited exercise of

review powers and the peculiar care that needs to be

extended by the courts in matters of child custody. We

sincerely believe that undertaking a far too hyper

technical approach in such cases shall indeed amount to

abandoning the doctrine of parens patriae and will cause

travesty of justice.”

61. We are conscious of the fact that the jurisdictional

Family Court, Patiala House Courts will finally decide the issue

of permanent guardianship of the child. Accordingly, what we

propose to do in the present proceeding is to examine the

advisability of passing certain interim arrangements, which will

not come in the way of the jurisdictional court in deciding the

final custody arrangement of the child.

Page - 35 - of 81

62. With this caveat in mind, we proceed to examine the

competing reliefs sought from us as to which interim relief can

be granted to either parent.

TRIPLE TEST:

63. It is well settled that interim relief is evaluated through

the triple test, viz.,

(a) prima facie case; and

(b) balance of convenience; and

(c) irreparable harm.

64. The test must be applied in this proceeding in view of

the interim nature of the child’s custody being sought from this

Court. We must make it clear that this Court would not have

had to engage in this analysis at all had the child been old

enough to express his own desires and wishes as to which parent

he would like to stay with, or which country he would want to

stay in. However, this child has only just turned four years old

on 15.07.2022 and in our interactions with him in chambers, it

has become clear to us he is too young to be able to express an

opinion or wish or desire one way or another and is oblivious of

his surroundings so long as he is with his parents. In light of

this, we must then engage in balancing the claims of the parents

against each other and consider the best interests of the child.

PRIMA FACIE CASE

65. The first prong of which party has a prima facie case

may be evaluated as which parent may have a better legal claim

over the child on the face of it. Ms. Luthra contends that under

Section 6 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956,

the custody of a child under the age of five years vests with the

mother. Further, where the parents are unwed, the mother is the

natural guardian of the child. She relied upon ABC v. State (NCT

of Delhi) (supra) and Queen v. Clarke (supra) to establish the

right of an unwed mother to the custody of a young child. On the

other hand, Mr. Sankaranarayanan contends that the Hindu

Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 does not apply as neither

the mother nor the father are Hindus and the applicable law is

the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890, wherein Section 17

provides that the custody of a child shall only be determined

based on the best interests of the child.

66. X1 v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2015) 10 SCC 1. provides a broad survey of the various laws across many jurisdictions as to an unwed mother’s claim of guardianship as opposed to the unwed father’s claim.

“10. Section 6(b) of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship

Act, 1956 makes specific provisions with respect to

natural guardians of illegitimate children, and in this

regard gives primacy to the mother over the father.

Mohammedan Law accords the custody of illegitimate

children to the mother and her relatives. The law follows

the principle that the maternity of a child is established

in the woman who gives birth to it, irrespective of the

lawfulness of her connection with the begetter. However,

paternity is inherently nebulous especially where the

child is not an offspring of marriage. Furthermore, as per

Section 8 of the Succession Act, 1925, which applies to

the Christians in India, the domicile of origin of an

illegitimate child is in the country in which at the time of

his birth his mother is domiciled. This indicates that

priority, preference and pre-eminence is given to the

mother over the father of the child concerned.

11. In the United Kingdom, the Children Act, 1989

allocates parental responsibility, which includes all

rights, duties, powers, responsibilities and authority of a

parent over the child and his/her property. According to

Section 2(2) of that Act, parental custody of a child born

of unwed parents is with the mother in all cases, and

additionally with the father provided he has acquired

responsibility in accordance with the provisions of the

Act. To acquire responsibility, he would have to register

as the child's father, execute a parental responsibility

agreement with the mother or obtain a court order giving

him parental responsibility over the child.

12. In USA, each State has different child custody laws

but predominantly the mother has full legal and physical

custody from the time the child is born. Unless an

unmarried father establishes his paternity over the child

it is generally difficult for him to defeat or overwhelm the

preferential claims of the mother to the custody. However,

some States assume that both the parents who sign the

child's birth certificate have joint custody, regardless of

whether they are married.

13. In Ireland, Section 6(4) of the Guardianship of Infants

Act, 1964 ordains — “The mother of an illegitimate infant

shall be guardian of the infant”. Unless the mother agrees

to sign a statutory declaration, an unmarried father must

apply to the court in order to become a legal guardian of

his child.

14. Article 176 of the Family Code of the Philippines

explicitly provides that “illegitimate children shall use the

surname and shall be under the parental authority of

their mother, and shall be entitled to support in

conformity with this Code”. This position obtains

regardless of whether the father admits paternity. In

2004, the Supreme Court of the Philippines in Joey D.

Briones v. Maricel P. Miguel2 held that an illegitimate

child is under the sole parental authority of the mother.

15. The law in New Zealand, as laid out in Section 17 of

the Care of Children Act, 2004, is that the mother of a

child is the sole guardian if she is not married to, or in

civil union with, or living as a de facto partner with the

father of the child at any time during the period beginning

with the conception of the child and ending with the birth

of the child.

16. In South Africa, according to the Children's Act 38 of

2005, parental responsibility includes the responsibility

and the right : (a) to care for the child; (b) to maintain

contact with the child; (c) to act as guardian of the child;

and (d) to contribute to the maintenance of the child. The

biological mother of a child, whether married or

unmarried, has full parental responsibilities and rights in

respect of the child. The father has full parental

responsibility if he is married to the mother, or if he was

married to her at the time of the child's conception, or at

the time of the child's birth or any time in between, or if

at the time of the child's birth he was living with the

mother in a permanent life partnership, or if he (i)

consents to be identified or successfully applies in terms

of Section 26 to be identified as the child's father or pays

damages in terms of customary law; (ii) contributes or has

attempted in good faith to contribute to the child's

upbringing for a reasonable period; and (iii) contributes or

has attempted in good faith to contribute towards

expenses in connection with the maintenance of the child

for a reasonable period.

17. This conspectus indicates the preponderant position

that it is the unwed mother who possesses primary

custodial and guardianship rights with regard to her

children and that the father is not conferred with an equal

position merely by virtue of his having fathered the child.

This analysis should assist us in a meaningful, dynamic

and enduring interpretation of the law as it exists in

India. (Emphasis added)


67. Thus, it becomes clear that across several jurisdictions,

the mother has primary custody of a child born outside of

wedlock. This right of the mother does not come at the exclusion

of the father’s claim of custody. In many jurisdictions, the father

acquires custody upon proper application to the proper forum.

Paragraph 17 of X1 v. State (NCT of Delhi) (supra) also notes

that the custodial and guardianship rights are not merely

conferred upon a person because he has fathered the child, but

when he meets some greater threshold than mere biological

connection. In the instant facts, we are not seeking to determine

if the father has met a greater threshold than that identified in

X1 v. State (NCT of Delhi) (supra) but only seeking to evaluate

which of the unwed parents has a better prima facie claim of

custody over a very young child.

68. It is recognised across legal jurisdictions that, unless otherwise proved, preference in the law is to give custody of the child to the mother when there is a dispute between the parents. Further, under the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890, there is no legal provision that disables the mother from having a prima facie claim of custody of a child of a tender age of four years.Thus, jurisprudentially, the mother has a preferential custody right over the child. There is no reason to depart from this well settled legal position. The recognized international jurisprudence is an additional reason that establishes the prima facie case in favour of granting custody to the mother. Therefore,in the case of a child born to unwed parents, the mother has a better prima facie claim of custody.

BALANCE OF CONVENIENCE

69. The next prong of the triple test is the balance of

convenience. The mother has been relentlessly pursuing

litigation in India to continue to maintain her relationship with

the child, which was never ruptured at her instance at any stage

except for necessary visits to Singapore to pursue her career.

Even prior to the litigation, while she was shuttling between

Singapore and India, she remained in constant touch with the

child. According to the mother, her communication and access

to the child was disrupted by the father without any reason

sometime in February 2026 when she came to India to meet the

child. This led to the filing of the habeas corpus petition before

the Bombay High Court. Despite facing serious hardships and

difficulties in being involuntarily away from her place of work in

Singapore, she has remained in India most of the time and has

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been in consistent contact with the child since the beginning of

the litigation.

70. The mother has informed this Court that her continuous

presence in India due to the litigation is hampering her ability to

work. Further prolonged presence in India may also affect her

ability to maintain her employment status. This Court is

cognizant of the fact that if the possibility of her having to stay

in India for a prolonged period to maintain her parental

relationship with the child results in her losing her employment

relationship, the resulting harm is that it will prevent her from

being able to provide the lush standard of living the child

currently enjoys, including access to the world-class education

that the mother has shown that she has consistently paid for.

The consequential disturbance to both mother and child, if she

were to lose her job, is also a factor this Court must consider

when evaluating the balance of convenience of the parents and

child. The court must be conscious not to allow fortuitous

circumstances to improve or diminish any rightful claim.

71. Comparatively, the father lives and works in New Delhi

as a founding partner of a successful law firm. Travelling to

Singapore to meet the child may be inconvenient. Pursuing any

Page - 42 - of 81

necessary litigation in Singapore may be additionally

inconvenient, but it cannot be said to be unfamiliar or

impossible for him, with access to both the financial and legal

resources to handle it, and the legal knowledge to understand

the processes, as he himself practices in the Supreme Court of

this country. The mother has been greatly inconvenienced in

having to approach this Court to even maintain proper

telephonic and physical access to her own child, while putting in

peril her employment status. The father, running his own law

firm, would face comparatively less inconvenience as regards his

employment if he were to travel often to Singapore to maintain

contact with the child.

72. The continued presence of the mother in India, if

temporary custody of the child is given to the father, can happen

only if the mother gives up her employment and remains at the

tender mercy of the father, which we consider utterly unfair and

iniquitous to the mother. The issue is whether it would be fair to

compel the mother to give up her job when the parents are not

living together and are hardly on speaking terms except because

of the child, if a viable alternative is available without her having

to give up her job.

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73. Certainly, neither parent has offered to give up their

respective careers and move for the sake of the child. Hence, we

do not consider an arrangement which would significantly

hinder either parent’s professional commitments. One of the

parents has to forgo a substantial period of companionship with

the child, which is the unfortunate fallout of this bitter dispute

between the parents. We are not, in any manner, seeking to find

the reasons for it or identify who is responsible for this

unfortunate situation. We are trying to determine in whose

custody the child’s best interests will be better served. We

conclude by finding that it cannot be said that the father would

be more inconvenienced than the mother in having to travel to

another country to maintain contact with the child, given that

the mother has been diligently doing the same since the birth of

the child in this country, though she is neither a citizen nor a

resident here, but ordinarily working and based out of

Singapore.

IRREPARABLE HARM

74. The most important prong of the triple test for interim

relief in the facts and circumstances before us is the issue of

irreparable harm. Irreparable harm in the context of habeas

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corpus petitions filed for child custody should be viewed from

the lens of the most vulnerable party and the subject of the

parens patriae jurisdiction, i.e., the child. As discussed above, it

is also settled law that courts of equity, in the exercise of their

parens patriae jurisdiction, always assess custody claims

through the lens of the best interests of the child.

75. Irreparable harm should thus be seen not from the

perspective of the parents or guardians of the child, but from the

view of irreparable harm which may be caused to the child by

granting/not granting a particular proposed arrangement by a

parent.

76. In evaluating the best interests of a child, there are

several factors that tip the scales one way or another. Love,

affection and warmth; formal schooling and opportunities for

growth; and the child's established roots are some of the major

factors.

77. In Rajeswari Chandrasekar Ganesh v. State of T.N.

(supra), this Court held that the factors through which the best

interests of a child are to be considered have to do with stability,

love, care and affection essential for the holistic development of

the child:

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“95. The question as to how the court would determine

what is best in the interest of the child was considered

McGrath (Infants), In re, and it was observed by Lindley,

L.J., as follows : (Ch p. 148)

“… The dominant matter for the consideration of the

Court is the welfare of the child. But the welfare of a

child is not to be measured by money only, nor by

physical comfort only. The word welfare must be

taken in its widest sense. The moral and religious

welfare of the child must be considered as well as

its physical well-being. Nor can the ties of affection

be disregarded.”

xxx

97. The question as to what would be the dominating

factors while examining the welfare of a child was

considered in Walker v. Walker & Harrison [Walker v.

Walker & Harrison, 1981 New Ze Recent Law 257] and it

was observed that while the material considerations

have their place, they are secondary matters. More

important are stability and security, loving and

understanding care and guidance, and warm and

compassionate relationships which are essential for the

development of the child's character, personality and

talents. It was stated as follows:

“Welfare is an all-encompassing word. It includes

material welfare; both in the sense of adequacy of

resources to provide a pleasant home and a

comfortable standard of living and in the sense of an

adequacy of care to ensure that good health and due

personal pride are maintained. However, while

material considerations have their place they are

secondary matters. More important are the stability

and the security, the loving and understanding care

and guidance, the warm and compassionate

relationships that are essential for the full

development of the child's own character,

personality and talents.”

78. The best interest of a child is a highly complex

consideration requiring assessment of all the relevant

considerations. Only after a comprehensive examination of the

relevant factors, the court may arrive at the most practical and

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desirable conclusion. It must be remembered that determining a

child’s best interests will always be a complex exercise as the

relevant factors themselves are always in a state of flux.

79. In Sharmila Velamur v. V. Sanjay,17 this Court

observed as follows:

“32. To consider the interests of the child, the Court must

take into account all attending circumstances and the

totality of the situation. The Court must consider the

welfare and happiness of the child as the paramount

consideration and go into all relevant aspects of welfare

including stability and security, loving and

understanding care and guidance, and full development

of the child's character, personality, and talents. The

Court has to give due weightage to the child's ordinary

contentment, health, education, intellectual development,

favourable surroundings, and future prospects. Further,

over and above physical comforts, moral and ethical

values also have to be taken note of, as they constitute

equal if not more important factors than the others.”

80. Keeping the best interests of the child in mind, this

Court had been continually nudging the parents to arrive at an

amicable solution which would factor in their own constraints.

However, over the course of the proceedings before this Court, it

has become clear that the parents are unable to agree on any

custody arrangement without the Court’s intervention, which

has only resulted in detriment to the child, who has now been

17 2025 SCC OnLine SC 482.

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out of formal schooling for several months, depriving him of the

structure and benefits of the same.

81. The inevitable consequence of the lack of agreement

between the parents is that the child must remain with only one

parent for a substantial period while undergoing schooling, while

the other parent would be with the child only intermittently,

since the parents are staying separately in different countries

pursuing their professions. It was in that context that this Court,

in exercise of its parens patriae jurisdiction, sought the opinion

of the National Institute of Mental Health and Neuro Sciences

(NIMHANS), a premier national institution of worldwide repute,

to give an opinion as to how to promote the best interests of the

child, keeping in mind the inability of the parents to come to a

mutually agreed arrangement, and the capacity of the parents in

all relevant parameters to look after the child.

82. NIMHANS has undertaken a detailed examination of the

parents and child and submitted a comprehensive report on

17.09.2026, of which references will be made to the relevant

portions.

83. Interestingly, the Report mentions that both parents are

capable of looking after the child’s welfare, despite the fact that

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there may be incompatibility between the parents per se, which

the Report also notes.

84. The Assessment Report of the mother by NIMHANS

states that,

“Ms Helena Anna Maria does not have a diagnosable

psychiatric disorder lifetime/currently. She has the

capacity to fulfil her parental responsibilities. She has

adequate access to financial, family, educational, and

healthcare resources.”

85. Interestingly, the Assessment Report of the father is also

along the same lines, which says that,

“Mr Suhaan Mukerji does not have a diagnosable

psychiatric disorder lifetime/currently. He has the

capacity to fulfil his parental responsibilities. He has

adequate access to financial, find family, educational,

and healthcare resources.”

86. At the same time, it is important to note the Family

Assessment Report of NIMHANS, with regard to parenting

capacity states as follows:

“Both parents presented as emotionally invested in

Marcus and described themselves as attentive and caring

parents despite their strained relationship with each

other.

The sessions suggest strengths in emotional investment

and commitment to Marcus in both parents, alongside

areas requiring attention in cooperative parenting,

communication, conflict management, and shared

decision-making.

Each parent appears to attribute the conflict primarily to

the other while viewing their own actions as motivated by

Marcus’s welfare.”

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87. The Family Assessment Report then concludes in the

following words:

“Both parents presented as strongly emotionally invested

in Marcus, with a strong emotional bond with him, and

described themselves as caring and committed parents.

The sessions indicate a high-conflict and significantly

strained couple relationship, with differing perceptions

regarding past events, safety, caregiving, residence, and

future parenting arrangements. The primary concern is

the ongoing inter-couple conflict and its potential impact

on Marcus, rather than a lack of parental attachment.

Couples therapy was recommended; however, it could

not be initiated as both parents were unable to arrive at

a mutually agreed decision regarding reconciliation.”

88. Since the proceedings revolve around the focal point of

the welfare of the child, we are of the opinion that the “Child

Clinical Psychologist Observation Report” of the child by

NIMHANS would be of great importance in deciding the issues

before us, including the issue of jurisdiction of this Court, and

hence, the same Report in totality is reproduced as below:

“Child Clinical Psychologist Observation Report

Marcus was seen across several sessions (about 12

hours) with both parents together and individually. Most

sessions were play-based sessions. The child had

consistently showed interests towards construction play,

especially in the sandpit where he built and then rebuilt

a “forest” scene using his construction toys. He also

enjoyed playing the keyboard and drums, singing, and

drawing.

Marcus is a bright, creative and verbally expressive child

who could clearly communicate his ideas, preferences

and needs. He spoke both fluently in English and German

and could understand and to some extent manage to

communicate in Hindi as well. He demonstrated a good

vocabulary beyond what is expected of his

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developmental level. His overall communication and

development appeared to be age-appropriate. It was

noted that he engaged well in imaginative play and he

could sustain his attention on activities he was interested

in. Additionally, it was seen that he had a strong need to

direct how the play went and how others took part in it,

and he resisted most attempts to redirect him.

Formal assessment including the Children’s

Apperception Test (CAT), Children’s Sentence Completion

Test (C-SCT) and drawing-based activities were

attempted during the course of the sessions. However,

the child’s responses were brief, limited and inconsistent

and therefore meaningful interpretation of these

assessments could not be made. During the CAT, he

primarily named the animals shown in the cards and

reported difficulty in creating stories. During the C-SCT,

he provided responses not related to the sentence stems

despite attempts to explain the task. His participation in

drawing activities was also limited to scribbling or

colouring. These responses may be understood in the

context of his age and developmental abilities, his

preoccupation with his preferred play activities, and his

difficulty engaging with structured tasks and limits.

Therefore, no clinical conclusions are drawn from these

formal assessments.

Both parents were involved and interactive with the child,

and he was observed to be comfortable with each of them

individually. Tantrums and resistance came up with both

parents on different occasions, mostly when his play was

interrupted, or when he was asked to follow an

instruction or when a parent tried to leave. Across

sessions, both parents were observed to have a

permissive stance in how they handled his behaviour.

Limit-setting was inconsistent, especially once he became

distressed or showed resistance. His demands were

often accommodated just to calm him down or avoid more

distress. This pattern showed up with both parents at

different points. It has been reported there is an increase

in his behavioural difficulties recently, and this was

observed during the play sessions too. It was observed

that heightened distress was present around situations

like separations, transitions, and changes to his expected

routine. Given the recent difficulties between the parents

and the changes happening in the family, this context is

relevant to understanding his current presentation.

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Both parents clearly demonstrate care about his welfare,

future, needs and interests, and both stay involved in his

activities. There were differences in how each parent

interacted with him, which can likely be attributed to their

respective and different cultures with its influence on

their individual parenting styles, which cannot be

considered as inherently good or bad.

It is suggested that the child should not be exposed to any

conversations, disagreements or comments about

custody, living arrangements, parental disputes, or either

parent’s relationship with him. These matters should be

discussed privately, away from him.

Given the observed difficulties in the child such as

tantrums, refusal, rigidity or non-cooperation, when his

demands are not met and alleged few reports of him

having behavioural issues/complaints from school;

which might be the result of a few things, such as

parental separation, probable heated

discussion/arguments/quarrel in his presence; it is

strongly recommended that both parents need to

mandatorily attend structured parenting training with a

qualified mental health professional over a few sessions,

focusing on managing the wellbeing of the child during

the current court proceedings, aiding in the adjustment of

the child post the decision regarding custody, explaining

the decision to the child in a developmentally appropriate

and consistent manner, developing an authoritative

parenting style (non-permissive parenting), age

appropriate limit-setting, handling tantrums and refusal,

managing transitions and building consistent responses

to difficult behaviour.

It is also strongly advised that the child resume formal

schooling at the earliest, in the light that the child has

been away from school for about four months, further

contributing to the above-mentioned difficulties.

Overall, based on what was observed, the child engaged

well with both parents individually and both parents

showed genuine concern for his wellbeing. His current

difficulties can be better explained by his individual

temperament, his developmental stage, the parenting

approaches observed, and the recent changes within the

family.”

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89. For the same reasons, we also reproduced the Child

Psychiatric Assessment Report as follows:

“Findings

The child presented as a bright, cheerful and wellengaged

four-year-old, with age-appropriate interaction,

communication and play. Both parents demonstrated an

adequate understanding of the child’s developmental

and emotional needs. Both were sensitive and responsive

to the child’s cues and described parenting as a positive

and enjoyable experience. Neither parent reported

significant parenting-related stress on the Parental Stress

Scale. Their responses on the PRFQ were broadly

indicative of an ability to consider the child’s internal

experiences and psychological needs.

During the parent and child interaction observations, both

parents engaged warmly and reciprocally with the child.

With each parent, the child approached readily,

participated spontaneously in child-appropriate play,

demonstrated positive affect and appeared relaxed,

comfortable. Both parents responded appropriately to the

child’s cues and were able to sustain enjoyable,

developmentally appropriate interaction. Both have

demonstrated an ability to appropriately soothe and

support the child during periods of distress.

Collateral information from the child’s regular caregivers

was consistent with the above findings. The child was

described as happy and comfortable with both parents

and as enjoying interaction with each. It was also

reported that the child likes having both parents together.

Opinion

Child demonstrates positive and comfortable

relationships with both parents. At present, child doesn’t

have a diagnosable mental health condition. However,

given the ongoing circumstances, there remains the

possibility of evolving stress-related symptoms, and

continued monitoring of the child’s wellbeing is

recommended.

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On the basis of the assessment, both parents

demonstrate adequate parenting capacities. Both appear

emotionally available and responsive to the child and are

capable of providing warm, developmentally appropriate

interaction.

In view of the child’s positive relationship with each

parent, the child’s psychological and developmental

interests would be best served by preserving meaningful

involvement of both parents in his caregiving and

upbringing.”

90. As quoted above, the Child Clinical Psychologist

Observation Report clearly holds that:

(i) Both parents clearly demonstrate care about his

welfare, future needs and interests, and both stay

involved in all these activities;

(ii) There were differences in how each parent

interacted with him, which can likely be attributed to

their respective and different cultural influences on

their individual parenting styles, which cannot be

considered as “inherently good or bad”;

(iii) It then suggested that the child should not be

exposed to any conversations, disagreements or

comments about custody, leaving arrangements,

parental disputes, or either parent's relationship with

him and that these matters should be discussed

privately away from him;

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(iv) It was also strongly advised that the child resume

formal schooling at the earliest, as the child has been

away from school for about 4 (four) months, further

contributing to the above-mentioned difficulties.

91. As regards the Child Psychiatric Assessment Report, it

says that:

(i) The child demonstrates a positive and

comfortable relationship with both parents;

(ii) The child does not have a diagnosable mental

health condition;

(iii) In light of the ongoing circumstances, there

remains the possibility of evolving stress-related

symptoms, and continued monitoring of the child’s wellbeing

is recommended;

(iv) Based on the assessment, both the parents

demonstrate adequate parenting capacities;

(v) Both appear emotionally available and

responsive to the child and are capable of providing

warm and developmentally appropriate interaction;

(vi) In view of the child's positive relationship with

each parent, the child's psychological and

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developmental interests would be best served by

preserving meaningful involvement of both parents in

his caregiving and upbringing.

92. The Report has revealed equal psychological capacity of

both parents in looking after the child’s welfare, ruling out any

disability of either parent in doing so. The Report has only

strongly urged that the child resume formal schooling at the

earliest to prevent any deterioration of the child’s well-being due

to the separation of the parents.

93. From our observations during interactions with the

parents and child, as well as from the NIMHANS Report, both

parents are equally invested in the child's well-being. There is

nothing to show that either parent cannot provide the warmth,

compassion, care and guidance such a tender-aged child

requires.

94. However, the Report also mentions that the child is

fluent in English and German, which indicates a close bond with

the mother in her mother tongue/native language. In that

circumstance, if interim custody is granted to the father, it is not

only that the mother will be deprived of the company of the child,

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but that the child will be deprived of her love and company

during a critical developmental period of his life.

95. Child psychology acknowledges that the company of the

mother, and maternal care and attention, is most desirable for a

very young child if the bonding between mother and child has

remained intact. We find reliance on research on child

psychology that demonstrates that separation of a young child

from a loving and close maternal bond has been linked to

increased behavioural difficulties, emotional distress and

adverse developmental outcomes. Though there is much

diversity in the context in which the psychological effects of

maternal separation have been studied, the common theme that

has come to the fore is that where the mother is the primary

caregiver of the child, prolonged separation from her risks the

child’s psychological well-being and development in the long

run.18

18 T.N. Srinivasan and K.J. Raman, ‘Early Child Parent Separation and

Risk for Childhood Psychopathology’ (1988) 30(3) Indian Journal of

Psychiatry 283–289; Kimberly Howard, Anne Martin, Lisa J. Berlin and

Jeanne Brooks-Gunn, ‘Early Mother–Child Separation, Parenting, and

Child Well-Being in Early Head Start Families’ (2011) 13(1) Attachment &

Human Development 5–26. DOI: 10.1080/14616734.2010.488119),

Danielle Horvath Dallaire & Marsha Weinraub (2005) Predicting children's

separation anxiety at age 6: The contributions of infant–mother

attachment security, maternal sensitivity, and maternal separation

Page - 57 - of 81

96. The NIMHANS Report clearly shows that the mother and

child have a very good and strong bond, that the child is very

comfortable with the mother, and that the mother does not have

diagnosable issues that would prevent her from being less caring

towards the child than the father. Though there is nothing

adverse against the father, in such a situation we are of the

opinion that it would not be beneficial for the child to be kept

away from the mother for a prolonged period.

97. The NIMHANS Report has placed the parents on equal

footing regarding their psychological and financial capacities,

and their commitment to the child. This Court had directed both

parents to provide parenting proposals, to see if there may be

any other factor that may tilt the balance in favour of either

parent.

98. The parenting proposals can broadly be summarised as

follows.

99. The mother wishes to take the child to Singapore, and

has identified the following possible schools wherein the child

can be admitted:

anxiety, Attachment & Human Development, 7:4, 393-408, DOI:

10.1080/14616730500365894.

Page - 58 - of 81

a. UWCSEA Dover Campus, Singapore (Admission

process pending either a No Objection Certificate from

the father, or an order of this Court, based on

communication from the school to the mother); or

b. Superland Pre-School, River Valley Campus

(Admission process is pending, but positive

communication from the school has been received as to

availability of a seat for the child).

100. She has specifically proposed visitation schedules to

India around the school academic calendar in Singapore, so that

the child may continue to visit India and keep in touch with the

father, as well as his roots, friends, and family. This would be in

addition to any visits the father may desire to make to Singapore

in exercise of his right of access to the child.

101. In terms of childcare, the mother plans to employ an

Indian, Hindi-speaking nanny such that the child continues to

learn Hindi. Additionally, the mother undertakes to keep the

child connected to his Indian roots through food, language and

social company.

102. The mother, having lived and worked out of Singapore

for the last several years, also has a comfortable and close social

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circle there to ensure the child has a loving and close community

of people to spend time with.

103. Per the father’s proposed parenting plan, the father

wishes to take the child to Kolkata, and proposes a Montessori

school, alongside certain co-curricular and extra-curricular

activities that the child shall have access to, including horseriding,

swimming and music classes.

104. He has also proposed that the mother may visit

whenever convenient for her. His proposal stipulates that the

mother may either stay over in the ordinary household of the

child or that she may reside in a suitable residence nearby, but

the child shall continue to live in the house of the father when

the mother visits.

105. He has also mentioned several relatives and some

friends of the child with whom the child is familiar who will be

available to create a friendly and homely environment in Kolkata.

106. The father has also repeatedly stated throughout his

pleadings and even in his parenting proposals that the mother

has significant mental health issues that put the child’s wellbeing

in jeopardy and that this makes her unsuitable to be the

primary caregiver of the child.

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107. We now delve into comparing both parents’ proposals on

three fundamental points – location, the mother’s mental health,

and education.

LOCATION

108. Mr. Sankaranaryanan has argued that uprooting the

child from his familiar environment in Kolkata will be greatly

distressing and may cause irreparable harm to the mental state

of the child. It has been argued that the established roots of the

child are in India and allowing the mother to take the child to

Singapore would amount to dislocation of the child.

109. Whether the child has already been rooted in the Indian

environment is a matter of fact to be established. We have noted

that the child is four years old now and during babyhood, the

child shuttled from place to place along with the parents. The

parents seemed conscious of the child’s educational needs and

made arrangements for the child’s schooling in more than one

location in Delhi and Goa, and even Germany, as revealed in the

pleadings. In such a short span of time, it would be reading too

much into any one fact to state that the child has developed a

particular attachment or roots in any place.

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110. The child, being all of four years now, is in a very

malleable stage. Children this young often have the capability to

adapt to any environment to which the parents may introduce

the child, so long as the child is in the comfortable company of

the parent(s). Therefore, the supposed cultural rooting of the

child at a very tender age should not be amplified. As long as the

child is with the parents, or either parent with whom the child

is comfortable, the child would adjust.

111. The NIMHANS Report clearly indicates that the child is

comfortable with both/either of the parents. Accordingly, the

father’s concern that the child would be uprooted from familiar

surroundings in India if the child is relocated to Singapore

appears to be an overstatement.

112. The father has also submitted, both before this Court

and before the Family Court when the guardianship petition was

pending in Alipore, West Bengal, that the child’s ordinary

residence is Kolkata and the child is rooted there. We find that

merely because the child has stayed with the father in Kolkata

for a few months, it cannot be said with certainty or

definitiveness that the child has established roots there, and

that relocating from Kolkata to Singapore would amount to

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uprooting the child. The materials show that the child is not

totally a stranger to Singapore or foreign soil. No one can say

that merely because the child is four years of age and has lived

largely in India, the child is rooted here. In fact, even within

India, the child had been living with the parents in different cities

across the country, each with a different cultural milieu and

environment. Delhi is culturally and socially very distinct from

Goa, and the same is true of Kolkata vis-a-vis the other cities. In

such circumstances, can the father claim a better right than the

mother on the factor of rootedness in Kolkata or even India? We

doubt.

113. The observational description of the child in the Child

Clinical Psychologist Observation Report of NIMHANS noted that

the child spoke fluently in both English and German and could

understand and, to some extent, communicate in Hindi as well.

This clearly indicates the child is linguistically quite close to the

mother, which is natural and demonstrates the child’s strong

bond with the mother, alongside the strong multicultural

comfort of the child. How can the father thus claim that the child

has established roots in India, which would be disrupted if he is

relocated to Singapore? The child’s familiarity with his

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surroundings can always be developed as the child grows more

mature, and it will always be available to the child to choose to

reconnect with India. Thus, the apparent loss of the child’s roots

if relocated from India cannot be said to be irreparable or

detrimental.

114. We are also of the opinion that familiar environment

cannot be decided merely on geographical location. The child is

four years old, has regularly shuttled between Delhi and Goa,

two very different socio-cultural environments and is still welladjusted.

The child has also stayed in Kolkata, albeit for only

some months, which is again different from Delhi and Goa in

almost all respects. During the proceedings before this Court,

the child has practically remained in Delhi. He is at a very

malleable, tender age and will adjust anywhere he has the

attention, love, and care of his parents. Therefore, the

geographical or physical location will not make much difference.

Stability comes from the persons around the child - the parents,

siblings, friend circles, and the routines they provide. At all of

four years, a child develops fondness for anybody who is

constantly with them and is affectionate towards them. Under

the circumstances as revealed in the pleadings, we are of the

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view that this issue of stability or cultural rootedness does not

prevent the relocation of the child to Singapore.

MENTAL HEALTH CONCERNS:

115. We must also deal with another concern repeatedly

expressed by the father in his pleadings, that the mother has

mental health concerns which are detrimental to the well-being

of the child, and thus disqualifies her from being granted interim

custody of the child. We are mindful of the observation of this

Court in Rohith Thammana Gowda v. State of Karnataka,19,

“12. When couples are at loggerheads and wanted to

part their ways, as Parthian shot they may level extreme

allegations against each other so as to depict the other

unworthy to have the custody of the child. In the

circumstances, we are of the view that for considering the

claim for custody of a minor child, unless very serious,

proven conduct which should make one of them unworthy

to claim for custody of the child concerned, the question

can and shall be decided solely looking into the question

as to, “what would be the best interest.”

116. We have noted that the pleadings of the father are

replete with allegations and insinuations against the mother that

she is not in the best mental disposition to look after the wellbeing

of the child, which appears to be totally negated by the

NIMHANS Report. As seen therein, the mother has been found

to not have a diagnosable mental health condition currently or

19 (2022) 20 SCC 550.

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in her lifetime, and neither displays any behaviour that might

otherwise be detrimental to the child. Therefore, we cannot give

any weight to the father’s contentions that the mother has

mental health issues that will impact the child negatively.

EDUCATION:

117. Based on the above discussion, we conclude that the

irreparable harm to the child that must be duly addressed is the

current lack of formal schooling, which the NIMHANS Report

indicates is detrimental to the child. The uncertainty of the

child’s schedule, coupled with a lack of a structured

environment, seems to be presenting as certain symptomatic

behaviours in the child.

118. There are two proposed options, one where the child is

allowed to remain in Kolkata where the father desires to educate

him, and the other is to allow the child to go with the mother to

Singapore, where she proposes an international school for his

education.

119. Both in the records and during the proceedings, the

father has said he does not consent to the child going to school

in Singapore. Realistically, we do not expect the mother to give

consent to schooling in Kolkata either. This Court, in the

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circumstances, cannot be expected to evaluate the aspect of

schooling from the perspective of either parent's consent to the

school. Additionally, no meaningful purpose will be served by

deciding on the suitability of schools either in Kolkata or in

Singapore for the child’s admission, as schools in both locations

may be of comparable standards. We also do not wish to engage

in any analysis as to whether one city is more suitable than the

other. Thus, the focus will be on who will be the better person to

ensure a better education for the child and provide better

intimate personal attention and a comfortable environment to

the child.

120. The mother has initiated the process for the child's

admission to UWCSEA in Singapore and has identified backup

schools as well. She has also demonstrated her very proactive

commitment to the child’s education and, from the record,

appears to be the primary parent financing the child’s education.

121. On the other hand, there is nothing too concrete to show

what the father did for the child’s schooling in Kolkata after he

took the child there in February. The father has only averred to

a Montessori school in Kolkata but has shown no documents of

admission/enrolment, etc. His pleadings are unspecific and not

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backed by any admission documents, conversations with the

schools, or any admission fees paid/payable by him. No concrete

plan for the child’s education is discernible on the part of the

father. In direct contrast, the mother has provided her

communications with the schools as well as the fees

payable/paid by her. The mother has shown two different

schools which are willing to admit the child in Singapore upon

either an NOC from the father or an order of this Court. We

therefore draw positive inferences from the mother’s pleadings.

We find that the mother has provided more compelling material

showing that she has been proactive and will immediately enrol

the child in formal schooling to provide a stable environment as

soon as she receives a green signal from this Court, in the

absence of any consent from the father.

122. The father has argued that the mother’s professional

commitments have limited her parenting time in the past and

will continue to leave her with insufficient time for the child. We

find that although she is working in a senior role at a large

company, we cannot hold her professional commitments against

her, as she has provided us with her employer's Work-from-

Home policy and their endorsement of the same, which clearly

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supports her ability to adjust her working hours to be present

for the child when he is not in school.

123. Let us now consider the situation where custody is

given to the father for the child’s education in Kolkata. We believe

that the father is also capable of providing a high quality of life

and education for the child. Yet, we are concerned with certain

other aspects which appear to be against the father. The father

is admittedly a successful lawyer running a busy law firm in

Delhi, employing about 53 associates. The father has a wide

professional network, practising law not only in Delhi but also

in other places such as Goa, Mumbai, and Bengaluru. We are

well aware of the limited time a busy lawyer can spare for family

members. In the present case, the family member is not an adult,

but a small child of four years who is very energetic, as the

NIMHANS Report also shows, who will require much more

personal attention. The demands of a small child of this age can

be very unpredictable, and we are not very confident that the

father would be in a position to spare sufficient and adequate

time for the child during the most crucial period for his

development, which will include preparing the child for school,

helping with homework, as well as keeping up with the demands

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of various hobbies and extracurricular activities. Even after

ascribing only the best intentions to the father and although he

has averred to having a flexible schedule, we are sceptical that

he would be able to provide the child with quality time

comparable to what the mother has arranged for, because of his

professional commitments. In most likelihood, he will have to

rely on the assistance, help and cooperation of his relatives and

nannies. Because of the demands of work, he would be

delegating a significant portion of parental responsibilities to

others. We are concerned about this prospect, which, in our

opinion, is not in the best interests of the child, who is already

struggling due to the current lack of stability.

124. On the other hand, the mother’s proposal appears

realistic and more beneficial to the child, with a significant focus

on direct parenting time by the mother. Thus, the proposal of

the mother inspires more confidence in us.

CONCLUSION

125. Accordingly, we conclude as follows:

Firstly, as regards the competency of this Court and

jurisdictional issue raised by Mr. Sankaranarayanan, we hold

that this Court has the jurisdiction to decide interim custody in

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exercise of the parens patriae jurisdiction in this habeas corpus

proceeding;

Secondly, the mother has a better prima facie claim of

custody over the child;

Thirdly, the balance of convenience lies in favour of the

mother;

Fourthly, it is most likely that the child may suffer

irreparable injury in the event the interim custody is not given

to the mother, as the mother has a better/more concrete plan

for his education and well-being in the interim, which is in the

child’s best interests.

126. Therefore, we will issue appropriate directions below.

127. However, before we issue directions, we want to address

the very genuine apprehensions of the father that once the

mother is allowed to take the child to Singapore, there is a

distinct possibility that once she is out of Indian territory, she

may not co-operate with the jurisdiction of the Family Court in

Patiala House Courts, New Delhi, or for that matter, even this

Court.

128. In this regard, it may be noted that as international

custody disputes become more prevalent, the issue of protecting

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the minor and the parent who is losing significant access to the

child has become necessary to address. This Court, in Smriti

Madan Kansagra v. Perry Kansagra,20 held that:

“24.2. Given the large number of cases arising from

transnational parental abduction in inter-country

marriages, the English courts have issued protective

measures which take the form of undertakings, mirror

orders, and safe harbour orders, since there is no

accepted international mechanism to achieve protective

measures. Such orders are passed to safeguard the

interest of the child who is in transit from one jurisdiction

to another. The courts have found mirror orders to be the

most effective way of achieving protective measures.

24.3. The primary jurisdiction is exercised by the court

where the child has been ordinarily residing for a

substantial period of time, and has conducted an

elaborate enquiry on the issue of custody. The court may

direct the parties to obtain a “mirror order” from the court

where the custody of the child is being shifted. Such an

order is ancillary or auxiliary in character, and supportive

of the order passed by the court which has exercised

primary jurisdiction over the custody of the child. In

international family law, it is necessary that jurisdiction

is exercised by only one court at a time. It would avoid a

situation where conflicting orders may be passed by

courts in two different jurisdictions on the same issue of

custody of the minor child. These orders are passed

keeping in mind the principle of comity of courts and

public policy. The object of a mirror order is to safeguard

the interest of the minor child in transit from one

jurisdiction to another, and to ensure that both parents

are equally bound in each State. The mirror order is

passed to ensure that the courts of the country where the

child is being shifted are aware of the arrangements

which were made in the country where he had ordinarily

been residing. Such an order would also safeguard the

interest of the parent who is losing custody, so that the

rights of visitation and temporary custody are not

impaired. The judgment of the court which had exercised

primary jurisdiction of the custody of the minor child is

however not a matter of binding obligation to be followed

by the court where the child is being transferred, which

20 (2021) 12 SCC 289.

has passed the mirror order. The judgment of the court

exercising primary jurisdiction would however have great

persuasive value.”

129. In the specific circumstances of this case, we are thus

of the view that the mother can only be allowed to remove the

child from India during the pendency of the Guardianship

Petition No. 37 of 2026, pending before the Patiala House Courts,

after there are protections put in place for the father’s right of

smooth visitation, and to prevent the possibility, however

extreme or unlikely, that the mother may stop cooperating with

the proceedings before the courts in India.

130. In this regard, we have also noted that the mother has

voluntarily undertaken to submit herself to the jurisdiction of

the Singaporean Courts and avail a mirror order of this interim

order, so that the Singaporean Courts may also be aware of the

dispute regarding the child’s custody between the parents and

ensure full compliance with the interim orders of this Court in

Singapore.

131. We are conscious of the fact that by allowing the mother

and the child to leave India and in granting them permission to

go to Singapore, they would ordinarily remain out of the reach of

Indian courts. However, we have given due consideration to the

fact that Singapore has a very robust and efficacious judicial

system with international recognition for the same. Even in the

field of arbitration, many parties prefer to specifically choose

Singapore as the seat, thus exhibiting the confidence that

litigants often repose in the robustness and reliability of the

Singaporean judicial system. Based on the principles of comity

of courts and the reputation of the Singaporean legal system, we

are confident in allowing the mother and child to stay in

Singapore as an interim custody arrangement for the welfare of

the child. The father himself is a well-established lawyer in India,

and we are sure he will not be in the woods if he has to seek

redressal for any grievance that may arise while his child is in

Singapore with the mother in terms of the orders of this Court,

for the Singaporean legal system, like India, is also based on

common law. The apprehension of the father, in our view, will be

secured by a mirror order to be obtained by the mother.

132. In light of the undertaking given by the mother, we

therefore direct the mother to obtain a mirror order within a

period of 3 weeks from the date of this order from an appropriate

court in Singapore to reflect the directions in this order, such

that it may be appropriately enforced in Singapore.


133. Further, after the mirror order from a Singapore court is

filed before this Court, the mother shall deposit a sum of Rupees

One Crore (Rs. 1,00,00,000/-) in the Registry of this Court,

which shall be kept in an interest-bearing fixed deposit account

(on auto-renewal basis), for a period of two years or until

Guardianship Petition No. 37 of 2026, Patiala House Courts,

New Delhi is finally disposed of (any appeals, reviews, revisions

etc. included), to ensure compliance with the directions

contained in this order until final disposal of the aforesaid

Guardianship Petition. Once this Court is satisfied that the

mother has discharged all her obligations in accordance with the

aforesaid directions, the mother shall be entitled to withdraw the

aforesaid amount, together with accrued interest.

DIRECTIONS OF THIS COURT:

A. The mother is granted three weeks to file for, and

obtain, a mirror order from the court of appropriate

jurisdiction in Singapore reflecting the directions of this

Court and the parenting plan approved herein.

B. In the meantime, the child shall remain in Delhi and

the schedule for interim custody between the parents till

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the production of said mirror order before this Court shall

be as per the following pattern every week:

Monday Father hands over the

child to Mother at

12.00pm.

Tuesday Mother

Wednesday Mother

Thursday Mother

Friday Mother to hand over the

child to Father at

12.00pm.

Saturday Father

Sunday Father

C. Further, so long as the mother is not in Delhi

during this period, the child shall remain with the father.

D. After the mother has filed the mirror order, the

Registry shall return the passport and the OCI card of the

minor child to the mother and allow the mother to take

the child to Singapore. Further, the mother is directed to

be present with the child before this Court and the Family

Court at Patiala House as and when directed to do so.

PARENTING PLAN:

E. The mother shall enrol the child in UWCSEA,

Singapore. If that is not possible, then the child may be

enrolled in one of the other schools mentioned in her

parenting plan as a back-up or any such appropriate

school in Singapore.

F. The father shall provide full cooperation and provide

the necessary documents of the child to enable the mother

to secure admission for the child in any of the schools in

Singapore within the specified time frame, failing which it

shall be deemed that he has consented to the admission

in terms of this order.

G. When the child is in Singapore, the mother shall

have primary responsibility for the health and physical

well-being of the child. If the child falls ill, the mother shall

be the primary decision-maker regarding the child’s

healthcare, for which the father shall provide full

cooperation.

H. While the child is in Singapore, the mother shall

ensure the father has access to the child via videoconferencing

every day for a minimum of 20 minutes or

any such longer period as agreed between the parties,

between 2.00 pm and 10.00 pm Singaporean time, as is

convenient to the child and his school schedule, and any

other convenient times as may be agreed between the

parents, or as the child may desire.

I. The father shall also be permitted to have access

and visitation rights with the child in Singapore as and

when he visits, after due intimation to the mother. He shall

have custody of the child for at least a day, as long as it

does not disrupt the child’s school schedule.

J. Further, if the father stays in Singapore for a period

longer than two days, he may have custody of the child

from Friday afternoon, when school/extra-curricular

activities end, until Sunday evening, 6.00 PM Singaporean

time. The father shall return custody of the child in a

timely manner so as not to disrupt the child’s participation

in school, based on the academic calendar. However, the

mother shall be constantly apprised of the location of the

child when the child is in the custody of the father in

Singapore.

K. The father will not be entitled to take the child out

of Singapore during the applicability of this interim

arrangement during the pendency of the Guardianship

Petition No. 37 of 2026 in Family Court, Patiala House

Courts.

L. The child shall be brought to India by the mother

during school vacations of more than 7 days, so that the

child may spend time in India with the father, paternal

family, and friends, amongst others. This shall be in

addition to any other mutually agreed periods as decided

by the parents or as decided by the Family Court in Patiala

House Courts for the purpose of deciding the guardianship

petition pending before it.

M. During the period that the child is brought to India,

the father shall have custody in India in the manner laid

out below:

Monday Mother

Tuesday Mother

Wednesday Mother to hand over the

child to Father at 10.00

AM.

Thursday Father

Friday Father

Saturday Father

Sunday Father hands over the

child to Mother at 6.00

PM.

During these visits, the father cannot remove the child

from India, and the father shall keep the mother apprised

of the child’s location at all times. The mother shall have

access to the child over the phone and/or on video call

from 10.00 AM to 8.00 PM, and also as the child otherwise

desires.

N. When the child is in India, the father shall have

primary responsibility for the child’s health and physical

well-being. If the child falls ill, the father shall be the

primary decision-maker regarding the child’s healthcare,

for which the mother shall provide full cooperation.

O. The mother shall not be entitled to remove the child

from Singapore to any other country, except to India as

mentioned above. However, if she desires to take the child

to any other country other than India, she has to take

specific permission of the concerned Family Court dealing

with Guardianship Petition No. 37 of 2026 in New Delhi.

P. The child will be entrusted to the safe custody of the

mother, but the child must not be exposed to any

influence that may foster the development of parental

alienation syndrome against the father. Per paragraph 97

of Sheetal Vasant Thakur (supra), we find that the

complex nature of facts and circumstances and the

international nature of the dispute necessitate that the

child be evaluated for the same. Thus, the mother is

directed to obtain a report from an appropriate child

psychologist/psychological institution in either Singapore

or from NIMHANS in India every six months to ensure the

child does not develop parental alienation syndrome. A

copy of this report shall be submitted both to this Court

as well as the concerned jurisdictional Family Court in

Patiala House.

Q. We direct both parents to file undertakings before

this Court, stating that they will abide by and comply with

the directions passed by this Court within one week from

the date of this judgment.

134. Considering the peculiar facts and circumstances of this

case, we invoke the powers under Article 142 of the Constitution

to transfer the habeas corpus petition titled “Helena Anna Maria

Lersch vs. State of Goa and Anr.” in Writ Petition No.478 of 2026

(F) from the High Court of Bombay at Goa, to this Court to avoid

any duplication of proceedings.

135. In order to ensure that our orders are duly complied

with by the parties, list the matter on 7th December, 2026 at 2.00

pm.

136. We also make it clear that though we have passed this

order for interim custody of the child in favour of the mother in

light of the materials brought before this Court, this order will

not come in the way of the jurisdictional court dealing with

Guardianship Petition No. 37 of 2026, Patiala House Courts,

New Delhi to decide the said petition finally in accordance with

the law, uninfluenced by the observations and directions made

by this Court in this order.

137. All pending applications, if any, stand disposed of in

terms of the above order.

…………………………………………………J.

[NONGMEIPAKAM KOTISWAR SINGH]

………………………..…..J.

[N.V. ANJARIA]

NEW DELHI;

NOVEMBER 19, 2026

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