Showing posts with label S 100 of Transfer of property Act. Show all posts
Showing posts with label S 100 of Transfer of property Act. Show all posts

Saturday, 9 April 2022

What is distinction between attachment of property and charge over property?

 12 We take this opportunity to explain the effect of attachment and also the effect of charge. In Mulla's Civil Procedure Code, 8th Edn., the law as applicable in India is thus summarised (p. 187):

“Attachment creates no charge or lien upon the attached property. It merely prevents and avoids private alienations; it does not confer any title on the attaching creditors. There is nothing in any of the provisions of the Code which in terms makes the attaching creditor a secured creditor or creates any charge or Hen in his favour over the property attached. But an attaching creditor acquires, by virtue of the attachment, a right to have the attached property kept in custodia legis for the satisfaction of his debt, and an unlawful interference with that right constitutes an actionable wrong.”

13 The Privy Council in Moti Lal v. Karrabuldin (1897) I.L.R. 25 Cal. 179, p.c. where Lord Hobhouse stated (p. 185):

“Attachment, however, only prevents alienation, it does not confer title.”

14 Similarly, in the Calcutta Full Bench case of Frederick Peacock v.

Madan Gopal (1902) I.L.R. 29 Cal. 428, F.B. Sir Francis Maclean, in

delivering the judgment of the Full Bench, says (p. 431):

“I think, therefore, it must be taken that the attaching creditor here did not obtain by his attachment any charge or lien upon the attached

property, and if so, no question as to the Official Assignee only taking the property of the insolvent subject to any equities affecting it, can arise.”

And Mr. Justice Ghose says (p. 483):

“I am clearly of opinion that the attaching creditor did not acquire any title or charge upon the property by reason of the attachment in

question.”

15 A charge on the other hand under Section 48 of the GVAT Act

creates no interest in or over a specific immovable property, but is only a security for the payment of money. (See : Dattatreya Shanker Mote vs. Anand Chintaman Datar and others (1974) 2 SCC 799).

16 The concept of charge emanates from Section 100 of the Transfer

of Property Act. Section 100 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882

defines “charge” as follows:

“100. Charges.- Where immoveable property of one person is by act of parties or operation of law made security for the payment of money to another, and the transaction does not amount to a mortgage, the latter person is said to have a charge on the property; and all the provisions hereinbefore contained which apply to a simple mortgage shall, so far as may be, apply to such charge. Nothing in this section applies to the charge of a trustee on the trust- property for expenses properly incurred in the execution of his trust, and, save as otherwise expressly provided by any law for the time being in force, no charge shall be enforced against any property in the hands of a person to whom such property has been transferred for consideration and without notice of the charge.”

17 The above-mentioned Section clearly indicates the following types of charges :

1) Charges created by act of parties; and

2) Charges arising by operation of law.

18 The words “by operation of law” are more extensive than the

words “by law” and a charge created by operation of law includes a

charge directly created by the provisions of an Act (like Section 48 of the GVAT Act) as well as other charges created indirectly as a legal consequence of certain conditions. The expression “operation of law” only means working of the law.

19 A charge, as we have already seen, is a right to receive a certain

sum of money. If a dealer registered under the GVAT Act incurs any

liability towards payment of tax, then the State has a right to receive a certain sum of money as crystallized in the form of liability. This

recovery of the money from the property can be by attaching the assets of the defaulting dealer, and thereafter, putting those to auction. This type of recovery would be governed by the provisions of Section 46 of the GVAT Act.

20 In the case on hand, it could be said that the day the assessment

order came to be passed determining the liability of the writ applicant under the provisions of the GVAT Act, a charge over the immovable assets of the writ applicant could be said to have been created in favour of the State by operation of law, as envisaged under Section 48 of the GVAT Act. Today, the recovery might have been stayed by the first appellate authority, but, tomorrow, if the first appeal as well as the second appeal that may be filed by the writ applicant is dismissed, then the next step in the process would be the recovery of the requisite amount. What could be said to have been done as on date is just to make one and all aware that by operation of law, as envisaged under Section 48 of the GVAT Act, there is a charge of the State Government over the immovable properties owned by the writ applicant, as described above. How would all come to know about the same. It is for this reason that an entry is ordinarily made in the revenue records.

21 We would like to clarify that what has been done by the Talati-cum-Mantri does not amount to attachment of the property. There is no attachment. We reiterate that there is a fine distinction between attachment of property and a charge over the property by operation of law.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD

R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 5413 of 2022

SHREE RADHEKRUSHNA GINNING AND PRESSING PVT. LTD. Vs STATE OF GUJARAT

CORAM: MR. JUSTICE J.B.PARDIWALA and  MS. JUSTICE NISHA M. THAKORE

Date : 29/03/2022

(PER : HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE J.B.PARDIWALA)

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Monday, 23 December 2019

Whether judgment debtor can claim exemption as per S 60(1)(c) of CPC in respect of property over which charge has been created by compromise decree?

According to the learned counsel for the appellant, she is a labourer occupying the land and building shown in the decree, as her sole shelter and source of means and therefore under S. 60(1)(c) of the Code, those assets are to be exempted from sale. On the other hand, according to the learned counsel for respondents 1 and 2, plea for exemption under S. 60(1)(c) does not accrue to the appellant having regard to the nature of decree in execution of which the property in question was sold. The argument is that the compromise decree passed on 11.02.2012 created a charge in the property and therefore, sale was not hit by S. 60(1)(c) of the Code.

11. We perused the decree and the terms of compromise incorporated therewith. The decree shows that the suit was instituted for specific performance of a contract for sale and the 2nd respondent later relinquished his claim for specific performance upon the promise made by the defendant that he would refund ` 75,000/- within six months of the date of compromise with 6% interest per annum. It was also agreed by the deceased Mylan that in case of default of payment of the amount as agreed, there shall be a charge in the plaint scheduled property. There is no dispute that the property brought for sale and confirmed in the execution proceedings was the same property over which charge was created as per compromise. Therefore the question that arises for consideration is whether exemption provided in S. 60(1)(c) of the Code can be claimed by the appellant in respect of the property over which charge has been created by a compromise decree.

12. Section 60(1)(c) of the Code enumerates the properties which are liable to attachment and sale in execution of a decree whereas proviso thereto categorises properties which are exempt from attachment or sale. On assimilation of the entire scheme of the provisions and also the object for which the exemption is enacted, it is very difficult to assume that a judgment debtor who suffers a money decree which creates a charge over his property can claim the benefit of exemption under S. 60(1)(c).

13. The nature of decree charging payment of money in the property of a defendant in a suit for money is such that the right of the holder of decree to recover money from the property by sale is determined at the time of passing the decree. Therefore the objection to attachability or saleability of property bearing charge cannot be said to be a matter arising before a court executing the decree. This is notwithstanding the fact that there is no need for the holder of such a charged decree to seek attachment of property which is already subject to charge since charge always runs with the land irrespective of subsequent transfers. In any view of the matter, a debtor after having created by his own consent a charge in his property cannot be allowed to turn round and contend later that the property is immune from attachment or sale as if he is entitled to exemption under S. 60(1)(c) of the Code. If he is allowed to approbate and reprobate, it will only defeat the very purpose of a decree creating charge in the property. There is nothing in law to indicate that S. 100 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882 (for short 'the T.P. Act') which makes provision for creating charge in the property by act of parties or decree is subservient to S. 60 of the Code. Where a decree orders payment of money and charges it on the immovable property on default, law permits the holder to realise money by sale of property in execution of that decree. This position of law is clear from Order XXXIV Rule 15(2) of C.P.C.

[(2) Where a decree orders payment of money and charges it on immovable property on default of payment, the amount may be realised by sale of that property in execution of that decree.]

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA

F.A.O. No. 210 of 2018

Decided On: 28.06.2019

 Ammini  Vs. Vibeesh

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
A. Hariprasad and T.V. Anilkumar, JJ.

Citation: AIR 2019 kerala 146
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