Whether court can grant extension beyond maximum of 30 days as per S 148 of CPC?

In Chinnamarkathian alias Muthu Gounder and Anr. v.
Ayyavoo alias Periana Gounder and Ors., (1982) 1 SCC 159, this
Court called in the principle of equity and held that the court has
the jurisdiction to examine alteration or modification which may
necessitate extension of time. In para (15), this Court held as
under:-
“….It is a well accepted principle statutorily recognised in Section
148 of the Code of Civil Procedure that where a period is fixed or
granted by the court for doing any act prescribed or allowed by the
Code, the court may in its discretion from time to time enlarge such
period even though the period originally fixed or granted may expire.
If a court in exercise of the jurisdiction can grant time to do a thing,
in the absence of a specific provision to the contrary curtailing,
denying or withholding such jurisdiction, the jurisdiction to grant
time would inhere in its ambit the jurisdiction to extend time
initially fixed by it. Passing a composite order would be acting in
disregard of the jurisdiction in that while granting time
simultaneously the court denies to itself the jurisdiction to extend
time. The principle of equity is that when some circumstances are to
be taken into account for fixing a length of time within which a
certain action is to be taken, the court retains to itself the
jurisdiction to re-examine the alteration or modification of
circumstances which may necessitate extension of time. If the court
by its own act denies itself the jurisdiction to do so, it would be
denying to itself the jurisdiction which in the absence of a negative
provision, it undoubtedly enjoys….”
14. Reference may also be made to the decisions of this
Court in Jogdhayan v. Babu Ram and Ors., (1983) 1 SCC 26, Johri
Singh v. Sukh Pal Singh and Ors., (1989) 4 SCC 403, Ganesh
Prasad Sah Kesari and Anr. v. Lakshmi Narayan Gupta, (1985) 3
SCC 53 and D.V. Paul v. Manisha Lalwani, (2010) 8 SCC 546.

15. In terms of Section 148 C.P.C. court has the discretion
to extend the time. The words “not exceeding thirty days in total”
have been inserted by the C.P.C. (Amendment) Act, 1999.
Observing that if the act could not be performed within thirty days
for the reasons beyond the control of the parties, the time beyond
maximum thirty days can be extended under Section 151 C.P.C.,
in Salem Advocates Bar Association, T.N. vs. Union of India
(2005) 6 SCC 344, this Court in para (41) held as under:
“41. The amendment made in Section 148 affects the power of the
court to enlarge time that may have been fixed or granted by the
court for the doing of any act prescribed or allowed by the Code. The
amendment provides that the period shall not exceed 30 days in
total. Before amendment, there was no such restriction of time.
Whether the court has no inherent power to extend the time beyond
30 days is the question. We have no doubt that the upper limit fixed
in Section 148 cannot take away the inherent power of the court to
pass orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent
abuse of process of the court. The rigid operation of the section
would lead to absurdity. Section 151 has, therefore, to be allowed to
operate fully. Extension beyond maximum of 30 days, thus, can be
permitted if the act could not be performed within 30 days for
reasons beyond the control of the party. We are not dealing with a
case where time for doing an act has been prescribed under the
provisions of the Limitation Act which cannot be extended either
under Section 148 or Section 151. We are dealing with a case where
the time is fixed or granted by the court for performance of an act
prescribed or allowed by the court.”
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1856 OF 2016
(Arising out of SLP (C) No.12330 of 2011)
NASHIK MUNICIPAL CORPORATION .
Versus
M/S. R.M. BHANDARI & ANR.

R. BANUMATHI, J.
Dated:February 26, 2016
Citation:(2016) 6 SCC 245

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When court can grant extend time beyond thirty days as provided under S 148 of CPC?

 Upon consideration of the rival contentions, the point
falling for consideration is whether or not the court has the
discretion to enlarge the time for doing any act prescribed by the
Code or allowed by the Code.
11. Section 148 C.P.C. provides for enlargement of the time
by the court. Section 148 C.P.C. reads as under:
S.148. Enlargement of time.- Where any period is fixed or
granted by the Court for the doing of any act prescribed or allowed
by this Code, the Court may, in its discretion, from time to time,
enlarge such period not exceeding thirty days in total, even though
the period originally fixed or granted may have expired.

A plain reading of the above would show that when any period or
time is granted by the court for doing any act, the court has the
discretion from time to time to enlarge such period even if the time
originally fixed or granted by the court has expired. Previously
discretion was given to the court to enlarge the period fixed or
granted by the court for any act prescribed or allowed by the Code.
The C.P.C. (Amendment) Act, 1999 puts a limit of thirty days on the
enlargement of such period. The words “not exceeding thirty days
in total” have been inserted with a view to curtail procedural delay
caused by any party to the suit or proceeding. Enlargement of
time, whether one-time or phased, cannot exceed thirty days.
12. Considering the reason for the delay in depositing the
cost, as noticed earlier, the High Court allowed the Writ Petition
No.1077 of 2010 vide order dated 03.05.2010 and restored the
Special Darkhast No.49 of 2002 subject to the payment of cost of
Rs. 25,000/- to the respondents within a period of eight weeks
from the date of the order. The appellant stated that the copy of
the order dated 03.05.2010 was received in the office of its Legal
Department on 12.05.2010 and the Accounts Department gave its
approval for the payment of cost on 26.05.2010. The Legal
Department thereafter prepared voucher/bill for the amount of

Rs.25,000/- for being paid in the name of Civil Judge (Senior
Division), Nashik and the same was approved on 03.06.2010 and
after completing the procedural formalities, the Accounts
Department issued the cheque on 15.06.2010. It is further averred
that the applications were presented before the executing court to
accept the cheque on 30.06.2010 and the said applications were
dismissed interalia holding that the time limit granted by the High
Court was over on 28.06.2010 and the executing court had no
power to extend the time granted by the High Court. The executing
court was correct in saying that it could not extend time for
depositing the cost as the same had been stipulated by the High
Court. The High Court has declined to extend the time mainly on
the ground that the SLP(C) No.21975 of 2010 filed by the
respondents was dismissed as withdrawn and that the respondents
have lost their right to challenge the order passed by the Court in
Writ Petition No.1077 of 2010. The High Court while declining to
enlarge the time to deposit the cost neither took into consideration
the sequence of dates and events stated by the appellantcorporation
nor the explanation offered by the appellantcorporation
for the delay in depositing the amount. This, in our
view, is not correct.

13. In Chinnamarkathian alias Muthu Gounder and Anr. v.
Ayyavoo alias Periana Gounder and Ors., (1982) 1 SCC 159, this
Court called in the principle of equity and held that the court has
the jurisdiction to examine alteration or modification which may
necessitate extension of time. In para (15), this Court held as
under:-
“….It is a well accepted principle statutorily recognised in Section
148 of the Code of Civil Procedure that where a period is fixed or
granted by the court for doing any act prescribed or allowed by the
Code, the court may in its discretion from time to time enlarge such
period even though the period originally fixed or granted may expire.
If a court in exercise of the jurisdiction can grant time to do a thing,
in the absence of a specific provision to the contrary curtailing,
denying or withholding such jurisdiction, the jurisdiction to grant
time would inhere in its ambit the jurisdiction to extend time
initially fixed by it. Passing a composite order would be acting in
disregard of the jurisdiction in that while granting time
simultaneously the court denies to itself the jurisdiction to extend
time. The principle of equity is that when some circumstances are to
be taken into account for fixing a length of time within which a
certain action is to be taken, the court retains to itself the
jurisdiction to re-examine the alteration or modification of
circumstances which may necessitate extension of time. If the court
by its own act denies itself the jurisdiction to do so, it would be
denying to itself the jurisdiction which in the absence of a negative
provision, it undoubtedly enjoys….”
14. Reference may also be made to the decisions of this
Court in Jogdhayan v. Babu Ram and Ors., (1983) 1 SCC 26, Johri
Singh v. Sukh Pal Singh and Ors., (1989) 4 SCC 403, Ganesh
Prasad Sah Kesari and Anr. v. Lakshmi Narayan Gupta, (1985) 3
SCC 53 and D.V. Paul v. Manisha Lalwani, (2010) 8 SCC 546.

15. In terms of Section 148 C.P.C. court has the discretion
to extend the time. The words “not exceeding thirty days in total”
have been inserted by the C.P.C. (Amendment) Act, 1999.
Observing that if the act could not be performed within thirty days
for the reasons beyond the control of the parties, the time beyond
maximum thirty days can be extended under Section 151 C.P.C.,
in Salem Advocates Bar Association, T.N. vs. Union of India
(2005) 6 SCC 344, this Court in para (41) held as under:
“41. The amendment made in Section 148 affects the power of the
court to enlarge time that may have been fixed or granted by the
court for the doing of any act prescribed or allowed by the Code. The
amendment provides that the period shall not exceed 30 days in
total. Before amendment, there was no such restriction of time.
Whether the court has no inherent power to extend the time beyond
30 days is the question. We have no doubt that the upper limit fixed
in Section 148 cannot take away the inherent power of the court to
pass orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent
abuse of process of the court. The rigid operation of the section
would lead to absurdity. Section 151 has, therefore, to be allowed to
operate fully. Extension beyond maximum of 30 days, thus, can be
permitted if the act could not be performed within 30 days for
reasons beyond the control of the party. We are not dealing with a
case where time for doing an act has been prescribed under the
provisions of the Limitation Act which cannot be extended either
under Section 148 or Section 151. We are dealing with a case where
the time is fixed or granted by the court for performance of an act
prescribed or allowed by the court.”
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1856 OF 2016
(Arising out of SLP (C) No.12330 of 2011)
NASHIK MUNICIPAL CORPORATION ....Appellant
Versus
M/S. R.M. BHANDARI & ANR. ....Respondents

R. BANUMATHI, J.
Citation:(2016) 6 SCC245
Dated:February 26, 2016

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Whether court can extend time for deposit of costs beyond thirty days as per S 148 of CPC?

 In terms of Section 148 C.P.C. court has the discretion
to extend the time. The words “not exceeding thirty days in total”
have been inserted by the C.P.C. (Amendment) Act, 1999.
Observing that if the act could not be performed within thirty days
for the reasons beyond the control of the parties, the time beyond
maximum thirty days can be extended under Section 151 C.P.C.,
in Salem Advocates Bar Association, T.N. vs. Union of India
(2005) 6 SCC 344, this Court in para (41) held as under:
“41. The amendment made in Section 148 affects the power of the
court to enlarge time that may have been fixed or granted by the
court for the doing of any act prescribed or allowed by the Code. The
amendment provides that the period shall not exceed 30 days in
total. Before amendment, there was no such restriction of time.
Whether the court has no inherent power to extend the time beyond
30 days is the question. We have no doubt that the upper limit fixed
in Section 148 cannot take away the inherent power of the court to
pass orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent
abuse of process of the court. The rigid operation of the section
would lead to absurdity. Section 151 has, therefore, to be allowed to
operate fully. Extension beyond maximum of 30 days, thus, can be
permitted if the act could not be performed within 30 days for
reasons beyond the control of the party. We are not dealing with a
case where time for doing an act has been prescribed under the
provisions of the Limitation Act which cannot be extended either
under Section 148 or Section 151. We are dealing with a case where
the time is fixed or granted by the court for performance of an act
prescribed or allowed by the court.”
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1856 OF 2016

NASHIK MUNICIPAL CORPORATION  Vs  M/S. R.M. BHANDARI & ANR.

Citation;AIR 2016 SC 1090,(2016) 6 SCC245,2016(6) MHLJ 813

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