But, if the report of the bailiff was to be treated as a
public document, there was nothing for the respondent no.4 to
do, but to produce a certified copy of the same and then claim
that he had proved his stand. This would be contrary to the
requirement of Section 101 of the aforesaid Act, which reads as
follows:-
101. Burden of proof.—Whoever desires any
Court to give judgment as to any legal right or
liability dependent on the existence of facts
which he asserts, must prove that those facts
exist.
When a person is bound to prove the existence of
any fact, it is said that the burden of proof lies on
that person.
18. Thus, it becomes clear that the burden to prove
clearly was on the respondent no.4 in the facts of the present
case. Only the contents of the summons issued by the Court,
consisting of name of the Court, name of the parties, seal of
the Court and the returnable date stated in the summons could
be said to be a public document. The report written by the
bailiff on the reverse of the said document could certainly not
be said to be a public document under Section 74 of the said
Act. Yet, the trial Court passed the order dated 26.08.2015
allowing the production of the documents, including the bailiff
report, by the respondent no.4 and passed the impugned order
dated 26.08.2015 below Exh.40 holding the said documents to
be directly admissible in evidence as public documents and
marking them as exhibits. The trial Court also erred in passing
the impugned order dated 21.07.2016 below Exh.44 rejecting
the application of the petitioner for de-exhibiting the said
documents including the bailiff report. It is also surprising that
the trial Court did not even call for the say/response of the
petitioner while passing the order, whereby production of the
documents was allowed and while passing impugned order
dated 26.08.2015, whereby the documents including the said
bailiff report, were treated as public documents and accepted.
This was clearly erroneous, thereby rendering the impugned
orders unsustainable and liable to be quashed and set aside.
19. In the light of the above, the present writ petition is
allowed and the impugned orders are quashed and set aside.
The application Exh.44 is allowed. It is held that the bailiff
report sought to be placed on record and exhibited as public
document cannot be treated as a public document and that it
will have to be proved by respondent no.4 in accordance with
law.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
NAGPUR BENCH : NAGPUR
Writ Petition No. 79 of 2017
Sushilkumar Mandanlal Ganediwal, Vs Vijaykumar Mandanlal Ganediwal,
CORAM : MANISH PITALE, J.
DATED: JANUARY 31,2019
Citation: 2019(3) MHLJ 721,AIR 2019 BOM 201
Print Page
public document, there was nothing for the respondent no.4 to
do, but to produce a certified copy of the same and then claim
that he had proved his stand. This would be contrary to the
requirement of Section 101 of the aforesaid Act, which reads as
follows:-
101. Burden of proof.—Whoever desires any
Court to give judgment as to any legal right or
liability dependent on the existence of facts
which he asserts, must prove that those facts
exist.
When a person is bound to prove the existence of
any fact, it is said that the burden of proof lies on
that person.
18. Thus, it becomes clear that the burden to prove
clearly was on the respondent no.4 in the facts of the present
case. Only the contents of the summons issued by the Court,
consisting of name of the Court, name of the parties, seal of
the Court and the returnable date stated in the summons could
be said to be a public document. The report written by the
bailiff on the reverse of the said document could certainly not
be said to be a public document under Section 74 of the said
Act. Yet, the trial Court passed the order dated 26.08.2015
allowing the production of the documents, including the bailiff
report, by the respondent no.4 and passed the impugned order
dated 26.08.2015 below Exh.40 holding the said documents to
be directly admissible in evidence as public documents and
marking them as exhibits. The trial Court also erred in passing
the impugned order dated 21.07.2016 below Exh.44 rejecting
the application of the petitioner for de-exhibiting the said
documents including the bailiff report. It is also surprising that
the trial Court did not even call for the say/response of the
petitioner while passing the order, whereby production of the
documents was allowed and while passing impugned order
dated 26.08.2015, whereby the documents including the said
bailiff report, were treated as public documents and accepted.
This was clearly erroneous, thereby rendering the impugned
orders unsustainable and liable to be quashed and set aside.
19. In the light of the above, the present writ petition is
allowed and the impugned orders are quashed and set aside.
The application Exh.44 is allowed. It is held that the bailiff
report sought to be placed on record and exhibited as public
document cannot be treated as a public document and that it
will have to be proved by respondent no.4 in accordance with
law.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
NAGPUR BENCH : NAGPUR
Writ Petition No. 79 of 2017
Sushilkumar Mandanlal Ganediwal, Vs Vijaykumar Mandanlal Ganediwal,
CORAM : MANISH PITALE, J.
DATED: JANUARY 31,2019
Citation: 2019(3) MHLJ 721,AIR 2019 BOM 201