But if the attack on the Judge functioning as a Judge substantially affects administration of justice it becomes a public mischief punishable for contempt, and it matters not whether such an attack is based on what a Judge is alleged to have done in the exercise of his administrative responsibilities. A judge's functions may be divisible, but his integrity and authority are not divisible in the context of administration of justice. An unwarranted attack on him for corrupt administration is as potent in doing public harm as an attack on his adjudicatory function.
55. The Full Bench has considered a very large number of cases and come to the conclusion that there is no foundation for the view that an attack on the court in its exercise of administrative functions does not amount to contempt. In Brahma Prakash Sharma and Ors. v. The State of Uttar Pradesh MANU/SC/0020/1953 : 1954CriLJ238 it is pointed out that the object of contempt proceedings is not to afford protection to Judges personally from imputations to which they may be exposed as individuals but is intended as protection to the public whose interest would be very much affected, if by the act or by the conduct of any party the authority of the court is lowered and the sense of confidence which the people have in the administration of justice by it is weakened. The case is no authority to the proposition put forward by Mr. Sen. In Gobind Ram v. State of Maharashtra [1971] I S.C.C. 740 some observations of Jagannadhadas, C.J. (as he then was) in the State v. The Editors and Publishers of Eastern Times and Prajatantra MANU/OR/0078/1952 : AIR1952Ori318 were quoted by this Court with approval. These observations are : "A review of the cases in which a contempt committed by way of scandalization of the court has been taken notice of for punishment shows clearly that the exercise of the punitive jurisdiction is confined to cases of very grave and scurrilous attack on the court or on the Judges in their judicial capacity the ignoring of which could only result encouraging a repetition of the same with the sense of impunity which would thereby result in lowering the prestige and authority of the court." Mr. Sen has particularly emphasised the words "judicial capacity" and argued that this only refers to the Judge functioning in the seat of justice. It does not appear from the report of the Orissa case that the High Court was in any way, concerned with the alleged dichotomy between the Judge's administration functions and his adjudicatory functions. "Judicial capacity" is an ambivalent term which means "capacity of or proper to a Judge" and is capable of taking in all functional capacities of a Judge whether administrative, adjudicatory or any other, necessary for the administration of justice. There is no sufficient warrant to hold that the Orissa High Court used the words "judicial capacity" with a view to exclude all other capacities of the Judges except the capacity to adjudicate, nor for holding that this Court approved the use of the expression as limited to the Judges' adjudicatory function.
56. On the other hand, there is high authority for the proposition that nullificatory criticism of a Judge functioning as a Judge even in purely administrative or non-adjudicatory matters amounts to criminal contempt.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Criminal Appeal Nos. 41 and 77 of 1973
Decided On: 19.11.1973
Shri Baradakanta Mishra
Vs.
The Registrar of Orissa High Court and Anr.
Vs.
The Registrar of Orissa High Court and Anr.
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
A.N. Ray, C.J., D.G. Palekar, P.N. Bhagwati, V.R. Krishna Iyer and Y.V. Chandrachud, JJ.
A.N. Ray, C.J., D.G. Palekar, P.N. Bhagwati, V.R. Krishna Iyer and Y.V. Chandrachud, JJ.
